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FOREWORD TO SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS
IN NORTH CAROLINA LAW, 1983
HARRY C. MARTINt
Several years ago the North Carolina Law Review began publishing an
annual "Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law." The work typi-
cally included discussions of significant decisions of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, decisions of the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, deci-
sions of the federal courts construing North Carolina law, and changes in the
statutory law. The present Survey reviews the developments for the 1983 cal-
endar year.
When requested to prepare a Foreword for this work, I recalled that for
many years the Harvard Law Review had published a similar review of the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. I thought perhaps I
could find some instruction from the Foreword in that law review. Upon dis-
covering that the foreword ran on for sixty-four pages, I abandoned that re-
search source. (I hasten to add that I am a proud graduate of the Harvard
Law School, 1948.) Believing that most, if not all, opinions (including mine)
are too long, I determined to apply that rule to this present endeavor.
The Survey issues of the North Carolina Law Review have been of great
benefit to the bench and bar alike, and I assume that they are of even greater
assistance to current law students. As a tool to refresh the reader about
changes in the law and as a research source when looking for that recent case
in point, the Survey is invaluable. Since the Review commenced this work,
the North Carolina Bar Association has presented a summary of recent impor-
tant appellate decisions at its annual meetings. The Review's Survey was at
least one, if not the sole, impetus for the Bar program.
The current Survey embodies some changes from the format of previous
issues. The Survey no longer attempts to chronicle all the developments for
the year. Others offer that service in a format that better ensures timely dis-
semination. Instead, the Survey attempts a selected, in-depth discussion of the
most significant developments in North Carolina law. This approach should
provide a more detailed analysis of those developments that warrant such
treatment and will supplement the descriptive material and commentary that
is available soon after the decisions are handed down. The Review made the
changes to better serve its readers and welcomes any comments on whether the
new format accomplishes this goal.
Along these lines, I would like to suggest an addition to the Survey. A
statistical analysis of the work of the appellate courts could prove most useful
t Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. A.B. 1942, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill; LL.B. 1948, Harvard; LL.M. 1982, University of Virginia School
of Law.
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to the bar and public in understanding the work of the courts. Perhaps some
statistical review, similar to that provided in the Harvard Law Review, could
be appended to the annual survey.
The continued development of the law is essential in a changing, dynamic
society. Whether the law evolves as a result of social change, or vice versa, is
debatable. Traditionally, the courts react to established fact situations; they
are not self-starters. The legislature, on the other hand, often presents society
with new legal standards and concepts. These in turn create new fact situa-
tions to which the courts eventually will be required to interpret and apply the
law. The work of the courts does not involve pure legal problems, but, as
Judge J. Braxton Craven, Jr. often said, it involves "people problems," some
of which can be solved by legal methods. As the law is made for man, and not
man for the law, it should speak with great clarity.
It is often said that the law is not a stagnant pool but a moving stream,
sometimes slow and steady, sometimes rapid and turbulent, ofttimes clean and
pure, ofttimes muddy and obscure. We are grateful for the annual chart of
these new waters provided us by the North Carolina Law Review.
The Involuntary Dismissal Sanction for Rule 8(a)(2) Violations
in Malpractice Complaints-A Reversion to Code
Pleadings?
In Harris v. MareadyI the North Carolina Court of Appeals effectively
established a mandatory rule that dismissal with prejudice under rule 41(b) 2 is
the proper sanction for violation of rule 8(a)(2)'s 3 restriction on ad damnum
clauses in professional malpractice actions. The Harris court reached this re-
sult by extending the court of appeals' holding in Jones v. Boyce.4 In Jones the
court had upheld the dismissal of a legal malpractice suit even though plaintiff
was a prison inmate appearingpro se who had filed a timely motion to amend
his complaint5 under rule 15(a).6 Harris solidified this reversion to code-like
pleading and created, in effect, a per se rule regarding sanctions for such
8(a)(2) errors. The court of appeals held that the trial court's refusal to dismiss
plaintiff's legal malpractice action with prejudice was an abuse of discretion.7
The court therefore reversed the trial court's ruling and dismissed the suit with
1. 64 N.C. App. 1, 306 S.E.2d 799 (1983) (notice of appeal filed Oct. 21, 1983; case argued to
the North Carolina Supreme Court Feb. 13, 1984). After this note was sent to press, the North
Carolina Supreme Court, on August 28, 1984, reversed the court of appeals' holding in Harris v.
Maready. The court held that a case in which the complaint violates rule 8(a)(2) should be dis-
missed only "when less drastic sanctions will not suffice." The supreme court identified "lesser
sanctions" as including fines, reprimands, and the striking of the offending portions of the
complaint.
2. N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(b) states:
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof-For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of
an action or of any claim therein against him. . . . Unless the court in its order for
dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this section ... operates as an adjudica-
tion upon the merits.
3. N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) states:
(a) Claimsfor relief-a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief. shall contain
(2) A demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled ....
Provided, however, in all professional malpractice actions. . . , wherein the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), the pleading
shall not state the demand for monetary relief, but shall state that the relief demanded is
for damages incurred or to be incurred in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) ....
4. 60 N.C. App. 585, 299 S.E.2d 298 (1983).
5. See id. at 586, 299 S.E.2d at 300; see Record at 10, Jones. Jones filed his motion to
amend Oct. 1, 1981, 21 days after Boyce filed his 41(b) motion to dismiss. See Record at 6-7,
Jones.
6. N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a) states:
(a) Amendments-A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of course at
any time before a responsive pleading is served .... Otherwise a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires.
7. Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808. The Harris court upheld the lower court's
dismissal for plaintiff's failure to comply with proper service of process. The complaint served
"was not addressed to the partnership but was issued to 'Petree, Stockton, Robinson, Vaughn,
Glaze & Maready, P.A.'" Id. at 8, 306 S.E.2d at 803. The court of appeals held that process
therefore was served on a nonexistent corporation, id., and defendant would be prejudiced if the
court allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint to drop the "P.A." from her complaint so as to
bring in properly the partnership as a defendant after the statute of limitations had run. Id. at 12,
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prejudice." Thus, Jones and Harris create a Draconian pleading trap for the
unwary, unversed and inept.
Plaintiff in Jones was tried and convicted of the first degree murder 9 of
his brother and subsequently filed a legal malpractice suit against his trial at-
torney.10 Appearing pro se, Jones included a prayer for damages totalling
$3,000,000 in his complaint." After defendant filed an answer denying the
allegations, plaintiff immediately sought leave of court under rule 15(a)' 2 to
amend his ad damnum clause. The trial judge denied the motion to amend
and granted defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice.' 3 The court of ap-
peals affirmed. 14
Harris involved a legal malpractice claim that arose out of an alleged
conflict of interest.' 5 The complaint demanded compensatory damages of ten
306 S.E.2d at 806. Judge Arnold dissented as to this finding. Id. at 17, 306 S.E.2d at 808 (Arnold,
J., dissenting).
Defendant Maready also was served incorrectly with process; he received a summons in-
tended for plaintiff's former husband. "Delayed service of complaint on Maready was by certi-
fied mail, delivery to addressee only, signed for by 'Bonnie Lawson, authorized agent.' "Id. at 12-
13, 306 S.E.2d at 806. No summons directed to defendant Maready ever was served upon him.
Id. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling that, as against Maready, the suit should
be dismissed for invalid service of process. Id. at 14, 306 S.E.2d at 807.
8. Id. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808. Judge Webb dissented as to the holding of abuse of discre-
tion. Id. (Webb, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The court of appeals reinforced its
holding in Harris in a third 1983 decision, Schell v. Coleman, 65 N.C. App. 91, 308 S.E.2d 662
(1983). Schell involved an action for legal malpractice in which plaintiff's attorney sought nearly
$2,000,000 in damages. This specific prayer for reliefviolated rule 8(a)(2). Id. at 91, 308 S.E.2d at
663. The court of appeals reversed, specifically relying on Jones and Harris, holding that it was an
abuse of discretion to order plaintiff to correct his complaint rather than to dismiss the action with
prejudice. Id. at 94, 308 S.E.2d at 664. The court stressed that although the trial court's dismissal
was discretionary, the Schell case illustrated the type of case that "justifies the extreme sanction of
a Rule 41(b) dismissal." Id. See infra note 44. Judge Hill authored the decision and was joined
by Judges Becton and Johnson.
9. Record at 2, 4, Jones.
10. Id. at 3. Jones alleged that he was placed in a prison mental health ward and kept on
medication from the date of his incarceration in June 1976 until his discharge from the ward in
October 1978. Id. at 2-3. Jones further alleged that defendant knew of this mental treatment and
medication but nevertheless advised him to withdraw his appeal of the murder conviction in Sep-
tember 1976 and to sign a consent judgment settling a wrongful death suit instituted by the dece-
dent's survivors. Jones alleged that defendant's advice to settle the wrongful death action was
"not in plaintiff's best interest but rather. . . for his own personal gain." Id. Jones allegedly was
under medication and psychiatric care at the time of the settlement. Id. at 3.
Defendant denied knowledge of Jones' alleged medication and impaired abilities. He main-
tained that Jones voluntarily dropped his appeal "against advice of counsel." Furthermore, de-
fendant alleged that Jones asked him to seek a settlement of the wrongful death action. Jones
allegedly wanted defendant to pay off Jones' creditors and his legal fees, and establish a trust fund
for plaintiff's son with the balance of his estate. Id. at 4.
11. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 586, 299 S.E.2d at 300.
12. The rule 41(b) motion to dismiss was filed Sept. 10, 1981. Record at 6-7, and Jones'
motion to amend his complaint was filed Oct. 1, 1981. Id. at 10.
13. Id. at 13-14.
14. The court of appeals' decision was written by Judge Whichard. Judges Arnold and Hill
joined him.
15. Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 2-3, 306 S.E.2d at 801. The law firm of Petree, Stockton, Robin-
son, Vaughn, Glaze & Maready, primarily through partner W.F. Maready, represented plaintiff,
Shirley Harris, in domestic matters against her husband Roger Harris. Id. William H. Petree, a
partner in the firm, and Roger Harris were involved in independent business transactions and
Shirley Harris alleged that this created a conflict of interest. Id. at 3, 306 S.E.2d at 801. She sued
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million dollars and punitive damages of five million dollars. 16 Unlike the trial
court in Jones, however, the trial court in Harris denied defendant's motion to
dismiss' 7 and allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint.' 8 In an opinion writ-
ten by Judge Braswell, t9 the court of appeals reversed and held that "the trial
judge abused his discretion by failing to allow the defendants' motion to dis-
miss for a violation of rule 8(a)(2)."2 0
Harris' factual setting, although substantially similar to that in Jones, dif-
fered in one significant respect: the flawed complaint was filed by a licensed
attorney rather than an inmate appearing pro se. Furthermore, by holding
that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to dismiss, the Harris
court established that involuntary dismissal for violations of rule 8(a)(2) is
mandatory rather that discretionary.2 ' Because the court in Harris specifically
adopted the reasoning in Jones and held that it was dispositive of the issue of
sanctions for rule 8(a)(2) ad damnum violations, 22 an analysis of Jones is
the law firm and joined Maready and Petree as individual codefendants. Id. at 2, 306 S.E.2d at
807.
16. Id. at 15, 306 S.E.2d at 807.
17. Id. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808.
18. Id. at 15, 306 S.E.2d at 808. Interestingly, the attempt to amend the complaint also was
mishandled. Although the offending parts of the prayer for relief were corrected, the two adjacent
paragraphs labeled "Damages" were not altered. Thus, the amended complaint still contained a
request for $5,000,000 in both general and punitive damages in apparent contravention of rule
8(a)(2). Id. at 15, 306 S.E.2d at 807. The court of appeals decided not to address this alleged
pleading error or assign it any weight. Instead, the court simply held that the trial judge abused
his discretion by refusing to grant defendants' motions to dismiss. See id. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808.
Harris' attorney contended that the 8(a)(2) limitation did not apply to these paragraphs. First, the
action was not "purely and simply a 'professional malpractice action.'" Appellant's North Caro-
lina Supreme Court Brief at 26. Second, plaintiff alleged that the 8(a)(2) limitation related exclu-
sively to the ad damnum clause in the complaint and the offending paragraphs were not in that
clause, which had been corrected. Id. at 26-27.
19. Judge Webb dissented concerning the holding of abuse of discretion, see supra note 7.
Judge Arnold concurred on that issue and dissented regarding the court's dismissal for failure of
service of process. Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 17, 306 S.E.2d at 808-09.
20. Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808.
21. See, e.g., id. While the court limited its decision with the phrase "on the facts before us,"
the underlying message in Harris is clear: violations of the professional malpractice section of
rule 8(a)(2) will be treated harshly. It is significant to note that there is no indication in Harris or
Jones that the mistakes were made in bad faith. If the court of appeals imposes a dismissal of a
suit in its entirety "on the facts" in Harris and Jones, it is difficult to postulate a fact pattern to
which the sanction would not apply. Thus, the practical effect of Harris and Jones is a rule man-
dating involuntary dismissal. See infra note 45-46 and accompanying text.
22. Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 15, 306 S.E.2d at 808. The court noted that Jones was the first
appellate case interpreting the rule 8(a)(2) damage restrictions and sanctions for violation thereof,
although the court of appeals had foregone one other opportunity to rule on sanctions for viola-
tions of rule 8(a)(2) in Thigpen v. Piver, 37 N.C. App. 382, 246 S.E.2d 67, disc. rev. denied, 295
N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 257 (1978). In Thigpen the court dismissed the case under rule 41(d), which
provides for dismissal with prejudice when a plaintifftakes a voluntary dismissal in a prior action
and then institutes a new action on the same claim against the same defendant without paying the
costs of the original action. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(d). Thus, the Thigpen court did not reach the
8(a)(2) issue. Thigpen, 37 N.C. App. at 388, 246 S.E.2d at 70.
Thigpen involved a medical malpractice suit in which plaintiff sought $500,000 in damages.
The trial judge applied a subjective good faith test to deny defendant's motion for an involuntary
dismissal. The court concluded that "there was no intention on the part of either the plaintiff or
his attorney to violate the provisions of Rule 8." Record at 30, "higpen. Judge Small also de-
clared as a matter of law that "[r]ule 8 does not provide for a mandatory dismissal by reason of the
failure to comply with its provisions." Id.
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imperative.
In Jones the court noted that, according to the Report of the North Caro-
lina Professional Liability Insurance Commission,23 the 1976 amendment to
rule 8(a)(2), limiting damage clauses in malpractice actions, was the General
Assembly's "response to a perceived crisis in the area of professional liability
insurance." 24 The court also observed that the legislative purpose of the dam-
age clause restriction, as defined by the Insurance Report, was to "avoid ad-
verse press attention prior to trial, and thus save reputations from the harm
which can result from persons reading about huge malpractice suits and draw-
ing their own conclusions based on the money demanded. '25 Interestingly,
this report referred only to medical malpractice suits; the reputations of attor-
neys and other professionals were not mentioned. 26 The Jones court reasoned
that, although rule 8(a)(2) provides no sanctions for its violation, "the General
23. REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMMISSION
(March 12, 1976) (available in University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Law Library) [herein-
after cited as INSURANCE REPORT]. The professional malpractice amendment to rule 8(a)(2) was
enacted two months after this report, during the 1975 General Assembly's second session. Act of
May 12, 1976, ch. 977, 1976 N.C. Sess. Laws 3. The General Assembly chose to limit the damage
clause to a jurisdictional amount ($10,000) rather than proscribe all mention of damage amount.
See N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
24. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300 (dictum). Senator Tom Suddarth filed a
minority report that challenged the existence of a medical malpractice crisis in North Carolina
and alleged that the actual insurance problem existed in other states as a result of high malpractice
awards in those states. INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 23, pt. II, at 4-5 (Minority Report), Be-
cause there is no recorded legislative history, discerning the legislators' intentions is problematic.
25. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300 (quoting INSURANCE REPORT, sWra note
23, at 33), quoted in Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808; Schell v. Coleman, 65 N.C.
App. 91, 93, 308 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1983).
Newspaper articles detailing Jones' suit, including the amount of damages sought, appeared
in both of Raleigh's major newspapers two days after Jones fied his suit. See Raleigh News and
Observer, Aug. 15, 1981, at 23, col. 1; Raleigh Times, Aug. 15, 1981, at 5-B, col. 6. Much lengthier
articles detailing the legal malpractice claim in Harris, including the damages sought, appeared in
the Winston-Salem papers after Mrs. Harris filed her suit. See Winston-Salem Journal, Feb. 4,
1982, at 12, col. 1; Winston-Salem Sentinel, Feb. 3, 1982, at 23, ol. 5. Copies of the Winston-
Salem articles are included in the Harris record. Record at 29-30, Harris.
26. See, e.g., INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6 ("[T]he malpractice dilemma. . . be-
gan to surface in North Carolina in 1974. . . . St. Paul was the principal malpractice insurer in
North Carolina, underwriting policies for over 90% of the physicians and surgeons practicing in
the state as well as 75 hospitals."); id. at 13 ("the crisis created by the lack of availability of
medical malpractice insurance has abated"); id. at 25 ("[P]ortions of the following analysis have
been reprinted from 'A Legislator's Guide to the Medical Malpractice Issue.' ").
No mention is made in the report of anything other than the needs ofpnedical malpractice
insurers. Furthermore, the statutes mentioned in the report, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.009(1) (West
1980) and TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-117 (1980), are limited to medical malpractice claims. The
Wisconsin medical malpractice statute is cited in the Jones opinion. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587,
299 S.E.2d at 300. Therefore, if the General Assembly enacted the rule 8(a)(2) addamnum restric-
tion on the basis of either the INSURANCE REPORT or the Wisconsin Statute, or both, then it is
arguable that the rule was intended to apply only to medical malpractice, but was artfully drafted
to include all professional malpractice.
In her brief to the North Carolina Supreme Court, plaintiff in Harris also has raised the
argument that singling out of professionals as a group is unconstitutional. Appellant's North Car-
olina Supreme Court Brief at 30-31, Harris. Indiana, however, has a statute similar to the North
Carolina statute. It excludes mention of any dollar amounts in medical malpractice claims, IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-6 (Burns 1983), and the Indiana Supreme Court has held that this statute
neither violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States or Indiana con-
stitutions, nor the free speech and writing provisions of the Indiana Constitution. Johnson v. St.
Vincent, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 604-05 (Ind. 1980).
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Assembly... must have intended application of the 41(b) power of dismis-
sal" because "absent application of the Rule 41(b) [sanction] . . . , litigants
could ignore the proscription with impunity, thereby nullifying the express
legislative purpose for its enactment." 27
The United States Supreme Court expressly rejected similar reasoning in
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp. 28 In Surowitz the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit had affirmed a rule 41(b) involuntary dismissal
on the grounds that failure to impose sanctions for violations of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23 (now rule 23.1) would destroy the effect of the
rule.2 9 The Supreme Court rejected that rationale and articulated the policy
consideration underlying modem pleading rules.30
The basic purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice
through fair trials, not through summary dismissals as necessary as
they may be on occasion. These rules were designed in large part to
get away from some of the oldprocedural booby traps which common-
law pleaders could set to prevent unsophisticated litigants from ever
having their day in court. If rules of procedure work as they should in
an honest and fair judicial system, they not only permit, but should
as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried
to an adjudication on the merits. Rule 23(b), like the other civil
27. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300. Despite this assertion, a New York court
rejected involuntary dismissal as too drastic in an analogous situation. In Pizzingrilli v. Van Kes-
sel, 100 Misc. 2d 1062, 420 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1979), plaintiffs included demands for $1,500,000 and
$1,000,000 in a medical malpractice suit. Id. at 1066-67, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 543-44. Defendants
moved to dismiss the counts in question pursuant to a New York statute that prohibits any state-
ment of money damages in medical malpractice cases. Id. at 1066, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 542. See N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3017(c) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84). The court rejected defendants' motion:
Defendant hospital contends that the third and fourth causes of action (in connec-
tion with which specific sums are demanded as damages) should be dismissed because
they violate the mandates of Section 3017(c). So drastic a remedy as this appears unau-
thorized by CPLR 3017(c). Motions for relief pursuant to CPLR 3017(c) . . . are
designed to correct pleadings, rather than to dismiss them.
Pizzingrilli, 100 Misc. 2d at 1065, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 542. Rather than dismissing the action, the
court ordered that the offending portions of the ad damnum clause be stricken and that plaintiffs
serve an amended pleading. Id. at 1067, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
28. 383 U.S. 363 (1966). Surowitz involved a shareholder derivative suit brought under FED.
R. Civ. P. 23 (current version at FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1), which required that the complaint be
verified by oath. Mrs. Surowitz, a Polish immigrant with a limited educational background and
virtually no English language skills verified the complaint as it was explained to her by her son-in-
law, an attorney. Upon oral examination Mrs. Surowitz was unable to demonstrate any under-
standing of her complaint, and Judge Hoffman dismissed the suit with prejudice for her violation
of rule 23. The court of appeals affirmed. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 342 F.2d 596 (1965),
rev'd, 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
29. Surowitz, 383 U.S. at 372-73 n.5. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit had held that for rule 23 to have any effect, a minimum requirement that plaintiff have a
general understanding of the complaint was not unreasonable. The Supreme Court rejected the
court of appeals' rationale. Id.
30. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) ("It is... entirely contrary to the spirit of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such
mere technicalities"); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) ("The Federal Rules reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the
outcome and accept the principal purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits.").
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rules, was written to further, not defeat the ends of justice.3 1
Rules 8 and 15 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure recognize
the policy articulated in Surowitz.32 Rule 8 parallels FRCP 8 and requires
only "notice pleading," 33 rather than the complex machinations required
under code pleadings. Rule 15 parallels FRCP 15;34 it demands that leave to
amend after a responsive pleading is filed be "freely given where justice so
requires." 35 Nevertheless, North Carolina rule 41(b), which is identical to
FRCP 41(b),36 expressly authorizes a court to dismiss a suit with prejudice if
the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules. 37 The issues presented in Jones and
Harris were: How should these conflicting rules and policies be balanced, and
at what juncture should the courts impose dismissal, the harshest penalty
available for pleading errors?38
The Jones and Harris courts both glossed over these fundamental ques-
tions, and instead focused on the narrower issue of whether the trial court
abirsed its discretion in granting the rule 41(b) motion to dismiss. 39 The two
opinions contained only one sentence on this policy question that arises when-
ever the trial court dismisses an action on a pleading technicality.40 By em-
phasizing the discretionary nature of the court's power to allow or deny rule
41(b) motions to dismiss,41 the court of appeals avoided the question of the
31. Surowitz, 383 U.S. at 373 (emphasis added). Although the presumption favoring trial on
the merits is not absolute, it is strong and not easily overcome. Coupling North Carolina rule
8(a)(2) with an automatic sanction of involuntary dismissal should be characterized as a "booby
trap" under the Surowitz language.
32. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 8, 15.
33. N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). This rule requires only a "short and plain statement" that puts all
parties and the court on notice.
34. Gro-Mar Pub. Relations, Inc. v. Billy Jack Enters., 36 N.C. App. 673, 678, 245 S.E.2d
782, 785 (1978) ("[Elxcept for differences in time allotments ... Rule 15(a) of the North Caro-
lina Rules is identical to its federal counterpart.").
35. N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
36. See Joyner v. Thomas, 40 N.C. App. 63, 65, 251 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1976).
37. N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(b) ("[fIor failure of the plaintiff. . . to comply with these rules. ..a
defendant may move for dismissal.").
38. See 5 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FED. PRACTICE 41.12 (1982). The
fundamental issue-whether a plaintiff should lose his cause of action because of pleading er-
rors-is identical in Jones and Harris. The two cases, however, differ in one crucial aspect. Jones
involved a complaint filed by apro se layperson, see Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300,
while the improper complaint in Harris was filed by an attorney. See Record at 52, Harris.
39. See Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808; Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 586, 299 S.E.2d
at 299.
40. That sentence, which was located in Jones, was:
While leave of court 'shall be freely given when justice so requires,' G.S. IA-I, Rule
15(a), and while justice might often so require where a layman appearing pro se inad-
vertently fails to conform to technical legal requirements, judicial discretion may prop-
erly be exercised to subordinate these concerns to readily discernible countervailing
legislative intent.
Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300 (citations omitted). In a similar setting, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the use of such reasoning to give force to a federal rule regarding
pleading procedure. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
41. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 586, 299 S.E.2d at 300. See Mumford v. Hutton & Bourbonnais
Co., 47 N.C. App. 440, 445, 267 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1980). Defendant in M'umford alleged that
plaintiff had failed to properly state a claim for relief. The court allowed plaintiff the opportunity
to amend, which plaintiff declined, and the court then dismissed the case with prejudice.
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intent and purpose of the rule 15(a) admonition to grant leave to amend when
justice so requires. Because rule 41(b) provides the discretionary power to
grant such dismissals,42 the court held that no abuse of discretion occurred in
Jones.43 In Harris, however, the court of appeals failed to explain why the
trial court's refusal to dismiss was an abuse of discretion. 44
By choosing the harshest available sanction, the court of appeals ignored
two alternative analyses, either of which would have resulted in a better rule
of law. First, the court could have examined the cases in light of the clear
North Carolina policy favoring freely granted amendments to cure defective
pleadings. Second, even if the court felt a need to impose a sanction for viola-
tion of rule 8(a)(2), the court could have selected a less harsh penalty to ensure
that parties who "inadvertently fail to conform to technical legal require-
ments"4 5 do not lose potentially valid causes of action. Either of these alterna-
tives would reflect more properly the underlying premise of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure "that decisions be had on the merits and
not avoided on the basis of mere technicalities. '46
The first, alternative analysis indicates that the court of appeals decisions
in Harris and Jones run counter to the policy favoring liberal amendment of
pleadings. Although North Carolina courts have stressed repeatedly that rule
15(a) is to be construed liberally,47 the trial judge has discretion to permit or
deny the offered amendments. 48 The trial judge's discretion, however, is not
42. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 586, 299 S.E.2d at 300. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
43. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587-88, 299 S.E.2d at 300.
44. See Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 15-16, 306 S.E.2d at 807-08. If the power truly is discretion-
ary, the court of appeals should have articulated the nature of the abuse of discretion that justified
reversal. Subsequently, in Schell v. Coleman, 65 N.C. App. 91, 308 S.E.2d 662 (1983), the court
ineffectively attempted to articulate its standard for abuse of discretion:
The court's holdings in these cases [Jones and Harris] do not dictate that a court
must dismiss an action if there is a Rule 8(a)(2) violation. The Rule 41(b) power of
dismissal is only a permissible sanction, not a mandatory one. Allowance of a motion to
dismiss on the basis of a Rule 8 motion is discretionary with the court . . . . But as
illustrated by Harris, an abuse of discretion may be found if the court denies a motion to
dismiss when there was a flagrant violation of the rule.
Id. at 94, 308 S.E.2d at 664. The Schell trial court had rejected defendant's motion for dismissal,
but ordered plaintiff to amend his prayer for relief, which plaintiff failed to do. Id. at 92, 308
S.E.2d at 663.
Although the court of appeals asserted that a 41(b) dismissal with prejudice for 8(a)(2) viola-
tions is a discretionary sanction in both its opportunities to review 8(a)(2) decisions, the court
reversed the trial judge's discretionary ruling that the complaint be amended rather than dis-
missed. In addition, this standard of discretion apparently is related to whether the damage
amounts improperly sought were reported in the news media; the court stressed that the print and
radio media reported the specific damage claims in Schell. Id, at 94, 308 S.E.2d at 664-65. The
damage requests in both Jones and Harris were published in local newspapers. See supra note 25.
45. Jones, 60 N.C.App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300.
46. Mangum v. Surles, 281 N.C. 91, 99, 187 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1972) (offered amendment
sought to conform the pleadings to the evidence under rule 15(b)).
47. See Vernon v. Crist, 291 N.C. 646, 654, 231 S.E.2d 591, 596 (1977) (dictum); Mangum v.
Surles, 281 N.C. 91, 98-99, 187 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1972); Roberts v. William N. and Kate B. Reyn-
olds Memorial Park, 281 N.C. 48, 56, 187 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1972); Watson v. Watson, 49 N.C. App.
58, 60, 270 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1980).
48. See Saintsing v. Taylor, 57 N.C. App. 467, 471, 291 S.E.2d 880, 883, disc. rev. denied, 306
NC. 558, 294 S.E.2d 224 (1982); Gladstein v. South Square Assocs., 39 N.C. App. 171, 177, 249
S.E.2d 827, 830 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 736, 254 S.E.2d 178 (1979); Willow Mountain
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unlimited. The supreme court has held that the trial court should allow the
amendment "unless some material prejudice is demonstrated. '4 9 Although
the trial judge's discretion is reversible only on a showing of abuse,50 it has
been held that denying a motion to amend without both a justification and a
showing of prejudice to the defendant is an abuse of discretion.5'
The only prejudice cited by the Jones and Harris courts was the possible
harm to defendants' reputation if a large malpractice claim were reported in
the news.52 No prejudice inheres in merely amending a flawed complaint to
make it comply with 8(a)(2); the damage to defendants' reputation is not cured
by denying leave to amend and dismissing the suit. The only other possible
prejudice is indirect-higher malpractice rates.53 This prejudice also arises
from media publication of the suit and not the motion to amend. Since analy-
sis of the Jones and Harris motions to amend reveals no undue prejudice to
defendants, the court of appeals should have reversed the trial court in Jones
for failure to grant leave to amend and should have affirmed the trial court's
grant of leave to amend in Harris.
The second, alternative analysis indicates that the court of appeals erred
when it chose involuntary dismissal rather than a less harsh penalty. Rule
Corp. v. Parker, 37 N.C. App. 718, 719-20, 247 S.E.2d 11, 12 ("extensive discretion"), disc. rev.
denied, 295 N.C. 738, 248 S.E.2d 867 (1978); Forbes v. Pillmon, 18 N.C. App. 439, 440, 197 S.E.2d
226, 227 (1973) ("broad discretion"); Helson's Premiums & Gifts, Inc. v. Duncan, 9 N.C. App.
653, 657, 177 S.E.2d 428, 431 (1970) ("broad discretion").
49. Mangum v. Surles, 281 N.C. 91, 98-99, 187 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1972). See also Vernon v.
Crist, 291 N.C. 646, 654, 231 S.E.2d 591, 596 (1977) (dictum---"the burden is on the party ob-
jecting to the Amendments to show that he would be prejudiced thereby"); Gladstein v. South
Square Assocs., 39 N.C. App. 171, 177, 249 S.E.2d 827, 831 (1978) ("at the time of plaintiff's
motion to amend to correct technical defects in her complaint, defendant would have suffered no
discernible prejudice") disc rev. denied, 296 N.C. 736, 254 S.E.2d 178 (1979); vanDooren v.
vanDooren, 37 N.C. App. 333, 337, 246 S.E.2d 20, 23 ("the motion should be allowed unless its
allowance would impose a substantial injustice upon the opposing party"), disc. rev. denied, 295
N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 258 (1978).
50. See Rogers v. Rogers, 39 N.C. App. 635, 636, 251 S.E.2d 663, 664 (1979).
51. Ledford v. Ledford, 49 N.C. App. 226, 271 S.E.2d 393 (1980). Ledford, relying on the
Supreme Court's holding in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), held that "the trial judge
abuses his discretion when he refuses to allow an amendment unless a justifying reason is shown
.... The burden is on the objecting party to show that he would be prejudiced thereby." Led-
ford, 49 N.C. App. at 233, 271 S.E.2d at 398-99.
52. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 200 S.E.2d at 300; Harris, 64 N.C. App. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at
808 (quoting Jones). Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals in Jones mentioned any
undue delay, bad faith, or other improper behavior by plaintiff; the court of appeals acknowl-
edged Jones' "inadvertent" failure to satisfy the restrictions of rule 8(a)(2). Jones, 60 N.C. App. at
587, 299 S.E.2d at 300. Furthermore, no references to improper behavior are cited in Harris. The
attorney who filed the improper complaint admitted that he did not know that rule 8(a)(2) applied
to legal malpractice actions. Record at 52, Harris. Cf. supra note 26.
Rule 8(a)(2) implicitly assumes that a newspaper article which states that a professional has
been sued for $3,000,000 causes more damage to his reputation than an article which states that he
has been sued for damages "in excess of$10,000." At best, however, the relative magnitude ofthe
loss of reputation is speculative. Arguably, the damage done to reputation, in whatever amount,
results from the public report that the "professional" is being sued for malpractice and not the
magnitude of the damages demanded. The court of appeals, however, accepted the INSURANCE
REPORT's "harm to reputation" theory, supra note 25 and accompanying text, without debate.
Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300.
53. See Note, Medical Products and Services Liability.- Public Policy Requires Legislative In-
novation and Judicial Restraint, 53 DEN. L.J. 387, 403 (1976).
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41(b) authorizes dismissal with prejudice in three circumstances. Failure to
comply with the rules, which was the justification for dismissal in the Jones
and Harris cases, is only one of the permissible grounds for dismissal. The
other two grounds, failure to prosecute and failure to comply with orders of
the court,54 define more serious wrongdoing than the inadvertant pleading er-
rors in Harris and Jones. Generally, the courts have been reluctant to dismiss
cases falling in these two categories. The North Carolina and federal cases
addressing sanctions for these offenses reflect the courts' efforts to apply less
harsh penalties absent either evidence of intentional misconduct or such im-
proper behavior that the court may infer deliberate abuse.55
For example, in the leading North Carolina case involving dismissal for
failure to prosecute, the court of appeals reversed a dismissal, holding that
"[d]ismissal [under 41(b)] for failure to prosecute is proper only where the
plaintiff manifests an intention to thwart the progress of the action to its con-
clusion."'56 The court derived its intent standard from the seminal United
States Supreme Court case of Link v. Wabash R.R. 57 The Link Court signaled
its unwillingness to enforce a dismissal with prejudice absent clear proof of
deliberate dilatoriness.58 Courts generally have imposed sanctions for failure
to comply with a court order because such behavior implies a conscious or
intentional failure to act.59 Logically, violations of the rules of the court
54. N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(b). See supra note 2 for text of rule 41o(b).
55. North Carolina's rule 41(b) is identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b), see supra note 36 and
accompanying text, and federal cases, therefore, are apposite. See, e.g., Mangum. v. Surles, 281
N.C. 91, 97, 187 S.E.2d 697, 701 (1972) (federal decisions apposite because N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(b)
virtually identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b)); Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 98-99, 176 S.E.2d 161,
163 (1970) (federal decisions that rule 12(b) motion to dismiss is modem equivalent of common-
law demurrer apposite because N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b) is virtually a verbatim copy of federal rule
12(b)).
56. Green v. Eure, 18 N.C. App. 671, 672, 197 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1973). Plaintiff in Green
failed to take action for two years because he misunderstood the court calendaring procedure.
The court emphasized the need for evidence "that the plaintiff had been deliberately proceeding
in dilatory fashion." Id. (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)). See Jones v. Stone,
52 N.C. App. 502, 505, 279 S.E.2d 13, 15 (citing Green with favor; "the record does not suggest
that petitioner deliberately proceeded in dilatory fashion"), disc. rev. denied, 304 N.C. 195, 285
S.E.2d 99 (1981); see also Barbee v. Walton's Jewelers, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 760, 253 S.E.2d 596
(citing Green with favor; dismissal upheld when neither plaintiff nor attorney offered explanation
for failure to appear when case called for trial), disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 608, 257 S.E.2d 435
(1979); Thompson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 24 N.C. App. 577, 211 S.E.2d 526 (1975) (same
facts and holding as Barbee).
57. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
58. The dismissal in Link was granted only after a six-year delay, two continuances, and a
failure of counsel to appear at pretrial conference. Id. Although the Court adopted an agency
theory to justify penalizing the client for her attorney's errors, the Court stressed that the attor-
ney's actions were deliberate and that several opportunities to proceed were afforded plaintiff and
counsel. Id. at 633-34, 636. See also Chandler Leasing Corp. v. Lopez, 669 F.2d 919, 920 (4th Cir.
1982) (rule 41(b) dismissal by North Carolina federal district court for "sloppy" failure to retain
local counsel held too drastic a sanction.); see infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
59. See Hyler v. Reynolds Metal Co., 434 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970) (dismissal proper when
plaintiff did not comply with court order to file amended complaint), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 912
(1971); Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.) (failure to amend complaint within 20 days as
ordered), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964). For a discussion of 41(b) dismissals in the federal
courts, and the willingness of the courts to consider any reasonable excuse in order to avoid invol-
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should be analyzed in the same manner, i.e., a showing of deliberate abuse
should be required before severe sanctions are applied.
Violators of rule 8(a)(2) can be categorized as follows: (1) the layperson
who files apro se complaint without any knowledge of the pleading rule and
errs inadvertently;60 (2) the attorney who either is unaware of the rule or is
unaware that the vale applies to his case;61 and (3) the attorney who intention-
ally violates the rule to damage the defendant's reputation or incite sensational
media coverage to increase his reputation and fees, in contravention of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. 62 An evaluation of these categories of
violators reveals that even if a penalty was deemed necessary, the court of
appeals should have chosen a less severe remedy than involuntary dismissal.
The first and easiest category to analyze is thepro se plaintiff. In Haines
v. Kerner63 the United States Supreme Court held that a court should not
dismiss summarily a complaint, especially apro se complaint, unless "it ap-
pears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.' "64 The court of appeals acknowl-
edged this policy favoringpro se litigants in Jones, yet still dismissed his case
without any evaluation of the merits of his case.65 Penalizing the pro se
layperson by dismissing his suit with prejudice directly contravenes this policy.
The typical pro se inmate, however, cannot be punished effectively in any
other manner because he usually is judgment-proof, not subject to censure or
ethical sanctions, and incapable of paying costs or attorneys' fees. One possi-
ble solution is to apply a "good faith" test topro se litigants, dismissing their
untary dismissals, see R. RODEs, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLA-
TIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 32-44 (1981).
North Carolina courts have upheld the application of severe sanctions for violating discovery
orders or rules. See Laing v. Liberty Loan Co., 46 N.C. App. 67, 264 S.E.2d 381 (answer stricken
and default judgment granted for failure to produce documents), disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 557,
270 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Silverthorne v. Coastal Land Co., 42 N.C. App. 134, 256 S.E.2d 397 (dis-
missal when plaintiff failed to answer interrogatories), disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 300, 259 S.E.2d
302 (1979). It is worth noting that these dismissals are under rule 37(b)(2) and 37(d) and that the
intentional nature of the action warrants such severe penalties. The parties in these cases had the
opportunity to proceed and chose not to do so. Furthermore, unlike rule 8(a)(2), the power to
dismiss is provided specifically within rule 37. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), 37(d).
60. See Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300. Jones is a fairly typical example of
such a plaintiff-a prison inmate dissatisfied with his conviction and claiming that his attorney
failed him.
61. See Record at 52, Harris. Harris' attorney informed the court that he was "unaware that
Rule 8(a)(2) was applicable to an action against an attorney and further, because the Complaint
contained other separate claims, that [he believed] such Rule was not applicable." Id.
62. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1980). Ethical
Consideration 7-25 specifies that an attorney "is not justified in consciously violating such rules [of
evidence and procedure]." Id. at EC 7-25.
63. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
64. Id. at 521 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)), quoled in Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978). The Gordon court also
held that, "[w]hat might be a meritorious claim on the part of apro se litigant unversed in the law
should not be defeated without affording the pleader a reasonable opportunity to articulate his
cause of action." Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1152.
65. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300 (1983) ("justice might often so require
[leave to amend] where a layman appearing pro se inadvertently fails to conform to technical
legal requirements.").
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suits with prejudice only upon a showing of intent to flaunt the rule.66 In all
other cases, courts should grantpro se litigants leave to amend their pleadings
to conform to the rule. A good faith standard would give the court leverage to
dismiss in cases of willful violations, but would ensure preservation of poten-
tially valid causes of action when the error is inadvertent.
The second and third categories of potential 8(a)(2) violators-unwitting
and unscrupulous attorneys-may be considered together. A more fundamen-
tal question underlies the issue of what sanctions to apply to these violators:
should a client be punished for the errors of his attorney?67 In Chandler Leas-
ing Corp. v. Lopez6 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed a dismissal with prejudice for violation of a local rule of court69 and
adopted a test. The court "must ascertain (1) the degree of personal responsi-
bility of the plaintiff, (2) the amount of prejudice caused the defendant ....
and [(3)] the existence of a sanction less drastic than dismissal." 70 The addi-
tion of a fourth criterion-the existence of clear evidence that the attorney
deliberately included a specific damage clause despite knowledge of rule
8(a)(2)-would create a proper test for attorneys who misfile damage claims in
malpractice suits.
The existence of viable lesser sanctions is a critical factor. Sanctions less
drastic than dismissal with prejudice include conditional dismissal,7 1 assess-
ment of attorneys' fees, fines against the attorney, assessment of costs, and
dismissal without prejudice.72 Any of these lesser sanctions, or a combination
of them, should be levied against the attorney who filed the improper com-
plaint,73 absent the unlikely possibility that the client intended that the com-
66. See Green v. Eure, 18 N.C. App. 671, 672, 197 S.E.2d 599, 600-01 (1973) (plaintiff must
show deliberate intent before dismissal is proper); 5 J. MOORE, J. LuCAS & 1. WICKER, supra note
38, 41.12 ("[w]here, however, a reasonable excuse is offered for failure to comply with a rule or
order, the court should. . . either refuse to dismiss, or provide in its order of dismissal that it does
not constitute an adjudication upon the merits"); R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, supra note
59, at 32-44.
67. See generally R. RODEs, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, supra note 59, at 70-79. Although the
courts have adopted a general agency analysis to hold the client responsible for the attorney's
failure to prosecute, see Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (dismissal only after six
years of inaction, two continuances, and a failure to appear at pretrial conference), Rodes, Ripple
and Mooney do not cite a single case in which a 41(b) dismissal with prejudice has been a sanction
for a violation of a pleading technicality under the federal rules. See R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C.
MOONEY, supra note 59, at 30-41.
68. 669 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 920. The local rule required that out-of-state counsel retain local counsel. Plaintiff
received three requests to comply before Judge Dupree dismissed the complaint.
70. Id. (citing Davis v. Williams, 588 F.2d 69, 69-70 (4th Cir. 1978)). The court reversed the
dismissal, holding that although there was evidence of "sloppiness," dismissal of an action with
prejudice was too drastic a sanction for mere carelessness.
71. See N.C.R. Clv. P. 41(b). Rule 41(b) was rewritten to "make clear that the court's power
to dismiss on terms, that is, to condition the dismissal . . . extends to all dismissals other than
voluntary dismissals under section 41(a)." Id.
72. See Lopez, 669 F.2d at 921.
73. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This rule allows the Court to place the potential cost of frivolous
or unsubstantiated claims on the attorney. For a general treatment of the growing policy favoring
the award of punitive attorneys' fees for attorney misconduct, see Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees
for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. REv. 613 (1983).
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plaint violate the rule.74 Furthermore, the court should file an automatic
complaint with the State Bar Association's disciplinary committee. Although
one such complaint might not, and probably should not, lead to disciplinary
action, it would create a record of improper conduct. Subsequent complaints
for the same violation would indicate intentional abuse and could be treated
more harshly.
It is significant to note that the limitation on ad damnum clauses con-
tained in rule 8(a)(2) is of little practical value in stopping intentional abuse of
the rule75 because it is defeated so easily. To circumvent the purpose of the
rule articulated by the Jones and Harris courts, 76 an unprincipled lawyer need
only file a malpractice complaint alleging large specific compensatory and pu-
nitive damages, then immediately contact the press as to the nature of the suit
and the amount of relief demanded. Then, without leave of court, he could
amend the complaint to conform to the 8(a)(2) damage limitations. Because
an efficient attorney or layperson easily could accomplish all of this in one or
two days, the defendant would rarely, if ever file a responsive answer early
enough to stop the plaintiff from amending his complaint as of right under
rule 15(a).77 The result is a sensationalized claim that cannot be dismissed
involuntarily with prejudice under the rule created by Jones and Harris.78
A procedural remedy for the foregoing scenario exists, but was not em-
ployed in the Jones or Harris proceedings. Once a plaintiff filed a complaint
that contained an 8(a)(2) violation, even if amended as of right before a re-
sponsive pleading were filed, the court could order all proceedings stopped to
determine whether the violation was intentional.79 If the pretrial investigation
revealed purposeful conduct on the part of the plaintiff or his counsel, the
judge then would be warranted in either penalizing the attorney or dismissing
the case with prejudice.80 Once again, the four-prong test articulated above8'
74. If the client knew of or encouraged the violations, or intentionally selected the attorney
because he wanted such a complaint filed, the court should dismiss the action with prejudice
under rule 41(b).
75. What difference could it possibly make as to the amount Mrs. Harris says she's been
damaged? If such a rule were valid, why not a law that says you can't put in a pleading
the "bad" things the "professional" did . . . or you can't tell who the "professional" is,
requiring all suits against attorneys to be against "John Doe?" The rule itself is absurd.
Enforcement by dismissal of a violative complaint would be a travesty.
Appellant's North Carolina Supreme Court Brief at 31, Harris.
76. The stated purpose was to stop publication of large damage claims to protect the reputa-
tions of professionals. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
77. N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that a party may amend once, as of right, if the amend-
ment is made prior to a responsive pleading.
78. The unscrupulous attorney intent on circumventing the stated purpose of rule 8(a)(2) has
at least one other alternative: file a complaint that meets 8(a)(2)'s requirements but have his client
tell the media what amount of damages are sought. This alternative has the added advantages of
preserving the one amendment plaintiff has as of right under N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a) as well as
cleansing the attorney of obvious rule manipulation. These rule-defeating procedures are not
offered as suggestions to practitioners, but to point out that rule 8(a)(2) is inadequate because it is
so easily defeated.
79. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966).
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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suits with prejudice only upon a showing of intent to flaunt the rule.66 In all
other cases, courts should grantpro se litigants leave to amend their pleadings
to conform to the rule. A good faith standard would give the court leverage to
dismiss in cases of willful violations, but would ensure preservation of poten-
tially valid causes of action when the error is inadvertent.
The second and third categories of potential 8(a)(2) violators-unwitting
and unscrupulous attorneys-may be considered together. A more fundamen-
tal question underlies the issue of what sanctions to apply to these violators:
should a client be punished for the errors of his attorney?67 In Chandler Leas-
ing Corp. v. Lopez 68 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed a dismissal with prejudice for violation of a local rule of court69 and
adopted a test. The court "must ascertain (1) the degree of personal responsi-
bility of the plaintiff, (2) the amount of prejudice caused the defendant ....
and [(3)] the existence of a sanction less drastic than dismissal."70 The addi-
tion of a fourth criterion-the existence of clear evidence that the attorney
deliberately included a specific damage clause despite knowledge of rule
8(a)(2)-would create a proper test for attorneys who misfile damage claims in
malpractice suits.
The existence of viable lesser sanctions is a critical factor. Sanctions less
drastic than dismissal with prejudice include conditional dismissal,7t assess-
ment of attorneys' fees, fines against the attorney, assessment of costs, and
dismissal without prejudice.72 Any of these lesser sanctions, or a combination
of them, should be levied against the attorney who filed the improper com-
plaint,73 absent the unlikely possibility that the client intended that the com-
66. See Green v. Eure, 18 N.C. App. 671, 672, 197 S.E.2d 599, 600-01 (1973) (plaintiff must
show deliberate intent before dismissal is proper); 5 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & J. WICKER, supra note
38, 41.12 ("[w]here, however, a reasonable excuse is offered for failure to comply with a rule or
order, the court should. . . either refuse to dismiss, or provide in its order of dismissal that it does
not constitute an adjudication upon the merits"); R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, supra note
59, at 32-44.
67. See generally R. RODEs, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, supra note 59, at 70-79. Although the
courts have adopted a general agency analysis to hold the client responsible for the attorney's
failure to prosecute, see Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (dismissal only after six
years of inaction, two continuances, and a failure to appear at pretrial conference), Rodes, Ripple
and Mooney do not cite a single case in which a 41(b) dismissal with prejudice has been a sanction
for a violation of a pleading technicality under the federal rules. See R. RODEs, K. RIPPLE & C.
MOONEY, supra note 59, at 30-41.
68. 669 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 920. The local rule required that out-of-state counsel retain local counsel. Plaintiff
received three requests to comply before Judge Dupree dismissed the complaint.
70. Id. (citing Davis v. Williams, 588 F.2d 69, 69-70 (4th Cir. 1978)). The court reversed the
dismissal, holding that although there was evidence of "sloppiness," dismissal of an action with
prejudice was too drastic a sanction for mere carelessness.
71. See N.C.R. Ctv. P.41(b). Rule 41(b) was rewritten to "make clear that the court's power
to dismiss on terms, that is, to condition the dismissal ... extends to all dismissals other than
voluntary dismissals under section 41(a)." Id.
72. See Lopez, 669 F.2d at 921.
73. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This rule allows the Court to place the potential cost of frivolous
or unsubstantiated claims on the attorney. For a general treatment of the growing policy favoring
the award of punitive attorneys' fees for attorney misconduct, see Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees
for4buses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. REv. 613 (1983).
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plaint violate the rule.74 Furthermore, the court should file an automatic
complaint with the State Bar Association's disciplinary committee. Although
one such complaint might not, and probably should not, lead to disciplinary
action, it would create a record of improper conduct. Subsequent complaints
for the same violation would indicate intentional abuse and could be treated
more harshly.
It is significant to note that the limitation on ad damnum clauses con-
tained in rule 8(a)(2) is of little practical value in stopping intentional abuse of
the rule75 because it is defeated so easily. To circumvent the purpose of the
rule articulated by the Jones and Harris courts, 76 an unprincipled lawyer need
only file a malpractice complaint alleging large specific compensatory and pu-
nitive damages, then immediately contact the press as to the nature of the suit
and the amount of relief demanded. Then, without leave of court, he could
amend the complaint to conform to the 8(a)(2) damage limitations. Because
an efficient attorney or layperson easily could accomplish all of this in one or
two days, the defendant would rarely, if ever file a responsive answer early
enough to stop the plaintiff from amending his complaint as of right under
rule 15(a).77 The result is a sensationalized claim that cannot be dismissed
involuntarily with prejudice under the rule created by Jones and Harrs.78
A procedural remedy for the foregoing scenario exists, but was not em-
ployed in the Jones or Harris proceedings. Once a plaintiff filed a complaint
that contained an 8(a)(2) violation, even if amended as of right before a re-
sponsive pleading were filed, the court could order all proceedings stopped to
determine whether the violation was intentional.79 If the pretrial investigation
revealed purposeful conduct on the part of the plaintiff or his counsel, the
judge then would be warranted in either penalizing the attorney or dismissing
the case with prejudice.80 Once again, the four-prong test articulated above s
74. If the client knew of or encouraged the violations, or intentionally selected the attorney
because he wanted such a complaint filed, the court should dismiss the action with prejudice
under rule 41(b).
75. What difference could it possibly make as to the amount Mrs. Harris says she's been
damaged? If such a rule were valid, why not a law that says you can't put in a pleading
the "bad" things the "professional" did. . . or you can't tell who the "professional" is,
requiring all suits against attorneys to be against "John Doe?" The rule itself is absurd.
Enforcement by dismissal of a violative complaint would be a travesty.
Appellant's North Carolina Supreme Court Brief at 31, Harris.
76. The stated purpose was to stop publication of large damage claims to protect the reputa-
tions of professionals. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
77. N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that a party may amend once, as of right, if the amend-
ment is made prior to a responsive pleading.
78. The unscrupulous attorney intent on circumventing the stated purpose of rule 8(a)(2) has
at least one other alternative: file a complaint that meets 8(a)(2)'s requirements but have his client
tell the media what amount of damages are sought. This alternative has the added advantages of
preserving the one amendment plaintiff has as of right under N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a) as well as
cleansing the attorney of obvious rule manipulation. These rule-defeating procedures are not
offered as suggestions to practitioners, but to point out that rule 8(a)(2) is inadequate because it is
so easily defeated.
79. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966).
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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should be used to evaluate the validity of such a harsh sanction.
Application of the good faith test forpro se laypersons and the four-part
test for attorneys, when coupled with the suggested procedural mechanism,
would allow courts to punish willful abuses while providing less harsh sanc-
tions for those who err inadvertently. Only the person responsible for the er-
ror-usually the attorney-would be penalized; his client's potentially valid
causes of action would be preserved.
The rule of law established by the holdings in Jones v. Boyce and Harris v.
Maready is unjust and should be repudiated by the North Carolina Supreme
Court. The Harris rule-requiring dismissal of a plaintiff's potentially valid
claim at an early pretrial stage in circumstances when the defendant would
suffer no damage if the complaint were amended-contradicts North Caro-
lina's strong policy favoring trial on the merits, 82 and is particularly inappro-
priate when applied to pro se litigants. The Jones and Harris decisions have
created a code-like pleading trap for the unwary, unversed and incompetent
that snares the innocent and lets the guilty go free.
JOHN REID PARKER, JR.
82. See Vernon v. Crist, 291 N.C. 646, 654, 231 S.E.2d 591, 596 (1977); see also supra note 46
and accompanying text.
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Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta International Corp:
The Reach of North Carolina's Long-Arm Statute
The question whether an out-of-state corporation's contacts with a state
are sufficient to permit that state's courts to exercise jurisdiction consistent
with due process under the state long-arm statute requires a careful applica-
tion of complex factors. The interstate character of modern commercial trans-
actions and recent United States Supreme Court pronouncements on the reach
of long-arm jurisdiction' complicate the analysis. In Vishay Intertechnology,
Inc. v. Delta International Corp. 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that, in limited circumstances, telephone and written com-
munications between California and North Carolina were sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of both the North Carolina long-arm statute and federal due
process.
The Vishay court was faced with a defendant whose routine commercial
practices involved little contact with North Carolina. The government of Ko-
rea unwittingly laid the foundation for multiple litigation when it solicited
bids for sixty units of a measurement device. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc.
(Vishay), a Delaware corporation that manufactures and sells such measure-
ment devices through its North Carolina office, submitted the next-to-lowest
bid on the devices through its agent in Korea. The bid was based on its for-
eign list price.3 Delta International (Delta), a California corporation, submit-
ted the lowest bid on the devices. Delta's bid was based on an oral quotation
of Vishay's domestic price for the instruments that allegedly was obtained
deceptively.4
The alleged misrepresentation arose out of a complex series of events.
Delta's vice-president had telephoned Vishay requesting one measurement de-
vice. He allegedly misrepresented himself as an agent of "Delta Corporation"
and a Vishay order clerk mistakenly quoted the unit's domestic price. A
Vishay supervisor who was preparing the written quotation, however, recog-
nized Delta as an exporter. At his supervisor's request the order clerk notified
Delta that the foreign price would apply.5 Delta insisted that the domestic
price should apply, and Vishay withdrew the oral quotation. Delta next sent
Vishay a purchase order for sixty units of the device at the domestic price;
1. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (Oklahoma court's
exercise of jurisdiction offended minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See generally Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally
Exceeds Its Reach: .A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v.
Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REv. 407 (1980).
2. 696 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1982).
3. Vishay charges higher prices in foreign markets than in domestic markets because over-
seas marketing involves greater sales commission, promotion, service, warranty, and technical
assistance costs. .d. at 1064.
4. Although Vishay informed the Korean government that Delta's bid was obtained decep-
tively, Delta's bid was not disqualified because of the government's bidding policy. Id.
5. The order clerk contacted Delta's vice-president, who initially denied that Delta was an
exporter. Id.
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Vishay rejected the purchase order.6 In subsequent communications, Delta
demanded that Vishay supply the devices at the domestic price, and
threatened to sue if Vishay did not comply. Eventually, Delta did file suit
against Vishay in a California federal district court, but the complaint was
dismissed on the merits following a hearing. Delta eventually obtained similar
devices from a competitor of Vishay, and sold them to the Korean
government.7
Vishay then filed suit against Delta in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina. Vishay sought damages for unfair and
deceptive business practices, tortious interference with contractual relations,
and abuse of process. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
sufficient contacts between Delta and the State to satisfy the requirements of
personal jurisdiction under North Carolina's long-arm statutes. 8 The court of
appeals reversed.9 The court concluded that Delta's contacts with North Car-
olina-three letters and five telephone calls to Vishay's North Carolina of-
fice-satisfied the requirements of the North Carolina long-arm statutes and
federal due process.' 0
At the outset, the Vishay court noted that the North Carolina long-arm
statutes I should be construed liberally, permitting the assertion ofjurisdiction
to the full extent allowed by due process. 12 Foreign corporations not transact-
6. The purchase order allegedly represented the first time that Delta indicated a need for
more than one unit. Delta admitted that the 60 units were to be offered for resale to the Korean
government. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1065.
9. Id. at 1063. The court first set forth the process for determining jurisdiction under a
long-arm statute:
To resolve a question of personal jurisdiction, the court must engage in a two step
analysis. First, the court must determine if the applicable North Carolina law would
allow the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over Delta. If so, the court must determine if
such an exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.
Id. at 1064.
10. Id. at 1067-69.
11. North Carolina's comprehensive long-arm statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1983), was
modeled after Wisconsin's long-arm statute. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West 1977 & Supp.
1983). North Carolina General Statutes § 1-75.4(2) provides for the exercise ofjurisdiction under
any state statute that specifically confers jurisdiction. Thus, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-143 to -145
(1982), enacted in 1955 and redesignated as part of the Noi'th Carolina Business Corporation Act,
remain in effect to provide alternative grounds for asserting jurisdiction over corporations. See 1
A. MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 937.5-937.20 (2d ed. Supp.
1970); R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 32-1 to -9 (3d ed.
1983). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1982) grants jurisdiction over foreign corporations not transact-
ing business in the State; it is the "most far-reaching of the statutes asserting jurisdiction over
foreign corporations." I A. MCINTOSH, supra § 937.20, at 180 n.98.73. Section 55-145 had been
called "the minimum contact statute" prior to the adoption of § 1-75.4. See Note, Corporations-
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations Not Qualfed to Transact Business Mi North Carolina, 44
N.C.L. REv. 449, 543 (1966). See generally Comment, Jurisdiction over Forein Corporations Not
Transacting Business in North Carolina-A Changing Attitude, 2 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REv. 1
(1966) (tracing development of North Carolina law under § 55-145).
12. "There is a clear mandate that the North Carolina long-arm statute be given a liberal
construction." Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1065. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.1 (1983) provides: "This Article
shall be liberally construed to the end that actions be speedily and finally determined on their
merits." Furthermore, the drafters of the Business Corporation Act provide insight into the legis-
lature's intent in adopting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1982).
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ing business in the State also are subject to suit on any cause of action arising
out of "tortious conduct" within the State under North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 55-145(a)(4). 13 Because Delta's initial solicitation of a price quo-
tation and the resulting oral and written communications formed the facts
necessary to prove Vishay's claims of unfair business practices and interfer-
ence with contractual relations, the court of appeals concluded that these tele-
phonic and written communications constituted "tortious conduct" within
North Carolina. The court relied on Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc.,14 in which
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had recognized the
modem business practice of using mail service rather than personal messen-
gers, and stated that "[w]here a defendant knowingly sends into a state a false
statement, intending that it should be relied upon to the injury of a resident of
that state, he has, for jurisdictional purposes, acted within that state." 15 The
Forein corporations are by Section 145 made subject to local suits by residents of North
Carolina in some situations where they have engaged in specified activity giving rise to a
cause of action locally, even though they are not so "transacting business" as to be re-
quired to obtain a certificate of authority. International Shoe Co. i. State of Washington
is thought to have removed the constitutional barriers against such an extension of juris-
diction over a foreign corporation which is not so transacting business as to come within
the domestication requirements. Provision is also made for substantial service in this
situation. It is thought that wise policy favors subjecting such foreign corporations to
suit here for the convenience of residents of this state where it is constitutionally possible,
since the alternative is to force our residents to bring their actions in foreign jurisdictions.
Latty, Powers & Breckenridge, The ProposedNorth Carolina Business Corporation Act, 33 N.C.L.
Rav. 26, 54 (1954) (emphasis added). Thus, "[e]ach of these statutes was apparently intended to
extend the jurisdiction of the North Carolina courts over foreign corporations to what was on each
occasion believed to be the ultimate limits allowed by due process." R. RoBINSON, supra note 11,
§ 32-1, at 477.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a)(4) (1982):
(a) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State, whether or not
such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this State and
whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause
of action arising as follows:
(4) Out of tortious conduct in this State, whether arising out of repeated activity or
single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance.
In Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enters., 368 F. Supp. 1366, 1379 (M.D.N.C. 1973) the court stated,
'[Wlhen seeking to acquire personal jurisdiction under G.S. § 55-145(a)(4) a plaintiff must show:
(1) that the cause of action arose in North Carolina; and (2) the defendant committed one or more
acts which gave rise to the cause of action in this State."
14. 460 F.2d 661 (Ist Cir. 1972). The long-arm statute applicable in Murphy allowed the
court to obtain personal jurisdiction in a cause of action arising out of the person's "causing tor-
tious injury by an act or omission in this commonwealth." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A,
§ 3(c) (West Supp. 1984). In Murphy the court stated that the delivery in Massachusetts by mail or
telephone of a false statement originating outside the state, followed by reliance on the statement
in Massachusetts, was an act within Massachusetts. Murphy, 460 F.2d at 664. This statement was
not necessary to the court's holding, however, since false statements also were made face-to-face
within the state.
15. Murphy, 460 F.2d at 664. The Murphy court relied on Buckley v. New York Post Corp.,
373 F.2d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 1967), in which the court stated that "damage to a person's reputation
caused by sending a libel into the state where he lives could still be considered as arising from
'tortious conduct' in that state," because "it could well be said that that publisher directly inflicts
damage on the intangible reputation just as the frequently hypothesized but rarely encountered
gunman firing across a state line does on the body." After paraphrasing from the above-quoted
passage, the Murphy court concluded:
We believe the same is true of the mailing of a fraudulent misrepresentation into a
state. We would be closing our eyes to the realities of modern business practices were we
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Vishay court rejected defendant's arguments that Murphy was questionable
authority, 16 and noted that the Murphy rationale has been followed more
often than rejected. 17
In determining whether causing process to be served on Vishay also con-
stituted "tortious conduct" within North Carolina for purposes of section 55-
145, the court looked to comparable cases in other federal courts.' 8 The court
to hold that a corporation subjects itself to the jurisdiction of another state by sending a
personal messenger into that state bearing a fraudulent misrepresentation but not when
it follows the more ordinary course of employing the United States Postal Service as its
messenger.
Murphy, 460 F.2d at 664.
16. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1066. The only two cases relied on by Delta that rejected the Murphy
rationale were Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co.,
504 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1974). Although both cases can be distinguished from Murphy, they both
rejected Murphy.
Margoles was distinguishable because it involved a different type of long-arm statute than
that at issue in Murphy. Nevertheless, the Margoles court criticized the apparent distinction
drawn in Murphy between intentional acts causing a "tortious injury" within the state and negli-
gent acts creating a condition from which damage might later arise. Referring to the Murphy
court's reasoning, the Margoles court remarked: "Evidently an intentional act. . . is a type of
continuing wrong which carries its perpetrator mysteriously along and thrusts him, constructively
of course, into the domain of the injurious consequences. The law regarding jurisdictional matters
is confusing enough; it needs less legal fictions, not more." Margoles, 483 F.2d at 1220.
Weller was distinguishable from Murphy on the basis that Weller subjected officers of a cor-
poration to jurisdiction. Disregarding this distinction, the Weller court observed that "Murphy
. . . was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Margoles v. Johns."
Weller, 504 F.2d at 930. The court concluded "the decision in Margoles is sound, and we will
follow it." Id. at 931.
In another case cited by Delta, Kolikofv. Samuelson, 488 F. Supp. 881 (D. Mass. 1980), the
court distinguished Murphy. Kolikof, 488 F. Supp. at 883. Kolikof also gave one of the best
explanations of the Murphy rationale: "In a misrepresentation case such as Murphy, the nature of
the information transmitted across state lines is a crucial element of the alleged tort since it is the
words themselves which are intended to bring about the injury." id.
17. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1066-67 (citing Ammon v. Kaplow, 468 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Kan.
1979)). See also Brown v. Flowers Indus., 688 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1275 (1983); Thorington v. Cash, 494 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1974); J.E.M. Corp. v. McClellan, 462 F.
Supp. 1246 (D. Kan. 1978).
In addition to the cases cited by Vishay, the most telling case is Burtner v. Burnham, 13 Mass.
App. Ct. 158, 430 N.E.2d 1233 (1982), in which the Massachusetts appellate court followed Mur-
phy's interpretation of the Massachusetts long-arm statute. Buriner concerned a misrepresenta-
tion, perpetrated by mail and telephone, of the acreage in a land sale. Plaintiffs relied on the
misrepresentation. The appellate court found that jurisdiction existed "particularly in the light of
Federal cases in the First Circuit," then outlined the cases both following and rejecting the Mur-
phy cases. Buriner, 430 N.E.2d at 1236-37. The Oregon Supreme Court also has cited the Murphy
with approval. See State ex rel Academy Press, Ltd. v. Beckett, 282 Or. 701, 581 P.2d 496
(1978); BRS, Inc. v. Dickerson, 278 Or. 269, 563 P.2d 723 (1977); State ex reZ Advanced Dictating
Supply v. Dale, 269 Or. 242, 524 P.2d 1404 (1974).
18. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1067. In Simon v. United States, 644 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1981), the
alleged tortious injury was based upon defendant's wrongful acts in influencing an Atlanta trial
judge to issue a bench warrant for plaintiff's arrest. The subpoena was served on plaintiff by
federal marshals in Louisiana. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
"the service in Louisiana of the subpoena ticket, improperly issued at the direction of Neal, was a
cause-in-fact, or substantial factor, in the tort by Neal alleged as a cause of action in Simon's
complaint," and thus was within the Louisiana long-arm statute. Id. at 499. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13:3201(c) (West 1968) ("causing injury or damage by an offense or quasi offense commit-
ted through an act or omission in this state"). In Hamilton, Miller, Hudson & Fayne Travel Corp.
v. Hori, 520 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Mich. 1981), the court held that service of an Illinois summons and
complaint in Michigan constituted a tortious act under the Michigan long-arm statute. See MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27A.705(2) (Callaghan 1976) ("the doing or causing an act to be done, or conse-
quences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort"). Since both statutes contain an
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deduced the following general rule from these opinions: "[I]f an out-of-state
defendant causes process to be served upon an in-state plaintiff, and the plain-
tiff subsequently sues the defendant in plaintiff's state, the state wherein the
alleged abusive process was served, on a cause of action arising out of such
abusive service of process," then personal jurisdiction exists over the defend-
ant.19 The court applied this rule and concluded that the service of process on
Vishay in North Carolina subjected Delta to North Carolina jurisdiction for
purposes of Vishay's claim of abusive service.
North Carolina General Statutes section 1-75.4(4)20 provides that state
courts may exercise jurisdiction over a local injury arising out of a defendant's
act occurring outside the state if certain business activities are being carried on
by the defendant within the state.2 ' In determining whether Delta's conduct
satisfied the section 1-75.4(4)(a) solicitation requirement, the court relied on
two federal district court cases interpreting that section.22 The court held that
express causation standard in the statutory language, a finding that abusive service of process falls
within the statutes is easier than in the case of the North Carolina "tortious conduct in this State"
requirement. To exercise personal jurisdiction in North Carolina, a court must employ Murphy-
type fictions to conclude that an out-of-state act was within the state for jurisdictional purposes.
19. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1067.
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4) (1983) provides that jurisdiction may be asserted in the fol-
lowing circumstances:
(4) Local Injury; Foreign Act.-In any action for wrongful death occuring within this
State or in any action claiming injury to person or property within this State arising out
of an act or omission outside this State by the defendant, provided in addition that at or
about the time of the injury either:
a. Solicitations or services activities were carried on within this State by or on behalf of
the defendant; or
b. Products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant
were used or consumed, within this State in the ordinary course of trade.
By separating the foreign act/local injury grounds from the "wholly local" tort grounds, the
legislature intended to avoid two problems encountered by other state statutes. 1 A. MCINTOSH,
supra note 11, § 937.10 at 166 n.53. The first problem the statute was designed to avoid was
having to decide whether "tortious acts" applies only to wholly local torts. Id. The second prob-
lem has been described as follows:
The second is the constitutional problem, which to some courts has seemed formidable
when jurisdiction is asserted on the basis of a single tortious activity occurring in sub-
stantial part outside the forum state .... The North Carolina statutory assertion is not
this liberal in favor of plaintiffs and specifically requires an amount of contemporaneous
bolstering activities which some courts have thought constitutionally required to support
jurisdiction in the foreign act-local consequences cases. The degree of bolstering activi-
ties required will of course have to be decided on a case by case basis.
.d.
21. Vishay's claims of injury suffered in North Carolina were sufficient for jurisdictional pur-
poses because a plaintiff need not prove injury under section 1-75.4(4)(a). Vishay, 696 F.2d at
1067-68.
22. Id. at 1068. The first case on which Vishay relied, Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enters., 368 F.
Supp. 1366 (M.D.N.C. 1973), held that the scouting of basketball players in North Carolina satis-
fied the "solicitation" requirement of § 1-75.4(4)(a), but did not satisfy the minimum contacts
requirement of the due process standard. Noting that § 1-75.4 was intended to be construed liber-
ally, the court stated:
Accordingly, there is no need to engage in a laborious analysis of the meanings of
key terms in the two alternative requirements in the provisos set forth in § 1-75.4(4). To
strictly construe the terms as set forth in those subsections so as to defeat in personam
jurisdiction when such jurisdiction would be constitutionally permissible would conflict
with the legislative and judicial mandate. Rather, it is concluded that the activities of the
defendant, which include preliminary contacts with North Carolina basketball players
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"Delta's written communications, especially the mailing of the purchase order,
and telephone conversations with Vishay satisflied] the solicitation require-
ment."23 Thus, the court concluded that Delta's conduct fell within two provi-
sions of the North Carolina long-arm statutes.
Having satisfied the first prong of the jurisdictional inquiry, the court of
appeals turned to the due process prong.24 The court quoted the applicable
standard established in International Shoe Co. v. Washington:25
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." 26
The court, however, refused to apply the quantitative analysis suggested by
Delta, and instead focused on Delta's initiation of contacts with Vishay. The
court concluded that, by initiating contact with Vishay Delta intended to avail
itself of the benefits and protections of North Carolina laws.27 Once again, the
court of appeals relied on Murphy, in which the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit stated that:
[T]he element of intent also persuades us that there can be no consti-
tutional objection to Massachusetts asserting jurisdiction over the
out-of-state sender of a fraudulent misrepresentation, for such a
sender has thereby "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the bene-
fits and protections of its laws."'28
The intentional character of Delta's contact with Vishay also met the foresee-
with some expectation of future contract negotiations, and the knowing participation in
athletic contests, at least some of which will be shown on television throughout the
United States, including North Carolina, can reasonably be included within the solicita-
tion and marketing activities embodied in the subject statutory provisions.
Id. at 1371-72.
In contrast, "Delta's contacts were more contractual in their intent than were the 'preliminary
contacts' considered in Munchak." Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1068 (quoting Munchak, 368 F. Supp. at
1372). For an analysis of the Munchak decision, see Note, Munchak Corp. v. Riko: Putting a
Little Polish on International Shoe, 52 N.C.L. REv. 809, 850 (1974).
The second case relied on by Vishay, Federal Ins. Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 341 F. Supp.
855 (W.D.N.C. 1972), a,'dmem., 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973), concluded that magazine adver-
tisements were solicitations "by or on behalf of' the manufacturer under § 1-75.4(4). Id. at 856.
These advertisements, however, were in conjunction with a state-wide network of distributorships
and service centers. "The cumulative result of Piper's activity is an established program in North
Carolina of solicitation of customers, sales of Piper aircraft, and the provision of a network of
authorized service facilities for local Piper owners." Id.
23. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1068.
24. See supra notes 9, 12 and accompanying text.
25. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
27. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1068. "[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958).
28. Murphy, 460 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir. 1972) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958)).
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ability test enunciated in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson .29 Delta
could reasonably have expected to be haled into court in North Carolina to
answer Vishay's claims arising out of the contacts initiated by Delta.
Among other factors relevant to the due process determination, the court
noted that Vishay's cause of action arose out of Delta's contacts with North
Carolina.30 This fact distinguished several cases cited by Delta.31 The court
also noted several state interests in determining whether the minimum con-
tacts requirement had been satisfied. 32 Finally, the court weighed the relative
conveniences to the parties, concluding that the inconvenience to Delta in de-
fending suit in North Carolina did not deny it due process. 33
The Vishay decision represents a logical approach to modem commercial
transactions that is consistent with the policy expressed in the North Carolina
long-arm statutes.34 When telephone calls and written communications form
an integral part of a tort claim, those communications may be said to be "tor-
29. 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ("[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process. . . is that
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.").
30. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). "[I]t has been generally
recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single, or isolated
items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on
causes of action unconnected with the activities there." Id. at 317.
31. See, e.g., Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enters., 368 F.Supp. 1366 (M.D.N.C. 1973) (Defend-
ant's contacts were insufficient to meet due process standards for personal jurisdiction,). In
Munchak "[a]n important factor in the court's decision was the fact that the alleged contacts with
North Carolina were unrelated to the claim for relief asserted." Note, supra note 22, at 856.
32. The interests of North Carolina that the court listed were: (1) plaintiff was a North Caro-
lina resident; (2) plaintiff sought relief under the North Carolina unfair trade practices statute; (3)
the cause of action centered on the production of $130,000 worth of goods that would have been
manufactured in North Carolina; and (4) the Delta contacts with North Carolina were essential
elements of Vishay's claims. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1069. By including the state's interest in the
litigation in its determination whether the minimum contacts requirement was met, the court erro-
neously caused a "subtle shift in focus from the defendant to the plaintiff." Rush v. Savchuk, 444
U.S. 320, 332 (1980). In Rush the Supreme Court cautioned against this shift in focus by stating:
Such an approach is forbidden by International Shoe and its progeny. Ifa defendent has
certain judicially cognizable ties with a State, a variety of factors relating to the particu-
lar cause of action may be relevent to the determination whether the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion would comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 332 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). "In other
words, these other factors may confirm or defeat jurisdiction, but they may not create it." Louis,
supra note I, at 421. Thus, the Virhay court should have stated that the interest of North Carolina
is a relevent factor in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is fair, only after determin-
ing that sufficient contacts were present.
33. "While the defendant's witnesses are located in California, since Delta initiated the con-
tested series of events, its inconvenience in transporting those witnesses to North Carolina when
weighed against the inconvenience that would result to Vishay if it had to file suit in California"
does not deny due process. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1069.
34. For a discussion of the legislative intent behind N.C. GEN STAT. § 1-75.4 (1983) and Id.
§ 55-145 (1982), see supra notes 11-12.
Prior to Vishay, the federal courts construed North Carolina's long-arm statutes more nar-
rowly than the North Carolina Supreme Court. It was noted that "the North Carolina Supreme
Court is more ready to grant jurisdiction to protect North Carolina residents, quite naturally, and
• ..it has taken the supposedly liberal interpretation offered by International Shoe more to heart
than have federal courts." Note, supra note 11, at 457-58. Vishay brought the federal court's
approach to § 55-145 into line with the State court's view.
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tious conduct" within the state and may satisfy the minimum contacts test.35
Similarly, characterizing a purchase order and other communications as "so-
licitation activities" is appropriate given the policy underlying section 1-75.4.
Although no North Carolina appellate court has adopted such a broad inter-
pretation of the solicitation requirement, language in several cases supports
this construction.3 6
In finding Delta's conduct to be within the reach of the North Carolina
long-arm statutes and sufficient to satisfy due process requirements, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adequately protected unwilling
defendants from the burdens of litigating in a distant forum. The Vishay ap-
proach permits courts to assert jurisdiction only in cases in which the commu-
nications in issue form an essential part of the plaintiff's tort claim. The
Vishay holding, however, does not permit a court to exercise jurisdiction if
communications unrelated to the tort claim were transmitted to North Caro-
lina because the due process requirements of foreseeability and purposeful
conduct would not be satisfied.
Thus, the Vishay court recognized the realities of modem commercial
practice. Routine interstate solicitations and purchase orders may provide in-
sufficient contacts to justify one state's assertion of personal jursidiction over
an out-of-state defendant in a typical breach-of-contract suit. Fraudulent or
misrepresentative communications, however, are not routine commercial prac-
tices. The Vishay decision recognized that when fraudulent or misrepresenta-
tive communications form the basis of a plaintiff's claim, they also may justify
a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction. Denying jurisdiction in such cir-
cumstances would allow defendants to act irresponsibly with relative impu-
nity, knowing that they would not be held accountable for their actions in the
forum state.
The Vishay court's expansive reading of the provisions of the North Caro-
lina long-arm statute represents a thoughtfully reasoned analysis, and should
35. These communications are to be distinguished from situations in which the cause of ac-
tion sounds in contract, not tort. In such situations, the same telephone calls may not constitute
"tortious conduct" in the State, and may not fall within that provision of the long-arm statute.
36. The following cases emphasized, among other factors, defendant's solicitations in North
Carolina in finding due process contacts sufficient: Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C.
674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977) (defendant actively solicited orders for its coins from North Carolina
residents through several mass mailings to North Carolinians); Farmer v. Ferris, 260 N.C. 619,
133 S.E.2d 492 (1963) (foreign corporation sent list of available rides through mails to operators of
amusement parks in North Carolina, thereby soliciting orders); Mabry v. Fuller-Shuwayer Co., 50
N.C. App. 245, 251, 273 S.E.2d 509, 513 (1981) (solicitation of employment through advertisement
in a newspaper of wide circulation in North Carolina, long distance telephone conversations by
defendant's agent with an undetermined number of residents, and approximately 28 mailed letters
containing "conditional offers of employment" that North Carolina residents received at their
homes), disc. rev. denied, 302 N.C. 398, 279 S.E.2d 352 (1981); Delprinting Corp. v. C.P.D. Corp.,
49 N.C. App. 449, 271 S.E.2d 548 (1980) (written memoranda on Illinois corporation's stationery
requested plaintiff corporation to ship books to churches in five states); Parris v. Garner Commer-
cial Disposal, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 282, 253 S.E.2d 29 (insurer had sent letter to plaintiff's counsel,
and policy was mailed in an envelope bearing insurer's trademark), disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 455,
256 S.E.2d 808 (1979). Two federal district court cases have construed § 1-75.4(4) broadly.
Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enters., 368 F. Supp. 1366 (M.D.N.C. 1973); Federal Ins. Co. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 341 F. Supp. 855 (W.D.N.C. 1972), a f'dmem., 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973). Both
cases are discussed supra note 
22.
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give adequate guidance to other courts in applying the provisions to particular
activities of corporations. The North Carolina courts should adopt the Vishay
holding because its interpretation of the North Carolina long-arm provisions
implements the express legislative policy of protecting the interests of North
Carolina residents.
ELIZABETH ANN UPCHURCH
Unfair Trade Practices and Unfair Methods of Competition
in North Carolina: Treble Damages and the
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
North Carolina General Statutes section 75-1.11 has been the "center-
piece" of the law of unfair trade practices since its enactment in 1969.2 Unlike
its federal counterpart, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,3 sec-
tion 75-1.1 is enforceable in a private damage action brought by an aggrieved
competitor or consumer,4 and damages awarded in a private action brought
pursuant to section 75-16 are trebled automatically.5 To establish a violation
of section 75-1.1, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant engaged in "unfair
methods of competition" or "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in or affect-
ing commerce. 6 Rather than enumerating a list of illegal acts, practices, and
I. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1981) provides that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are de-
clared unlawful." The original version of§ 75-1.1(a) provided that "[u]nfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful." Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, § 1, 1969 N.C. SEss. LAWS 930. This version
was amended in 1977. Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, §§ 1-2, 1977 N.C. SEss. LAWS 984. This
amendment conformed § 75-1.1 to the exact wording of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). Although the justification for the amendment was not made explicit,
the timing of the amendment suggests that the legislature was responding to the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in State ex. rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d
895 (1977), which had distinguished the scope of the North Carolina and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act provisions. See Aycock, North Carolina Law on Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 60
N.C.L. REv. 207, 210 (1982); see also Comment, The North Carolina Consumer Protection Act of
1977, 56 N.C.L. REv. 547, 548 nn.7-8 (1978).
2. Aycock, supra note 1, at 210-11.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1981). Section 75-16 expressly provides a private cause of
action to any person, firm, or corporation injured as a result of any act in violation of § 75-1.1.
If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, firm, or corporation shall be
broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person,
firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person, firm or
corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done, and if
damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.
A private cause of action under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act has been rejected
by a great majority of the courts. See Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1981); Fulton
v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1978), reh'g denied, 585 F.2d 520, cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981
(1979); Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974); Holloway v.
Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also 4 CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, § 24.01 n.22 (1983). But cf., Guernsey v. Rich
Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
5. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1981). For text of§ 75-16, seesupra note 4. In Marshall v.
Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981), the court stated:
Absent statutory language making trebling discretionary with the trial judge, we must
conclude that the Legislature intended trebling of any damages to be automatic once a
violation is shown. To rule otherwise would produce the anomolous result of recogniz-
ing that although G.S. 75-1.1 creates a cause of action broader than traditional common
law actions, G.S. 75-16 limits the availability of any remedy to cases where some recov-
ery at common law would probably also lie.
Id. at 547, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1981). For text of§ 75-1.1(a), seesupra note 1. The statute
has two components: an unfair-methods-of-competition component and an unfair-or-deceptive-
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methods of competition, the general assembly decided "that the most useful
tool that could be made available .. to stop fraud and deception was the
operative language of Section 5."7 Thus, the general assembly followed Con-
gress' definition, "advisedly adopt[ing] a phrase which. . . does not 'admit of
precise definition but the meaning and application of which must be arrived at
by what [the Supreme Court] elsewhere has called "the gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion." ' "28
Because of the potential for enormous liability under this mandatory
treble damage provision and the uncertainty surrounding the precise bounda-
ries of section 75-1.1, a number of defendants have challenged the constitu-
tionality of section 75-16 as applied to section 75-1.1 on the grounds of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine.9 This note will analyze the application of the
acts-or-practices component. To understand the analysis applied by the courts when interpreting
a claim under § 75-1.1, "Itlhe unfair-method-of-competition component should be examined sepa-
rately from the unfair-or-deceptive-acts-or-practices component." Aycock, supra note I, at 217.
The unfair-method-of-competition component derives its meaning from interpretations of § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act and the North Carolina common law. In Harrington Mfg.
Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393, 400, 248 S.E.2d 739, 744 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296
N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469 (1979), the court of appeals stated that, "the fair or unfair nature of
particular conduct is to be judged by viewing it against the background of actual human experi-
ence and by determining its intended and actual effects upon others." The court cautioned puta-
tive defendants "to exercise care not to step over the necessarily vague but nonetheless real
boundary line dividing fair conduct from foul which the court from time to time may be called
upon to draw." Harrington, 38 N.C. App. at 404, 248 S.E.2d at 745 (emphasis added).
Although unfair methods of competition historically have been the most fertile ground for
litigation, the rise in the consumer movement and increased state consumer protection activities
have focused increasing attention on the unfair-or-deceptive-acts-or-practices component. See
Comment, The Trouble with Trebles: What Violates G.S. 75-1.1?, 5 CAMPBELL L. REV. 199 (1983).
In Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981), a consumer action alleging misrepre-
sentation concerning services to be provided to lessees in a mobile home park, the North Carolina
Supreme Court gave the statute a broad reading and attempted to outline "what, as a matter of
law, makes a trade practice 'unfair or deceptive.'" Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
Whether a trade practice is unfair or deceptive usually depends upon the facts of each
case and the impact the practice has in the marketplace. A practice is unfair when it
offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, op-
pressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. As also noted in John-
son, [300 N.C. at 265, 266 S.E.2d at 622,] under section 5 of the FTC Act, a practice is
deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive; proof of actual deception is not
required. Consistent with federal interpretations of decisions under Section 5, state
courts have generally ruled that the consumer need only show that an act or practice
possessed the tendency or capacity to mislead, or created the likelihood of deception, in
order to prevail under the states' unfair and deceptive practices act.
Id. The court concluded that "[u]nfairness and deception are gauged by consideration of the
effect of the practice on the marketplace. . . and the effect of the actors's conduct on the consum-
ing public." 1d.
7. Morgan, The People's Advocate in the Marketplace-The Role of The North Carolina 4t-
torney General in the Field of Consumer Protection, 6 WAKE FOREST ITrRA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1969).
8. Federal Trade Comm'n v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 312 (1934), (quoting Fed-
eral Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931)). In Keppel, the Supreme Court
discussed the purpose of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce's rejection of a specific enumeration of acts deemed unfair. Id. at 310-12
nn.l-2.
9. In L.M. Hammers v. Lowe's Cos., 48 N.C. App. 150, 268 S.E.2d 257 (1980), Judge Parker
recognized the constitutional question but was not required to reach the issue on the record before
the court.
Admittedly, the language of [the] statute, proscribing as it does "[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
1130 [Vol. 62
COMMERCIAL LAW
treble damage provision to section 75-1.1 and the constitutional requirement
that a statute "convey sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed con-
duct when measured by common understanding and practices."' 0
The applicable standard for determining whether a given statute is un-
constitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution depends on whether the statute
is penal or criminal and whether it is considered civil legislation or economic
regulation."I If the mandatory treble damages are judged by the standard ap-
plicable to penal statutes, the statute "must be sufficiently definite to give no-
tice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties, and to guide
the judge in its application and the lawyer in defending one charged with its
violation."' 2 If the statute is considered economic regulation and the
mandatory trebles predominantly remedial, however, "greater leeway is al-
lowed,"13 and "[a] finding of vagueness will. . . result only where 'the exac-
tion of obedience to a rule or standard .. was so vague and indefinite as
really to be no rule or standard at all,' . or where . . . men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion." 14 Although the nature of the vagueness inquiry under these standards
and the ultimate decision whether the statute is "too vague" or "sufficiently
definite" to pass constitutional scrutiny is not readily apparent, the practical
effect of the selection of a given standard may be determinative.
Whether the stricter standard of definiteness applicable to penal statutes
should apply to the North Carolina statute depends on the legislative intent
behind section 75-1.1 and its effect on putative defendants. Section 75-1.1 was
enacted in response to a growing need for state legislation to supplement sec-
tion 515 "so that local business interests could not proceed with impunity, se-
affecting commerce," is extremely broad, so broad and vague, indeed, as to render the
triple damage penalty provided by G.S. 75-16 in a private action brought for violation of
the vague language of G.S. 75-1.1 at least of questionable validity. On the present rec-
ord, however, we do not reach that constitutional question.
L.M. Hammers, 48 N.C. App. at 154, 268 S.E.2d at 259-60.
More recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
cited Judge Parker's skepticism and once again raised the issue. See Terry's Floor Fashions v.
Burlington Indus., 568 F. Supp. 205, 216 (E.D.N.C. 1983).
The North Carolina statute is vague, has been the subject of widely varying judicial
interpretations, and is of questionable constitutionality. The North Carolina appellate
courts have yet to provide a clear and consistent interpretation of the provisions of this
act. Indeed, defendants argue very persuasively that the act is unconstitutionally vague,
and at least one panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals has indicated its skepti-
cism as to the constitutional validity of § 75-1.1.
Id. at 216. Because the court dismissed the action on jurisdictional grounds, the constitutional
question ivas not resolved.
10. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947).
11. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
12. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952). See also United States v.
National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1947).
13. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
14. Horn v. Burns, 536 F.2d 251, 254 (8th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
15. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 543, 276 S.E.2d at 400. See also Leaffer & Lipson, Consumer Ac-
tions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission
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cure in the knowledge that the dimensions of their transgressions would not
merit federal action." 16 Rather than placing the entire burden of business reg-
ulation on the Attorney General or creating a North Carolina commission to
enforce section 75-1.1, the general assembly decided to place primary respon-
siblity for the enforcement of the statute on private parties. Treble damages
were extended to claims under section 75-1.1 for the purposes of encouraging
private enforcement by making it economically feasible to bring an action in
which possible money damages were nominal, and increasing the incentive for
reaching a settlement.17 As such the private enforcement provisions are more
analogous to section 4 of the Clayton Act' s than section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.' 9
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Marshall v. Miller20 considered
the purpose of the State's unfair and deceptive trade practices act 2 1 and the
role of the treble damage provision.22 The court concluded that the
"[legislature intended to establish an effective private cause of action for ag-
grieved consumers in this State." 23 As such, the court reiterated its earlier
characterization of 75-16 as a "hybrid."
[I]t is an oversimplification to characterize G.S. 75-16 as punitive.
Jurisprudence, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 521 (1980). The various state consumer protection acts
passed during the 1960s and 1970s to supplement § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act "had
their genesis in various forms suggested to the states by the Federal Trade Commission." Id. at
521 n.2. See generally Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 46 TULANE L. REv. 724,
730-31 (1972); Lovett, Private Actionsfor Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 AD. L. REv. 271, 275
(1970); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION C4-C5 (1970).
16. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 549, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
17. Id. at 550, 276 S.E.2d at 403-04. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 149-
50 (1978); Comment, Consumer Protection and Unfair Competition in North Carolina-The 1969
Legisiation, 48 N.C.L. REv. 896, 900 (1970).
It could be argued that the incentive provided by treble damages is not needed in the context
of an unfair-methods-of-competition claim, and thus that this component should not be subject to
mandatory treble damages. Because the plaintiffs and the defendants in an unfair-methods-of-
competition claim usually are competing businessmen and the amount in controversy is likely to
be greater than an unfair-or-deceptive-acts-or-practices claim, the plaintiff has more incentive to
bring a private action whether or not treble damages are available. This view, however, ignores
the small businessman whose actual damages, like the consumer, might be small relative to the
sales revenues of his larger competitor or supplier. The existence of an effective private cause of
action may mean the difference between continued operations or bankruptcy. Moreover, the con-
tinuing "unfair methods of competition" may have a secondary effect, effectively passing on the
damage to the ultimate consumer in the form of higher prices or misleading advertising. Thus,
under the better view, both components of § 75-1.1 and the corresponding treble damage provi-
sions should be viewed as part of a broader scheme to maintain the legitimacy and integrity of
competition and ethical standards in the marketplace.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). Section 15 provides:
[Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States
in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
19. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 542, 276 S.E.2d at 399. See also Survey of North Carolina Law,
1980-Commercial Law, 59 N.C.L. REv. 1070, 1073 (1981).
20. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
21. Id. at 543, 549-50, 276 S.E.2d at 400, 403-04.
22. Id. at 546-47, 276 S.E.2d at 403-04.
23. Id. at 543, 276 S.E.2d at 400.
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The statute is partially punitive in nature in that it clearly serves as a
deterrent to future violations. But it is also remedial for other rea-
sons, among them the fact that it encourages private enforcement
and the fact that it provides a remedy for aggrieved parties. It is, in
effect, a hybrid.24
Whereas the legislature's primary focus appears to be remedial, the effect on a
defendant convicted for a violation of section 75-1.1 is more akin to a pen-
alty.25 The individual defendant is not concerned whether his treble damage
payment is exacted for the remedial purpose of maintaining fair and ethical
standards of competition or for the purpose of punishing his past transgres-
sions; he cares only that his liability is three times the actual damages proved
by the plaintiff. Since there is no limit to the treble damage award, putative
defendants face enormous potential liability and the possibility of financial
ruin.26
In light of these conflicting views concerning the nature of the treble dam-
age provision as applied to section 75-1.1, it is important to consider the appli-
cation of the remedy by the North Carolina courts and the federal courts'
interpretation of the similar treble damage provision under the federal anti-
trust laws. In Marshall the supreme court rejected defendants' contention that
bad faith was an essential element of a section 75-1.1 treble damage claim .27
This holding follows directly from the court's conclusion that "unfairness and
deception are gauged by consideration of the effect of the practice on the mar-
ketplace," 28 and supports the "remedial" purpose of the statute. If, for exam-
ple, the statute primarily was punitive or penal in nature, the treble damage
remedy would be inappropriate in actions asserting an unwitting violation of
section 75-1.1. Since the defendant would not have been aware that his busi-
ness practices were in violation of the statute, he could not have taken steps to
comply with the statutory proscriptions. Thus, the Marshall holding supports
the "remedial" nature of section 75-16.29
24. Id. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
25. See Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367, 376 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), rev'd, 606
S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980). See also Note, Unfair Trade Practices and Unfair Methods of Competi-
tion in North Carolina: Are Both Treble and Punitive Damages Availablefor Violations of Section
75-LIZ 62 N.C.L. REv. 1139 (1984).
26. See Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d at 376, rev'd, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980).
27. 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 401.
28. Id. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403. Marshall involved a consumer challenge under the unfair-
or-deceptive-acts-or-practices component. .A similar "effect-on-the-marketplace" test was es-
poused by the court of appeals with reference to the unfair-methods-of-competition component in
Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393, 248 S.E.2d 739 (1978), disc. rev. de-
nied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469 (1979).
Unfair competition has been referred to in terms of conduct "which a court of equity
would consider unfair." Extract Co. v. Ray, 221 N.C. 269, 273, 20 S.E.2d 59, 61 (1942).
Thus viewed, the fairness or unfairness of particular conduct is not an abstraction to be
derived by logic. Rather, the fair or unfair nature of particular conduct is to be judged
* . . by determining its intended and actual effects upon others.
Id. at 400, 248 S.E.2d at 744.
29. This distinction is clarified by § 75-15.2, which provides for a civil penalty at the discre-
tion of the presiding judge if certain specified conditions are satisfied. By making the penalty
rovisions for § 75-15.2 discretionary and maintaining the mandatory treble damages provision,
the legislature has indicated the disparate purposes and functions of these sections. See Holley v.
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Further support for the proposition that the paramount concern of the
treble damages provision is maintenance of the integrity of the marketplace
rather than punishment of past violations is found in the federal courts' inter-
pretations of the nature of the federal, antitrust, treble damages under the
Clayton Act.30 In Pfizer, Inc. v. India3 l the United States Supreme Court
noted that, "[iin light of the law's expansive remedial purpose, the Court has
not taken a technical or semantic approach in determining who is a 'person'
entitled to sue for treble damages,"'32 and reiterated its previous conclusion
that the provision had two purposes: "to deter violators and deprive them of
'the fruits of their illegality' and to compensate victims of antitrust violations
for their injuries."33 As such, the great majority of the courts have held that
the primary purpose of this provision is compensatory and remedial. 34 Thus,
the plaintiff is representing not only his personal interests, but the public inter-
est as well.35
A number of decisions in Texas and Illinois support the conclusion that
the treble damage provision is primarily remedial. In Singleton v. Pen-
nington36 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court
Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229, 237-38, 259 S.E.2d 1, 6-7, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 806,
261 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
30. Prior to the enactment of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1980), § 75-16 provided for treble
damages for violation of § 75-1, North Carolina's "little Sherman act." As such, § 75-16 was
modeled after the federal, antitrust, treble damage provision, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1984). Logic dictates
that the decision to incorporate § 75-1.1 in Chapter 75 of the General Statutes in 1969, and there-
fore subject § 75-1.1 violations to mandatory treble damages (note the wording and operation of
§ 75-16), indicated that the purpose of the treble damage provision as applied to § 75-1.1 was
identical to the purpose as applied to § 75-1. Otherwise the same statutory provision would have
divergent purposes, depending on which section was violated.
31. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
32. Id. at 313.
33. Id. at 314. See also American Soe'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556 (1982); Former Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
34. See Wolf Sales Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 105 F. Supp. 506, 509 (D. Colo. 1952) and
cases cited therein. Also, in John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1977), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit summarized the nature of the
treble damages.
On the other hand, § 4 is basically a remedial provision. It provides treble damages
to "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws.." While § 4 does play an important part in penaliz-
ing and deterring wrongdoing, .. it was designed primarily as a remedy.
Id. at 498 (citations omitted). See also Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act
Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117, 147-59 (1940).
In Herald Co. v. Harper, 410 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit was faced with an action to enjoin the operation of the Clayton Act's treble
damages provision. Plaintiff alleged ten separate constitutional infirmities with the provision.
Herald Co. v. Harper, 293 F. Supp. 1101, 1102 n.1 (E.D. Mo. 1968). The court dismissed the
action "for want of a substantial constitutional question," Herald Co., 410 F.2d at 131, and thus
rejected plaintiff's contention that the provision should be treated as if it were a criminal statute.
The court stated that, "[a]ssuming arguendo that the statute is punitive in nature, 'this is not
enough to label it as a criminal statute,' to which all the constitutional safeguards of a criminal
proceeding attach." Id. at 130.
35. See Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276, 279-80 (9th Cir. 1976). This view has
been expressed with regard to N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1, 75-16 (1981) by a commentator. See
Comment, supra note 17, at 900.
36. 568 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), rev'd, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980).
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considered the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act 37 in the context of an
"innocent misrepresentation by a seller of second-hand goods who [was] not in
the business of selling such goods."38 The court of civil appeals rejected plain-
tiff's contention that the statute was remedial rather than punitive39 and stated
that "[flrom the point of view of the seller, any exaction over and above that
necessary to compensate the buyer for his loss is punitive."40 Because of this
punitive element and the potential for draconian liability, especially in the
context of class actions, the court of appeals applied the "due process require-
ment applicable to criminal penalties." 41 To construe the statute to comport
with the due process standard of reasonable notice, the court interpreted the
act to require a showing of intent to deceive.42
On appeal, however, the Texas Supreme Court overruled the court of
civil appeals and construed the statute as remedial economic regulation. 43 Al-
though the court noted that "[t]he fact that a statute limits punishment to acts
done 'knowingly' or requires specific intent as a prerequisite to punishment
has been given weight by courts rejecting challenges made on the ground of
vagueness," 44 the court concluded that the requirement of specific intent
merely would make the statute more restricted, not necessarily more specific. 45
In Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home4 6 defendant contended that
section 2 of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
was unconstitutionally vague because it affected rights protected by the first
and fourteenth amendments and because it was a penal statute.47 Although
the statute did not provide for multiple damages, a civil penalty of up to
$50,000 could be imposed. 48 The court applied the economic regulation
37. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 to .63 (Vernon Supp. 1977).
38. Singleton, 568 S.W.2d at 369.
39. Id. at 376. At the time of this case, the Texas statute provided for mandatory treble
damages. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (rex. 1977). The Texas statute declared that
"[flalse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce," were
unlawful. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1977). Subsection (b) enu-
merated a "laundry list" of specific violations in addition to the general proscription of§ 17.46(a).
The court of civil appeals addressed the constitutional claim in Singleton under the assumption
that defendant was not guilty of a § 17.46(a) per se violation, but was guilty only under the
§ 17A6(a) "umbrella" provision. But see infra note 43.
40. Singleton, 568 S.W.2d at 376.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 381.
43. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980). The Texas Supreme Court con-
cluded that defendant violated two of the specified per se violations enumerated in TEx. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1977), and that, therefore, it did not have to decide
whether the language of § 17.46(a) was unconstitutionally vague. Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 688.
Since the same treble damages provision was being applied, however, the supreme court's rejec-
tion of the court of civil appeals' characterization of the effect of the statute as primarily penal is
applicable equally to § 17.46(a).
44. Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 689.
45. Id. The court added that "[ilt is unquestionably true that deception is more reprehensible
when done intentionally and that liability for treble damages is less harsh when intent is present.
The necessity or reasonableness of specific enactments, however, is a matter of legislative discre-
tion." Id. at 689-90.
46. 88 Ill. 2d 279, 430 N.E.2d 1012 (1981).
47. Id. at 285-86, 430 N.E.2d at 1016.
48. Id. at 288, 430 N.E.2d at 1017.
1984] 1135
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
vagueness standard and held that the terms " 'unfair methods of competition'
and 'unfair acts or practices' have a sufficiently definite and well-established
meaning to overcome the allegation of vagueness." 49
The general assembly's intent in enacting section 75-1.1 and the corre-
sponding treble damages provision make it apparent that the primary purpose
of the North Carolina scheme is economic regulation. Both the state and fed-
eral courts have recognized that although the treble damages remedy is par-
tially punitive,50 the statute is not penal.51 Although the statute can be
interpreted as punitive from the standpoint of the defendant who is forced to
pay a damage award exceeding the amount necessary to compensate the plain-
tiff,52 the remedial and private enforcement objectives of section 75-16 cannot
be ignored.5 3 Thus, the proper "fair notice" test required by the due process
requirement of the fourteenth amendment is the test applied to regulatory stat-
utes governing business activity. Because North Carolina's statute is primarily
for economic regulation, the courts should not invalidate the statute on the
grounds of vagueness unless it does not convey "sufficiently definite warning
as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practices."'54
The determination of whether section 75-1.1 is unconstitutionally vague
in light of the mandatory treble damage remedy must begin with sound princi-
ples of statutory construction. Since section 75-1.1 does not implicate constitu-
tionally protected first amendment freedom,55 the statute must be interpreted
in light of the facts of each particular case.56 Furthermore, acts of the legisla-
49. Id. at 290-91, 430 N.E.2d at 1018.
50. See supra notes 24 and 33 and accompanying text.
51. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402; Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C.
App. 229, 237-39, 259 S.E.2d 1, 6-7, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979). See
also United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 n.5 (E.D.N.C. 1980),
aftd, 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981).
52. See Singleton, 568 S.W.2d at 376.
53. See Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402; Holley, 43 N.C. App. at 237-39, 259
S.E.2d at 6-7.
54. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
55. See Scott, 88 Ill. 2d 279, 285-88, 430 N.E.2d 1012, 1015-17 (1981).
[The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the first amendment is not a bar to
State regulation prohibiting false, misleading or deceptive commercial speech. "By defi-
nition, commercial speech is linked inextricably to commercial activity: while the First
Amendment affords such speech 'a limited measure of protection,' it is also true that 'the
State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the
public whenever speech is a component of that activity.'" Thus the investigation and
regulation of unfair or deceptive business practices under the Act does not, because it
cannot, impinge upon constitutionally protected speech. Since the Act prohibits only
such speech as amounts to a fraudulent or deceptive practice, te., false or misleading
advertising, it can affect only speech that is by definition outside the ambit of first
amendment protection, and within the scope of permissible State regulation.
Id. at 287, 430 N.E.2d at 1016 (citations omitted).
56. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975). See also United States v. Na-
tional Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963); State v. Covington, 34 N.C. App. 457, 460,
238 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1977).
In National Dairy the Supreme Court repeated the distinction between vagueness challenges
to statutes that arise under the first amendment and those concerning economic regulation.
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ture are presumed to be constitutional 5 7 and therefore, "statutes are not auto-
matically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in
determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language."5 8
Although section 75-1.1 admittedly is phrased in broad language, it is not
so vague as to be no rule or standard at all 59 or so indefinite as to require "men
of common intelligence... [to] guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation."'60 When section 75-1.1 was enacted the phrases "unfair methods of
competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" had a long history of
case-by-case interpretation under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. The North Carolina courts have stated repeatedly that Federal Trade
Commission decisions and judicial interpretations of section 5 may be used as
a guide in determining the scope and meaning of the statute.6 1 In addition,
claims under section 75-1.1 must be construed with reference to the numerous
legislative inclusions that have been added as per se violations since 1969.62
Given section 75-16's remedial purpose and role in the maintenance of ethical
standards of fair dealing in the marketplace, there is no reason to treat sections
75-1.1 and 75-16 differently than section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act for the purpose of a vagueness challenge. Thus, the opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission63 is equally relevant to the North Carolina scheme.
[T]he phrase [unfair methods of competition] is no more indefinite
than "due process of law." The general idea of that phrase as it ap-
pears in constitutions and statutes is quite well known; but we have
never encountered what purported to be an all-embracing schedule
or found a specific definition that would bar the continuing processes
of judicial inclusion and exclusion based on accumulating experi-
ence. If the expression, "unfair methods of competition," is too un-
certain for use, then under the same condemnation would fall the
In this connection we also note that the approach to "vagueness" governing a case
like this is different from that followed in cases arising under the First Amendment.
There we are concerned with the vagueness of the statute "on its face" because such
vagueness may in itself deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct.
No such factor is present here where the statute is directed only at conduct designed to
destroy competition, activity which is neither constitutionally protected nor socially de-
sirable. We are thus permitted to consider the warning provided by § 3 not only in terms
of the statute "on its face" but also in the light of the conduct to which it is applied.
NationalDairy, 372 U.S. at 36.
57. See Mitchell v. Financing Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E.2d 745, 750 (1968). See also
National Dairy, 372 U.S. at 32.
58. National Dairy, 372 U.S. at 32. The constitutionality of the Sherman Act was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913), against an attack on vagueness
grounds. Mr. Justice Holmes' oft-quoted remark is particularly relevant in this instance. "[T]he
law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury
subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong not only may he incur
a fine or a short imprisonment ... ; he may incur the penalty of death." Id. at 377.
59. See A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925).
60. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See Horn v. Bums, 536 F.2d
251, 254 (8th Cir. 1976).
61. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 542, 276 S.E.2d at 399.
62. See supra note I and accompanying text.
63. 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
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innumerable statutes which predicate rights and prohibitions upon
"unsound mind," "undue influence," "unfaithfulness," "unjust dis-
crimination," and the like. This statute is remedial and orders to
desist are civil; but even in criminal law convictions are upheld on
statutory prohibitions of "rebates or concessions," or of "schemes to
defraud," without any schedule of acts or specific definition of for-
bidden conduct, thus leaving the courts free to condemn new and
ingenious ways that were unknown when the statutes were enacted. 64
Although it is conceivable that a given interpretation could make the stat-
ute unconstitutionally vague,65 section 75-1.1 as applied is sufficiently definite
to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Given the predominantly remedial pur-
pose of section 75-16 and the extensive body of law that has developed under
the aegis of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, section 75-1.1 is
no more vague than many of the other terms which the law has accepted,
interpreted, and refined over the years. Although commentators and defend-
ants might quarrel with the necessity and reasonableness of the treble damages
provision 66 or prefer a different formulation of the definition of an unfair
trade practice, these considerations are a matter of legislative discretion.
GLENN CARSTEN CAMPBELL
64. Id. at 311.
65. If, for example, the North Carolina courts were to extend N.C. GEN. STAr. § 75-1.1
(1981) and the treble damages of § 75-16 to a simple breach of contract between two private
citizens not engaged in business for profit, it is conceivable that § 75-1.1 and the mandatory treble
damage provision of § 75-16 would be deemed unconstitutionally vague as applied.
66. See Aycock, supra note I, at 264. Professor Aycock notes that "the treble damage provi-
sion might be a double-edged sword." Id. at 223.
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Unfair Trade Practices and Unfair Methods of Competition in
North Carolina: Are Both Treble and Punitive Damages
Available for Violations of Section 75-1.1?
North Carolina General Statutes section 75-1.1 prohibits "unfair methods
of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in or affecting commerce."' Section 75-16 establishes a private cause of
action for "any person, firm or corporation" injured by a violation of section
75-1.1.2 Any damages assessed pursuant to section 75-1.1 are trebled automat-
ically. 3 Whether a plaintiff seeking relief under section 75-1.1 may recover
punitive damages in addition to treble damages is unsettled. North Carolina
courts never have awarded both statutory treble damages and punitive dam-
ages;4 they have, however, stopped short of declaring treble and punitive dam-
ages to be mutually exclusive. 5
Most recently, the availability of the statutory treble damages and puni-
tive damages was considered in tlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc. 6
In this diversity action, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit denied an award of treble and punitive damages. Although the result
was reached on grounds other than mutual exclusivity, 7 the majority of the
court expressed doubt that the North Carolina courts would uphold an award
of punitive damages and statutory treble damages.8 A review of the North
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981).
2. Id. § 75-16.
3. Id See also Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981); Hardy v. Toler, 288
N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975); Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229, 259 S.E.2d 1,
disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979); Rosenthal v. Perkins, 42 N.C. App. 449, 257
S.E.2d 63 (1979); Stone v. Paradise Park Homes, Inc., 37 N.C. App. 97, 245 S.E.2d 801, disc. rev.
denied, 295 N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 257 (1978).
5. See supra note 4. 4ccord Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712,
719 (4th Cir.) (Bryan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 155 (1983).
6. 705 F.2d 712 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 155 (1983).
7. In Alantic Purchasers plaintiffs brought an action for fraud and breach of express war-
ranty in connection with the purchase of an airplane. Id at 714. Plaintiffs alleged that the air-
plane's engines had been operated for more hours than defendants represented, that the necessary
airworthiness inspections had not been performed as claimed, and that the log books had been
doctored to substantiate these representations. Id The jury awarded compensatory damages of
$31,000 and punitive damages of $15,000. Id After the verdict was returned, plaintiffs moved to
treble the compensatory damages pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981), and sought attor-
neys' fees pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1 (1981). Plaintiffs had made no use of, or refer-
ence to, these statutory provisions prior to their motion. They denied that an award of punitive
damages was inconsistent with statutory treble damages and suggested that if they were inconsis-
tent, "the punitive damages should be eliminated and the actual damages trebled." Atlantic Pur-
chasers, 705 F.2d at 714-15. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed.
Although the court of appeals recognized that the jury's special verdict supported liability and
treble damages under §§ 75-1.1 and 75-16, they determined that granting plaintiffs' motion would
unfairly prejudice defendants. The court concluded: "Fundamental fairness requires in such a
case, where the statutory remedy may increase greatly the defendant's liability, that the opposing
party be notified of the possibility of the unusual relief prior to the plaintiffs tender of a proposed
judgment on the verdict." Id at 717.
8. Atlantic Purchasers, 705 F.2d at 716 n.4. The dissenting opinion supported the availabil-
ity of the statutory recovery. Moreover, the dissent argued that an award of punitive damages
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Carolina cases considering relief under section 75-1.1, of analogous North
Carolina statutes with multiple damage provisions, and of statutes and judicial
precedent in other jurisdictions, reveals the soundness of the court of appeals'
prediction. Moreover, an award of statutory treble and punitive damages ex-
ceeds the parameters of the statutory scheme envisioned by the legislature in
enacting section 75-1.1.
Analysis of this issue begins with a consideration of the substantive provi-
sions of section 75-1.1 and the characteristics of treble and punitive damages.
Since the 1960's, North Carolina and most other states have enacted consumer
protection legislation 9 designed to parallel and supplement the Federal Trade
Commission Act.' 0 These state statutes were derived from various alternative
legislative schemes suggested to the states by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)" and the Commission on Uniform State Laws.' 2 The FTC en-
couraged such statutes because enforcement of the FTC Act's section 5 prohi-
bition against "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"' 3 could not be
accomplished solely by the FTC.14 In 1969 North Carolina adopted the
broadest of the suggested forms and enacted section 75-1.1.15 Although vari-
ous common-law causes of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices had
been recognized in North Carolina,' 6 the General Assembly reacted favorably
to FTC encouragement of state legislation because the legislature perceived
that the common-law remedies were inadequate.' 7 Section 75-1.1, however,
does not supersede common-law causes of action. A plaintiff may pursue re-
does not preclude an award of treble damages for a violation of§ 75-1.1. Id at 718-21 (Bryan, J.,
dissenting).
9. Although the North Carolina legislation was enacted in part to provide enhanced con-
sumer protection, Morgan, The People's Advocate in the Marketplace-The Role of the Norh Caro-
lina Attorney General in the Field of Consumer Protection, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 1, 18-20
(1969), relief is not restricted to consumers. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981). See also Allan-
tic Purchasers, 705 F.2d 712 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 155 (1983); United Roasters, Inc. v.
Colgate Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981); Johnson v.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982).
11. [T]he FTC offered three alternative drafts of an Unfair Trade Practices and Con-
sumer Protection Law: Alternate Form No. 1 contains the broad language of § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act prohibiting "unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices" in trade or commerce; Alternate Form No. 2 outlaws all
forms of fraudulent, deceptive and sometimes unfair acts or practices in trade or com-
merce; and Alternate Form No. 3 itemizes the deceptive practices proscribed, and usu-
ally contains a "catch-all" clause reaching all other forms of deception.
Leaffer & Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices., The Private
Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 521-22 n.2 (1980).
12. Id. at 521-22.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
14. Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 11, at 522.
15. Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930.
16. See, e.g., Roberson v. Williams, 240 N.C. 696, 83 S.E.2d 811 (1954) (fraud). The North
Carolina courts have continued to recognize common-law unfair trade practices since 1969. See
Gritffn v. Wheeler Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976) (implied warranty); Rag-
sdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494 (1974) (fraud).
17. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543-44, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981).
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lief under the common law and section 75-1.1 in the same action.' 8
Unlike the FTC Act, which does not provide for a private cause of action
based on its violation,' 9 section 75-16 allows a private cause of action and
provides treble damages2 0 to encourage private enforcement of section 75-
1.1. 2 1 Trebling damages "makes more economically feasible the bringing of
an action where the possible damages are limited."2 2 The North Carolina
Supreme Court also has recognized that: "The statute is partially punitive in
nature in that it clearly serves as a deterrent to future violations. '2 3 As an
additional deterrent, the statutory scheme provides for the award of attorneys'
fees for willful misconduct.2 4
The legislature did not define what constitutes "unfair methods of compe-
tition" or "unfair or deceptive trade practices"; the scope of section 75-1.1 and
the conduct that it proscribes are to be defined by the courts.25 The North
Carolina Supreme Court has determined that a violation of section 75-1.1 and
an award of treble damages pursuant to section 75-16 do not require inten-
tional wrongdoing by the defendant.2 6 The defendant is judged on the effect
of his actions rather than his intent.27 The court also has established a bifur-
cated private-action procedure. Initially, the jury determines the facts. The
court then determines, as a matter of law, whether the defendant engaged in
unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive trade practices.2 8 If it
finds a violation, the court must treble the compensatory damages that are
established by the jury's fact finding.29
18. See Abernathy v. Ralph Squires Realty Co., 55 N.C. App. 354, 358, 285 S.E.2d 325, 327
(1982).
19. See Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981); Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d
1243, 1249 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979). See also 4 R. CALLMANN, THE
LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, § 24.01 (4th ed. 1983).
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1981). Section 75-16 was enacted in 1913 as part of the origi-
nal Chapter 75: Monopolies, Trusts and Consumer Protection. Act of Mar. 3. 1913, ch. 41, § 14,
1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 66. All provisions of Chapter 75 are subject to the treble damage provision
of § 75-16, except § 75-56 (regulating debt collection practices). Accordingly, when § 75-1.1 was
enacted in 1969 it became subject to § 75-16 as well. See Aycock, North Carolina Law on Antitrust
and Consumer Protection, 60 N.C.L. REv. 205, 258 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Aycock, North
Carolina]. In 1977, § 75-16 was amended to delete the requirement that damages be assessed by
the jury, thus making the award of treble damages automatic if compensatory damages were as-
sessed. See id at 258 n.365. See generally Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Law in
North Carolina-Federal Law Compared, 50 N.C.L. REv. 199 (1972).
21. See Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229, 235, 259 S.E.2d 1, 5, disc. rev.
denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
22. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 549, 276 S.E.2d 397, 404 (1981).
23. Id. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
25. See Aycock, North Carolina, supra note 20, at 211. For a discussion of the judicial inter-
pretation of unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive trade practices under 75-1.1,
see generally N. ALLEN, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION: THE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA
§§ 10-2, 10-3 (1982); Aycock, North Carolina,supra note 20 at 211-23; Comment, The Trouble with
Trebles.- What Violates G.S. § 75-L1?, 5 CAMPBELL L. REv. 119, 123-57 (1982).
26. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 545-46, 276 S.E.2d 397, 401-402 (1981).
27. Id at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
28. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 310, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346-47 (1975).
29. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-16 (1981).
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Although both treble and punitive damages are awards in excess of com-
pensatory damages, the justification for awarding statutory treble damages
pursuant to section 75-16 contrasts sharply with the common-law justification
for punitive damages. The treble damage provision has been recognized as
partially punitive in nature and partially an encouragement to private enforce-
ment.30 Punitive damages, however, are awarded for the sole purpose of pun-
ishing and deterring others from similar behavior. 31 Unlike an award of
treble damages under section 75-16, an award of punitive damages requires a
showing of "intentional wrongdoing, ' 32 "willful conduct,"33 or "outrageous
conduct."3 4
Because treble and punitive damages serve different purposes and are not
awarded for the same policy reasons, it has been argued that a plaintiff should
be able to recover both measures of damage.35 Furthermore, the availability
of punitive and treble damages for violations of section 75-1.1 arguably effec-
tuates the state's goals of punishment, deterrence and encouragement of pri-
vate enforcement.36 Opponents, however, contend that treble and punitive
damages are mutually exclusive. They argue that an award of both is duplica-
tive because each measure has a punitive element.3 7 The resolution of this
conflict can be advanced by considering North Carolina cases involving unfair
methods of competition or unfair or deceptive trade practices and by analyz-
ing analogous statutes in North Carolina and other jurisdictions. Ultimately,
however, legislative intent should govern the resolution of this controversy.
The issue whether treble and punitive damages are mutually exclusive
arises when a plaintiff pursues, in the same suit, a cause of action for a viola-
tion of section 75-1.1 and a common-law cause of action. The plaintiff could
seek treble damages for the statutory violation and punitive damages for the
30. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text; Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C.
App. 229, 237, 259 S.E.2d 1, 6, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
31. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112-13, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976).
32. Id
33. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 306, 218 S.E.2d 342, 344-45 (1975).
34. Id To determine punitive damage, the court submits a separate punitive damage issue to
the jury and instructs the jurors that such an award should not be made if they have not found
compensatory damages. The propriety and amount of punitive damages, however, is within the
complete discretion of the jury. See Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 111, 229
S.E.2d 297, 300-01 (1976); Phillips v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 43 N.C. App. 53, 56, 257
S.E.2d 671, 673 (1979).
35. See, e.g. ,Atlantic Purchasers, 705 F.2d at 718-20 (Bryan, J., dissenting); Roberts & Martz,
Consumerism Comes of Age: Treble Damages and Attorney Fees in Consumer Transactions-The
Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 927, 959 (1981); Note, Consumer Protec-
tion-Hardy v. Toler. Applying the North Carolina Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation- What
Rolefor the Jury?, 54 N.C.L. REv. 963, 965 n.15 (1976). Cf. Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d
873 (8th Cir. 1979) (although reversed, the district court awarded treble and punitive damages for
a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act); John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 198
N.W.2d 363 (1972) (although reversed, the Wisconsin Circuit Court awarded treble and punitive
damages for a violation of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act).
36. See Parker, The Deterrent Effect of Punitive Treble Damage Suits: Fact or Fantasy, 3
N.M.L. REv. 286, 287 (1973).
37. See, e.g.,Atlantic Purchasers, 705 F.2d at 716 n.4; Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 312, 218
S.E.2d 342, 348 (1975) (Huskins, J., concurring); Roberts & Martz, supra note 35, at 959. See also
infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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common-law violation.38 The North Carolina Court of Appeals has deter-
mined that both theories may be submitted to the jury.39 Consequently, in the
same action a jury might award compensatory damages, find a common-law
violation, and establish facts constituting a violation of section 75-1.1, which
would entitle plaintiff to treble damages. 40 If the common-law violation in-
volved intentional wrongdoing, the jury conceivably could award punitive
damages as well.4 1 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, has also
determined that a plaintiff may recover under the statutory or common-law
cause of action, but not under both.4 2 Thus, it appears that the plaintiff would
be required to choose a theory of recovery after the verdict is returned.43 Be-
cause each measure is tied to a specific theory of recovery, the plaintiff's
choice of a theory would be an election of remedies.44 A plaintiff could not
choose the statutory theory and receive treble as well as punitive damages-the
measures of damage would be mutually exclusive.
The foregoing conclusion does not resolve the treble/punitive issue. A
plaintiff might pursue a section 75-1.1 cause of action seeking treble damages
pursuant to section 75-16 and punitive damages for the statutory violation on
the basis of intentional wrongdoing. Again, a jury might award compensatory
and punitive damages and find facts constituting a violation of section 75-1.1.
Because an election between theories of recovery would be unnecessary, a
court would be faced squarely with the mutual exclusivity question. Although
the North Carolina courts never have considered the availability of common-
law punitive damages in this context, they have considered the availability of
punitive damages in connection with other North Carolina statutes that pro-
vide for multiple damage recovery.
North Carolina General Statutes section 20-348 provides for an award of
treble damages to those injured by a violation of the North ,Carolina Vehicle
Mileage Act.45 In Roberts v. Buffaloe 46 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
38. See, e.g., Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975); Gower v. Strout Realty,
Inc., 56 N.C. App. 603, 289 S.E.2d 880 (1982); Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229,
259 S.E.2d 1, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979); Rosenthal v. Perkins, 42 N.C.
App. 449, 257 S.E.2d 63 (1979); Stone v. Paradise Park Homes, Inc., 37 N.C. App. 97, 245 S.E.2d
801, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 257 (1978).
39. See Abernathy v. Ralph Squires Realty Co., 55 N.C. App. 354, 358, 285 S.E.2d 325, 327
(1982). See also United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 990-91 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981) (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981) diversity action).
40. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
42. See Marshall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 541-42, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980), modfled on
other grounds, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981); Stone v. Paradise Park Homes, Inc., 37 N.C.
App. 97, 105-06, 245 S.E.2d 801, 807-08, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 257 (1978). See
also Atlantic Purchasers, 705 F.2d at 716 n.4.
43. The North Carolina courts that have considered a suit such as the hypothetical described
here did not address the availability of treble and punitive damages. Although none of these
courts awarded both remedies, the results were reached on grounds other than mutual exclusivity.
See supra note 38.
44. Presumably the plaintiff could elect the cause of action and accompanying measure of
damage which yielded the largest award.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-340 to -350 (1983).
46. 43 N.C. App. 368, 258 S.E.2d 861 (1979).
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rejected the possibility of an award of punitives along with the treble damage
remedy.47 The court ruled that common-law punitive damages were pre-
cluded by the statute.4 8
North Carolina General Statutes section 1-539.1 provides for an award of
double damages to those injured by a wrongful cutting of timber, under tres-
pass. At common law, damages for wrongful timber cutting could be en-
hanced, as a penal measure, if the trespasser was a "knowing wrongdoer." 49
Such damages were calculated by valuing the timber where cut and enhancing
that measure by the value added by the trespasser's labors. Thus, the plaintiff
was awarded the full value of the timber as held or disposed by the defend-
ant.50 In Jones v. Georgia-Pacoc Corp. 51 plaintiff sought double damages pur-
suant to section 1-539.1 and enhanced damages. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals rejected such an award. The court characterized the common-law
enhanced damage measure and the statutory damages as mutually exclusive.52
The above decisions suggest that the North Carolina courts would find
punitive and treble damages for violation of section 75-1.1 to be mutually ex-
clusive. Court interpretations of the "little FTC Acts" of other states also are
instructive in resolving the punitive/treble damage issue. Legislation concern-
ing unfair trade practices and consumer protection now has been enacted in
forty-eight other states.53 These statutes, however, offer limited assistance. Of
the forty-eight, only one-third provide for multiple damages.54 Many of the
states that provide for multiple damages also require a showing of intentional
misconduct.55 Because an award of treble damages under section 75-16 does
not require intentional misconduct,5 6 it can be argued that punitive damages
should be allowed when such conduct is present. In states where intentional
misconduct is required for an award of multiple damages, the argument for
punitive damages is less persuasive. These jurisdictions appear to have incor-
porated a punitive damages remedy into the statute.57
47. id at 372, 258 S.E.2d at 863.
48. Id The analogy between N.C. GEN STAT. § 75-16 (1981) and Id. § 20-348 (1983) is de-
fective in one respect. A violation of§ 75-1.1 and an award of treble damages under § 75-16 does
not require a showing of intentional wrongdoing. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
A violation of § 20-348, however, requires a showing that the defendant acted with "intent to
defraud." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-348 (1983). Although it could be argued that punitive damages
should be available for intentional wrongdoing that violates § 75-1.1, such an argument is less
persuasive regarding § 20-348. Roberts, however, was not decided on this ground.
49. Dobbs, Trespass to Land in North Carolina.- Part IL Remediesfor Trespass, 47 N.C.L.
REv. 334, 336-37 (1969).
50. Id
51. 15 N.C. App. 515, 190 S.E.2d 422 (1972).
52. Id at 518, 190 S.E.2d at 424.
53. See Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 11, at 531.
54. See id at 560-64. "Multiple damages" refers to the doubling or trebling of compensatory
damages.
55. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(c) (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409A (West
Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 11 ('West 1975 & Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 39-5-140 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(a) (1979).
56. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
57. Put see Colonial Lincoln-Mercury Sales, Inc. v. Molina, 152 Ga. App. 379, 382, 262
S.E.2d 820, 823 (1979) (although recognizing that a violation of the Georgia unfair trade practice
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Those states that do not require intentional misconduct have not ad-
dressed the mutual exclusivity issue.58 Although the North Carolina courts
have emphasized that treble damages serve to encourage private enforce-
ment,59 other "nonintentional" jurisdictions highlight the punitive aspect of
such an award. 60 This emphasis weighs against the award of punitive dam-
ages in addition to multiple damages. 61 Thus, it appears that many states
might find multiple damages and punitive damages to be mutually exclusive
in an unfair or deceptive trade practice action. Because the language and in-
terpretation of the North Carolina statutes differ significantly from other juris-
dictions, however, the applicability of this conclusion to sections 75-1.1 and
75-16 is limited.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that federal decisions inter-
preting the FTC Act may be used as guidance in determining the conduct that
constitutes a violation of section 75-1.1.62 Because the FTC Act does not pro-
vide for a private cause of action, however, it does not provide an analogy for
resolving whether punitive damages may be recovered when treble damages
are awarded under section 75-16. As noted by the North Carolina Supreme
Court: "[TIhe provisions for private enforcement found in [section 75-16] are
more closely analogous to Section 4 of the Clayton Act,[631 which provides for
private suits with treble damage recovery for violation of federal antitrust
laws." 64 The federal courts consistently have ruled that punitive damages are
unavailable to a plaintiff who is awarded treble damages65 for a violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.66 These courts have characterized treble damages
as punitive, and accordingly, they view punitive damages as a double recov-
statutes required intentional conduct, the court suggested that punitive damages were "permissi-
ble" along with an award of "mandatory" treble damages under the statute).
58. See, e.g., Roberts & Martz, supra note 35, at 958 ("not clear" whether a plaintiff can
recover treble damages under the Ohio unfair trade practice statutes and also recover punitive
damages).
59. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. 267, 274-75, 390 A.2d 566, 571
(1978) (Pashman, J., concurring). Cf. Bailey Employment Sys. v. Hahn, 545 F. Supp. 62, 73 (D.
Conn. 1982) (punitive damages allowable under Connecticut unfair trade practice statutes in
judge's discretion; court awarded compensatory damages doubled).
61. But see D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1) (1981) (no requirement of intentional conduct
to show violation of District of Columbia unfair trade practice statutes, but treble damages and
punitive damages enumerated as possible awards).
62. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 542,276 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1981); Johnson v. Phoenix
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 262-63, 266 S.E,2d 610, 620-21 (1980); Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C.
303, 308, 218 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1975).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
64. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 542, 276 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1981).
65. See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 888 (8th Cir. (1979); Hansen Packing
Co. v. Armour & Co., 16 F. Supp. 784, 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) Cf. Hometowne Builders, Inc. v.
Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 477 F. Supp. 717, 719-20 (E.D. Va. 1979) (finding "duplicative" an award of
punitive damages along with the treble damage recovery of 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1982), an "addition
to the antitrust laws"). See also John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 409, 198
N.W.2d 363, 367-68 (1972) (noting that while the Wisconsin version of the Sherman Antitrust Act
was designed to encourage private enforcement and punish violators, the award of punitives with
statutory trebles "would amount to double recovery of a penalty and thus violate the basic fairness
of a judicial proceeding required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
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ery.67 Treble damages are an exclusive remedy for the violation of the federal
antitrust statutes.68 Since the North Carolina courts have relied heavily on
federal decisions interpreting section 5 of the FTC Act when interpreting sec-
tion 75-1.1, the federal decisions concerning the availability of punitive and
treble damages for violations of the federal antitrust laws also are instructive.
These decisions suggest that the North Carolina courts would find punitive
and treble damages to be mutually exclusive.
In Marshall v. Miller69 the North Carolina Supreme Court considered
whether a violation of section 75-1.1 should require a showing of intentional
wrongdoing. The court recognized that legislative intent should govern its de-
termination.70 Likewise, legislative intent ultimately should govern whether
punitive and treble damages are mutually exclusive under sections 75-1.1 and
75-16. Although the foregoing consideration of analogous statutes, both
within and without the state, is instructive on how the North Carolina courts
should resolve this issue, a sounder approach is to attempt to effectuate the
legislature's statutory intent.
The void left by the lack of written legislative history regarding section
75-1.1 has been filled by the judiciary. As declared by the courts, the essence
of the legislative intent was to supplement the common law in the area of
unfair or deceptive trade practices, 71 to encourage private enforcement,7 2 and
to provide a punitive measure.73 Thus, the General Assembly enacted section
75-1.1 creating "an entirely statutory cause of action"'74 and provided the ex-
isting treble damage provision of section 75-16 as the remedy for that cause of
action. The result was a cause of action "broader than traditional common
law actions," 75 an "expansion" of the common law,7 6 and a remedy more eas-
ily recovered than remedies at common law.7 7 Thus, it is inconsistent with this
scheme to interject common-law punitive damages upon the showing of inten-
tional wrongdoing, an element not required under section 75-16.
The inconsistency between punitive damages and legislative intent is most
apparent when considering the punitive intent of the treble damage provision.
An award of treble damages under section 75-16 represents both an incentive
67. See supra note 65.
68. Hansen Packing Co. v. Armour & Co., 16 F. Supp. 784, 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
69. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
70. Id at 543, 276 S.E.2d at 400.
71. See id
72. See id; State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 320, 233 S.E.2d 895, 900
(1977); Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229,237, 259 S.E.2d 1, 6, disc. rev. denied, 298
N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
73. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402; Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C.
App. 229, 237, 259 S.E.2d 1, 6, disc. rev, denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
74. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
75. .Id at 547, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
76. Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229, 241, 259 S.E.2d 1, 9, disc. rev. denied,
298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
77. For example, although at common law actionable fraud required an "intent to deceive,"
Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974), an award of treble damages




for private enforcement and a punitive measure. The award is one; it cannot
be apportioned between these aspects. Necessarily, an additional award of
punitive damages overlaps and duplicates the punitive portion of treble dam-
ages. It would be a double recovery, prohibited in North Carolina, to the
extent that the treble award represents a punitive element.7 8 Thus, punitive
damages and a treble damage recovery under section 75-16 should be deemed
mutually exclusive.
It could be argued that because the statutory cause of action does not,
require intentional wrongdoing, the outrageous conduct associated with inten-
tional wrongdoing demands an additional punitive remedy. This argument is
particularly appealing when compensatory damages, even when trebled, result
in a minimal award.79 The response is two-fold. First, the legislature contem-
plated intentional conduct in connection with a violation of section 75-1.1.
Under North Carolina General Statutes section 75-16.1, a plaintiff injured by
a violation of section 75-1.1 may recover attorneys' fees upon a showing that
the defendant acted "willfully." Section 75-16.1 also was intended to en-
courage private enforcement.80 Although the award of attorneys' fees is not a
punitive provision, it does enable the plaintiff to recover an increased award
for intentional wrongdoing.81 Had the legislature intended punitive damages
to be available in connection with violations of section 75-1.1, they would have
provided such a remedy for intentional wrongdoing.
Second, in cases involving intentional wrongdoing in which treble dam-
ages are minimal, the plaintiff may pursue a common-law cause of action and
seek punitive damages. Since a plaintiff may pursue the common-law and the
statutory causes of action in the same suit,8 2 if punitive damages are warranted
and are awarded by the jury, he may elect such a remedy in lieu of the statu-
tory treble damages.8 3
78. See Smith v. Gulf Oil Corp., 239 N.C. 360, 368, 79 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1954); Marshall v.
Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 542, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980), modfiedon other grounds, 302 N.C. 539,
276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
79. Cf. J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY: PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS § 198
(1972).
80. See Marshall, 302 N.C. at 549, 276 S.E.2d at 404. In Marshall, the court stated:
We further note that G.S. 75-16.1 also provides that an unsuccessful plaintiff may be
charged with defendant's attorney fees should the court find that "It]he party instituting
the action knew, or should have known, the action was frivolous and malicious." This is
an important counterweight designed to inhibit the bringing of spurious lawsuits which
the liberal damage provisions of G.S. 75-16 might otherwise encourage.
Id Thus, it is doubtful that the court would liberalize further the damages available for a viola-
tion of § 75-1.1 by legitimizing an award of punitive damages.
81. Like punitive damages, an award of attorneys' fees under § 75-16.1 requires a finding by
the jury of some amount of compensatory damages.' Compare supra note 34 and accompanying
text with Mayton v. Hiatt's Used Cars, Inc., 45 N.C. App. 206, 212, 262 S.E.2d 860, 864, disc. rev.
denied, 300 N.C. 198, 269 S.E.2d 624 (1980) (court denied an award of attorneys' fees because
plaintiff did not suffer actual injury).
82. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. Cf. B.B. Walker Co. v. Ashland Chem.
Co., 474 F. Supp. 651 (M.D.N.C. 1979). In Walker, plaintiff sued under both the North Carolina
common law of unfair competition and § 75-1.1. Although the statute of limitations applicable to
the statute had expired, plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages of $10 and punitive dam-
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One final ground for the mutual exclusivity of punitive and treble dam-
ages exists. Punitive damages should not be used to supplement a statutory
scheme in which treble damages have been provided explicitly and no provi-
sion has been made for additional damages. When considering the availabil-
ity of punitive damages along with double damages under the North Carolina
statute governing wrongful cutting of timber,84 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals stated:
It is settled law that statutes in derogation of the common law or
statutes imposing a penalty must be strictly construed. Strict con-
struction. . . requires that everything be excluded from the opera-
tion of the statute which does not come within the scope of the
language used, taking the words in their natural and ordinary
meaning.8 5
Because section 75-1.1 is in "derogation of the common law" causes of action
for unfair or deceptive trade practices86 and section 75-16 imposes a penalty,8 7
strict construction is in order. Absent explicit legislative inclusion, punitive
damages should be excluded from the statutory scheme.88 Punitive damages
and treble damages should be mutually exclusive.
In conclusion, the North Carolina cases that have interpreted sections 75-
1.1 and 75-16 and the interpretations of analogous statutes within and without
North Carolina suggest that the North Carolina courts should conclude that
statutory treble damages and punitive damages are mutually exclusive. More
importantly, the North Carolina courts' interpretation of the legislative intent
suggests that the two measures should be mutually exclusive. Until the courts
or legislature resolve this issue, however, the prudent plaintiff should pursue
punitive damages under both the common-law and statutory causes of action.
CHRISTOPHER BLAIR CAPEL
ages of $250,000 under the common-law cause of action. Pursuant to § 75-16, recovery would
have been limited to treble damages of $30.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.1 (1982). See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
85. Jones v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 15 N.C. App. 515, 518, 190 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1972) (cita-
tions omitted).
86. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
87. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
88. Cf. Hometowne Builders, Inc. v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 477 F. Supp. 717, 719 (E.D. Va.
1979) (in construing a federal antitrust treble damage provision, the court stated: "The absence of
any discussion [in the legislative history] of punitive damages in excess of treble damages is a
strong indication that such damages were not contemplated by Congress and were not implied in
the statute."); Marshall, 302 N.C. at 547, 276 S.E.2d at 402 ("Absent statutory language making
trebling discretionary with the trial judge, we must conclude that the Legislature intended trebling
of any damages assessed to be automatic once a violation is shown."); John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v.
Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 409, 198 N.W.2d 363, 367 (1972) (because the Wisconsin antitrust statute
explicitly creates treble damages, the statutory remedy is exclusive of punitive damages).
If the North Carolina legislature had intended punitive damages to be available, it could have
enumerated trebles as well as punitives, as has been done in the District of Columbia. See D.C.
CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1) (1981).
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North Carolina's License Revocation for Drunk Drivers: Minor
Inconvenience or Unconstitutional Deprivation?
North Carolina General Statutes section 20-16.5, added by the 1983
North Carolina Safe Roads Act,' establishes a mandatory, immediate, ten-
day, pretrial license revocation for certain drivers charged with driving while
intoxicated (DWI).2 Since possession of a driver's license is a property interest
protected by the notice and hearing guarantees of due process,3 section 20-16.5
implicates these due process guarantees. The leading United States Supreme
Court case in this area, Mackey v. Montrym ,4 establishes a "balancing of com-
peting interests" test to determine when the revocation of a driver's license
without a prior hearing is constitutional. 5 The test set out in Mackey, how-
ever, ignores the Court's earlier decision in Bell v. Burson.6 The Bell rule
states that a presuspension hearing always must be held before deprivation of
an important property interest 7 unless an emergency 8 exists. This note applies
both the Mackey "competing interests" test and the Bell "emergency" test to
section 20-16.5 and concludes that under either test the new provision is
unconstitutional.
There are two types of individuals whose licenses are revoked under the
mandatory provisions of section 20-16.5-those who refuse a chemical test af-
ter a DWI arrest, and those who take the test and show a blood alcohol con-
centration of 0.10 percent or more.9 The revocation occurs without a hearing.
A judicial official1 ° determines, based on the revocation report filed by the
charging officer and the chemical analyst,1 ' whether there is probable cause to
believe that the conditions requiring revocation are present.' 2 If he finds
1. Act of June 3, 1983, ch. 435, § 14, 1983 3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-16.5 (1983)).
2. Id. DWI is the term applied to the impaired driving offenses consolidated under the Safe
Roads Act.
3. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
4. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
5. Id. at 5.
6. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
7. Id at 537.
8. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-101(l) (1983).
10. Id. § 15-105(5) defines a "judicial official" as "a magistrate, clerk, judge, or justice of the
General Court of Justice."
1 I. Id. § 20-16.5(a)(4). Section 20-16.5(c) provides that "[i]f the person has refused to submit
to a chemical analysis, a copy of the report to be submitted. . . may be substituted for the revoca-
tion report if it contains the information required by.this section."
12. I. § 20-16.5(b). The judicial official makes the probable cause determination only if the
revocation report is filed with the judicial official while the DWI offender is present. Id. § 20-
16.5(e). If a blood test is given, so that the offender already will have been released when the
results are received, or if a DWI offender is given a citation rather than arrested, the procedure
enumerated in § 20-16.5(f) applies. In that case the revocation report will be presented to the clerk
of court, who will determine probable cause on the basis of the report and any other evidence
presented to him. If probable cause is found the clerk will mail a revocation order to the offender.
J. DRENNAN, THE SAFE ROADS ACT OF 1983: A SUMMARY AND COMPILATION OF STATUTES
AMENDED OR AFFECTED BY THE AT 24 (1983).
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probable cause, the judicial official is required to enter an order revoking the
individual's license for ten days. 13 The revocation is absolute-no temporary
permits or limited driving privileges are provided.' 4 Section 20-16.5(g), how-
ever, does provide for a postrevocation hearing to determine whether the revo-
cation was proper. The judicial official must inform the individual charged
with DWI, both personally and in the revocation order, of his right to a hear-
ing.15 The individual then may submit a written request for a hearing, but his
license remains revoked pending that hearing.' 6 The hearing must be held
within three working days of the issuance of the order (five if the hearing is
before a district court judge), 17 and the decision is final.' 8
The fourteenth amendment guarantees an individual the due process pro-
tections of notice and hearing before being deprived of an important property
interest.' 9 Due process analysis20 of summary license revocation involves ex-
amination of two issues: whether the right in question is protected and what
procedural protections must be accorded an individual possessing the right.2'
Once granted, a driver's license is an important interest entitled to fourteenth
amendment protection.22 Thus, the question of constitutionality centers on
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.5(e) (1983). The revocation period begins at the time the order
is issued and the license surrendered and continues for ten days (or until the revocation is re-
scinded under § 20-16.5(g)), and a $25 fee, see id. § 20-16.5(j), has been paid. If the person does
not have a valid license, the revocation continues until ten days from the date the revocation order
is issued. Id. § 20-16.5(e).
14. Id. § 20-16.5(i).
15. Id. § 20-16.5(e).
16. Id. § 20-16.5(g).
17. Id. If the hearing does not take place within these time limits, and the person contesting
the revocation has not contributed to the delay, the revocation is rescinded. Id.
18. Id.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
20. The constitutionality of pretrial license revocation has been challenged on other grounds
than due process. Both equal protection and right-to-travel arguments have been proffered, but
no court has accepted them.
Right-to-travel cases concern the right of a person to go to a certain location; they do not
establish a constitutional right to travel by a certain mode of transportation. Suspension of a
driver's license does not prevent an individual from traveling wherever and whenever he chooses;
it merely limits his mode of getting there. McGue v. Sillas, 82 Cal. App. 3d 799, 805, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 357 (1978).
The equal protection argument asserts that, for some people, deprivation of a driver's license
is equivalent to deprivation of the ability to work, causing a hardship of varying degrees. Section
20-16.5 presents no equal protection problems, however, because no particular class of persons is
selected for suspension. Cf. Kellum v. Thorneycroft, 113 Ariz. 115, 116-17, 649 P.2d 994, 995-96
(1982); Murphey v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 86 Cal. App. 3d 119, 122-23, 150 Cal. Rptr. 20,
22 (1978); Pepin v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 275 Cal. App. 2d 9, 11, 79 Cal. Rptr. 657, 659
(1969).
21. Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.
22. Bell states that how possession is achieved is irrelevant to the protection granted:
Once licenses are issued . . . their continued possession may become essential in the
pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adju-
dicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken
away without that procedural Due Process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. This
is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints
limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a
"right" or a "privilege."
Id. at 539 (citations omitted). See also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977). Therefore, that
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whether the procedural due process requirements of notice and hearing are
satisfied by pretrial revocation statutes.
In Bell the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Georgia
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,23 which provided for automatic sus-
pension of the license of any uninsured motorist involved in an accident, irre-
spective of fault, unless he posted security to cover the amount of damages.
The Act provided an administrative hearing before suspension, but limited the
issues that could be raised in this summary proceeding. 24 The Supreme Court
held that this scheme violated the fourteenth amendment by failing to afford
petitioner a prior hearing on liability, and stated that "except in emergency
situations . . . due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an
interest such as that here involved, it must afford 'notice and an opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termination be-
comes effective." '25
Bell left open the question of what constituted an emergency sufficient to
justify dispensing with notice and the opportunity for a hearing. In Fuentes v.
Shevin,26 however, the Court defined "emergencies" for due process purposes.
Fuentes dealt with state laws authorizing the prehearing seizure of property
upon the exparte application of any individual claiming a right to that prop-
erty.27 The Court established three requirements that had to be satisfied
before such a seizure would be within the "emergency exception" to the due
process requirement of a prior hearing.
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure
an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there
has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has
kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for
determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it
was necessary and justified in the particular instance.28
Following Fuentes, several courts applied this three-prong test to deter-
mine the constitutionality of pretrial driver's license revocation for failure to
submit to chemical testing under implied consent laws.29 All fifty states have
North Carolina courts have termed the possession of a driver's license a "conditional privilege"
rather than a "right," Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226, 235, 182 S.E.2d 553, 559 (1973), has no
bearing on the State's power to terminate possession.
23. Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-601 (1983).
24. The issue of fault could not be raised. The only evidence allowed to be considered during
the administrative hearing was "(a) [whether] the petitioner or his vehicle [was] involved in the
accident; (b) [whether] petitioner complied with the provisions of the Law as provided; or (c)
[whether] petitioner [came] within any of the exceptions of the Law." Bell, 402 U.S. at 537-38.
25. Id. at 542 (citations omitted).
26. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
27. Id. at 68.
28. Id. at 91.
29. See, e.g., Slone v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp., 379 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ky. 1974), aft'd,
513 F.2d 1189 (1975); Chavez v. Campbell, 397 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Ariz 1975); Holland v. Parker,
354 F. Supp. 196 (D.S.D. 1973); Graham v. State, 633 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1981).
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"implied consent" laws.30 Under these statutes, a motorist, simply by driving
on the roads of a state, gives implied consent to chemical testing of his alcohol
concentration level if he is arrested for DWI.3 t If the motorist refuses a chem-
ical test, his license is suspended for some statutorily determined period of
time.32 Applying the Fuentes test, courts generally have held that license revo-
cations under implied consent laws are not related directly to an emergency
and, therefore, are unconstitutional under Bell.33
The Supreme Court applied a different analysis, however, in Mackey v.
Montrym,34 and held a similar statute constitutional. Under the Massachu-
setts implied consent law challenged in Mackey, a driver's license was auto-
matically suspended for ninety days upon refusal to take a breath analysis test
when arrested for DWI.35 The statute provided an immediate hearing before
a state official at any time after the license was suspended, but provided no
procedure for a presuspension hearing.36 The Court stated that "the para-
mount interest the Commonwealth has in preserving the safety of its public
highways. . . distinguishes this case from [Bell]."'3 7 Thus, the Court, without
discussion, assumed that the case presented an emergency, and that the re-
quirement of a presuspension hearing therefore was negated. The Court, how-
ever, did not analyze the statute under the three-prong Fuentes test; instead,
the Court applied the "balancing of interests" test, first set out in Mathews v.
Eldridge,"s to determine whether the procedure satisfied due process. In Ma-
thews the Court had held that due process analysis requires consideration of
three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
30. Note, Implied Consent Laws: Some Unsettled Constitutional Questions, 32 RUT RS L.J.
99, 99 n.2 (1980) (citing to the laws of all fifty states).
31. Id. at 101.
32. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (1983) (automatic 12-month revocation).
33. In Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D.S.D. 1973), the United States District
Court for the District of South Dakota applied Fuentes to that State's implied consent law, stating,
'itfhere is an important governmental and general public interest in keeping the drunk driver off
the road. ... Secondly, it could be argued that there is a special need for 'very prompt action,'
and finally the person initiating the seizure is a 'government offical' (a law enforcement officer)."
Although the statute ostensibly met the Fuentes criteria, the Holland court found the statute un-
consitutional under Bell because the summary procedure was not in response to an emergency.
The court reasoned that since only those drivers who refused the test, and not those who failed the
test, had their licenses revoked, it was clear that the summary revocation was not related directly
to the State's need to keep drunk drivers offthe road. The court's analysis does not apply to North
Carolina's Safe Roads Act, since North Carolina's § 20-16.2 provides for revocation both for mo-
torists who refuse alcohol testing and for those who show 0.10% or more blood alcohol
concentration.
34. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
35. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(l)() (West Supp. 1983).
36. Id. § 24(l)(g) (West 1975). The hearing would have resolved all questions about whether
grounds existed for the suspension. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 7.
37. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 17. The Court apparently based the distinction on the fact that Bell
concerned revocation for failure to post security, a situation that did not threaten public safety.
38. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews involved termination of disability benefits. The Court
balanced the governmental and private interests and determined that an evidentiary hearing is not
required prior to termination of payments and that the administrative procedures set out in the
Social Security Act comport with due process.
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the procedures used, and the possible value, if any, of additional or
substitute safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, includ-
ing the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. 39
The Mackey Court applied this test to the Massachusetts license suspen-
sion provision, recognizing the importance of the private interest affected, that
of "continued possession and use of the license pending the outcome of the
hearing." 40 The weight given to this important interest, as balanced against
the governmental interest, was to be determined by weighing, in turn, three
additional factors devised by the Mackey Court: the duration of the revoca-
tion; the availability of hardship relief; and the availability of prompt post-
revocation review.4 1 Although acknowledging a substantial private interest,
the Mackey Court also recognized the strength of the government's interest in
preserving the safety of the highways42 and in easing fiscal and administrative
burdens. 43 The availability of prompt postrevocation review for correction of
any erroneous deprivation44 tipped the balance in favor of the State interest;
the Mackey Court therefore held that the Massachusetts implied consent stat-
ute was constitutional."5 The Court believed that "the compelling interest in
highway safety justifies the Commonwealth in making a summary suspension
effective pending the outcome of the prompt postsuspension hearing
available."46
Justice Stewart, however, believed that Bell mandated a presuspension
hearing in Mackey. 47 He reemphasized that under Bell the presuspension
hearing requirement is negated only in an emergency, and stated that the Mas-
39. Id. at 335.
40. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 11. The Court in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977), recognized
that the interest in a driver's license is a substantial one, since the State cannot make a driver
whole for any personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by reason of any delay in
redressing an erroneous suspension through postsuspension review procedures.
41. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 12.
42. Id. at 18. The Court found that summary suspension was justified because its existence
acted to deter drunk driving and contributed to highway safety by removing drunk drivers from
the roads.
43. Id. See also Reese & Burgel, Summary Suspension of Drunken Drivers' Licenses- Pre-
liminary Constitutional Inquiry, 35 AD. L. Rav. 313 (1983). "[W]hen considering the government's
interest, it is also necessary to determine whether that interest would be defeated or severely lim-
ited by the time delay inherent in providing a pre-deprivation hearing." Id. at 320 (citation
omitted).
44. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 13. In construing this second prong of the Mathews test, the Court
stated,
[T]he Due Process Clause has never been construed to require that the procedures used
to guard against an erroneous deprivation of a protectible "property" or "liberty" inter-
est be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of error. . . .And, when prompt
post-deprivation review is available. . . we generally have required no more than that
the deprivation procedures used be designed to provide a reasonably reliable basis for
concluding that the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental
official warrants them to be.
Id. (citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 19.
47. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined Justice Stewart in dissent. Id.
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sachusetts statute was not concerned with an emergency situation.48 Justice
Stewart acknowledged that "the dimensions of a prior hearing may. . . vary
depending upon the nature of the case, the interests affected, and the prompt
availability of adequate postdeprivation procedures," but believed that "when
adjudicative facts are involved, when no valid governmental interest would
demonstrably be disserved by delay, and when full retroactive relief cannot be
provided, an after-the-fact evidentiary hearing on a crucial issue is not consti-
tutionally sufficient." 49 The dissent believed that the Bell-Fuentes test, rather
than the Mathews test, was applicable.
The Supreme Court has not determined the constitutionality of an im-
plied consent statute that suspends licenses both for refusing to take a chemical
test and for failing the test, but the Minnesota Supreme Court in Hedden v.
Dirkswagers° was faced with such a question. The Minnesota implied consent
statute mandates a ninety-day suspension for failing a chemical test by regis-
tering blood alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more and a six-month
suspension for refusing to take the test.5 1 The statute also provides for the
automatic issuance of a temporary seven-day license upon revocation and es-
tablishes a form of postsuspension administrative review.52 The Hedden
Court, relying on Mackey, held that the Minnesota scheme was constitu-
tional.53 The court stated that since "drunken drivers pose a severe threat to
the health and safety of the citizens of Minnesota, the compelling interest in
highway safety justifies the State of Minnesota in making a revocation pend-
ing the outcome of the prompt post-suspension hearing. '54
To determine whether section 20-16.5 is constitutional, the North Caro-
lina courts probably will apply the Mackey test. The Mackey Court, however,
incorrectly applied the balancing of interests test set out in Mathews.55 The
Supreme Court specifically stated in Bell that due process requires a presus-
pension hearing except in an emergency situation. 56 Thus, according to Bell,
the Mackey Court should have applied the three-prong Fuentes test5 7 to deter-
mine whether the Massachusetts prehearing revocation scheme was constitu-
tional as an exception to the general rule requiring hearings.
The summary revocation of section 20-16.5 is unconstitutional under Bell
because the ten-day automatic revocation of DWI offenders' licenses does not
respond to an emergency. Under the first criterion of the Fuentes test, license
revocation without prior hearing is justifiable only when it is "directly neces-
48. Id. at 20 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The suspension penalty itself is concededly imposed
not as an emergency measure to remove unsafe drivers from the roads, but as a sanction to induce
drivers to submit to breath-analysis tests.").
49. Id. at 21-22.
50. 336 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1983).
51. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (West Supp. 1983).
52. Id.
53. Hedden, 336 N.W.2d at 56.
54. Id. at 63.
55. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 621154
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
sary to secure an important governmental or general public interest" 58 Fur-
ther, under the second criterion, there must be a "special need for very prompt
action" that is served by the revocation.5 9 Although North Carolina has an
important interest in protecting its citizens from drunk drivers, 60 the
mandatory license suspension of section 20-16.5 goes far beyond what is "di-
rectly necessary" to effectuate that interest. Before automatic ten-day revoca-
tion of the DWI offender's license can be justified as a "directly necessary"
response to an emergency situation, or to a "special need for very prompt ac-
tion,"6 1 it must be presumed that these individuals would drive drunk during
that ten-day period. Although there is a need for very prompt action when the
driver is drunk and on the road, the fact that the driver may be removed from
the road by arrest, and held until he is sober enough to drive, makes it unlikely
that the ten-day revocation is "necessary and justified"62 by the need for
prompt action. The act of arrest itself suffices to protect the government's in-
terest in public safety by removing immediately the drunk driver from the
highways. Thus, section 20-16.5 overreaches the governmental interest. Since
the automatic, ten-day revocation is not "directly necessary" to keep North
Carolina's roads safe, section 20-16.5 fails under the Fuentes emergency excep-
tion, and the prehearing suspension is unconstitutional under Bell.
The motivation behind the legislature's adoption of such a stringent
measure, which bears only a tangential relationship to the interest it ostensibly
seeks to protect, is clear. Justice Stewart's criticism of the Massachussetts li-
cense suspension provision examined in Mackey is applicable equally to the
North Carolina provision: "The suspension penalty itself is concededly im-
posed not as an emergency measure to remove unsafe drivers from the roads,
but as a sanction .... *"63 Although there is a justifiable governmental inter-
est in maintaining safe roads, there is an equally strong desire, among the
legislators and the public, to punish DWI offenders. Commentary on the
adoption of the Safe Roads Act bears out this presumption. 64 Proponents of
the Act , stressed the need for "an immediate 'slap in the face' to virtually all
drivers charged with DWI" and for certainty of punishment for DWI offend-
ers.65 Indeed, the very title of the bill seems to indicate that punishment of
drunk drivers was at least as important a force behind the enactment of the bill
as protection of the citizenry.66 Punishment of the DWI offender, even though
58. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., State v. Carlisle, 285 N.C. 229, 232, 204 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1974): "The purpose of a
revocation proceeding is not to punish the offender, but to remove from the highway one who is a
potential danger to himself and other travelers." (citation omitted). See also Harrell v. Scheidt,
243 N.C. 735, 740-41, 92 S.E.2d 182, 186 (1956).
61. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
62. Id.
63. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 30 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
64. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
65. J. DRENNAN, LEGISLATION OF INTEREST TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS 117 (1983). See also J.
DRENNAN, supra note 12, at 1.
66. The Safe Roads Act was entitled "An Act to Provide Safe Roads By Requiring
Mandatory Jail Terms for Grossly Aggravated Drunken Drivers, Providing an Effective Deterrent
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a legitimate governmental purpose when effectuated by other means, does not
support license revocation without the usual due process requirement of prior
hearing under either the Bell-Fuentes emergency rule or the Mackey -Matthews
balancing test.
In applying the Mathews test, the Mackey Court implictly overruled Bell
in part. Because Bell requires a hearing before terminating an important prop-
erty interest unless an emergency is involved, 67 there is no room under the Bell
rule for weighing competing interests in determining whether a presuspension
hearing is required. The Mackey-Matthews test, however, depends on balanc-
ing the private interest of "continued possession and use of the license pending
the outcome of the hearing" 68 against the government's interest in safe roads.
This private interest is an important one, and the balance can tip in favor of
allowing prehearing revocation only when sufficient remedies to protect the
private interest exist.69 The Hedden court applied the Mackey test and found
the prehearing suspension under the Minnesota implied consent law to be con-
stitutional. That revocation scheme, however, unlike the North Carolina pro-
vision, provided for protection of the private interest in possession of the
license.70 Besides including provisions for prompt postrevocation review, the
Minnesota statute allowed a limited driving permit to be granted in hardship
cases.71 In addition, a seven-day, temporary license was granted to all offend-
ers upon revocation.72 Since the statute in Hedden is analogous to section 20-
16.5, the North Carolina courts are likely to apply the Mackey analysis to
determine the constitutionality of the ten-day revocation.7 3 Because section
20-16.5 is distinguishable from the Minnesota statute, however, the North Car-
olina statute arguably is unconstitutional even under the Mackey test.
Section 20-16.5 provides no protection for the private interest affected. 74
The ten-day revocation is automatic and absolute; no temporary license is
granted. An automatic grant of a temporary license may not be required to
protect the private interest, but some type of provision must be made for hard-
to Reduce the Incidence of Impaired Driving, and Clarifying the Statutes Related to Drinking and
Driving." Act of June 3, 1983, ch. 435, 3 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52.
67. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
68. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 11.
69. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
71. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (West Supp. 1983).
72. Id.
73. The Minnesota statute and § 20-16.5 are not analogous. Section 20-16.5 augments North
Carolina's implied consent law, and imposes an additional revocation penalty on DWI offenders.
However, the Minnesota law is similar in that it does revoke licenses immediately for both failure
of the test and refusal to take it.
74. For temporary permit provisions similar to the Minnesota provision in Mackay, see
ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.165(a)(3) (Supp. 1983) (7 days); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-69(b) (Supp. 1983)
(180 days or until license is suspended or revoked); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-11-4-7(b)(1) (Burns Supp.
1983) (until license is suspended); IOWA CODE ANN. § 312B.16 (West Supp. 1983) (20 days); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 63-11-23(2) (Supp. 1983) (30 days); NEv. REV. STAT. § 484.385(1) (1983) (7 days);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-03.1(1) (Supp. 1983) (20 days); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 754(2)
(West Supp. 1983) (30 days). Only Connecticut immediately revokes the license without issuing a




ship cases. A provision that provides at least temporary relief to those individ-
uals who depend on their ability to drive for their livelihoods would more
likely survive the Mackey balancing test.
75
The ten-day revocation also tips the balance in favor of the private inter-
est. A ten-day revocation may not appear to be oppressive, but the absolute
nature of the revocation increases the severity of the sanction. The Governor's
Task Force on Drunken Drivers76 reasoned that "many drivers faced with a
sudden ten-day loss of license would be able either to take time off as vacation
or get friends and family to drive them for such a short period."77 This re-
sponse ignores the fact that many motorists depend on driving for their liveli-
hood and may not be able to make other plans. For them, "such a short
period" might well be economically disasterous.
78
Prompt postrevocation review is available under section 20-16.5, but rev-
ocation is not stayed pending appeal. The Mackey Court found that a stay
provision, in conjunction with the temporary licenses, was sufficient to tip the
balance in favor of the governmental interest. Given the recognized impor-
tance of the affected private interests, however, prompt postrevocation review
is not sufficient to tip the balance in favor of the State. In sum, the unavaila-
bility of hardship relief and the duration of the revocation add up to an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of private property by the State. Under either Mackey
or Bell, section 20-16.5 is unconstitutional.
MARGARET L. MILROY
75. A selective hardship provision would serve the government's goal as well as an absolute
revocation procedure. Because of the possibility of equal protection arguments against selective
permits, the administrative burdens, and the severe, unprotected intrusion of an absolute revoca-
tion on the private interest, a better solution is to issue automatically a temporary permit to all
DWI offenders.
76. The Task Force drew up the recommendations for the Safe Roads Act. Watts, The
Drinking-Driving Problem: Assessing Some Proposed Solutions, 48 POPULAR GOV'T 20, 30 (1983).
77. Id.
78. Justice Stewert recognized this in his Mackey dissent.
The Court has never suscribed to the general view "that a wrong may be done if it can be
undone." We should. . . be even less enchanted by the proposition that due process is
satisfied by delay when the wrong cannot be undone at all, but at most can be limited in
duration. Even a day's loss of a driver's license can inflict grave injury upon a person
who depends upon an automobile for continued employment in his job.
Mackey, 443 U.S. at 30 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Involuntary Outpatient Civil Commitment Expanded:
The 1983 Changes
In 1983 the North Carolina General Assembly amended the state's invol-
untary commitment statutes-to expand the use of outpatient commitment for
the mentally ill.1 The amended statutes contain three significant changes: a
new standard for committing patients to outpatient care, 2 a definition of "out-
patient treatment,' 3 and procedural changes for more effective support and
enforcement of the outpatient commitment laws.4 This note examines the
constitutionality of the new outpatient commitment standard and the practical
effects of the 1983 amendments.
Prior to the 1983 amendments, for a person to be involuntarily committed
to either inpatient or outpatient treatment, the court had to find "by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent [was] mentally ill or ine-
briate, and [was] dangerous to himself or others, or [was] mentally retarded,
and, because of an accompanying behavior disorder [was] dangerous to
others."'5 Although the 1983 amendments do not change the criteria for com-
mitting a respondent to inpatient treatment, 6 a new standard is provided for
commitment to outpatient treatment:
If the court finds by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the
respondent is mentally ill; that he is capable of surviving safely in the
1. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-451, -451.1, 122-8.1, -58.2, -58.3, -58.4, -58.5, -58.6, -58.6A,
-58.7, -58.7A, -58.7A:1, -58.8, -58.8A, -58.10A, -58.10B, -58.11, -58.1IA, -58.13 (Cum. Supp, 1983).
The House Bill was titled "An Act to Expand the Use of Outpatient Involuntary Commitments for
the Mentally Ill." 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 638. Much of the background of the 1983 amendments to
the commitment laws can be found in Miller & Fiddleman, Involuntary Civil Commitment in North
Carolina: The Result of the 1979 Statutory Changes, 60 N.C.L. REV. 985 (1982), which chronicles
the changes in the North Carolina commitment statutes through the 1979 amendments and pro-
vides an excellent discussion of the historical background of the civil commitment law. For a
discussion of the North Carolina outpatient commitment statute from January 1978 through De-
cember 1979, see Hiday & Goodman, The Least Restrictive4ternative to Involuntary Hospitaliza.
tion, Outpatient Commitment: Its Use and Effectiveness, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 81, 84-93 (1982).
The 1983 amendments to the commitment law became effective January 1, 1984. 1983 N.C. Sess.
Laws 638 § 27.
2. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.4(c)(2), -58.6, -58.8(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
3. See id. § 122-58.2(8).
4. See id. §§ 7A-451(6) (counsel provided at outpatient commitment hearing for indigent
respondents), 7A-451.1 (payment to counsel representing indigent respondent at outpatient com-
mitment hearing), 122-8.1 (disclosure of necessary information), -58.4 (directs examining physi-
cian to "give the respondent a written notice listing the name, address, and telephone number of
the proposed outpatient treatment physician or center and directing the respondent to appear at
the address at a specified date and time"; also directs examining physician to notify designated
treatment center and to send the respondent a copy of both the notice and his examination report),
-58.6A (procedures for examination and treatment pending hearing), -58.7A: 1 (district court hear-
ing procedures for outpatient commitment), -58.8A (immunity from liability for those involved in
outpatient commitment), -58.10A (duties for commitment order follow-up), -58.10B (supplemental
hearings for outpatient commitments), -58.11 (adding option of outpatient commitment at inpa-
tient commitment rehearing), -58.11A (rehearings for outpatient commitments), -58.13 (release
from an inpatient commitment-may request supplemental hearing to determine outpatient com-
mitment need) (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
5. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.8(b) (1981).
6. See id. § 122-58.8(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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community with available supervision from family, friends or others;
that based on respondent's treatment history, the respondent is in
need of treatment in order to prevent further disability or deteriora-
tion which would predictably result in dangerousness as defined by
G.S. 122-58.2(1); and that the respondent's current mental status or
the nature of his illness limits or negates his ability to make an in-
formed decision to voluntarily seek or comply with recommended
treatment, it may order outpatient commitment for a period not in
excess of 90 days.
7
Thus, a patient who presently is not dangerous to himself or others may be
committed to outpatient care if his treatment history indicates that he will be-
come dangerous in the future.8
Does commitment based on these new criteria violate the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee that a person shall not be deprived of liberty without
due process of law?9 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
"civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of lib-
erty that requires due process protection."10 The constitutional standard for
evaluating civil commitments requires that "the nature and duration of com-
mitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual
is committed."" 1 The Court, however, also has acknowledged the state's inter-
est in committing psychiatrically ill people and the state's power to protect its
citizens:
The state has a legitimate interest under itsparenspatriae pow-
ers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emo-
7. Id. §§ 122-58.8(a)(2), -58.8(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.2(I)
(1981) defines "dangerous to himself' to mean:
within the recent past: 1. The person has acted in such manner as to evidence: ....
That he would be unable without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of
others ... to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion . . . , or to satisfy his need
for nourishment, personal or medical care. . .; or 2. The person has attempted suicide
or threatened suicide and that there is a reasonable probability of suicide. . .; or 3. The
person has mutilated himself or attempted to mutilate himself and that there is a reason-
able probabilty of serious self-mutilation.
An individual is defined by the statute as "dangerous to others" if,
within the recent past, the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict or threatened to
inflict serious bodily harm on another or has acted in such a manner as to create a
substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another and that there is a reasonable
probability that such conduct will be repeated.
Id.
8. The commitment criteria involve a question of degree. For example, if a mentally ill
patient is not taking care of himself, but is not in immediate danger of "serious physical debilita-
tion," whether the patient is dangerous is a question of fact. The outpatient commitment danger-
ousness criterion, however, does not include the "near-future" element. To be committed to
outpatient care, the court must determine that the respondent "is in need of treatment in order to
prevent further disability or deterioration which predictably would result in dangerousness." See
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.2(1), -58.8(a)(2), -58.8(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
10. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patter-
son, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
11. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 325 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
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tional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority
under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous
tendencies of some who are mentally ill. t2
The Court's test weighs "the individual's interest in liberty against the State's
asserted reasons for restraining individual liberty"'13 to determine whether a
substantive due process right has been violated. 14
Since the new outpatient commitment statute deprives a nondangerous
individual who has not committed a crime of his liberty, it can be argued that
the statute is unconstitutional. Outpatient commitment proceedings deprive
the respondent of substantial rights. He is taken into custody, examined by a
physician, brought into court, and required to follow his outpatient commit-
ment treatment plan.15 The treatment plan may include almost any form of
treatment that does not take place in an inpatient facility. 16 It may include
medication and may require supervision of the patient's living arrangement.17
The outpatient who fails to follow the prescribed treatment may be returned to
custody and reevaluated.18
Even though substantial liberty interests of the individual are affected by
the outpatient commitment process, the statute is constitutional. The commit-
ted outpatient is not confined in an inpatient facility. Thus, the state's interfer-
ence with the outpatient's liberty is significantly less than in inpatient
commitment. If the patient complies with his treatment plan, he is free to do
as he pleases except during the times of actual outpatient treatment.19
Two state interests justify the statutes' limitations on the rights of the out-
patient. First, the state has an interest in preventing the mentally ill patient
from becoming dangerous. 20 Second, the state has an interest in providing
treatment to mentally ill individuals who cannot otherwise seek or comply
12. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). For a discussion of the state's parenspa-
triae and police powers, see S. HALLECK, LAW IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY: A HANDBOOK
FOR CLINICIANS 126-28 (1980).
13. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
534 (1979); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972) ("The power of the state to deprive a person of the
fundamental liberty to go unimpeded about his or her affairs must rest on a consideration that
society has a compelling interest in such deprivation."), vacated andremanded, 414 U.S. 473, mod-
fled, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975).
14. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982).
15. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.4, -58.6, -58.7, -58.8 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
16. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
17. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.2, -58.10A (Cum. Supp. 1983).
18. Id. § 122-58.1OA(b).
19. The United States Supreme Court has applied substantive due process protection to civil
inpatient commitments because of the loss of liberty involved in confining an individual to an
inpatient facility. The Court, however, may be unwilling to extend this protection to the patient
committed to outpatient treatment. For example, in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975),
the Court held that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individ-
ual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members or friends." O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added).
20. For a discussion of the problems associated with committing a patient under the police




with necessary treatment. 21 Under the outpatient commitment law, the pa-
tient must be mentally ill, must be "in need of treatment in order to prevent
further disability or deterioration which would predictably result in danger-
ousness," 22 and must be unable to make an informed decision regarding treat-
ment.23 Thus, in every case of outpatient commitment, both state int irests are
present.
To balance the state interests with the outpatient's loss of liberty, several
points must be considered. Commitment to an inpatient facility, which in-
volves a substantially greater loss of liberty, based on dangerousness to self or
others has been found to be constitutional. 24 Although the standard for com-
mitment to outpatient treatment is somewhat lower, it results in a lesser intru-
sion upon the liberty of the patient.25 The statutory requirements are designed
to limit outpatient commitments to those cases in which the patient would
deteriorate to the point of requiring inpatient commitment but for the availa-
bility of outpatient commitment.26 Thus, even though outpatient commitment
entails a substantial loss of liberty, the patient is spared an even greater loss.
For these reasons, the state's interests in outpatient commitment outweigh
the individual's liberty interests. If the committed outpatient satisfies the stat-
utes' requirements and complies with his treatment plan, the intrusion on the
liberty interests of the individual is minimized.27 The outpatient commitment
law, as amended, is constitutional.
Analysis of the 1983 amendment's practical effect indicates that, if ap-
plied cautiously, the amended outpatient commitment statutes can have posi-
tive results. Properly committed patients who comply with an appropriate
treatment plan will not become dangerous to themselves or others28 and will
receive necessary treatment without having to enter an inpatient facility.29 To
21. See S. HALLECK, SUpra note 12, at 127-28. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.4(c)(2), -58.6, -58.8(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983). See Miller &
Fiddleman, supra note 1, at 989 n.18 (1982):
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was among the first to
discuss the requirement for dangerousness as a criterion for involuntary commitment.
Relying on District of Columbia statutes, the court supported the necessity of a demon-
stration of dangerousness in Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968), and in
Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (sexual psychopath laws). Stronger
arguments, basing requirements for dangerousness on constitutional grounds, were soon
forthcoming. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
23. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
24. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (state "has authority under its police
power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill");
Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) ("[A] State cannot constitutionally confine with-
out more a nondangerous individual.").
25. See supra notes 6-8, 19 and accompanying text.
26. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
28. To be committed, the respondent must be "in need of treatment in order to prevent fur-
ther disability or deterioration which would predictably result in dangerousness." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122-58.8(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983). Assuming the outpatient treatment is effective, the
patient will not become dangerous.
29. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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a great extent, however, the effectiveness of outpatient care depends on the
willingness of the patient to comply with the treatment plan. When a patient
is involuntarily committed to outpatient care, his therapy is likely to be inef-
fective because he cannot be compelled to follow his treatment plan. Despite
this potential drawback, the statutes' enforcement provisions30 effectively pro-
tect the state's interests. Since the statutes' ability to protect state interests de-
pends on the efficacy of the enforcement provisions, the state should
reevaluate psychiatrists' role in enforcement.3 ' Psychiatrists should be re-
quired to perform police power functions only when outpatients fail to comply
with treatment32 and "the provision of needed and effective treatment for the
committed patients"33 justifies the psychiatrists' enforcement role.
No specific form of outpatient treatment is required by the North Caro-
lina statute. Practical problems may arise involving the availability and qual-
ity of the various types of treatment listed in the definition of "outpatient
treatment." "'Outpatient treatment' may include medication; individual or
group therapy; day or partial-day programming activities; services and train-
ing, including education and vocational activities; supervision of living ar-
rangements; and any other services. . .. -34 North Carolina General Statutes
section 122-58.2(8) identifies three goals of outpatient therapy. Outpatient
therapy may be provided (1) to "alleviate the person's illness or disability, '35
(2) "to maintain semi-independent functioning," 36 or (3) "to prevent further
deterioration that may reasonably be predicted to result in the need for inpa-
tient commitment to a mental health facility."37
Outpatient commitment proceedings, like inpatient commitment proceed-
ings, begin with the filing of an affidavit and a petition with the clerk or magis-
trate for an order to take an individual into custody for examination by a
qualified physician.38 Although amended section 122-58.8 permits the state to
commit individuals involuntarily to outpatient care if they presently are not
dangerous but may become dangerous, the statutes relating to the affidavit's
sufficiency and the magistrate's findings have not been amended to reflect this
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.10A, -58.10B, -58.11A (Cum. Supp. 1983).
31. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
32. See in/ra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
33. Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 1, at 988 n.10 (1982).




38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.3(A) (1981) provides:
Any person who has knowledge of a mentally ill or inebriate person who is dangerous to
himself or others, or who is mentally retarded and, because of an accompanying behav-
ior disorder, is dangerous to others may appear before a clerk or assistant or deputy clerk
of superior court or a magistrate of district court and execute an affidavit to this effect,
and petition the clerk or magistrate for issuance of an order to take the respondent into
custody for examination by a qualified physician. The affidavit shall include the facts on
which the affiant's opinion is based. The respondent must be found in or be a resident of
the same county as the clerk or magistrate.
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new dangerousness standard.39 Both provisions currently require a finding
that the respondent ispresenty dangerous to himself or others.40 Thus, a lit-
eral reading of the involuntary commitment statute yields the following illogi-
cal rule: a respondent must qualify for inpatient commitment under the higher
dangerousness standard before he may be committed to oupatient therapy
under the lower dangerousness standard. The remedy for this problem is sim-
ple. The General Assembly should amend section 122-58.3, which prescribes
the petitioning procedure and magistrate's fact-finding standard, to comport
with the new standards in section 122-58.8.
Assuming that the problem posed by the mismatched statutes is overcome
by legislative action, magistrates will be authorized to require that a respon-
dent be taken into custody and examined by a qualified physician if they rea-
sonably believe that the respondent is mentally ill and will become dangerous
without treatment. Following the physician's examination, a court could order
the respondent to be committed to outpatient therapy if it found that the re-
spondent satisfies four criteria. He must be mentally ill, capable of surviving
safely in the community, in need of treatment to prevent his predictable deteri-
oration into a dangerous person, and unable to make an informed decision to
seek or comply with treatment voluntarily.41 The third criterion requires the
court to make a very difficult factual determination.
How is a court to determine when a patient is not dangerous but is "in
need of treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration which
would predictably result in dangerousness?" 42 As a practical matter, the court
will rely on the examining physician's evaluation. North Carolina General
Statutes section 122-58.4 requires the physician to determine whether the re-
spondent is presently dangerous 43 or predictably will become dangerous with-
out treatment.44 One criticism leveled at the dangerousness standard is that it
is difficult to predict dangerousness in individual cases.45 The type of patient
who will be found to satisfy the outpatient commitment criteria is one who has
not attempted suicide, mutilated himself, or inflicted or threatened serious
bodily harm on another in the recent past, and who is not in danger of serious
39. See id. (affidavit statute). See also id. § 122-58.3(b) (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983) (magis-
trate's findings). Section 122-58.3(b) provides:
If the clerk or magistrate finds reasonable grounds to believe that the facts alleged in the
affidavit are true and that the respondent is probably mentally ill or inebriate and dan-
gerous to himself or others, or is mentally retarded and, because of an accompanying
behavior disorder, is dangerous to others, he shall issue an order to a law-enforcement
officer. . . to take the respondent into custody for examination by a qualified physician.
40. See id. § 122-58.3.
41. Id. § 122-58.8.
42. Id.
43. Id. § 122-58.4(c)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (examination by qualified physician-one crite-
rion for inpatient commitment is dangerousness to self or others).
44. Id. § 122-58.4(c)(2) (examination by qualified physician-respondent must be in need of
treatment to prevent further disability or deterioration which would predictably result in danger-
ousness to be committed to outpatient care).
45. S. HALLECK, supra note 12, at 130-32 (section entitled "Is Dangerousness Predictable,
and are Psychiatrists any more Equipped to Predict it than Anyone Else?").
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physical debilitation within the near future,46 but who has been committed to
inpatient treatment in the past and who shows signs of deteriorating. Judges
should recognize that psychiatrists' predictions may not be accurate in individ-
ual cases.
Another potential problem is determining the length of the respondent's
commitment to outpatient treatment. By statutory limitation, the period of
initial commitment may not exceed ninety days.4 7 Upon rehearing, "[i]f the
respondent continues to meet the criteria" for outpatient commitment, "the
court may order outpatient commitment for an additional period not in excess
of 180 days."'48 The court may order additional periods of outpatient commit-
ment for as long as the patient continues to meet the criteria for commit-
ment.49 The practical problem is that "[a]t any time that the outpatient
treatment physician finds that the respondent no longer meets the criteria [for
outpatient commitment], the physician shall notify the court and the case shall
be dismissed."50 This provision will require dismissal of a patient's case as
soon as the patient does not satisfy any one of the criteria. In particular, the
patient's case must be dismissed as soon as he becomes fully able "to make an
informed decision to voluntarily seek or comply with recommended treat-
ment. ' 51 Although this criterion protects an important right of the respon-
dent,52 it does not appear in the standard for commitment to an inpatient
facility.5 3 Under the amended outpatient commitment statutes, physicians
and the courts will face the difficult task of determining when the respondent
is able to make an informed decision about his treatment. The physician
should not assume that the patient should be treated for the entire length of
the commitment ordered by the court, and should be prepared to release the
patient when he no longer meets all four criteria for outpatient commitment.
Finally, practical problems may arise with regard to the availability and
quality of the various treatments listed in the statutes' definition of outpatient
treatment.54 The definition is very broad-it is not clear what services actually
will be available to patients committed under the statute.
How well will outpatient commitment work? Will it further the specified
46. Cf N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.2 (1981). If the patient is in danger of serious physical
debilitation within the near future, or has threatened or attempted suicide or bodily harm on
another, then the patient should be committed to an inpatient facility. Outpatient commitments
are "intended for the revolving door patient, not [the] first admission with no treatment history."
Memorandum to Screening Staff at Dorothea Dix Hospital, Raleigh, North Carolina, February
21, 1984.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.8(a)(1), -58.8(a)(2), -58.8(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
48. Id. § 122-58.11A(c).
49. See id. § 122-58.1IA.
50. See id. § 122-58.10A(b)(4).
51. See id. § 122-58.4(c)(2) (criteria for outpatient commitment). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-
58. 10A(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1983) requires dismissal as soon as any one of the criteria is no longer
satisfied by the respondent.
52. This criterion protects the patient's right to determine his own treatment. This right may
be taken away only if the patient is dangerous, as is the case in inpatient commitments, or if the
patient is unable to make this decision for himself.
53. See N.C. GuN. STAT. § 122-58.4(c)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
54. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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goals in the statute?-' A study of North Carolina's previous outpatient com-
mitment statute was conducted in 1978 and 1979.56 The patients studied had
been committed under the stricter standard for dangerousness. 57 The results
of the study were promising:
[O]utpatient commitments appear to be working very well, since
more than two-thirds did not become dangerous enough within 90
days to invoke legal action to have them involuntarily hospital-
ized. . . . Of all respondents committed to outpatient treatment,
only 15.7% in 1978 and 9.5% in 1979 were involuntarily hospitalized
within 90 days by the court.58
All persons involved in administering the outpatient commitment law should
be interested in having the statute evaluated further. Long-term studies
should evaluate whether and when patients require inpatient commitment af-
ter release from the outpatient treatment program.
One factor that will influence the success of the outpatient commitment
law is the support given by the physicians who examine and treat the respon-
dents. At each stage in the commitment process, the physician is placed in a
difficult and potentially unpleasant position. The physician must examine the
patient and determine whether the patient meets the commitment criteria.5 9 If
the respondent is committed to outpatient treatment, the outpatient treatment
physician must "make all reasonable effort to solicit the respondent's compli-
ance." 60 If the outpatient fails to comply with his treatment plan, the treating
physician may request that the respondent be returned to custody for reexami-
nation and possible commitment to an inpatient facility. 6 1 Thus, the physician
will be placed in an adversarial relationship with the patient and may have to
perform the function of a police officer for the state.
Since "[cilinicians do not relish the role of incarcerators, an inevitable
part of involuntary commitment; that role becomes tolerable only when there
is justification in the provision of needed and effective treatment for the com-
mitted patients."' 62 So long as the statute results in "needed and effective"
treatment, treating physicians should support the law. If a large percentage of
55. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
56. Hiday & Goodman, supra note 1, at 84-93 (1982).
57. Id. at 85 The 1983 amendment incorporated the lower standard for outpatient commit-
ments and did not become law until January 1, 1984. See supra note I and accompanying text.
58. Hiday & Goodman, supra note 1, at 89-90. The study further concluded:
Without the use of outpatient commitment, all of the respondents of this present study
would have been removed from their communities, separated from their social support
systems, and involuntarily confined to the strange, abnormal environment of a mental
hospital. Outpatient commitment has been effective in providing treatment and control
of dangerousness while enabling respondents to maintain their roles and networks in
familiar surroundings. Outpatient commitment not only is more rational in terms of
human costs, but also is more rational in terms of financial costs to the taxpayer.
d. at 91.
59. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.4 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983). See also supra notes 44-46
and accompanying text.
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.10A(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
61. Id. § 122-58.10A(b)(2).
62. Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 1 at 988 n.10.
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the patients committed under the law do not comply with their treatment
plans, however, the statute should be reexamined since the effectiveness of
outpatient care depends on the willingness of the patient to comply with the
treatment plan.
North Carolina's amended outpatient commitment statutes should prove
beneficial to properly committed patients who comply with their outpatient
treatment plans. It will provide them with necessary treatment without exact-
ing an unreasonable loss of personal liberty. The statutes' provisions for han-
dling cases in which the patient fails to comply or refuses to comply with
treatment ensure that, whether the patient complies or not, other citizens will
be protected from the patient becoming dangerous. Furthermore, the 1983
amendments to the outpatient commitment law should result in greater use of
outpatient commitment for the mentally ill. The amendments expand the
class of persons who may be committed to include patients whose mental ill-
ness will lead predictably to dangerousness. Proper application of the new law
will benefit both the state and the patients committed under the law. The state
should be aware of potential problems with the statute, however, and reevalu-
ate its use and effectiveness in the years to come.
MARY JoY O'MEARA
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Compulsory Education: Weak Justifications in the Aftermath
of Wisconsin v. Yoder
Free exercise of religion is a right protected by the first amendment.' De-
spite the constitution's simple declaration, however, courts repeatedly have
struggled to balance the individual's right to religious freedom against the
state's competing interest in governing society.2 This familiar dilemma re-
curred recently in the context of North Carolina's compulsory education stat-
ute.3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found in
Duro v. District Attorney, Second Judicial District of North Carolina4 that de-
spite plaintiff's religion-based aversion to structured education, North Caro-
lina could compel plaintiff's children to attend state-sanctioned schools. 5 The
Duro court did not clarify how the competing interests in freedom of religion
cases should be balanced, but merely added to the voluminous materials ad-
dressing the issue of an individual's freedom of religious expression in our
society.
Duro and his wife have six children, five of whom are school-aged.6 The
Duros are Pentecostalists.7 Although this religion does not require that chil-
dren be educated at home, the Duros' interpretation of Pentecostalism did.8
Specifically, Duro worried that exposing his children to people who did not
share the family's religious beliefs would corrupt them. Additionally, he was
opposed to what he called the "unisex movement where you can't tell the dif-
ference between boys and girls and [which advocates] the promotion of secular
humanism." 9 Because of these beliefs, Duro refused to enroll his children in
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The first amendment was applied to the states
via the fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See generally Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exer-
cise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327 (1969); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doc-
trinal Development, Part L" The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. Rav. 1381 (1967).
3. North Carolina's compulsory education statute requires regular school attendance for
children between the ages of seven and sixteen. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1983). The statute
also provides: "No person shall encourage, entice or counsel any such child to be unlawfully
absent from school." Id. Evidence that the parents were notified of thirty accumulated absences
by their child that cannot be justified establishes a prima facie case that the parent is responsible
for the absences. Id.
4. 712 F.2d 96 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 998 (1984).
5. Although North Carolina has deregulated nonpublic schools, all schools still must satisfy
certain criteria. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-547 to -557 (1983).
6. Duro, 712 F.2d at 97.
7. Id. Although the Duro court did not examine the sincerity of Duro's religious views,
many cases have pinpointed the genuineness of "religious" views as a relevant issue. See, e.g.,
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931);
Delconte v. State, 65 N.C. App. 262, 308 S.E.2d 898 (1983).
8. Duro, 712 F.2d at 97.
9. Id.
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state-sanctioned schools and elected to have his wife teach them at home. t0
Duro's refusal to send his children to school caused him to be charged in
1981 with violating the North Carolina compulsory school attendance law.'I
Duro filed suit alleging that the State's application of the statute was unconsti-
tutional as applied because his religious beliefs prohibited him from sending
his children to school. The federal district court granted Duro's motion for
summary judgment. 12 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that North Carolina could compel Duro to send his chil-
dren to a regular school because the State's interest in compulsory education
was stonger than his interest in freely directing his children's religious
training.13
To understand the Duro decision, it is necessary to examine the 1971
United States Supreme Court decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 14 Yoder in-
volved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Wisconsin compulsory educa-
tion statute as applied to the Amish people. Is On the basis of the Amish tenet
that separation from the world is fundamental to salvation,' 6 the parents in
Yoder removed their children from formal schools after the eighth grade so
that they could be taught the attitudes, and be trained in the skills, necessary
for life in the simple, agrarian Amish community. 17
The Yoder Court, recognizing the importance of the free exercise of reli-
gion in our constitutional scheme, announced its guidelines for determining
whether Wisconsin could compel the Amish to attend school past the eighth
grade: "[Ilt must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of
religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise
Clause."'18 The Yoder Court acknowledged that Wisconsin law compelled the
Amish to perform acts undeniably at odds with their three hundred year-old
religion;19 therefore, state compulsion could not be allowed under the first part
of the test. The Court concluded that the second prong of the test was not
10. Id. The court noted that Mrs. Duro did not have a teaching certificate and never had
been trained as a teacher. For a discussion of what qualifies as a school under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-555 (1983), see Delconte v. State, 65 N.C. App. 262, 266-67, 308 S.E.2d 898, 902-03 (1983)
(§ 115C-555(4) refers only to established educational institutions).
11. Duro was charged with four violations of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1983); the war-
rants were quashed for technical defects. Duro, 712 F.2d at 97.
12. Id. The district court opinion was not published.
13. Id. at 99.
14. 406 U.S. 205 (1971). For a general discussion of Yoder, see Note, Wisconsin v. Yoder:
The Right to Be Dfferent-First Amendment ExemptionforAmish Under the Free Exercise Clause,
22 DE PAUL L. REv. 539 (1972); Note, Freedom ofJReligon-The Amish and Their Right to Reject
Compulsory School Attendance Beyond the Eighth Grade, 24 MERCER L. REV. 479 (1973).
15. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209.
16. Id. at 210. The Amish shun modem conveniences to promote a purer, simpler lifestyle,
See generally Comment, The Amish and Compulsory School Attendance: Recent Developments,
1971 Wis. L. REv. 832; Note, The Right Not to Be Modern Men: The Amish and Compulsory
Education, 53 VA. L. REv. 925 (1967).
17. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211.
18. Id. at 214.
19. Id. at 218.
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satisfied because Wisconsin's interest in compulsory education-having an in-
formed citizenry-was fulfilled adequately by the Amish alternative to formal
secondary school education. 20
Wisconsin's final argument was that exempting Amish from the statute
denied the children their substantive right to an education.2' The Yoder
Court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, since the criminal penal-
ties of the statute fell upon the parent, not the child, it was the parents' inter-
ests in religious freedom that was impeded. Second, the Yoder Court
recognized the fundamental interest that parents have in guiding the religious
future and education of their children and characterized their interest as an
"enduring American tradition."22 In conclusion the Yoder Court stated:
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious
sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of
American society, the Amish in this case have convincingly demon-
strated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, . . .and the hazards
presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as
to others. Beyond this, they have carried the even more difficult bur-
den of demonstrating the adequacy of their alternative mode of con-
tinuing informal vocational education .... 23
The Court emphasized that the exemption from the statute was narrow and
was not intended to undermine the general applicability of the statute.24
The court of appeals' decision in Duro relied heavily on language in the
Yoder opinion, but reached a different result. The Duro court began by iden-
tifying the two issues that Yoder had characterized as mandatory considera-
tions: whether the individual's religious expression was being infringed upon
by the state, and whether the state had demonstrated a competing, overriding,
compelling interest.25 The Duro court recognized the validity of plaintiff's
allegation that his religious expression was being hampered by the State and
allowed him to satisfy the first prong of the Yoder balancing test. Despite the
20. Id. at 235. The Yoder Court also noted that because they had received a basic education,
Amish children would be prepared to reenter secular society if they desired. Id. at 224. Some
commentators doubted whether an eighth grade education adequately prepares a person for
worldly life. See, e.g., Note, The Balancing Process for Free Exercise Needs a New Scale, 51
N.C.L. REV. 302, 308-09 (1972).
21. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion was based on the right of the
child to an education. See id. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Comment, The Educa-
tion oftheAmish Child, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1506, 1515-31 (1974); cf. Note, supra note 20, at 309-10.
22. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
23. Id. at 235.
24. Id. at 236. Many commentators believed that because the Yoder exception was so nar-
row, the case set a meaningless precedent. See Note, Balancing Test Employed to Resolve Conflict
Between State Statute and Resulting Burden on Free Exercise of Religion--State Interest in Compul-
sory High School Attendance Outweighed by Resulting Burden on Free Exercise of Amish Religion,
18 VILL. L. REV. 955, 967 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Balancing Test Employed]. Cf. Kur-
land, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75
W. VA. L. REV. 213, 244-45 (1973); Note, Freedom and Public Education: The Needfor New Stan-
dards, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 530, 540-44 (1975).
25. Duro, 712 F.2d at 97. The Duro court stated that the two issues in Yoder were "(1)
whether a sincere religious belief exists, and (2) whether the state's interest in compulsory educa-
tion is of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claimed by the parents." Id.
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genuineness of Duro's religious beliefs, however, the court concluded that
Yoder arose in "an entirely different factual context" 26 and therefore was not
controlling. According to the court, it was the "unique facts and circum-
stances associated with the Amish community" 27 that mandated the Yoder re-
suit. In distinguishing Duro from Yoder the court stated:
The Duros, unlike their Amish counterparts, are not members of
a community which has existed for three centuries and has a long
history of being a successful, self-sufficient, segment of American so-
ciety. Furthermore, in Yoder, the Amish children attended public
school through the eighth grade and then obtained informal voca-
tional training to enable them to assimilate into the self-contained
Amish community.28
The second part of the Duro opinion contained a disappointingly shallow
discussion of the State's interest in education. The Duro court stressed the
continuing, vital interest the State has in private schools and rejected the dis-
trict court's conclusion that North Carolina had abdicated its interest in non-
public education.29 Without defining the nature or purposes of the State
interest in education, the court noted evidence of the State interest's strength
in state-required attendance records, standardized testing, and disease immu-
nization requirements in private schools, as well as in fire, health, and safety
standards.30 These regulations demonstrated to the Duro court the compelling
nature of North Carolina's interest in education.31 The court also mentioned
that since "Duro [had] not demonstrated that home instruction [would] pre-
pare his children to be self-sufficient participants in our modern society or
enable them to participate intelligently in our political system,"'32 the State's
interest in education prevailed over Duro's interest in religion.33
In a lengthy footnote, the Duro court explained that in addition to the
mandates of Yoder, its chief consideration was the welfare of the children.34
The State's interest in "[t]heir well-being, along with their state constitutional
right to an education" 35 convinced the court that state sanctioned education
was appropriate. The Duro court compared denying children an education to
neglecting them, because both wrongs occur in environments injurious to their
welfare.3 6 The State's interest in the children's welfare indicated a sufficiently




30. Id. These requirements are contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-548 to -558 (1983).
31. Duro, 712 F.2d at 99.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 99 n.3.
35. Id. The court also remarked that "Article 1, § 15 of the North Carolina Constitution
expressly provides that, 'It]he people have a right to the privilege of education and it is the duty of
the State to guard and maintain that right." Id.
36. Id. The Duro court borrowed this analogy from Matter of McMillian, 30 N.C. App. 235,
238, 226 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1976). McMillian involved parents who had been charged with neglect
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strong State interest in compulsory education to override Duro's religious free-
dom claim.
Two factors in Duro suggest that the result was correct. First, in contrast
to the facts in Yoder, Duro insisted on controlling all levels of instruction for
his children. Obviously, the State interest in education becomes stronger when
the child has not received even a basic education in approved schools. 3 7 Sec-
ond, the Duro result seems justified in that Mr. Duro planned to send out his
children at age eighteen to make their way in society. In contrast, the Amish
children in Yoder were expected to lead simple, traditional agrarian lives; their
vocational training adequately prepared them for their future. The prospect
that Duro's children would reenter secular society heightened North Caro-
lina's interest in directing their education.38
Although it is apparent that Duro's outcome was correct, the court's logic
and reasoning are disturbing. First, Duro misinterpreted the nature of the
right to religious freedom that was recognized in Yoder. Although the Yoder
Court limited its discussion of religious expression to the peculiarities of the
Amish community, it is a mistake to read that case as narrowly as the Duro
court did. The Duro court found that the situation was sufficiently different
from that of the Amish and, therefore, Yoder was not controlling. 39 Yet, in
allowing the Amish an exemption from the Wisconsin statute, Yoder did not
impose a new set of requirements that must be met before an individual's in-
terest in religion can triumph over the state's education interest. Yoder did not
hold that only Amish people will be allowed religious exemptions from com-
pulsory education statutes; rather, the Yoder Court concluded that, in the par-
ticular case of the Amish, an exception was justified.40 The fact that the
Duros' religion and situation did not conform to those of the Amish should
have been irrelevant to the court's analysis of Duro's first amendment claims.
The first amendment protects individuals' freedom to practice any religion,
not merely the freedom to be Amish.
The second problem with Duro is the court's inadequate discussion of
North Carolina's interest in education. Surely there is stronger evidence of the
State's interest in education than its health and fire regulations. Presumably,
of their children under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(4) (1976) (repealed by Act of June 7, 1979, ch.
815, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 966).
37. The nature of the state's interest in educating its citizenry has not been articulated clearly.
See Note, Balancing Test Employed, supra note 24, at 962. One commentator suggests that the
state's interest in education is the selfish one of making each citizen more productive. See Kur-
land, supra note 24, at 215.
38. Duro, 712 F.2d at 99.
39. Id.
40. The Court's rationale for providing an exception to the Amish was that societal diversity
should be respected:
We must not forget that in the Middle Ages important values of the civilization of
the Western World were preserved by members of religious orders who isolated them-
selves from all worldly influences against great obstacles. There can be no assumption
that today's majority is "right" and the Amish and others like them are "wrong." A way
of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not
to be condemned because it is different.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 223-24.
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the State's legitimate interest in education is in having an informed electo-
rate.41 By summarily concluding that Duro failed to show that he had pre-
pared his children to be intelligent members of society, the court glossed over
what should have been an important component of its analysis.
A third problem with the Duro court's rationale was its offhand pro-
nouncement that the children's welfare was the primary issue in the case.4 2
Although this consideration could be the basis for compelling school attend-
ance in another context,43 in Duro it was entirely inconsistent with Yoder. In
Yoder Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion argued that children's rights were
determinative;" the Yoder majority, however, made clear that the relevant
issue was the parents' right to direct freely their children's religious training.
Thus, the question of the allowable extent of parents' religious control over
their children is an unresolved and controversial issue.45 The Duro court's
quick reference to the children's welfare as a justification for its decision
dodged the issue of the parents' right to direct their children's religious
training.
The Duro decision is a deceptively simple opinion resting on questionable
premises. The issue of whether a state may compel a child's education against
the wishes of his parents was resolved only partially in Yoder. North Caro-
lina's right to compel the Duro children's school attendance in contravention
of their father's religious beliefs warranted a more convincing definition of the
State's interest than the court offered in Duro.
CYNTHIA B. SMITH
41. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), expanded on the importance of education:
"Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." Id. at 493.
For a suggestion that Yoder is inconsistent with this aspect of Brown, see Note, supra note 20, at
307.
42. Duro, 712 F.2d at 99 n.3.
43. Yoder recognized that children's rights would be relevant if there was a conflict between
the wishes of the parent and those of the child. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231-32.
44. Id. at 241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs:
Justfcations and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383 (1974).
45. Some of the most interesting cases on this point involve the Jehovah's Witnesses. For a
collection of these cases, see Note, Their Life is in the Blood- Jehovah's Witnesses, Blood Transfu.
sions and the Courts, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 281 (1983).
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Statutory Preference for Straight-Ticket Voting in Counting
Crossover Baliots-Hendon v. North Carolina State Board
of Elections
The right to vote is a fundamental right.' Inherent in that right is the
constitutional privilege of having one's vote counted in a manner consistent
with the intent with which it was cast.2 In determining how to count an am-
biguous vote, "the object should be to ascertain and to carry into effect the
intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable certainty."' 3
In Hendon v. North Carolina State Board of Elections4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined the constitutionality of a
North Carolina statute declaring that a ballot marked in both a straight-party
circle and in the individual circle of a competing candidate of another party
was to be counted as a straight-party vote.5 The court of appeals determined
that the statute was contrary to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment,6 reversed the district court's decision,7 and remanded the case for
a determination of a counting procedure that would reflect better the intent of
crossover voters.8 The court, however, refused to order a recount of the ballots
cast in the election,9 declaring its decision to be prospective only.10
The Hendon court implied that a counting procedure replacing the one
held unconstitutional could count crossover votes cast for individuals as either
"neutralizing" or "controlling" the straight-party vote for the candidate's op-
ponent. This note examines the merits of each of these counting techniques
and concludes by proposing a "striking" system of vote-counting that com-
bines elements of both methods. The proposed striking system better ensures
that the voter's intent will be counted accurately.
Hendon, an incumbent Republican representing North Carolina's elev-
enth district in the United States House of Representatives, lost a reelection
bid in November 1982 to Clarke, a Democrat. The election was close, with
Clarke receiving 85,410 votes, or 49.93 percent of the total votes cast, and Hen-
1. As the Supreme Court remarked in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964), "No right
is more precious in a free country, .. other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to
vote is undermined."
2. The right to have one's vote counted correctly was afforded constitutional protection in
United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
3. G. MCCRARY, AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS § 530, at 393-94 n.2 (4th ed. 1897).
4. 710 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1983).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-151(5)(b), -170(6)(b) (1982 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I provides: "No State shall. . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
7. The district court's decision inHendon was not published, but can be found in the Record
at 47.
8. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 183.
9. Hendon, an incumbent Republican, lost his seat in the House of Representatives during
the November 1982 election in North Carolina's Eleventh Congressional District. The results are
described in more detail infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
10. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 182.
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don tallying 84,085, or 49.16 percent.1 ' The number of ballots marked for
both Hendon and the straight Democratic party ticket was significant.12 Rec-
ognizing that a recount could swing the election if enough crossover ballots
were counted differently,' 3 Hendon contested the election.
Four methods of voting had been used during the 1982 election in Hen-
don's district-paper ballots, mechanical lever machines, an electronic punch
card system (CES), and an optically scanned paper ballot system (Airmac).14
The counting of the crossover ballots varied among the voting methods. No
crossover ballots existed among the paper ballots because separate congres-
sional ballots, unaffected by straight-party voting, were used. The mechanical
lever machines counted votes in a manner contrary to the statutory require-
ment. The machines counted the specific vote over the general party vote and
gave no readout indicating that a straight ticket ever was voted.' 5 Because
neither of these voting methods adversely affected Hendon, they were not
challenged. The CES and Airmac systems counted the straight-party vote
over contrary individual votes; Hendon challenged the total in the five coun-
ties where they had been used. 16 After being denied a recount, first by all five
county boards of elections and then by the state board on appeal, Hendon filed
11. FEDERAL ELECTIONS 82: OFFICIAL ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. SENATE AND THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 67 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL ELECTIONS 82]; Hen-
don, 710 F.2d at 179. A Libertarian candidate received the other 1552 votes. A plurality vote is
sufficient to win a general election for Congressman.
12. Although the total number of votes cast in the election was 171,047, FEDERAL ELECTIONS
82, supra note 11, at 67, the dual ballots would have to have been cast within the challenged areas
of the five disputed counties to have affected the outcome (the total vote within these counties was
31,732 for Clarke, 33,096 for Hendon, and 537 for the Libertarian candidate). Nevertheless, evi-
dence was presented from the Republican observer in one precinct (Boyd) in one of these counties
(Transylvania) that he had "personally observed approximately 150" crossover votes for Hendon
in the 500 ballots rejected by the machine. These ballots later were counted for Clarke when they
were fed into a replacement machine. Record at 77, Hendon. Although no workers in other
precincts observed Hendon crossover votes in numbers approaching 150, none experienced
machine breakdowns as serious as in the Boyd precinct. The one-third ratio was not uncharacter-
istic of that found elsewhere. See, e.g., id. at 81 (12 of 33 observed ballots contained were Hendon
crossovers in Brevard precinct, Transylvania County); id. at 82-83 (two of six were Hendon cross-
overs in Little River precinct). At least six precincts in Transylvania County alone had Hendon
crossover votes observed among machine-rejected ballots. Id. at 105. Because a recount was de-
nied by the court of appeals, however, it never will be known exactly how many dual ballots
existed, or whether the counting method used in 1982 altered the election results. See also infra
note 21.
13. Hendon would have had a plurality vote if 1326 dual ballots were declared void ("neu-
tralized") or if 663 dual ballots were counted in his favor under an "individual vote controls"
method of counting.
14. Each county in North Carolina is free to choose the method of voting to use. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 163-161 (1982); H. LEWIS, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 199 (1982). The
CES method electronically counts votes punched in a card by the voter, while Airmac optically
scans ballot marks made with a special pen. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 179. CES is examined in detail
in Record at 139-40, 155-67, Hendon. Airmac is examined id. at 136, 143-48.
15. Defendant's Brief at 8, Hendon. If Hendon had been granted a recount, Clarke could
have challenged the votes counted by mechanical lever machines as violative of his equal protec-
tion rights. If Clarke were successful, the number of votes voided from Hendon's tally in these
counties could have offset the number Clarke lost in the CES and Airmac counties. Because the
mechanical lever machine did not even indicate crossover ballots, however, such a recount would
be impossible.
16. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 179.
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1983 and 1985 actions 17 in federal district court.
Hendon's claim'8 challenged the constitutionality, both facially and as
applied, of three sections of North Carolina's election statutes. 19 The first sec-
tion required that a ballot marked both generally for straight-party and specif-
ically for individual opposing candidates be counted as if it were purely a
straight-party ballot.20 This "counting" statute was challenged as violative of
the equal protection clause, because its "arbitrary" classifications allegedly
served no legitimate state interest. Hendon argued that the section facially
violated the equal protection rights of voters who did not intend their party
vote to prevail over their individual vote for that particular office. 21 He also
noted that individual write-in votes for candidates on the ballot prevailed over
conflicting straight-party votes, while marked votes for candidates on the bal-
lot did not.22 Finally, Hendon argued that because the crossover ballots were
counted differently in precincts using one type of machine than in precincts
using a different type, the section violated the equal protection clause as ap-
plied to his supporters casting dual ballots in precincts using CES and Airmac
systems.
The second section, which required that split-ticket voters mark each can-
didate individually,23 also was challenged on equal protection grounds. Hen-
don argued that forcing a split-ticket voter to vote individually for every
candidate he desired was facially unconstitutional because it was a statutory
incentive against splitting tickets that unfairly discriminated against crossover
voters, particularly in light of the statutory five minute maximum on voting
when others are waiting. 24 He also argued that this voting procedure was in-
equitably applied in the 1982 elections. In precincts using CES and Airmac
systems, each crossover voter had to vote individually up to fifty-four times to
cast a single crossover vote and vote in every race.2 5 In other precincts, how-
ever, crossover voters merely had to mark their ballot twice--once in the
17. Id. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1976).
18. Hendon was joined in his suit by his campaign committee and a registered voter from the
eleventh district. The suit was filed against the various election boards and their members who
had denied Hendon's recount requests. Clarke, the victorious Democratic candidate, later was
allowed to intervene as a party defendant. Plaintiff's Brief at 2, Hendon.
19. A statute is facially unconstitutional if it is inherently inconsistent with constitutional
tenets, whereas a statute is unconstitutional as applied if, while not facially unconstitutional, it
violates the constitution as it is put into effect in a particular situation.
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-170(6)(a), -151(5)(b) (1982).
21. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 181.
22. The anomaly probably grew out of the traditional tendency to view ballots as written
documents, with hand-written statements prevailing over print for purposes of determining intent.
See G. McCRARY, supra note 3, § 543, at 402-03. This distinction was removed after the Hendon
case began; the statute was modified to allow straight-party votes to override all conflicting write-
ins as well. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-170(5)(d)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983). Another section, id. § 163-
151(6)(d) (1982), reiterates this instruction as it applies to candidates already on the ballot whose
names are written in. Both statutes were declared unconstitutional in Hendon, 710 F.2d at 182.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-151(5)(a) (1982).
24. Id. § 163-150. The five minute time limit is discussed in greater detail infra notes 98-103
and accompanying text.
25. Plaintiff's Brief at 14, Hendon. The number of individual votes necessary to split a ticket
and vote for all of the offices ranged from a low of 41 to a high of 54 in the disputed counties.
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Democratic circle and once for Hendon. Hendon contended that no compel-
ling state interest justified placing this additional burden on split-ticket voters.
Finally, Hendon alleged that violation of the technical requirements of
North Carolina General Statutes section 163-140 amounted to a denial of due
process.26 The most notable violations were Haydon County's failure to pub-
lish a sample ballot prior to the election 27 and the absence of split-ticket in-
structions printed in "heavy black type" on the CES and Airmac ballots.2 8
Hendon sought three remedies: a declaration that the statutes were unconsti-
tutional; an injunction staying North Carolina's Board of Elections from certi-
fying Clarke as the victorious candidate; and an order for a recount of the
ballots in the regions challenged.2 9
Although the district court in Hendon initially granted a temporary stay
of certification,30 it eventually dissolved the restraining order and dismissed
the case, finding no constitutional infringement. 3 t In an unpublished opin-
ion,32 the court agreed with Hendon that the right to have one's vote counted
fairly is constitutionally protected. 33 Although the court stated that state laws
have a "presumption of validity" against equal protection attacks, 3 4 it agreed
with plaintiff's argument that the proper standard of review should be strict
scrutiny and that encroachment on voting rights can be justified only when a
compelling state interest exists. 35
Despite its agreement with plaintiff on the standards to be applied, the
trial court disagreed with plaintiff as to their application. The court rejected
plaintiff's equal protection arguments and applied the traditional three-part
test, examining the character of the statutory classifications, the individual in-
terests, and the governmental interests involved.3 6 The court did not find the
classifications in the first two statutes (counting and voting procedure) particu-
larly invidious or discriminatory, either facially or as applied. The court sug-
26. See Hendon, 710 F.2d at 182. The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
fourteenth amendment precludes such deprivation by states. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
27. Record at 85, Hendon.
28. Plaintiff's Brief at 16-17, Hendon.
29. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 180. Hendon did not assert the second desired form of relief-
injunction against certification-beyond the district court level. Id. at 180 n.3. Hendon did not
ask the courts to determine who had been elected. The Constitution confers that function on the
House of Representatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
30. Record at 36, Hendon.
31. The Hendon case moved quickly through the adjudicative system. The election was on
November 2, 1982. After seeking a recount through the elections boards, Hendon received the
temporary stay on November 22. It was dissolved, and Hendon's claim was dismissed by the
district court on December 6. By January 11, 1983, oral arguments were being heard by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; the decision, however, was not handed
down until June. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 177.
32. Hendon v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, No. A-C-82-357 (W.D.N.C. filed Dec.
6, 1982), reprinted in Record at 47, Hendon, rev'd, 710 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1983).
33. Id., slip op. at 9, reprinted in Record at 55, Hendon.
34. Id., slip op. at 8, reprinted in Record at 54, Hendon.
35. Id., slip op. at 11, reprinted in Record at 57, Hendon.
36. Id., slip op. at 10-1I, reprinted in Record at 56-57, Hendon (citing Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972)).
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gested that the challenged statutes were not unconstitutionally discriminatory
because, in each separate precinct, the voters were treated alike.37 Further-
more, all voters in the State were charged with a duty to become familiar with
the ballot form and voting procedure before entering a voting booth.38 Even if
the classifications were discriminatory, the court found that a compelling state
interest existed. North Carolina's desire to "permit the voters to vote without
undue delay; to count the votes within a reasonable time and to prevent fraud
and illegal procedures" 39 outweighed any infringement on the expression of
voter intent. The district court rejected the due process argument asserted
against the third statute because it believed that the technical violations in
Hendon constituted "lesser legal wrongs" that did not amount to "patent and
fundamental unfairness." 4 Although the trial court admitted that "valid ar-
guments . . . against the wisdom of the present statutory rule" existed, and
remarked that "if this Court were a member of the General Assembly serious
consideration would be given to voting to repeal" the statute, it concluded that
the statute could not be overturned on constitutional grounds.4 1
The court of appeals unanimously reversed the district court's decision.
Although it agreed with the lower court's statement of the applicable stan-
dards of review, 42 the court of appeals disagreed with its application of these
standards. The appellate court first examined the North Carolina counting
statute and declared its preference for straight-party candidates facially un-
constitutional.43 The court accepted as persuasive precedent two decisions
from other jurisdictions declaring similar statutes unconstitutional. 44 The
Hendon court approved the reasoning of the United States District Court for
the Virgin Islands in Melchoir v. Todman45 that such statutes exhibit a legisla-
tive preference unrelated to voter preference and discriminate unlawfully
against independent candidates. 46 The Hendon court also cited with approval
the following New Hampshire Supreme Court language in Murchie v. Clif-
ford:47 "The legislature may enact the method by which a man shall vote, but
cannot direct how the ballot he casts shall be counted." 48 Stating that no case
37. "All voters in each individual precinct are treated alike, using the same voting methods
under the same rules. The rules for casting and counting votes apply the same to each candidate
in the individual precincts ...... Id., slip op. at 10, reprinted in Record at 56, Hendon.
38. "It is the duty of the indivdual voter to read and familiarize himself or herself with the
ballot instructions prior to casting his or her ballot." Id., slip op. at 15, reprinted in Record at 61,
Hendon.
39. Id., slip op. at 11, reprinted in Record at 57, Hendon.
40. Id., slip op. at 14, reprinted in Record at 60, Hendon.
41. Id., slip op. at 15, reprinted iz Record at 61, Hendon.
42. Specifically, the court noted the constitutional right to have one's vote counted as cast, the
strict scrutiny standard of review, and the compelling state interest requirement. Hendon, 710
F.2d at 180. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
43. Id. at 180-81.
44. Melchoir v. Todman, 296 F. Supp. 900 (D.V.I. 1968); Murchie v. Clifford, 76 N.H. 99, 79
A. 901 (1911).
45. 296 F. Supp. 900 (D.V.I. 1968).
46. Id. at 901-02, citedin Hendon, 710 F.2d at 180.
47. 76 N.H. 99, 79 A. 901 (1911).
48. Id. at 101, 79 A. at 903, quotedin Hendon, 710 F. 2d at 180-81.
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"holding to the contrary has been called before our attention, '49 Hendon de-
clared the statute's classification discriminatory. Employing the district court's
three-part equal protection test, the court of appeals found that the character
of this discrimination, when combined with the strong individual interest in
the voting process, outweighed any state interest.50 Furthermore, the court
found that the state's interest was not compelling, but "arbitrary."5' 1 The court
of appeals remanded the case to the district court to determine a counting
procedure to replace the automatic straight-party vote and noted that either a
rule voiding the vote on that office ("neutralization" method of counting) or a
rule automatically giving the vote to the specifically voted individual candi-
date ("individual vote controls" method) would be constitutional.52
The appellate court also examined the other two statutes challenged. The
statute requiring voters seeking to split tickets to cast individual ballots for
each candidate was found to be facially constitutional, but was remanded for a
reexamination by the district court of its constitutional validity as applied.53
Recognizing the equal protection problems of varying the difficulty of casting
split-ticket votes with the type of machine used, the court of appeals declared
that the statute would be unconstitutional as applied if the State were unable
to show that the means used were the least burdensome to voters seeking to
split their ticket or that some rational state interest justified an added
burden.5 4
The court then examined the violations of the technical requirements of
the third statute.55 Because the violations were caused by "simple negligence"
rather than an intentional effort to erode the voting process and because there
was "no evidence of confusion or deception," the failure to provide a sample
ballot in one county and instructions in bold-face type in others did not
amount to a denial of due process. 56
Thus, the court of appeals declared the first statute (counting) unconstitu-
tional, reserved judgment on the constitutionality of the second (procedure for
splitting tickets) as applied, and held the technical violations of the third stat-
ute insufficient to raise a constitutional question. The court refused to grant
Hendon the injunctive relief desired, however, stating that limiting election
remedies to prospective relief was justified because plaintiff had foregone an
opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes before the elec-
tion.57 A contrary decision would "permit, if not encourage," every candidate
to gamble on his election and challenge the statute only if he lost the
49. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 180.
50. Id. at 180-81. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
51. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 180.
52. Id. at 183.
53. Id. at 181.
54. Id.






Despite the Hendon court's belief that the legislative branch should not
control how ballots are counted,5 9 it is evident that North Carolina's General
Assembly has done so for at least fifty years.60 The current statute, enacted in
1955,61 may have been enacted specifically to tighten the majority party's con-
trol in the representative bodies.62
Election law is by its very nature political. Although some rules of elec-
tion law are so self-evident that they may be politically neutral,63 most voting
regulations will either help or hinder certain candidates.64 It should not be
surprising that members of state legislatures vote out of self-interest when reg-
ulating election tabulations.
Adoption of the "straight-party-vote-controls" counting statute in 1955
appears to have been an example of self-interested voting by majority party
legislators. North Carolina originally followed the common-law majority
rule,65 which "neutralized" votes for offices on which a ballot was marked
both for one candidate through a straight-party vote and for a competing can-
didate individually.66 The rule was codified in the early statutes governing
elections.67 In 1939, however, North Carolina amended its voting laws to pro-
vide that such dual votes would be counted for the individually marked candi-
date.68 It is difficult to discern why the 1939 individual-vote-controls statute
was passed, except perhaps to make it easier for voters to mark their individ-
ual choices. 69 The supremacy of the democratic party through the 1940s 70 no
doubt helped downplay the statute's political significance.
It is less difficult to determine the reasons for the enactment of the current
statute in 1955. The 1952 reelection of a Republican in North Carolina's
Tenth Congressional District following a campaign in which he demonstrated
the ease with which tickets could be split caused some consternation among
Democrats and prompted the introduction of the straight-party-vote-controls
58. Id.
59. See supra text accompanying note 48.
60. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 165, § 23, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 145, 172-74.
61. Act of May 4, 1955, ch. 812, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 750.
62. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., G. MCCRARY, supra note 3, § 692, at 501 (describing the rapid passage of state
secret ballot laws once the idea was imported from Australia in the 1880s).
64. Perhaps the most glaring example of election laws which help majority party candidates
is the territorial lines drawn in redistricting'plans. Legislators are acutely aware that these laws
benefit the majority party, and voting on redistricting plans historically is split along party lines.
65. See G. McCRARY, supra note 3, § 532, at 395.
66. Plaintiff's Brief at 6, Hendon (citing 1928 sample ballot).
67. Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 165, § 23, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 145, 172-74.
68. Act of Mar. 16, 1939, ch. 116, § 2, 1939 N.C. Sess. Laws 131, 131-32.
69. Although one could argue that the passage of this act in a General Assembly controlled
by the Democratic Party would contradict the idea that politicians vote on election laws out of
self-interest, the partisan circumstances surrounding the passage of its replacement as soon as the
law was seen to affect election results mitigates this argument.
70. Trilling & Harkins, The Growth of Parly Competition in North Carolina, in POLITICS AND
POLICY IN NORTH CAROLINA 82 (1975) (Republicans had no hope of directly influencing state
politics through the 1940s).
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bill.7 1 Although North Carolina does not maintain an official legislative his-
tory, newspaper accounts published in 1955 indicate the strong partisan nature
of the bill's enactment.72 The bill was entitled, "An act to . . .simplify and
clarify the procedure to be followed in voting a split ticket," 73 but it did much
more than simplify and clarify existing law. Passage of the bill reversed the
existing law and made North Carolina's vote-counting procedures unique
among the various state methods. 74
Despite the potential of voting and counting procedures to influence elec-
tions, legislatures have been able to retain control over these procedures be-
cause courts traditionally have refrained from reviewing election laws.
Election law challenges have been considered political questions and, there-
fore, inappropriate for judicial review.75 Placing the conclusory label "polit-
ical" on an issue does not reduce its legal significance; the need for protection
of minority political interests continues. Nevertheless, the political question
rationale has been used "to prevent review of a multitude of political sins."'76
Such deference to self-interested legislative bodies is particularly surprising
given the fundamental nature of the right to vote.77
Unfortunately, the district court and the court of appeals continued to
cling to the doctrine of judicial restraint and returned control over counting
and voting procedures to the legislative branch. The district court used the
political question rationale to support its statutory presumption of validity de-
spite doubts concerning the statute's wisdom. Although the court of appeals
declared unconstitutional the statute preferring straight-party counting, it did
so in part because it had not been shown contrary precedent,78 which did in
fact exist.79 If the court of appeals in Hendon had known about these contrary
cases, it might have used their holdings to justify an exercise of judicial re-
straint, even though the cases generally were outdated. In addition, even
71. Charlotte Observer, May 3, 1955, at 8A, col. 2, reprinted in Record at 113, Hendon.
72. See, e.g., Charlotte Observer, May 3, 1955, at 8A, col. 2 (Republican representative criti-
cizing bill as depriving voters of voting their intentions), reprinted in Record at I 11, 113, Hendon;
Raleigh News & Observer, Apr. 9, 1955, at 10, col. 5 (article titled "Democrats Act to Plug up
Political Leak").
73. Act of May 4, 1955, ch. 812, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 750.
74. North Carolina is the only state that counts crossover votes for the straight-party candi-
date. According to a survey by the Council of State Governments, 21 states statutorily provide for
straight party voting. THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1982-83 at 104. Of those states, all but North
Carolina count the specific vote over the general party vote. See Plaintiff's Brief at 5, Hendon
(statutes from all 20 other states digested). Other states that do not govern statutorily straight-
party voting presumably follow the common-law "neutralization" counting method. See supra
notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
75. See R. CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 1 (1970) (from
1944 to 1969 the Supreme Court ruled on more election-related cases than it had in the previous
century); Note, Minority Party Access to the Ballot, 1971 DUKE L.J. 451, 451.
76. Comment, The Application of Constitutional Provisions to Political Parties, 40 TENN, L.
REv. 217, 228 (1973).
77. See supra note 1
78. See supra text accompanying note 49.
79. See, e.g., Snowden v. Flanery, 159 Ky. 568, 575-76, 167 S.W. 893, 897 (1914); In re Mead




though it determined that North Carolina's counting statute was unconstitu-
tional, the court suggested two alternate methods of counting crossover ballots.
The court's failure to delineate a specific replacement counting method meant
that the legislature's control over ballot counting had not been removed, but
only limited. Although the choice of counting methods was remanded to the
district court, the legislature could control its decision by enacting its preferred
choice of the two alternatives.
The court of appeals also used the doctrine ofjudicial restraint in uphold-
ing the voting procedure statute, even though it imposed an added burden on
split-ticket voters. The court stated that, even if the statute were discrimina-
tory, it would be justified if a rational (rather than a compelling) state interest
existed.80 The court also noted that judicial restraint was a factor in its failure
to order a recount despite the fact that the unconstitutional statute may have
affected the election.8'
The court's refusal to grant injunctive relief82 is most justifiable on
grounds of judicial restraint, because "few remedial measures. . . cut quite as
deeply to the core of both federalism and representative government" as fed-
eral court invalidation of state elections.8 3 Although an unconstitutional stat-
ute's effect on an election's outcome has been suggested as the most
appropriate instance for federal court intervention,8 4 filing suit in a timely
manner consistently has been a prerequisite to federal court consideration of
invalidation as a remedy.8 5 Had Hendon challenged the statute prior to the
election, he probably would have been granted a recount.
The Hendon court's exercise ofjudicial restraint with regard to the consti-
tutionality of the voting-procedure statute is less justifiable. The court re-
manded the case to the district court for a determination of the statute's
constitutionality as applied, noting that the procedure least burdensome to
voters should be used unless an overriding state interest exists. 86 The court
qualified that standard in two ways. First, it noted that the least restrictive
system would not be required if the State demonstrated a "rational" justifica-
tion for an alternate system.8 7 By requiring merely a "rational" rather than a
"compelling" state interest, the court implied that the least restrictive system
80. Athough a compelling state interest is required .to meet the strict scrutiny standard of
facial unconstitutionality, the voting procedure statute was upheld as facially constitutional. See
supra text accompanying note 53. Thus, a rationality standard was found to be sufficient to prove
the constitutionality of the statute as applied.
g1. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 182.
82. Id.
83. Starr, Federal Judicial Invalidation as a Remedy for Irregularities in State Elections, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1092, 1095 (1974).
84. Id. at 1128.
85. Id. at 1111-14. Although admitting that strict adherence to the timeliness of the filing
prerequisite "may seem incongruous or unduly harsh at first blush," Professor Starr believes that
it is fair to deny plaintiffs injunctive relief when the only reason such an extraordinary remedy is
necessary is because of a "lack of industry" by the plaintiff. Id. at 1113. Starr makes an exception
when the illegality of the challenged provision cannot be determined prior to the election despite
due diligence, id., a situation not present in Hendon.
86. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 181.
87. Id.
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generally would not be imposed on an uncooperative legislature.88 Second,
the court implied that, at most, the State might be required to alter its ma-
chines to count all votes in the same manner, but could not be required to alter
them to count all votes in the manner least restrictive to split-ticket voters.
The court, however, ignored the fact that the neutralization method of count-
ing is inherently more burdensome to straight-ticket voters than the individ-
ual-vote-controls method, and suggested both as legitimate alternatives. The
court's approval of the neutralization method of counting indicates that the
voting procedure need not be the least burdensome system to split-ticket voters
as long as the extra burdens are borne equally in each precinct.
The Hendon court not only declined to examine the differing burdens of
the two proposed counting methods, but also left to the "sound discretion of
the district court" the task of determining which method was preferable.8 9
Both methods, however, are insufficient to protect the constitutional rights of
candidates.
The general theory supporting the individual-vote-controls method of
counting is that the specific intent enunciated by the voter should control over
his general intent. This theory "would appear to recognize the intent of the
voter,"90 especially given the general principle that a ballot should be con-
strued as effective to cast a valid vote whenever possible.91 The individual-
vote-controls theory has been implemented without problems in other states92
and, perhaps most importantly, is the least burdensome method to split-ticket
voters, who need only mark their exceptions to a straight-party vote to have all
of their votes counted as intended.
This same advantage also makes the theory politically unpalatable. A
system allowing stray marks to count for straight-party opponents invariably
will be opposed by beneficiaries of straight-party votes. Just as the 1939 indi-
vidual-vote-controls statute was replaced by Democrats in 1955 with a
straight-party-vote-controls statute, judicial adoption of an individual-vote-
controls method probably would invite Democratic challenge. This group
would prefer a neutralization method of counting, which at least voids the
stray votes for straight-party opponents. Because the neutralization method of
counting apparently was declared constitutionally permissible by Hendon, its
enactment by the legislature would prevent or override district court adoption
of the individual-vote-controls method.
The theory underlying the neutralization method of counting is that the
crossover voter has cast more votes than he was allowed for a particular office;
88. Id.
89. Id. at 183.
90. Id.
91. G. MCCRARYSupra note 3, § 530, at 393-94 n.2. Because the voter did not intend to vote
for more than the allowed number of candidates, reconciliation of his conflicting marks should be
attempted to discern his true intent. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-170 (1982): "No official
ballot shall be rejected because of technical errors in marking unless it is impossible to determine
the voter's choice." (emphasis added). By this analysis "neutralization" should be used only as a
last resort.
92. See supra note 74.
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therefore, his vote must be voided.9 3 The cases followed by Hendon both im-
plemented the neutralization counting method in place of the straight-party-
vote-controls statutes declared unconstitutional. 94 The neutralization count-
ing method has strong mathematical appeal because it favors neither candi-
date. Another argument favoring neutralization of ambiguous votes is that
courts should not endeavor to determine voter intent when it cannot be known
with any reasonable degree of certainty.95
Unfortunately, the neutralization theory places an added burden on split-
ticket voters.96 The neutralization method of counting, like the straight-party-
vote-controls method, allows split-tickets only if the voter makes a separate
mark for each candidate. 97 When a large number of offices are included on
the ballot, requiring individual votes for each candidate imposes an unneces-
sary burden on split-ticket voters and is a statutory incentive to vote a straight-
party ticket.
This incentive is heightened by the five minute limit on time spent in the
voting booth when others are waiting.98 Statutes requiting individual votes
for each candidate may be unduly burdensome because they "require the
voter to deal with substantial numbers of partisan races. . . in addition to the
non-partisan choices and other local votes in a maximum of 300 seconds." 99
Studies have confirmed that time limits discourage split-ticket voting when
individual selection of candidates is required. 1°° Facing "long and compli-
93. For example, by voting for the party candidate as well as a crossover individual, a voter
would have cast too many votes in an election in which only one candidate was to be elected.
94. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 181 n.4.
95. This argument assumes that the voter's intent was just as likely to have been to cast his
ballot for the straight-party candidate as for the separately aligned individual. Defendant's Brief
at 5-6, Hendon (presumption should be that voter understood instructions).
96. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 181. The court noted that split-ticket voting was easy in counties
using the mechanical lever machine and its individual-vote-controls method of counting, whereas
it was quite difficult in Airmac and CES districts, where split-ticket voters had to vote individually
from 41 to 54 times (depending on the county in which they resided). If all three machines were
programmed to use the neutralization method of counting, the disparity between counties would
disappear, but the disparity in the ease of voting between straight-party and split-ballot voters
would persist.
The significance of this difference is illustrated by the Hendon election. Voters in Rutherford
County who wished to vote for every Democrat except Hendon's opponent were forced to mark 54
spaces on the ballot (53 Democratic spaces and Hendon's space) because Rutherford County's
CES machine counted ballots using the straight-party-controls method. Fifty-four marks would
also have been required to get all votes counted if Rutherford County had used the neutralization
method. Under the individual-vote-controls method of counting, however, the crossover voter
would have had to make only two marks, one in the Democratic party circle and one beside
Hendon. Thus, the latter clearly is the least restrictive method to split-ticket voters.
97. Under both the neutralization theory and the straight-party-vote-controls theory, once
the voter marks the straight-party circle he has exhausted his right to vote for other candidates.
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-150 (1982). See Plaintiff's Brief at 16, Hendon. The "time fac-
tor" issue was excluded properly from consideration by the court of appeals, as it had not been
raised at the district court level. Defendant's Brief at 8 n. 1, Hendon. On remand, however, it may
be possible for the district court to consider this interesting and important argument. The legisla-
ture should examine closely the time-factor issue's effect on split-ticket voting in drafting a re-
placement counting statute.
99. Plaintiff's Brief at 16, Hendon.
100. In the Ohio Democratic primary election of 1972, "'[tlhe option of individual voting [for
delegates] was virtually ignored,'" with voters choosing slates of candidates. Even well-known
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cated ballots, . . . the voter, under [general] state law, is often allowed no
more than three minutes or so to record his decisions. Under these conditions,
it is easy to understand why voters take the path of least resistance."101
In North Carolina, the five minute rule apparently is not being strictly
enforced.' 0 2 Enforcement of the rule, however, is not the only burden placed
on voters. The rule is listed in the North Carolina Precinct Manual 0 3 and its
mere publication to voters by poll workers may have a chilling effect on their
desire to vote individually. Just as important is the potential for abuse if the
five minute rule were to be enforced more strictly.
Despite the clear incentive against split-ticket voting inherent in the neu-
tralization counting method, Hendon affirmed its constitutionality. Thus, neu-
tralization of crossover votes remains a viable alternative to the statute
declared unconstitutional in Hendon. The best system of counting votes, how-
ever, would be a "striking" system, under which votes for crossover candidates
are counted only if the voter affirmatively strikes through (votes against) the
crossover candidate's straight-party opponent. 1°4 With more complex voting
machines, on which striking through a name is impossible, additional levers or
circles could be provided on the right side of a candidate's name for affirma-
tive votes against the candidate. The striking procedure would use both count-
ing methods proposed by the Hendon court, with the individual vote
controlling if the straight-party vote were crossed out for that particular office,
and the votes neutralized if it were not.
The proposed striking system would avoid the unduly burdensome re-
quirements of individual split-ticket voting inherent in the neutralization
method of counting, but would require a voter to demonstrate clearly his in-
tent to depart from the straight-party ticket in individual races. The striking
method of counting is only slightly more burdensome than the individual-
vote-controls counting method and provides little room for arguing that a
political leaders failed to draw significant individual votes due to time restrictions. COUNCIL OF
STATE Gov'Ts, MODERNIZING ELECTION SYSTEMS 27 (1973) (quoting OFFICE OF FED. ELEC-
TIONS, A STUDY OF ELECTION DIFFICULTIES IN REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN JURISDICTIONS: Fi-
NAL REPORT (1973)).
101. Id. at 27.
102. Defendant's Brief at 17-18, Hendon (affidavit of Executive Secretary-Director of the
North Carolina Board of Elections stated that he has "instructed all county elections officers that
the five-minute voting time. . . shall not be strictly adhered to" and that it has not been imposed
on a voter since a deliberate attempt to stall the voting process in 1968).
103. H. TURNBULL, PRECINCT MANUAL/1974 at 60 (1974).
104. Striking through a party candidate's name and voting for his opponent has been judi-
dally determined to illustrate the voter's intent to vote for the latter, see, e.g., Tuthill v. Rendle-
man, 387 Ill. 321, 56 N.E.2d 375 (1944) (opposing write-in candidate); Johnstun v. Harrison, 114
Utah 94, 197 P.2d 470 (1948); Frantz v. Hansen, 104 Utah 412, 140 P.2d 631 (1943) (opposing
party candidate). It, however, has not been codified or incorporated as a specific voting system, as
is suggested by this note.
Even in the absence of formal adoption of the striking system, split-ticket voters in paper
ballot districts are likely to be able to use the method to give effect to their crossover votes. Al-
though paper ballot straight-party votes in 1982 did not negate crossover votes for Hendon, they
did negate crossover votes for candidates for lower offices. Striking would ensure that these indi-
vidual votes were counted. For other types of ballots, however, the striking system would be
unavailable absent its express incorporation as a specific voting system.
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crossover voter cast his individual votes unintentionally. Although not per-
fect,105 the striking system could provide a workable compromise between the
interests and concerns of majority and minority parties.
GREGORY STUART SMITH
105. The proposed striking system still would void crossover ballots lacking a strike through
the straight party candidate who is opposing the individually marked candidate. This result may
be contrary to voter intent. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 93-
95 and accompanying text.
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North Carolina's New Involuntary Servitude Statute:
Inadequate Relief for Enslaved Migrant Laborers
Slavery, in its modem form, still exists in North Carolina. Since 1980,
two federal courts have found several persons in North Carolina guilty of en-
slaving migrant laborers' in violation of the thirteenth amendment2 and the
1866 Civil Rights Act.3 In 1983 the North Carolina General Assembly re-
sponded by enacting legislation making involuntary servitude a crime.4 The
statute makes it a felony to knowingly and wilfully hold persons in involun-
tary servitude and a misdemeanor not to report violations to the local sheriff.5
Although the debate surrounding this statute should increase public
awareness of the migrant laborers' situation, the Act is inadequate to end
abuse of migrant workers. The General Assembly needed to change existing
law significantly by enacting bold legislation making the farmers and growers
more responsible for the migrant laborers. Instead, the present Act adds little
to the already proven federal remedies. The General Assembly can justify the
1. United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding defendants guilty of kid-
napping migrant laborers with the intent to hold them as slaves); United States v. Warren, 535 F.
Supp. 1102 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (defendants guilty of holding migrant laborers in involuntary servi-
tude and conspiring to violate the civil rights of a migrant laborer by forcing him to continue
working when he was physically unable to do so; laborer died on the way back from the fields),
afr'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3554 (1983). See infra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
2. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
3. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 enforces the thirteenth amendment's prohibition of slavery.
Both courts upheld jury verdicts finding defendants guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1583 (1982).
United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 564 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Warren, 535 F. Supp.
1102, 1105 (E.D.N.C. 1982). 18 U.S.C. § 1583 provides:
Whoever kidnaps or carries away any other person, with the intent that such other
person be sold into involuntary servitude, or held as a slave; or
Whoever entices, persuades, or induces any other person to go on board any vessel
or to any other place with the intent that he may be made or held as a slave, or sent out
of the country to be so made or held-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
The Warren court also upheld convictions of violating 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1584 (1982). Warren, 535 F. Supp. at 1104-05. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982) provides:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citi-
zen in the exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States . . . [t]hey shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to
imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
d. § 1584 provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any
condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or brings within the
United States any person so held, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
4. Although North Carolina did not have a statute outlawing slavery, a constitutional provi-
sion expressly prohibits it. "Slavery is forever prohibited. Involuntary servitude, except as pun-
ishment for crimes whereof the parties have been adjudged guilty, is forever prohibited." N.C.
CONsT. art. I, § 17.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-43.2 (Cum. Supp. 1983). The statute provides:
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involuntary servitude statute only by recognizing it as a step toward improving
and humanizing the migrant laborers' conditions and not as the final solution.
Migrant laborers perform an essential food production function in North
Carolina. 6 Generally, farmers secure laborers by contracting directly with mi-
grant laborers who travel in groups looking for work,7 or through the Rural
Manpower Division.8 The Rural Manpower Division facilitates matching
farmers with farm labor contractors, or crew leaders, who recruit and transport
migrant laborers to North Carolina. The Rural Manpower Division works
only with crew leaders registered under the Farm Labor Registration Act9 and
inspects the labor camps before helping the farmer find migrant laborers.' 0
A crew leader generally is in charge of the labor camp. Farmers often
give exclusive control of the harvesting to the crew leader," who will hire a
few other people to help him manage the labor camp. Once the farmer dele-
gates the harvesting to the crew leader, the farmer does not guarantee the fair-
ness of the prices charged and the wages paid. Crew leaders are free to
(a) As used in this section, "involuntary servitude" means the unlawful holding of a
person against his will:
(1) For the performance of labor, whether or not for compensation, or
whether or not for the satisfaction of a debt, and
(2) By coercion or intimidation using violence or the threat of violence, or by
any other means of coercion or intimidation.
(b) It is unlawful to knowingly and willfully:
(1) Hold another in involuntary servitude, or
(2) Entice, persuade or induce another to go to another place with the intent
that the other be held in involuntary servitude.
A person violating this subsection shall be guilty of a Class I felony.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the laws governing the rela-
tionship between an unemancipated minor and his parents or legal guardian.
(d) If any person reports a violation of subsection (b) of this section, which viola-
tion arises out of any contract for labor, to any party to the contract, the party shall
immediately report the violation to the sheriff of the county in which the violation is
alleged to have occurred, for appropriate action. A person violating this subsection shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, in
the discretion of the court.
See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39(a)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1983). Section 14-39(a)(4) makes it a
crime to kidnap a person to hold in involuntary servitude.
6. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT TO THE 1983 GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 8 (1983) [hereinafter cited as MIGRANT WORKERS RE-
PORT]. The Commission estimated that North Carolina farmworkers, including 35,000 migrant
laborers, harvest nearly one billion dollars worth of agricultural products each year.
7. Id. at 10. These groups are known as "freewheelers."
8. The Rural Manpower Division is part of the North Carolina Employment Security Com-
mission. Id. at 9.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982). The Farm Labor Registration Act requires crew leaders who
transport migrant laborers more than 25 miles to register with the United States Secretary of
Labor. Registration requires proof of insurance on the transporting vehicle, disclosure to the la-
borer of the employment conditions, and a guarantee that federal minimum wage and housing
standards will be followed. This system does identify many crew leaders, but the Migrant Work-
ers Report conceded that "much of the [migrant laborers'] housing. . . was dilapidated, unsani-
tary and grim." MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT, supra note 6, at 22. "It is difficult to write about
migrant housing without seeming to be melodramatic. One can approach the subject with the
most modest expectations and be unprepared for the realities." Id.
10. MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT, supra note 6, at 29.
11. The farmer usually will pay the crew leader a fixed sum, and the crew leader will allocate
it among wages, food, and lodging for the migrant laborers and himself.
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allocate only a small amount for the laborers and to keep much of the money
as salary. 12 In the spring a crew leader managing a North Carolina farm usu-
ally will travel to Florida to recruit migrant laborers.t3 Most of the laborers
are black or Puerto Rican, 14 and the crew leader may be the only person who
speaks English.'5 Because the crew leader controls the transportation and the
labor camps,' 6 migrant laborers depend on him to meet their needs. Crew
leaders frequently capitalize on the laborers' dependence by forcing them to
purchase meals, liquor, and retail items from them at inflated prices. 17 In ad-
dition, the migrant laborers often must pay to rent a small room and linens at
the camp; 18 the crew leader simply deducts these charges from their pay.' 9
Most modem social legislation does not protect migrant laborers. North
Carolina explicitly exempts agricultural workers from coverage by workers'
compensation, 20 child labor,21 minimum wage, overtime, and youth employ-
ment statutes.22 In addition, migrant laborers rarely qualify for unemploy-
ment compensation.23 Communities seldom feel responsible for ensuring the
laborers' health and welfare,24 since they spend only a few weeks in each com-
munity and live in labor camps apart from much of the population.25 The
migrant laborers' transient lifestyle also makes continuing education and
health care almost impossible, especially when the laborer does not speak
English.26 Migrant laborers are extremely vulnerable; they have little legal
protection or community support.
The plight of migrant laborers recently gained public attention in North
Carolina. The United States Department of Justice brought suit against a
number of North Carolina crew leaders for violating federal statutes. In
12. Although the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (1982), provides that mi-
grant laborers who cross state lines to do agricultural work and those who work for a farmer who
uses no less than 500 man days of farm labor in any quarter of the preceding year must receive the
federal minimum hourly wage and overtime, crew leaders can avoid the requirements by paying
migrant laborers on a piece work basis. The Legislative Research Commission found that less
than one-half of the North Carolina farmworkers, including both migrant and resident laborers,
receive the federal minimum wage. MIGRANT WORKERs REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.
13. The migrant laborers who work in North Carolina are part of the "East Coast" stream.
They work their way up the Atlantic coast in the spring planting and harvesting, and return to
Florida after harvesting the fall crops, such as apples. During the off-season, they harvest or do
odd jobs .in Florida. The other major identifiable patterns or streams of migrant labor are the
"midcontmental and "West Coast" streams. MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 11.
16. Id. at 10-I1.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 22.
19. Id. at 11.
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(b) (1979).
21. Id. § 95-25.5(k) (Cum. Supp. 1983). Migrant children may work legally at 10 years of
age. MIGRANT WORKER REPORT, supra note 6, at 31.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.14(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
23. MIGRANT WORKERs REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
24. Id. Migrant laborers "are viewed and treated as 'outsiders' by many local residents." Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 28. Migrant laborers tend to have larger families, so all the children can help
earn the family's income. See id. at 27.
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United States v. Booker2 7 crew leaders were found guilty of kidnapping two
migrant laborers with the intent to hold them as slaves.28 The crew leaders
had recruited the migrant laborers with promises of free transportation to the
work site and steady employment once they arrived.29 Both promises proved
false, and the laborers quickly discovered that they "owed" the crew leaders
not only for the transportation, but for all their meals and other expenses. The
crew leaders threatened the laborers with death and beat them when they tried
to leave before paying their "debts."'30 In one instance, two laborers left the
camp against the crew leaders' orders. When the crew leaders found the la-
borers, they choked them, beat them repeatedly with their fists and with an ax
handle, forced them back to the labor camp, and threatened beatings or death
if they tried to escape again.3 1 The court held that the "climate of fear" 32
created by the crew leaders brutally beating the laborers to force payment of
illusory debts violated federal statutes outlawing slavery33 and kidnapping
with the intent to hold persons as slaves.34
Soon after Booker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit found crew leaders guilty of holding migrant laborers in involuntary
servitude and of conspiring to violate the civil rights of one laborer. In United
States v. Harris35 the labor camp functioned more like a prison camp. Crew
leaders guarded the laborers at night to prevent escape; those caught attempt-
ing to escape were banished to a house known as the "jail.' 36 Laborers who
did not work as quickly as the crew leaders desired were beaten with rubber
hoses and threatened with death. Only two days after one laborer began work,
he died from the intense work, beatings, and absence of medical care. The
laborer, Robert Anderson, apparently was sick when he arrived at the camp.
Because he was weak, he could not pick potatoes for long without resting. The
crew leaders forced him to continue picking each time he tried to stop. That
night and the following day, Mr. Anderson vomited blood; the crew leaders,
however, refused to take him to the hospital. Instead, they forced him back to
the potato fields and beat him when he tried to rest. Mr. Anderson finally
collapsed in the fields and died within minutes, apparently of heat stroke.37
The crew leaders' "reign of physical terror at the farm" 38 was slavery in a
modem form. 39
27. 655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981).
28. Id. at 567.
29. Id. at 563.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 563-64.
32. Id. at 566.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1982).
34. Id. § 1583.
35. 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3554 (1983).
36. Id. at 1098.
37. Id. at 1101-02.
38. Id. at 1100.
39. In United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007
(1978), the court held that a "defendant is guilty of holding a person to involuntary servitude if the
defendant has placed him in such fear of physical harm that the victim is afraid to leave, regard-
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After the federal slavery convictions, the North Carolina General Assem-
bly created the Legislative Research Commission to "study the role of the state
with respect to migrant farmworkers. ' '40 The Commission studied several past
reports about migrant laborers in North Carolina,4' and visited labor camps in
Sampson County, North Carolina.42 It conceded that "[m]ost of our programs
treat only the symptoms of farmworkers' problems, ' 43 and made recommen-
dations to address the problems more effectively. Although the General As-
sembly enacted legislation making both farmers and crew leaders jointly
responsible for migrant housing,44 it failed to address the majority of the mi-
grant laborers' problems fully. The first major legislative act merely makes it
criminal to hold persons in involuntary servitude;45 the second merely estab-
lishes a farmworkers' council.46 Because the acts do not alter existing reme-
dies and programs substantively, they cannot provide solutions to migrant
labor exploitation.
Even though the General Assembly did not attack aggressively the situa-
tion, its actions may have some positive effects. The publicity surrounding
Booker, Harris, and the involuntary servitude legislation should make people
more sensitive to the exploitation of migrant labor in their communities. If
farmers realize that crew leaders are subjugating migrant workers and beating
them if they try to escape, they may take steps to protect the laborers. Farmers
may retain some control over harvesting and be more selective in hiring crew
leaders. Increased sensitivity may also induce local law enforcement person-
nel to work more actively to curb or prevent violence in the labor camps.47
Despite these potential advantages of the involuntary servitude statute, it
adds very little to the already proven federal remedies. The Civil Rights Act
of 1866 generally provides for prison terms up to five or ten years and fines
less of the victim's opportunities for escape." Id. at 1168. This case involved a crew leader who
worked in North Carolina as well as Florida. He forced the migrant laborers to rent space in the
housing he provided and to buy meals and liquor from him, all at exorbitant prices. He also
charged for necessities such as electricity and work gloves. Laborers often found that their "ex-
penses" outweighed their weekly earnings. Furthermore, the crew leader threatened and beat
laborers who attempted escape.
40. MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT, supra note 6, at 3.
41. Id. at 18. Because the migrant laborers' problems have been studied often, the General
Assembly's failure to act on the problems until after the successful federal prosecutions indicates
that embarrassment over the slavery cases prompted the action.
42. Id. at21.
43. Id. at 20.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-238 to -244 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
45. Id. § 14-43.2.
46. Id. § 143B-426.25 to .26.
47. The Legislative Research Commission noted that alcohol consumption added to the vio-
lence in the labor camps. Enforcing the Alcoholic Beverage Control laws, the Commission be-
lieved, would reduce some of the fights and injuries. MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT, supra note 6,
at 21, 27. Migrant laborers often are required to buy their beer and liquor from the crew leaders
at unreasonable prices. See supra text accompanying note 17.
The Legislative Research Commission thought that a statute outlawing involuntary servitude
would probably be a deterrent to incidents of slavery, servitude and peonage. If incidents were
reported, enforcement of a state law should be easier and less time consuming than to rely on
federal law." MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT, supra note 6, at 39.
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violators up to $5000 or $10,000, with increased penalties if death results.48
The North Carolina law makes involuntary servitude a Class I felony with a
presumptive sentence of two years.49 Although the presumptive sentence ap-
pears to guarantee that a convicted defendant will serve time in prison, the
sentencing judge has complete discretion to impose an active sentence or
merely probation.50 Unless actively enforced, the Act loses its effectiveness as
a deterrent and means of punishment.
It is questionable whether the slight difference between the existing fed-
eral and state remedies justifies creating a state statute. Unfortunately, the
General Assembly rejected part of the Legislative Research Commission's rec-
ommendation that would have made the state remedies substantially stronger
than the federal remedies. The recommended version would have defined in-
voluntary servitude as employing a person with the knowledge that the person
holds others in involuntary servitude.5 1 This provision would have forced
farmers to take responsibility for the abuses occurring on their farms, and be
more cautious in hiring crew leaders. The enacted version, however, makes it
only a misdemeanor if the farmer or another party to the labor contract re-
ceives reports of violations, and does not report them to the local sheriff.52
Another weakness with the North Carolina statute is that it prohibits only
the knowing and willful imposition of involuntary servitude.53 Applying a
similar standard, the court in Harris indicated that unless the farmer were
active in the harvesting process, he could not be convicted under the federal
statute.54 Thus, a farmer probably will be found guilty under the North Caro-
lina Act only if he participates in the day-to-day operations of harvesting.55
The General Assembly's omission of the recommended provision holding a
farmer responsible for hiring persons whom he knows hold others in involun-
tary servitude weakens the statute.56 Without proving the farmer's daily in-
volvement, it will be difficult to prove he knowingly and willfully held others
48. See supra note 3. In United States v. Warren, 535 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D.N.C. 1982), aff'din
part and rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 3554 (1983), defendant Harris received a life sentence on the conspiracy count and five-year
sentences on three counts of involuntary servitude to run consecutively; defendant Dennis Warren
received a twenty-year sentence for conspiracy and two five-year sentences for involuntary servi-
tude to run concurrently; and defendant Richard Warren received concurrent split sentences on
the conspiracy and false imprisonment counts of six months in prison and five years probation.
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(f)(7) (1983).
50. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a).
51. MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT, supra note 6, at app. E.
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-43.2(d) (Cum. Supp. 1983). The extent of punishment upon con-
viction lies within the court's discretion.
53. Id. § 14-43.2(b).
54. Harris, 701 F.2d at 1099.
55. Similarly, farmers generally are not liable for the crew leader's torts, since the crew leader
is an independent contractor. "lAin independent contractor [is] one who exercises an independent
employment and contracts to do certain work according to his own judgment and method without
being subject to his employer except as a result of his work." Cooper v. Asheville Citizen-Times
Publishing Co., 258 N.C. 578, 586-87, 129 S.E.2d 107, 113 (1963). Farmers usually give the crew
leader a certain sum of money, and the crew leader uses it for food, lodging and wages, as needed.
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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in involuntary servitude.5 7
Enforcement will be another problem with the involuntary servitude stat-
ute. The Legislative Research Commission recognized that "there seems to be
an accepting indifference of the local law enforcement agencies"58 towards
migrant labor exploitation. In addition to recognizing that violence was com-
mon in labor camps,59 the Commission noted regular violations of food stamp
regulations, wage and hour laws, and liquor laws. 60 The Commission pro-
posed to authorize the State Bureau of Investigation to investigate violations
of the involuntary servitude statute without waiting for local law officers to
request its help.6 ' Although this proposal would have made the involuntary
servitude statute stronger and more likely to be enforced, it was rejected by the
General Assembly. Thus, the involuntary servitude statute will be no more
effective than existing federal remedies. If local law enforcement officers hesi-
tate to investigate assaults and Alcoholic Beverage Control violations, they
probably will not investigate abuses of the new involuntary servitude statute
on their own initiative. Furthermore, if local officers do not investigate mi-
grant labor abuses on their own, they will be reluctant to ask state detectives to
intervene. The involuntary servitude statute is a superficial remedy that dem-
onstrates that North Carolina is not committed to providing adequate security
and health standards for migrant laborers in the state.
The second major legislative act, establishing the North Carolina
Farmworker Council,62 is no more potent a weapon than the involuntary ser-
vitude statute. The Council's purpose is to study the migrant laborer's situa-
tion to determine how to prevent overlapping services, and to recommend
legislative changes.63 Migrant labor problems in North Carolina, however,
already are well documented. The problems deserve active solutions, not fur-
ther study.64
There are a number of effective remedies available to the state. Requiring
farmers to carry Workers' Compensation insurance for the migrant laborers
would guarantee income to laborers unable to work after a job-related in-
jury.65 Granting migrant laborers the right to form and join unions and pro-
57. In Harris crew leaders were found guilty of illegally recruiting and kidnapping migrant
laborers, of beating them, and of killing one laborer. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
The court recognized that the farmer could not be implicated in the crimes, because he was not
involved with the farm's daily operations. See Harris, 701 F.2d at 1099. Although the farmer's
crew leaders were beating and killing people, the farmer "knew" nothing about it. As long as
farmers can remove themselves from liability by distancing themselves from the migrant laborers,
they will have no incentive to make the labor camps secure and sanitary.
58. MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT, supra note 6, at 32.
59. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
60. MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT, supra note 6, at 23.
61. Id. at app. E.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-426.25 to .26 (Cum. Supp. 1983). The Council will work with
problems facing both resident and migrant laborers.
63. Id.
64. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
65. The Legislative Research Commission refused to recommend bringing agricultural work-
ers within the Workers' Compensation Act. The paperwork and cost, the Commission feared,
would be prohibitive to small farmers. It did propose legislation requiring farmers who meet
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viding a board to mediate disputes would give the migrant laborers
independence from the crew leaders and some control over their working con-
ditions.66 Also, certain existing organizations that help migrant laborers de-
serve guaranteed funding. Farm Workers' Legal Services, which aided the
migrant laborers in Booker, and the East Coast Migrant Head Start Program,
which allows many migrant children to attend regular day-care centers,67 are
two such organizations. Unless the Farmworker Council has the power to im-
plement and enforce effective protections such as these, it cannot address fully
the migrant laborers' problems. Creating the Farmworker Council without
giving it the ability to make significant changes is an illusory solution.
Although slavery was abolished over a century ago, it has taken on a
twentieth century6" form in North Carolina; the General Assembly's relief has
not. The General Assembly had an excellent opportunity to make substantive
changes while the public still was sensitive to the federal slavery prosecutions.
Instead, it studied migrant laborers' problems and made involuntary servitude
a crime, adding nothing to the federal remedies that have existed for over one
hundred years. The General Assembly must recognize that migrant laborer
problems will worsen 69 unless farmers and growers are liable for the abuses at
their labor camps. Farmers should not be able to avoid responsibility by dele-
gating harvesting to crew leaders who subjugate and beat migrant laborers.
The Farmworker Council and the involuntary servitude statute are not solu-
tions to the laborers' situation. They may be effective as steps towards a solu-
tion. The final result must be a system that respects the essential function
migrant laborers perform in producing food, and gives them the status and
environment commensurate with their function.
CHARLOTTE GAIL BLAKE
certain qualifying standards to purchase liability insurance. MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT, supra
note 6, at 37. The proposal was not adopted.
66. California does allow migrant laborers to join labor unions and provides a labor dispute
board. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1152-1155.7 (West Supp. 1983).
67. MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT, supra note 6, at 28.
68. See Booker, 655 F.2d at 566.
69. The Legislative Research Commission reported that North Carolina is eleventh in the
nation in its use of migrant labor. It estimated that North Carolina employed 10,000 migrant
laborers in 1975, and 35,000 in 1981. MIGRANT WORKERS REPORT, supra note 6, at 27.
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A Preliminary Analysis of the North Carolina Crime
Victims Compensation Act
In 1982 more than twenty-six thousand North Carolinians were victims of
violent crime.' Traditionally, the only means for a victim to recoup his losses
was to institute a civil suit against the offender.2 Two major practical
problems, however, may destroy the usefulness of a civil suit: a civil suit re-
quires that the offender be both apprehended, 3 and wealthy enough to make
the civil suit economically feasible. To aid the uninsured innocent victim, a
majority of states have enacted crime victims reparations programs.4 In 1983
the North Carolina General Assembly joined this trend by enacting North
Carolina General Statutes chapter 15B, the North Carolina Crime Victims
Compensation Act.5
The purpose of the Act is simple: to compensate victims for losses caused
by violent crimes. The Act, however, does not purport to compensate for
every crime. Section 15B-4 requires that a victim have been injured by "crimi-
nally injurious conduct. '" 6 This is defined as conduct that "by its nature poses
a substantial threat of personal injury or death, and is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or death."'7 The focus is solely on the perpetrator's conduct; the
victim of the crime is compensated by the Act even if the perpetrator lacked
the legal capacity to commit the crime.8 Because injury or death arising from
the operation of a motor vehicle is expressly excluded from the Act,9 a victim
will be unable to recover under the Act if his injuries are caused by one who,
1. CRIME IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1982 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 57. The Uniform Crime
Report defines "violent crime" to include murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Id.
2. North Carolina, like many other states, affords its citizen-victims another avenue for
compensation. A court can, as a condition to an inmate's probation, require him to make mone-
tary restitution to his victim. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(d) (1983). This remedy, however,
is mostly illusory. First, it assumes that someone has been convicted of the crime. Second, the
statute requires the court to consider the offender's financial status before awarding restitution.
Id. These drawbacks severely hamper the remedy.
3. Of the 26,000 violent crimes reported in this state in 1982, only 17,000 arrests were made.
CRIME IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 1, at 163. Thus, the civil remedy was available to, at best,
6 of the victims.
4. For a survey of 27 such programs, see Hoelzel,4 Survey of27 Victim Compensation Pro-
grams, 63 JUDICATURE 485 (1980). At least five justifications have been posited for these pro-
grams: (1) the state has assumed the responsibility for protecting its citizens, and when one is
victimized, the state has breached that obligation; (2) the programs are a result of a moral duty to
secure the public welfare; (3) the programs spread the risk of loss among all of society; (4) the
programs prevent victims from being alienated by society; and (5) most civil remedies are inade-
quate. See Clark & Webster, Indiana's Victim Compensation Act: A Comparative Perspective, 14
IND. L. REV. 751, 753-54 (1981).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15B-1 to -22 (1983). Attorney General Rufus Edmisten urged the
General Assembly to enact the program. Telephone interview with Representative Thomas C.
Womble, D-Forsyth (Feb. 27, 1984).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-4 (1983).
7. Id. § 15B-2(5). The injurious conduct must have taken place within the state.
8. Id. Thus, even if the offender was legally insane when the crime was committed, the
victim still can recover.
9. Id.
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for example, intentionally assaults him with an automobile. 10
Eligibility under the Act is governed by section 15B-2(2). To be eligible
for recovery, a person must be a victim or a dependent of a deceased victim. a'
"Victim" is defined as one who "suffers personal injury or death proximately
caused by criminally injurious conduct."' 2 A perpetrator or his accomplice
may not recover' 3 and a claim will be denied if it would benefit unjustly either
one.14 The Act further provides that unless "the interests of justice require," a
spouse, parent, child, sibling, or housemate of the offender or accomplice may
not recover.'
5
Recovery under the Act is limited to out-of-pocket "economic loss arising
from criminally injurious conduct."' 16 Economic loss includes any reasonable
medical and burial expenses. 17 Economic loss also includes any loss of in-
come the victim suffers, 18 as well as any expense the victim incurs hiring some-
one to perform the services he usually performs for his own or his dependents'
benefit.' 9 If the victim dies as a result of the crime, economic loss also in-
cludes any monetary loss the dependents suffer as a result of the victim's
death,20 including any expense the dependents incur in hiring someone to per-
form the services the victim usually performed for their benefit. 2 '
Recovery for "pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, or
other nonpecuniary damage," however, is excluded specifically.22 This limita-
tion is consonant with the spirit of the Act-to compensate only for out-of-
pocket economic loss. The Act does recognize, however, that such emotional
damage may cause compensable economic harm.23 The Act also excludes
compensation for property losses, no matter how catastrophic they may be.24
10. This aspect of the North Carolina Act differs from the Uniform Crime Victims Repara-
tions Act. The latter excludes injuries arising out of the operation of motor vehicles unless the
conduct was "intended to cause personal injury or death." See UNIF. CRIME VICTIMs REPARA-
TIONS ACT, I1 U.L.A. 33 (1974) [hereinafter cited as UNIF. ACT]. See also ihra notes 55-59 and
accompanying text.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(2) (1983).
12. Id. § 15B-2(13). The North Carolina Act and Uniform Act also differ on this point. In
North Carolina the injury or death must by "proximately caused" by the criminal conduct. Id.
The Uniform Act, however, compensates those who suffer injury or death as a result of a crime, a
good faith effort to prevent a crime, or a good faith effort to apprehend a suspect. See UNIF. ACT,
supra note 10, § l(i), at 37. See also infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(2) (1983).
14. Id. §15B-11(a)(3).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 15B4.
17. Id. § 15B-2(10). The Act labels these expenses "allowable expense[s]." A maximum of
$2000 is recoverable for burial expenses. Id. § 15B-2(l).
18. Id. § 15B-2(14) ("work loss").
19. Id. § 15B-2(12) ("replacement services loss").
20. Id. § 15B-2(7) ("dependent's economic loss").
21. Id. § 15B-2(8) ("dependent's replacement service loss").
22. Id. § 15B-2(10), (I1).
23. Id. § 15B-2(10). Thus, although a victim cannot recover for pain and suffering per se, he
may recover any lost wages that the pain and suffering cause him.
24. Exclusion of property losses is the overwhelming trend among the states. See Hoelzel,
supra note 4, at 485. Louisiana, however, allows recovery for "catastrophic property loss," which
is limited to "loss of abode." See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:1802(8)(c) (West 1982).
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This exclusion is based primarily on the assumption that allowing compensa-
tion for property losses would be too costly,25 and is a prime example of the
Act's goal of compensating solely for personal injury.
The dollar limits of the Act are straightforward. 26 A maximum of 2000
dollars is allowed for burial expenses. 27 All other economic loss is compensa-
ble up to a maximum of 200 dollars per week,28 and the maximum total com-
pensation payable to any victim or his dependents is 20,000 dollars.29
Furthermore, no compensation can be awarded if the victim's economic loss
totals less than 100 dollars.30
Compensation can be reduced or denied for several reasons. A claim
must be denied if the claimant failed to file his application for compensation
within two years of his injury.31 In addition, it is within the Commission's
discretion to deny a claim if the victim failed to report the criminal act to
police within three days of its occurrence.32
A claim can be reduced in three situations. If a victim's misconduct con-
tributed to his injury or death, the Commission may reduce the claim.33 If a
claimant failed to cooperate properly with any law enforcement agency, the
claim may be reduced or denied.34 Most importantly, the claimant's award is
reduced by any amount he recoups from collateral sources. 35 This provision is
designed to prevent double recovery.36
To administer the Act, the Crime Victims Compensation Commission
25. See Note, The Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 2 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 187, 219-20 (1976).
26. These dollar limits illustrate the tension inherent in any compensation program. There is
a strong philanthropic desire to aid the injured victim, but, financial reality places a limit on state
largesse. As a result, the dollar limits represent a compromise of these competing interests.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(l) (1983).
28. Id. § 15B-ll(f).
29. Id. § 15B-1l(g).
30. Id. § 15B-l l(e). The minimum loss provision has been justified on the ground that it
"costs more to process [small] claims than the claim itself is worth." See Hoelzel, supra note 4, at
489.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-11(a)(l) (1983).
32. Id. § 15B-11(a)(2). The Commission can waive this requirement upon a showing of
"good cause." Id. Presumably, the Commission can waive this requirement, and not the two-year
statute of limitations of section 15B-I l(a)(1), because of the relative shortness of a three-day
period.
33. Id. § 15B-11(b).
34. Id. § 15B-1 1(c). This recovery requirement will encourage citizen interest in law enforce-
ment. If a victim wishes to to be aided by the State, he must cooperate with the police. See
Hoelzel, supra note 4, at 487. It should be noted that the Act does not mention the necessity for
cooperation with the state prosecutor. Presumably, however, a court could construe "law enforce-
ment agency" to include a prosecutor.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-1 l(d) (1983). A collateral source is defined as a readily available
source of benefits from, inter alia, the offender, any government agency, social security, medicare,
medicaid, workers' compensation, or insurance. Id. § 15B-2(3).
36. See Hoelzel, supra note 4, at 488. The prevention of a double recovery is the antithesis of
the tort concept known as the collateral source rule. Under this rule, courts generally hold that
cash or in-kind benefits received by an injured plaintiff from a source collateral to and independ-
ent of the tortfeasor will not be set off against the plaintiff's recovery from the tortfeasor. Most
courts reach this result to prevent awarding a "windfall" to the defendant. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Milam, 115 Ga. App. 396, 397, 154 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1967) ("A tortfeasor can not diminish the
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was created and granted broad powers.37 The administrative machinery is set
in motion when a victim files an application for compensation with the Com-
mission.38 Each claim is assigned to an investigator, who conducts an initial
investigation. 39 Based on the application and the investigator's report, the
Commission director makes an initial decision on the claim. To be awarded
compensation, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the Act's requirements have been met.40 The perpetrator need not be
convicted for the claim to be successful; proof of conviction, however, is con-
clusive evidence that the crime was committed.
4 1
If the claimant is satisfied with the initial decision, the claim is submitted
to the Commission for its approval. If dissatisfied with the director's decision,
the claimant can appeal to the Commission for a full hearing.42 The claimant
may obtain judicial review of the Commission's decision in superior court.43
Thereafter, appeals are taken to the court of appeals "under rules of procedure
applicable in other civil cases."44 If compensation ultimately is awarded, the
State is subrogated to the claimant's rights to the extent of the compensation
paid.45
The General Assembly relied heavily on the Uniform Crime Victims
Reparations Act.46 In its final form, however, the North Carolina Act differs
from its model in a number of significant ways. A "victim" is defined in the
North Carolina Act as one "who suffers personal injury or death proximately
caused by" the crime.47 The Uniform Act, however, has a more comprehen-
sive definition of "victim." Under that Act, a "victim" is one who suffers in-
jury or death as a result of the crime, a good faith effort to prevent the crime,
or a good faith effort to apprehend one suspected of the crime.4 8 Thus, a key
question is whether the North Carolina Act is to be construed so that the
amount of his liability by pleading payments made to the plaintiff under the terms of a contract
between the plaintiff and a third party who was not a joint tortfeasor.").
In the compensation programs, however, there is no need to be concerned about a windfall
for the offender;, the victim and the state are the only interested parties. Since the aim of the
program is to aid a victim whose losses will come out of his own pocket, the program limits
recovery to those losses not covered by a collateral source.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15B-3, -6 (1983). The Commission consists of five members: three
appointed by the Governor, one appointed by the Senate, and one appointed by the House. Id.
§ 15B-3(a).
38. The application includes information relating to the criminal act, the injury, and the
victim's economic loss. See id. § 15B-7. The Commission can waive the $10 application fee for
claims brought by indigent victims. Id. § 15B-7(a).
39. Id. § 15B-10(a).
40. Id. § 15B-4.
41. Id. § 15B-14(a). Of course, the victim still must prove the other requirements of the Act.
42. Id. § 15B-10(b) to (d).
43. Id. §§ 15B-9, 150A-45.
44. Id. § 150A-52.
45. Id. § 15B-18(a). The State would have a civil remedy against the offender in the amount
of compensation paid to the victim.
46. UNIF. Acr, supra note 10.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(13) (1983).
48. UNIF. ACT, supra note 10, § l(i), at 37.
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"proximately caused" language includes persons injured as a result of trying to
prevent a crime or apprehend a suspected criminal.
Because the purpose of the Act is to compensate innocent victims of
crime, it is irrational not to compensate "good samaritans" who are injured.
Thus, the "proximately caused" language of the Act should be interpreted to
include good faith intervenors.49 In Sutton v. Duke5° the North Carolina
Supreme Court stated that for an act to be the proximate cause of a negli-
gently-caused injury, all that is required is "that a person of ordinary prudence
could have reasonably foreseen that such a result, or some similar injurious
result, was probable under the facts as they existed."'' s Since it is entirely
foreseeable that a good samaritan might be injured while coming to a victim's
aid, the North Carolina Act should be construed to allow compensation to
good faith intervenors.52
The North Carolina Act also differs from the Uniform Act by denying
compensation to a victim whose injury occurred while he was confined in
prison or jail.53 This provision is practically meaningless. Since only eco-
nomic loss is compensable, an inmate-victim ordinarily would recover only his
lost wages and out-of-pocket medical expenses. The State already provides
free medical care to inmates, 54 and few inmates earn a significant wage. Thus,
even without the limitation found in section 15B-11, there is little chance an
inmate would receive compensation.
The North Carolina and Uniform Acts also differ substantially regarding
compensation for injuries arising out of the operation of motor vehicles. The
North Carolina Act bars compensation for all injuries or deaths "arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle."'55 The Uniform Act
provides a similar limitation unless the crime was "intended to cause personal
49. The Act's sponsor, Representative Thomas C. Womble, stated that although the North
Carolina Act is not as explicit as the Uniform Act, "victim" is to be interpreted to include injured
good faith intervenors. Telephone interview with Representative Thomas C. Womble, D-Forsyth
(Feb. 27, 1984).
The term "proximate cause" is borrowed from the law of negligence. Countless pages have
been written on this complex and confusing subject. See, e.g., Agnihotri, Too Much Ado About
Something. Fate of Proximate Cause in Louisiana, 3 S.U.L. REV. 1 (1976); Reynolds, Limits on
Negligence Liability: Palsgraf at 50, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 63 (1979); Comment, Civil Liability For
Suicide: An Analysis of the Causation Issue, 1978 ARuz. ST. L.J. 573; Comment, House v. Keller-
man: Judge, Jury, and Intervening Cause in Kentucky Negligence Law, 64 KY. L.J. 889 (1976).
50. 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970).
51. Id. at 107, 176 S.E.2d at 169.
52. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that a person cannot be charged with con-
tributory negligence if he acts neither rashly nor recklessly in coming to the aid of a victim of
negligence. The tortfeasor's negligent act is seen as the proximate cause of the rescuer's injury.
See Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 380, 218 S.E.2d 379, 382 (1975).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-ll(a)(4) (1983). Representative Womble noted that this limita-
tion was enacted because it is not the intention of the Act to compensate an inmate injured, for
example, in a prison riot. One state that did not have this limitation was deluged with applica-
tions from inmates so injured. Telephone interview with Representative Thomas C. Womble, D-
Forsyth (Feb. 27, 1984).
54. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-19 (1983).
55. See id. § 15B-2(5).
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injury or death."' 56 North Carolina should amend its Act to conform with the
Uniform Act and allow compensation for intentional automobile-related inju-
ries. 57 Otherwise, the Act creates the anomaly that a person can recover if
someone shoots him, but not if someone intentionally strikes him with a car.
A literal reading of section 15B-2(5) also might preclude recovery for a victim
of a car bomb, since the injury arose "out of the. . . use of a motor vehicle."
Although cost reduction is the usual justification for barring recovery when an
automobile is involved,5 8 the Uniform Act's approach-by allowing recovery
for only intentionally inflicted injuries-would reduce costs while still compen-
sating the handful of victims who are assaulted intentionally with an
automobile.59
The Uniform Act contains a controversial optional provision that North
Carolina wisely did not adopt. The optional provision premises a victim's re-
covery on his financial situation; a claimant may recover only if he will suffer
"financial stress" as a result of his economic losses. "Financial stress" is de-
fined as an inability to maintain one's "customary level of health, safety, and
education" for oneself and one's dependents "without undue financial hard-
ship."'60 The purpose of this provision is to limit costs by not compensating
those who can take care of themselves. 61 This justification has three major
faults. First, the financial stress test "reads a welfare concept into a program
not related to welfare."62 The purpose of the Act is to compensate all innocent
victims, not just those below a certain income level. Second, the program al-
ready has a large cost-reduction provision that disallows recovery to the extent
the economic loss is recouped from collateral sources. 63 Third, it has been
suggested that it may be as costly to require the Commission to evaluate the
victim's financial need as it is to compensate all victims regardless of financial
stress. Thus, any savings made by disallowing recovery by wealthy victims
would be offset by the increased administrative costs.64 Since the justification
for the financial stress test is weak, North Carolina was wise not to adopt it.
56. UNIF. AcT, supra note 10, § l(e), at 36. Texas follows the Uniform Act on this point. See
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 3(4)(D) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
57. Four reasons for disallowing recovery for victims of automobile-related crimes have been
suggested. First, automobile liability insurance provides an adequate remedy for the injured vic-
tim. Second, it may be too difficult to prove that the injury was intentionally inflicted. Third,
compensating these victims would be too costly. Fourth, "[m]otoring offenses are 'not the type of
offense about which the public is concer[n]ed."' Lamborn, The Scope of Programs For Govern-
mental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 21, 30-32.
58. See Hoelzel, supra note 4, at 492.
59. See CRIME IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 1, at 21, 57.
Rep. Womble stated that the reason for total exclusion for motor-vehicle-related injuries is
because the State should not become an automobile insurance company. Telephone interview
with Representative Thomas C. Womble, D-Forsyth (Feb. 27, 1984).
60. UNiF. ACT, supra note 10, § 5(g)(1), at 41. Texas decided to adopt this optional financial
stress test. See Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
61. See UNiF. AcT, supra note 10, at 42 (Commissioners' Comment).
62. Id.
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-ll(d) (1983); UNIF. AcT, supra note 10, § 5(f)(1), at 41.
64. UNiF. AcT, supra note 10, at 42 (Commissioners' Comment). Thirty percent of the aver-
age program's expenses is consumed by administrative costs. Hoelzel, supra note 4, at 488. In all
likelihood, this percentage is even greater in "financial stress" states.
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In addition to the departures from the Uniform Act, there will be other
problems in interpreting the North Carolina Act. In approaching the Act, one
must decide whether to construe the Act liberally to facilitate recovery, or con-
strue the Act strictly to save money. On the one hand, it is likely that any
funding by the General Assembly will be inadequate to compensate all vic-
tims.65 If the Commission or courts feel that the program is underfunded,
they may construe the Act strictly to preserve funds. On the other hand, most
programs with a humanitarian or social goal are construed liberally to facili-
tate recovery.66 Because the program is designed to aid innocent crime vic-
tims, any ambiguity in the Act should be resolved in favor of the victim.
One such interpretation problem will be the Act's definition of "crimi-
nally injurious conduct." It is defined as conduct "which by its nature poses a
substantial threat of personal injury or death." 67 This definition does not
identify adequately the compensable crimes. If a crime is covered only if it
intrinsically poses a "substantial threat" of injury, murder and assault clearly
are covered; burglary, however, is not. The better view would be to determine
if the criminal conduct poses a substantial threat of injury in fight of the par-
ticular circumstances. This view is preferable because the words "substantial
threat" modify the word "conduct." The emphasis is on the dangerousness of
the conduct, not on the dangerousness of the underlying crime.68 Thus, if the
crime was dangerous as carried out, as opposed to dangerous as defined in the
criminal code, the victim would be able to receive compensation.69
Another interpretation problem is the definition of work loss. Compensa-
ble work loss is defined in part as "loss of income from work that the injured
person would have performed if he had not been injured."'70 It has been ar-
gued that any loss of income caused by the crime should be covered under the
program. Proponents of this view favor compensating the injured victim for
wages lost because of a need to appear in court and testify against the offender.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in Hughes v. North Dakota Crime Vic-
tims Reparations Board,71 held that such lost wages were not covered. The
65. For example, the future of Indiana's program looked gloomy from its inception in 1978
until 1980 because of funding woes. The Indiana Commission stopped processing claims for six
months when the administrative funding was exhausted. See Clark & Webster, supra note 4, at
755-56.
66. See Note, supra note 25, at 199 ("[T]he Act is remedial in nature and thus should be
accorded a liberal construction in favor of the remedy provided by law, or in favor of those enti-
tled to the benefit of the statute."). See also Ames v. Texas, 656 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tex. App. 1983)
(Burdock, J., dissenting) (Act should be construed liberally in favor of victim). But S6 Hughes v.
North Dakota Crime Victim Reparations Bd., 246 N.W.2d 774, 776-77 (N.D. 1976) (when court
feels Act is unambiguous, it will not be given liberal construction).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(5) (1983).
68. See Note, supra note 25, at 211.
69. See id. The "dangerous as carried out" approach has been adopted by the Minnesota
Commission. Id. at 211 n.155. North Dakota avoided this interpretation problem by defining
"criminally injurious conduct" as criminal conduct that "results in bodily injury or death." See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-13-03(4) (Supp. 1983). Thus, in North Dakota the risk of injury or death
attendant to a particular crime is unimportant.
70. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(14) (1983).
71. 246 N.W.2d 774 (N.D. 1976).
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Hughes decision represents the proper interpretation. The statute clearly is
aimed at compensating the victim for wage loss caused by the injury he suf-
fered. In Hughes the victim's lost wages were not the result, directly or indi-
rectly, of his injury. Even if the victim had not been injured, he still would
have been required to testify against the offender.72 Section 15B-2(14) clearly
states that the loss must be attributable to the injury, and not just to the
crime.7
3
North Carolina General Statutes section 15B-1 l(a)(3) also may present an
interpretation problem. That section denies recovery if an award unjustly
would benefit the offender or his accomplice. Furthermore, unless "the inter-
ests of justice require," an award may not be made to a spouse, parent, child,
sibling, or housemate of the offender or his accomplice.74 These two require-
ments must be interpreted together.75 Thus, the interests of justice would re-
quire compensating an offender's innocent spouse unless the award would
benefit unjustly the offender himself. If, for example, the offender and his
victim are estranged spouses with no hope of reconciliation, an award would
be proper since it would not benefit the offender unjustly. Similarly, an eman-
cipated son who is assaulted by his father should recover. In this respect,
North Carolina was wise to reject the approach taken by Maryland. Under
the Maryland program, a victim cannot recover if he is a member of the of-
fender's family.76 This rule is too inflexible because it disallows recovery
merely because of a legal, blood, or social relationship with the offender. The
North Carolina approach, which emphasizes the unjust enrichment of the of-
fender, represents a view more in keeping with the policies underlying the Act.
In addition to problems of interpretation, two problems may arise in im-
plementing the North Carolina program. If the program is funded inade-
quately by the General Assembly, its effectiveness will be diminished severely.
As originally drafted, the program was to be funded by increased criminal
court costs. 77 This proposal was defeated. 78 Instead, the program will be
funded with general state revenues through the Department of Crime Control
72. Id. at 777 n.1.
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(14) (1983).
74. See id. § 15B-11(a)(3).
75. Maryland, unlike North Carolina, has made no conscious effort to emphasize the unjust
enrichment of the offender. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 5(b) (1981). North Carolina's provi-
sions were included so that an offender could not be benefited by an award. Assuming that a
victim meets every other requirement of the Act, the logical conclusion is that "justice requires"
compensating the victim if the award will not benefit the offender.
76. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 5(b) (1981). "Family" is defined as a person within the third
degree of consanguinity or affinity, a sexual partner, or a housemate. Id. § 2(d).
77. See N.C. House Bill 177 (1983) (as originally introduced). The rationale behind this
method of funding is to let the criminals pay for a program that is aimed at victims. Texas, for
example, funds its compensation program in this manner. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
8309-1, § 14 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
78. This proposed method of funding was defeated for two principal reasons. First, the ma-
jority of criminal cases are traffic offenses, and thus the increased court costs really would not be
borne by "criminals." Second, the purpose of court costs is to pay the court's administrative ex-
penses, not to fund other programs. Interview with James Drennan, Associate Professor, North
Carolina Institute of Government (Feb. 27, 1984).
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and Public Safety.79 To date, no funds have been appropriated for the pro-
gram. To operate effectively, the program must receive adequate funds. The
Indiana program "had a precarious existence" from its inception in 1978 until
1980 because of inadequate funding.8 0 This should not be allowed to happen
in North Carolina.
The drafters of the Act attempted to protect against funding deficiencies.
The Act expressly states that if compensation is awarded when there are insuf-
ficient funds to pay the award, it nevertheless will be paid as soon as funds
become available.8 1 The Commission, however, probably would cease
processing claims if its administrative expenses could not be paid.82 A backlog
of unpaid claims would result. Thus, proper funding is imperative if the pro-
gram is to have a meaningful existence.
If the Act is to be effective, it is necessary that the victims it was intended
to benefit be made aware of the program. Even a properly funded program is
ineffective unless crime victims know it exists.8 3 The North Carolina Act en-
courages victim awareness by requiring law enforcement agencies to use "rea-
sonable efforts" to introduce the program to injured victims.3 4 Although this
is a step in the right direction, it may not be enough. The Act does not provide
for enforcement against an agency that is derelict in notifying victims. Such a
provision should be considered by the legislature if it is serious about full im-
plementation of the Act. Pursuant to its own power to publicize the pro-
gram,85 the Commission also could implement a comprehensive plan to
educate the public. Although any publicity drive will be restricted by limited
funds, the program could be featured in radio and television public service
announcements.
8 6
By enacting the North Carolina Crime Victims Compensation Act, the
79. 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 832, § 6. The majority of the states fund their programs
with general state revenues. Hoelzel, supra note 4, at 492.
80. See Clark & Webster, supra note 4, at 755-56.
81. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-22 (1983).
82. In Indiana the Commission stopped processing claims when its administrative coffers
were emptied. Clark & Webster, supra note 4, at 755.
83. "A major shortcoming of every program is that most of its customers, victims of violent
crime, are not aware of it." H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS OF
CRIME 281 (1974). The best gauge of public ignorance is the percentage of victims who use the
programs. In California, for example, 200,000 people were victims of violent crime. Only
12,000-a mere 6%--applied for compensation. CiuM. JUST. NEWSLETTER, Nov. 7, 1983, at I.
Similarly, in 1974 only 3% of Alaska's, 12% of Hawaii's, 5% of Maryland's, and 2% of New York's
eligible victims applied for compensation. See Note, supra note 25, at 230 n.261.
Incredible as it may seem, some state legislatures have been reluctant to publicize their pro-
grams. The Nebraska legislature, for example, would allow no money to be spent on publicity
during the first year of the program (to limit the number of claims). Likewise, the Washington
legislature was "distraught" about the widespread publicity of that state's program. Hoelzel,supra
note 4, at 495.
84. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-20 (1983).
85. See id. § 15B-6(3).
86. Minnesota has a simple and relatively inexpensive program for informing potential
claimants. When the police investigate a crime, they give the victim a card that tells the victim
how to contact the compensation board. See Hoelzel, supra note 4, at 492.
Since the North Carolina Act allows compensation for reasonable attorneys' fees regardless
of a claimant's success, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-15(a) (1983), it is likely that a large number of
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General Assembly created a humanitarian program designed to aid injured
crime victims. If the program is to serve this benevolent purpose, three consid-
erations must be remembered. First, any ambiguities in the statute should be
construed in favor of the victim; the adequacy or inadequacy of appropriation
should not affect the construction given the Act. Second, it is imperative that
the program be funded adequately. The General Assembly should look to
other states to determine the level of funding a successful compensation pro-
gram demands. Third, it is crucial that the program be publicized widely.
Only if victims are aware of the program can it effectively serve both the citi-
zens of the State and the policies it was intended to promote.
KENNETH L. JONES
victims will be made aware of the program by their attorneys. See also Hcelzel, supra note 4, at
495.
1984] 3
State v. Neal-Are North Carolina Criminal Defendants
Adequately Protected from Judicial Comments on
Verdicts?
As a general rule, the presiding judge in a criminal trial is prohibited from
commenting on a verdict rendered in that session if his comments can be
heard by prospective jurors for that session.t This rule is intended to prevent
prejudice to defendants tried before those jurors,2 and to ensure the protection
of the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair and impartial trial? Al-
though the defendant has a right to be tried before jurors unbiased by com-
ment from the bench, it is unclear what remedy a defendant should have in the
event that members of the jury are exposed to such judicial comment. The
North Carolina legislature has enacted two statutes that address this issue.
The first is North Carolina General Statutes section 1-180.1, enacted in 1955,
which prohibits judicial comment on any verdict before jurors or prospective
jurors4 and has been interpreted as providing that a motion for continuance is
a defendant's sole remedy for such comment.5 The second is section 15A-
1239, enacted in 1977 as part of the Trial Stage and Appellate Procedure Act,6
which contains similar language prohibiting comment on a verdict.7 This lat-
ter statute, however, does not contain the restrictive language of section 1-
180.1 that has been interpreted to limit a defendant's remedy to a motion for a
continuance. Thus, the question arises whether the absence of this restrictive
language in the recently adopted section 15A-1239 is to be interpreted as re-
pealing by implication the older statute, or whether these two statutes are to be
1. See State v. Carriker, 287 N.C. 530, 215 S.E.2d 134 (1975); State v. Brown, 29 N.C. App.
391, 224 S.E.2d 206 (1976).
2. See State v. Carriker, 287 N.C. 530, 215 S.E.2d 134 (1975).
3. U.S. CONST. amend VI. The sixth amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed .
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180.1 (1983) states:
In criminal actions the presiding judge shall make no comment in open court in the
presence or hearing of all, or any member or members, of the panel of jurors drawn or
summoned for jury duty at any session of court, upon any verdict rendered at such ses-
sion of court, and if any presiding judge shall make any comment as herein prohibited,
or shall praise or criticize any jury on account of its verdict, whether such comment,
praise or criticism be made inadvertently or intentionally, such praise, criticism or com-
ment by the judge shall constitute valid grounds as a matter of right, for the continuance
for the session of any action remaining to be tried during that week at such session of
court, upon motion of a defendant or upon motion of the State. The provisions of this
section shall not be applicable upon the hearing of motions for a new trial, motions to set
aside the verdict of a jury, or a motion made in arrest of judgment.
5. See State v. Carriker, 287 N.C. 530, 215 S.E.2d 134 (1975); State v. Neal, 60 N.C. App.
350, 299 S.E.2d 654, disc. rev denied, 308 N.C. 389, 302 S.E.2d 256 (1983).
6. Act of June 23, 1977, ch. 711, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 853, 863 (codified at N.C. G E. STAT.
§ 15A-1239 (1983)).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1239 (1983) states:
The trial judge may not comment upon the verdict ofajury in open court in the presence
or hearing of any member of the jury panel. If he does so, any defendant whose case is
calendared for that session of court is entitled, upon motion, to a continuance of his case
to a time when all members of the entire jury panel are no longer serving.
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read in conjunction with one another, so that a motion for continuance still is
a defendant's "exclusive remedy" for judicial comment on the verdict.8 The
North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed this issue for the first time in State
v. Nea 9 and concluded that section 1-180.1 had not been repealed by implica-
tion, but was still in effect. Thus, a defendant's sole remedy for prejudicial
comment on a verdict from the bench remains a motion for continuance.1o
This note questions the ruling in Neal, focusing particularly on the policy
implications of the court's interpretation of the relevant statutes. In addition,
the note questions the court's rejection of defendant's argument that he was
entitled to a new trial under another statute, North Carolina General Statutes
section 15A-1414(b)(3), which provides for a new trial if "[flor any other cause
the defendant did not receive a fair and impartial trial."" The note concludes
that, although sections 1-180.1 and 15A-1239 might be reconcilable logically, a
better result, and one more in keeping with the general philosophy of the Trial
Stage and Appellate Procedure Act, is to eliminate the restrictive language of
section 1-180.1.
In State v. Neal12 defendant was charged with the misdemeanor of assault
upon a female.13 Defendant's trial was set in Forsyth Superior Court during
the criminal jury session beginning on March 15, 1982.14 On the first day of
the session, the case of State v. Wilson was heard and the jury found Wilson
not guilty. 15 Following that trial, the presiding judge addressed the jury, ad-
monishing them to pay close attention to what future witnesses might say, and
reminding them of their vital role as the triers of fact. 16 Neither defendant
Neal nor his attorney was present at the time these comments were made. On
the following day defendant's trial began before three of the same jurors. On
March 17, 1982, defendant was convicted and sentenced to two years in
8. This was one of the issues raised by defendant in State v. Neal, 60 N.C. App. 350, 299
S.E.2d 654, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 389, 302 S.E.2d 256 (1983).
9. 60 N.C. App. 350, 299 S.E.2d 654, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 389, 302 S.E.2d 256 (1983).
10. Id. at 353, 299 S.E.2d at 656 (1983).
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1414(b)(3) (1978).
12. 60 N.C. App. 350, 299 S.E.2d 654, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 389, 302 S.E.2d 256 (1983).
13. Id. at 351, 299 S.E.2d at 654.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 352, 299 S.E.2d at 655.
16. Id. The trial record reveals the judge's admonitions upon the return of the verdict:
COURT: All right, I'm going to let you folks go until tomorrow. Let me say this.
In view of this question, I don't believe you were listening carefully to the evidence in
this case and I caution you that if you're called on another jury, do listen to what the
witnesses say because you are the triers of facts. I ask you to please do that. Because if
you don't listen-these cases are right important cases.
Now, as I recall the evidence there which would have been improper for me to give
you my recollection of it because I'm not the trier of fact, but as I recall the evidence in
this case, the officer said that when he came up there, the defendant put his hand in his
pocket, that he told him-he put his hand on his shoulder or arm, and said take your
hands out and he took his hands out and the substance dropped to the ground under-
neath him. But it would have been improper for me to tell you that. That's the way I
heard the evidence.
I say this simply to you, you're going to be on the jury the rest of the week. Do
listen carefully. It's important that you do (jury excused).
Id. at 351-52, 299 S.E.2d at 655.
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prison. 17
On March 24, 1982, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief, in
which he alleged that "he did not discover that the presiding judge ... had
made the comments listed above, until after [the] verdict in . . . [his] case." 18
The relief sought was "for a new trial because the comments of the trial judge
were made in contravention of N.C.G.S. 15A-1239, the VI Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, and Article 1, Section 24 of the Constitution
of North Carolina."' 9 This motion was denied.20 In the court of appeals,
defendant relied on one argument-that his motion for a new trial should
have been granted because of the trial judge's indiscretion in commenting on
the verdict of a prior trial. The court of appeals held that defendant's motion
for a new trial was denied correctly because neither of the statutes that deal
with judicial comment on the verdict provide for a new trial as a remedy;
instead, they provide, as an exclusive remedy, continuance.2 1 The court of
appeals further held that defendant's failure to make a motion for continuance
prior to trial resulted in a waiver of that right, and finally, that the trial court
had not abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial.2 2
A brief overview of sections 1-180.1 and 15A-1239, including a considera-
tion of the policy concerns underlying these statutes, is helpful in understand-
ing the issues in Neal. Section 1-180.1 states that "[i]n criminal actions the
presiding judge shall make no comment in open court in the presence or hear-
ing of all, or any member or members, of the panel of jurors drawn or sum-
moned for jury duty at any session of court, upon any verdict rendered at such
session of court."23 Prior to the enactment of section 1-180.1, there was no
statute that dealt specifically with the matter of judicial comment on the ver-
dict. A previously enacted statute, North Carolina General Statutes section I-
180,24 commanded that the judge, in making his charge to the jury, explain the
law, but offer no opinion on the facts of the case. In State v. Canove25 the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the expression of an opinion of the
facts of a particular case by a trial judge constituted a violation of section 1-
180, even though made to prospective jurors during the selection process. 26
Despite this expansive reading of section 1-180, the General Assembly enacted
section 1-180.1 to "supplement [section 1-180 and] . . . to further prevent the
trial judge from invading the province of the jury."27
On July 1, 1978, the Trial Stage and Appellate Procedure Act went into
17. Id. at 351, 299 S.E.2d at 654.
18. Id. at 352, 299 S.E.2d at 655.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 351, 299 S.E.2d at 654.
21. Id. at 352-53, 299 S.E.2d at 655-56.
22. Id. at 353-54, 299 S.E.2d at 656-57.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180.1 (1983). See supra note 4.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180 (1983).
25. 240 N.C. 60, 81 S.E.2d 173 (1954).
26. Id. at 64, 81 S.E.2d at 176-77.
27. State v. Carriker, 287 N.C. 530, 534, 215 S.E.2d 134, 138 (1975).
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effect.2 8 This Act, which was drafted by the Criminal Code Commission, is
essentially a "codification of the [criminal] procedures developed by case law
and an attempt to make them uniform." 29 The expansive scope of the Act
encompasses the procedure from the outset of trial through the exhaustion of
all appeals.30 Section 15A-1239 was enacted in 1978 as part of the Trial Stage
and Appellate Procedure Act. This statute, like section 1-180.1, deals with
judicial comment on the verdict, and states in language similar to that of its
older counterpart that "[t]he trial judge may not comment upon the verdict of
a jury in open court in the presence or hearing of any member of the jury
panel."3 1 There is certain language in section 1-180.1, however, that, either by
design or oversight, was omitted from section 15A-1239. This language is the
restrictive provision at the end of section 1-180.1, which states that "[tihe pro-
visions of this section shall not be applicable upon the hearing of motions for a
new trial, motions to set aside the verdict of a jury, or a motion made in arrest
of judgment."32
The underlying purpose of these two statutes is the protection of the crim-
inal defendant from potentially prejudicial remarks made by the judge in the
presence of prospective jurors. One of the fundamental rights of a criminal
defendant is the right to a fair trial--one free from bias or prejudice on the
part of the judge or the jurors. An aspect of this right is the assurance that the
judge, "the embodiment of even and exact justice, ' 33 will say or do nothing
that might prejudice the rights of the defendant. This basic principle is stated
as follows:
[T]he rule appears to be that the practice of addressing the pro-
spective jurors does not of itself constitute reversible error, although
suggestions or statements which are likely to influence the decisions
of the jurors when called upon later to sit in a given case may consti-
tute error and should be avoided, as should misstatements of the law
or remarks disparaging legitimate defenses that may be made in
cases to be tried, as well as references made directly or by innuendo
to particular cases which might come before the jurors.34
This principle was expressed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in State
v. Carriker:35 "'Every suitor is entitled by the law to have his cause consid-
ered with the "cold neutrality of the impartial judge" and the equally unbiased
mind of a properly instructed jury. This right can neither be denied nor
Abridged.' "36
28. 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 853 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1239 (1983)).
29. Bailey, Trial Stage andAppellate Procedure Act: An Overview, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
899, 900 (1978).
30. Id.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1239 (1983).
32. Id. § 1-180.1.
33. Withers v. Lane, 144 N.C. 184, 191, 56 S.E. 855, 857 (1907).
34. Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 197, 234 (1963).
35. 287 N.C. 530, 215 S.E.2d 134 (1975).
36. Id. at 534, 215 S.E.2d at 138 (quoting Withers v. Lane, 144 N.C. 184, 192, 56 S.E. 855, 857
(1907)).
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When analyzing the comments of a judge to determine whether section 1-
180.1 has been violated, the courts have focused on "whether or not the lan-
guage complained of might have so affected the prospective jury panel that it
was likely defendant would be deprived of a fair and impartial trial."'3 7 Com-
ments that might have prejudiced a jury are prohibited by section 1-180.1 re-
gardless of the judge's motive in making those comments.38 Recent cases have
given some indication of the nature of judicial comments on a verdict that will
trigger that statute. Remarks by a judge containing opinions regarding the use
of marijuana,3 9 expressions of contempt for those charged with its use or
sale,4° and statements regarding the undesirability of drug use4l made to a
jury panel prior to the trial of a defendant in a drug case, have been held to
entitle the defendant to a motion for a continuance under section 1-180.1. Re-
marks or comments such as these need not have been made immediately prior
to the trial of a particular defendant for that defendant to invoke the protec-
37. Id. at 535, 215 S.E.2d at 138.
38. See id.
39. Defendant in Carriker was charged with "the willful and felonious distribution of a con-
trolled substance, marijuana, to a minor." Id. at 530, 215 S.E.2d at 135. Defendant appealed this
guilty verdict, alleging that the trial court had erred in denying a motion for continuance under
§ 1-180.1. Defendant argued for a continuance because of certain remarks made by the presiding
judge before the jury panel-remarks which "prejudiced his right to a fair trial." These remarks
were made by the trial judge before passing sentence in State v. Bell, the case preceding Carriker's
case. In Bell defendant had entered a plea of guilty to possession of marijuana charges. The
remarks that follow were those made by the trial judge and Mr. Lea, Carriker's attorney, shortly
after judgement was imposed in Bell:
Mr. Lea: We make a Motion to continue on the basis of certain remarks made by
the Presiding Judge in the sentencing of Roger Paul Bell, these remarks which I think-
The Court: -What remarks? I don't care about your opinion.
Mr. Lea: The first one was that marijuana was a habit-forming drug. The second
remark-
The Court: -I didn't say that.
Mr. Lea: That is what I understood you to say.
The Court: I said when they got hooked on marijuana that my experience was that
anything went, and I have tried them for robbery; they get desperate for money and
anything goes, robbery or anything else.
Mr. Lea: I think that is close to what you said; and further, as the defendant in a
previous case left the Courtroom, the Presiding Judge looked at the Jury and stated
substantially as follows: That they all get religion when they come into the Courtroom.
Is this a fair statement, Your Honor?
The Court: I don't know that I said they all do. I said a lot of them get religion
when they come in the Courtroom.
Mr. Lea: Is it necessary for me to give the reasons for this?
The Court: I don't care anything about the reasons. You can take it up if you
want to and tell the Court up there why you took it up. All I said in front of the Jury is
what you get from the papers everyday, on the radio or on television anytime you want
to turn it on, and those people sitting on the Jury are grown men and women. The
Motion is DENIED.
Id. at 531-32, 215 S.E.2d at 136.
40. Id. at 535, 215 S.E.2d at 138.
41. See State v. Brown, 29 N.C. App. 391, 224 S.E.2d 206 (1976). The basis for defendant's
motion, as in Carriker, was the utterance by the trial judge of comments concerning the undesir-
ability of drug use. These comments were made with all prospective jurors present, immediately
prior to defendant's arraignment on charges of "felonious sale and delivery of the controlled sub-
stance [LSD]." The court of appeals, following the holding of the supreme court in Carriker, held
that the trial judge had erred in denying defendant's motion for continuance. Id. at 392-94, 224
S.E.2d at 206-08.
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tion of section 1-180.1.42 In State v. Brown4 3 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, emphasizing the reach of the statute, stated that "[u]nder G.S. § 1-
180.1, if a judge comments on a verdict in a criminal case, all other defendants
whose cases remain for trial during that week are entitled to continuance as a
matter of right."44 In this way the statute guards against the possible long-
range or cumulative effects of prejudicial remarks upon prospective jurors,
and affords a safeguard to all defendants who might be prejudiced by those
remarks.
Although these provisions demonstrate the legislature's resolve to ensure
that the criminal defendant be given every opportunity to receive a fair and
impartial trial, the remedy for infringement of this right is limited. Section 1-
180.1 expressly provides that "[t]he provisions of this section shall not be ap-
plicable upon the hearing of motions for a new trial, motions to set aside the
verdict of a jury, or a motion made in arrest of judgement. ' 45 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina has interpreted this to mean that the exclusive rem-
edy for judicial comment on the verdict is a motion for continuance. 46
Despite the restrictive language in section 1-180.1-limiting the remedies
available to a defendant in the event of judicial comment on the verdict-
there is no equivalent language in its more current counterpart, section 15A-
1239. 47 Curiously, section 15A-1239, while omitting the restrictive language of
section 1-180.1, adds nothing substantive to the latter statute. The question
that inevitably arises from the coexistence of these two otherwise identical stat-
utes, is whether section 15A-1239, by virtue of the absence of restrictive lan-
guage, might be interpreted to repeal section 1-180.1. A comprehensive list of
the statutes repealed and replaced by the Trial Stage and Appellate Procedure
Act is enumerated in section 33, chapter 711 of the 1977 Session Laws. Section
1-180.1, however, is not included in that list. State v. Neal48 represents the
court of appeals' first attempt to address the question whether section 1-180.1
was repealed by implication.
The question presented in this case was, in part, one of legislative intent:
Did the legislature intend the two statutes to be read in conjunction with one
another, thereby providing that a motion for continuance is the exclusive rem-
edy for judicial comment on the verdict under section 1-180.1? Neal answered
this question in the affirmative, holding that the two statutes were reconcilable,
and that section 1-180.1 had not been repealed by implication." 49 Indeed,
there is authority to support the court's determination. In State ex rel Commis-
42. See id. at 394, 224 S.E.2d at 207.
43. 29 N.C. App. 391, 224 S.E.2d 206 (1976).
44. Id. at 394, 224 S.E.2d at 207.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180.1 (1983).
46. Carriker, 287 N.C. at 535, 215 S.E.2d at 138. The court in Carriker stated: "Hence, in
order to obtain the benefit of the statute a defendant must, as defendant did in this case, move for
a continuance." Id.
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1239 (1983). See supra note 7.
48. 60 N.C. App. 350, 299 S.E.2d 654, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 389, 302 S.E.2d 256 (1983).
49. Id. at 353, 299 S.E.2d at 656.
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sioner of Insurance v. North Carolina Automobile Administrative Rate Office"0
the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that "[p]arts of the same statute
dealing with the same subject matter must be considered and interpreted as a
whole"5' and "statutes dealing with the same subject matter [should] be recon-
ciled and effect [should be] given to all unless some are irreconcilable with
others."'52 In light of the court's conclusion in Automobile Administrative Rate
Office, the Neal court would have been challenged to find that section 15A-
1239, simply by virtue of the absence of certain restrictive language, overruled
section 1-180.1 by implication.
Although the court might logically find, as it did, that the statutes are
reconcilable, this determination presents unsettling implications. If the stat-
utes are to stand together, then the sole remedy available to the defendant,
whose right to a fair trial at the hands of an impartial jury has been impaired
by comments of the presiding judge, is a motion for continuance. 53 In most
situations, such a remedy, which delays the trial until twelve impartial jurors
can be found, is adequate.54 If the defendant and his attorney are absent from
the court at the time such comments are made, and remain oblivious to the
fact that potentially prejudicial and damaging comments were made, however,
no pre-trial motion for continuance could be made as required.55 Such was
the situation in Neal. Under the court's reading of the statute, Neal was pre-
cluded from making "motions for a new trial, motions to set aside the verdict
of [the] jury, or a motion made in arrest ofjudgement."56 Under such a read-
ing, the chance presence or absence of a criminal defendant when the judge
utters potentially damaging or prejudicial remarks to future or prospective ju-
rors might be determinative of whether that defendant receives a fair and in-.
partial trial.
How, then, might the statutes accommodate a defendant like Neal, who,
at some point during trial or soon thereafter, learns of remarks made by thejudge that might have had a prejudicial effect? One possible answer, and one
that the court in Neal rejected, is provided by section 15A-1414(b)(3). 57 This
statute, which "regulates the post-trial correction of errors," s58 provides that
the defendant may make a motion for a new trial based on any cause other
than the causes expressly specified in the statute for which defendant did not
receive a fair and impartial trial.59 Neal, however, rejected defendant's argu-
ment that his motion for a new trial be permitted under this statute. The court
reasoned that because the ground for defendant's motion for a new trial under
50. 294 N.C. 60, 241 S.E.2d 324 (1978).
51. Id. at 66, 241 S.E.2d at 328.
52. Id. at 67, 241 S.E.2d at 329.
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-180.1, 15A-1239 (1983).
54. See State v. Carriker, 287 N.C. 530, 215 S.E.2d 134 (1975); State v. Brown, 29 N.C. App.
391, 224 S.E.2d 206 (1976).
55. See Neal, 60 N.C. App. at 351-52, 299 S.E.2d at 655.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180.1 (1983). See Neal, 60 N.C. App. at 353, 299 S.E.2d at 655-56.
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1414(b)(3) (1983).
58. Bailey, supra note 29, at 905.
59. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1414(b)(3) (1983).
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section 15A-1414(b)(3) was comment on the verdict by a judge, and because
the statute governing that matter disallows motions for a new trial,60 such a
motion was unavailable to defendant. 6 1 Such reasoning restricts the scope of
section 15A-1414(b)(3) in two ways. First, it refuses to consider the possibility
that section 15A-1414(b)(3) might function in one capacity as a "safety net"
for situations that the legislature could not have anticipated, and without
which defendant might otherwise be denied a fair trial. Second, such reason-
ig places too narrow a construction on the "[flor any other cause" language 62
of the statute.
Thus, the court in Neal, although constrained to deny defendant's motion
under section 15A-1239 by the holding in Automobile Administrative Rate Of-
fice,63 nevertheless might have construed section 15A-1414(b)(3) to cover a
situation like that presented. Neal's right to receive a fair trial was jeopardized
by the presiding judge's comments on the verdict rendered prior to his case.
These comments constituted valid grounds, as a matter of right, for the contin-
uance of his case.64 By virtue of his absence from the courtroom at that point,
however, he was unaware of the need to make such a motion. The court
stated: "Ignorance of a factual basis on which to move for a continuance af-
fords no relief once the trial has begun." 65 Although this might be so, it must
be questioned whether the court was overly hasty in dismissing defendant's
motion for a new trial pursuant to section 15A-1414(b)(3), and making a rul-
ing that seems more in keeping with the "letter" than the "spirit" of the law.
As long as both sections 1-180.1 and 15A-1239 remain in effect, the sole
remedy for judicial comment will be the motion for continuance provided in
section 1-180.1. Although this remedy is usually sufficient to counter the ef-
fects of the judge's disparaging or prejudicial remarks, in situations in which
the defendant is unaware of the utterance of such remarks, their effect on the
jury will go unremedied. For that reason, courts need an alternative means to
ensure that the defendant, who is absent from the courtroom when such re-
marks are made, is afforded the same opportunity to receive a fair and impar-
tial trial as the defendant who happens to hear the judge's comments. Section
15A-1414(b)(3) provides that alternative means. This statute, however, will
remain ineffective to remedy judicial comment on the verdict so long as courts
interpret section 1-180.1 to preclude any remedies other than a motion for
continuance. As there is every indication that the courts will continue to do so,
it remains in the hands of the legislature to remedy this situation by repealing
section 1-180.1 and its restrictive language. In this way, the right of the crimi-
60. Id. § 1-180.1.
61. Neal, 60 N.C. App. at 352-53, 299 S.E.2d at 656.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1414(b)(3) (1983).
63. 294 N.C. 60, 241 S.E.2d 324 (1978).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180.1 (1983).
65. Neal, 60 N.C. App. at 353, 299 S.E.2d at 656.
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nal defendant to receive a fair and impartial trial, though not ensured, will be
secured more completely.
MICHAEL COLLIER CONNELL
Qualifying Jurors in Capital Trials: Are Sixth Amendment
Rights Adequately Protected in North Carolina?
The North Carolina judicial system heartily embraces the practice of
death qualification in capital trials.I A jury is deemed death-qualified when it
is purged of all resolute opposition to capital punishment. In North Carolina,
as in all states with capital crimes, the prosecutor may challenge for cause all
prospective jurors who express unequivocally that they would never impose
the death penalty.2 The rationale for allowing death qualification of a jury is
twofold. First, the prosecution wants to eliminate all jurors who would refuse
to find a defendant guilty of a capital offense, regardless of the evidence, be-
cause of the threat of capital punishment. 3 Second, the prosecution desires a
jury willing to impose the death penalty in statutorily defined situations.4
Constitutional objections to death qualification, grounded in the sixth amend-
ment, are based on defendants' claims that a death-qualified jury is convic-
tion-prone5 and that a death-qualified jury does not represent a fair cross-
section of the community.6 In Witherspoon v. Illinois7 the United States
Supreme Court attempted to balance the state's interest in securing a jury ca-
pable of following the law with the criminal defendant's constitutionally guar-
anteed right to an impartial jury composed of a fair cross-section of the
community.8 The Supreme Court held that a death qualification exclusion
was acceptable only when it was unequivocally clear that the excluded pro-
spective juror automatically would vote against the death penalty regardless of
the evidence, and that the attitude of that prospective juror toward capital
punishment would make it impossible for him to follow impartially the law in
determining a defendant's guilt.9 Exclusion for less would result in a reversal
of the death sentence. 10
Although the conclusion of the Supreme Court is clear, several issues re-
main unsettled and attacks on death qualification continue. First, the
1. See, e.g., State v. Bare, 309 N.C. 122, 305 S.E.2d 513 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C.
26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983); State v. Hill, 308 N.C. 382, 302 S.E.2d 202 (1983); State v. Ladd, 308
N.C. 272, 302 S.E.2d 164 (1983); State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983); State v.
Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28,
272 S.E.2d 183 (1981); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E.2d 803 (1980).
2. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968); White, Death-Quaifled Juries
The "Prosecution-Proneness"Argument Reexamined, 41 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 353, 354-55 (1980).
3. White supra note 2, at 354.
4. Id at 355.
5. Id at 356.
6. See Colussi, The Unconstitutionality of Death Pualifying a Jury Prior to the Determination
of Guili: The Fair-Cross-Section Requirement in Capital Cases, 15 CRE GHTON L. REv. 595, 596
(1982).
7. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
8. Id at 518-21.
9. Id at 522 n.21.
10. Id In Witherspoon the Court limited its reversal to defendant's death sentence. "Nor
does the decision in this case affect the validity of any sentence other than one of death. Nor,
finally, does today's holding render invalid the conviction, as opposed to the sentence, in this or
any other case." Id at 523 n.21.
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Supreme Court never has defined specifically the situation in which a Wither-
spoon violation warrants reversal of the death penalty.it Second, it is not
clear when a prospective juror has expressed an unequivocal inability to fol-
low and apply the law.12 Finally, the Court left unanswered the question
whether the sixth amendment rights of a defendant are protected adequately
by the death qualification procedure as limited by Witherspoon. 13
North Carolina consistently has resolved all of these issues against the
capital defendant. '4 In 1983 the North Carolina Supreme Court perfunctorily
dismissed the allegations of five defendants attacking the death qualification
procedure. 15 This note analyzes the practice of death qualification in North
Carolina by examining the background of Supreme Court death qualification
treatment, the application of death qualification in North Carolina capital tri-
als, the North Carolina Supreme Court's treatment of attacks on the state's
death qualification practice, and the available alternatives to the present death
qualification system. The note concludes that death qualification as presently
practiced in North Carolina unnecessarily violates a capital defendant's guar-
anteed right to a fair trial under the sixth amendment.
The practice of death qualification began at a time when conviction for a
capital offense resulted in an automatic death sentence.1 6 Consequently, a ju-
ror opposed to the death penalty might refuse to find a defendant guilty to
avoid imposition of capital punishment. To promote the impanelling of juries
capable of finding a capital defendant guilty, prosecutors were permitted to
exclude from capital cases jurors who had serious objections to the death pen-
alty.' 7 Because the death penalty is no longer mandatory,' 8 however, the ne-
cessity of impanelling a death-qualified jury is not readily apparent.
Furthermore, all states that have retained capital punishment provide for a
bifurcated proceeding in which the guilt and sentencing phases are separate.19
11. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, however, have tended to clarify the Witherspoon
holding. See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
12. North Carolina examines death qualification "contextually." See infra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court has not specified whether the unequivocal
refusal to apply the death penalty must be ascertainable from the record. A juror's response of "I
think so" to the question of whether he would refuse to impose the death penalty, however, was
held less than unequivocal. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 264-66 (1970). The Supreme Court
has also held that a conviction by a guilt-phase jury chosen in violation of Witherspoon cannot
stand simply because the totality of the record evidences no violation of the spirit of Witherspoon.
See Mathis v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 946 (1971) (mem.), rev'g 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968). Nor
does the fact that a trial judge has the opportunity to observe and listen to a juror prevent reversal
when the juror's responses on record are equivocal. See Aiken v. Washington, 403 U.S. 946
(1971) (mem.), rev'g 75 Wash. 2d 421, 452 P.2d 232 (1971).
13. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n.18.
14. See infra notes 39-48, 108-10, and accompanying text.
15. See State v. Bare, 309 N.C. 122, 305 S.E.2d 513 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305
S.E.2d 703 (1983); State v. Hill, 308 N.C. 382, 302 S.E.2d 202 (1983); State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272,
302 S.E.2d 164 (1983); State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983).
16. See White, supra note 2, at 354-56.
17. Id at 354-55.
18. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1983).
19. See White, supra note 2, at 353 n.2. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983). The
bifurcated system has been in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Supreme Court has approved the bifurcated system. See,
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Although the concern that jurors, to avoid the death penalty, would not con-
vict a defendant arguably diminishes in the wake of discretionary capital pun-
ishment and bifurcated capital trials, the majority of jurisdictions still allow
prosecutors to excuse for cause jurors opposed to the death penalty.20
Counterbalancing the prosecution's desire to impanel a jury willing to
convict and impose the death penalty is the sixth amendment guarantee of the
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. 21 This right guarantees the defendant
a trial before an impartial jury.22 Any verdict rendered by a less than impar-
tial jury cannot stand, regardless of whether actual prejudice to the defendant
is shown.3 To meet the requirement of an impartial jury, the United States
Supreme Court has held that a jury must be chosen from a venire representing
a fair cross-section of the community.24 Although the sixth amendment does
not guarantee that each jury must have a representative from each class in the
community, absent a justifiable state interest, systematic exclusion of any class
from jury service is constitutionally unacceptable.25 This constitutional right
to a fair trial by an impartial jury is extended to state proceedings by the four-
teenth amendment. 26 Thus, any sixth amendment issues arising out of the
North Carolina death qualification practice must conform to the Supreme
Court's interpretation.
In Witherspoon the Supreme Court attempted to balance the need to im-
panel a jury able to properly follow the law with the need to protect sixth
amendment guarantees to a fair trial. Prior to this decision, jurors routinely
were excluded for cause from capital juries when expressing any opposition to
the death penalty.27 The Court rejected such comprehensive exclusions and
limited the sweep of the death qualification procedure, holding that prospec-
tive jurors could be excused for cause only when they unequivocally state that
they would never impose the death penalty, and when jurors state that their
views concerning the death penalty would make it impossible for them to de-
termine guilt impartially.28 Absent one of these exceptions, a juror cannot be
e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (validating a Georgia statute providing for bifurcated
proceedings in capital cases); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (validating a similar Florida
statute).
20. See Colussi, supra note 6, at 598 n.12. This power to excuse, however, was limited by the
Supreme Court in Witherspoon and later decisions. See infra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
21. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
.... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966).
23. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972).
24. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (criminal trial jury should consist of
laymen representative of cross-section of the community).
25. The Court reached this conclusion in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534-35 (1975).
The requirements for establishing a systematic exclusion were established in Duren v. Mississippi,
439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). See also infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
26. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-50 (1968).
27. See, e.g., Spence v. State, 274 N.C. 536, 164 S.E.2d 593 (1968) (79 of 150 jurors excused
for cause due to belief that death penalty was wrong). See also Colussi, supra note 6, at 598 n.12
(outlining history of practice of excluding jurors because of opposition to death penalty).
28. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23 & n.21.
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excluded for cause. If veniremen are excluded on any broader basis, the death
penalty cannot be imposed.29 The Witherspoon Court reversed the death pen-
alty sentence imposed by a jury from which prospective jurors had been ex-
cused on a broader basis. 30
Several Supreme Court decisions have clarified the holding in Wither-
spoon. In Adams v. Texas 31 the Court held that the fact that a juror's deliber-
ations merely would be "affected" by death penalty attitudes was not sufficient
for an excusal. The Court found it natural for a juror to take more seriously a
decision concerning a person's life. 32 In Adams a death penalty sentence was
overturned because jurors were excused for cause on a broader basis than that
permitted under Witherspoon.33
In Davis v. Georgia34 the Court held that a death qualification exclusion
was proper only if, prior to trial, a venireman is committed unequivocally to
voting against the death penalty regardless of the evidence. The Court held
that improper exclusion of even one juror would invalidate any death sentence
imposed.35 Thus, it was not necessary to establish systematic exclusion in vio-
lation of Witherspoon to warrant a sentence reversal.
The Supreme Court further clarified the Witherspoon test in Boulden v.
Holman,36 in which it addressed the question of how prospective jurors may
be examined during the death qualification voir dire. The Court affirmed the
assertion in Witherspoon that "'[t]he critical question . . . is not how the
phrases employed in this area have been construed by courts and commenta-
tors. What matters is how they might be understood-or misunderstood-by
prospective jurors.' "37 The Court held that the questions asked prospective
jurors during death qualification must be phrased so that laymen can under-
stand what is asked and the response can be interpreted properly. This hold-
ing reaffirmed the statement in Witherspoon that "[u]nless a venireman states
unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of
capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal, it simply cannot be
29. Id
30. Id at 521-23. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the Witherspoon criteria were met
because prospective jurors who stated that their death penalty views would make it impossible for
them to follow the law and the instructions of the trial judge were excluded, See also Keeten v.
Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (W.D.N.C. 1984) (upholding state's right to exclude from both
phases of trial jurors whose opposition to death penalty would color their consideration of the
evidence).
31. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
32. Id at 49-50. The Texas statute permitted prospective jurors to be excused for cause when
their death penalty attitudes would "affect" their deliberations. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974). The State argued that the statute and Witherspoon offered alternate
grounds for excusal. The Supreme Court rejected this suggestion, holding that Witherspoon was
limiting and therefore excusal on broader statutory grounds was error. Adams, 448 U.S. at 48-49.
33. Adams, 448 U.S. at 49.
34. 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam).
35. Id at 123.
36. 394 U.S. 478 (1969).
37. Id at 48 12 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516 n.9).
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assumed that that is his position. '38 If a juror cannot understand the ques-
tions put forward during voir dire, it is impossible to determine if his answers
are unambiguous and unequivocal.
In summary, to conform with Supreme Court decisions, death qualifica-
tion can exclude only those jurors who would vote automatically against the
imposition of the death penalty or who are unable impartially to determine
guilt because of death penalty attitudes. Voir dire questions should be asked in
such a way that veniremen understand the questions and the significance of
their responses. Finally, the improper exclusion of even one prospective juror
is sufficient to mandate reversal of a death sentence. North Carolina practice
must be analyzed in light of these limitations.
There is no explicit death qualification statute in North Carolina.39 The
basis for death qualification is implied from a North Carolina statute authoriz-
ing challenge for cause of certain jurors.40 Despite the absence of a specific
statutory authorization, the practice of death qualification is accepted through-
out North Carolina.
Because there are no definite statutory guidelines, there is little uniformity
in death qualification procedures in North Carolina. The basic procedure,
however, is similar to that found in other jurisdictions. Death qualification
takes place during voir dire of the jury with the entire jury panel present.4 1
Typically, the prosecutor or trial judge questions prospective jurors concerning
their death penalty attitudes. Often, the questions used by the court or prose-
cutor are unclear and not framed according to Witherspoon limitations.4 2 If,
38. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516 n.9. See also Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (per
curiam) (remanding for further consideration of Witherspoon issue).
39. Some states have had statutory authorization for death qualification. See, e.g., Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (Texas death-qualification statute invalidated); Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510 (1968) (Illinois death-qualification statute invalidated).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212(b)(9) (1983) provides in pertinent part:
A challenge for cause to an individual juror may be made by any party on the ground
that the juror.
(8) As a matter of conscience, regardless of the facts and circumstances, would be unable
to render a verdict with respect to the charge in accordance with the law of North
Carolina.
(9) For any other cause is unable to render a fair and impartial verdict.
41. See State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 34, 305 S.E.2d 703, 710 (1983) (whether to allow se-
questration and individual voir dire of prospective jurors is a matter for trial court's discretion).
Allowing prospective jurors to be present is unwise for two reasons. First, prospective jurors are
able to hear and see the voir dire of other jurors. This allows them to determine what is necessary
for an excusal for cause. Although jury duty is a responsibility shared by all citizens, many avoid
it if they can find a way. See Brief for Appellant Moore at 33, State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274
S.E.2d 183 (1981) (prospective juror expressed unwillingness to impose death penalty when he
realized he could be excused for doing so). Second, the process tends to prejudice jurors against
the defendant. The constant talk of guilt and capital punishment may convince prospective jurors
prior to trial of the defendant's guilt. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301,
168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980) (holding that any portion of voir dire concerning death qualification
must be conducted individually and in sequestration); Haney, The Biasing Effect of the Death
Qualification Process (1979 prepublication draft) (study indicating that when voir dire is not con-
ducted on an individual basis, out of the hearing of other potential jurors, bias against defendant
develops).
42. The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized this as a problem. See, e.g., State v.-
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after this preliminary questioning, a juror expresses disfavor of capital punish-
ment, there is further inquiry in accordance with Witherspoon and Adams.43
Prospective jurors often are excused for cause based on such ambiguous
responses as "I don't think so" or "I don't believe so," when asked whether
they could vote to impose the death penalty." Courts in North Carolina have
uniformly found that although the specific answers are equivocal, the context
of the responses indicates an unwillingness to impose the death penalty.45
Even in cases in which a juror has been excluded improperly, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has held that there was no reversible error because a sys-
tematic exclusion in violation of Witherspoon was not evident from the
record.46
The North Carolina Supreme Court has adopted a very narrow interpre-
tation of Witherspoon. The court has never analyzed fully the state's death
qualification practice in light of the Wiherspoon decision, yet insists that the
North Carolina practice comports with Supreme Court limitations. 47 Post-
Witherspoon Supreme Court decisions dealing with death qualification have
been ignored by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The North Carolina
courts analyze death qualification "contextually," meaning that the trial judge
Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 56, 292 S.E.2d 203, 240 (Exum, J., dissenting) (questions asked by trial judge
ambiguous-excused juror could not have known meaning), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982);
State v. Bernard, 288 N.C. 321, 327, 218 S.E.2d 327, 331 (1975) ("[M]any of the problems growing
out of prospective jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty could be avoided if district attorneys
would prepare and use in the voir dire examination of prospective jurors questions framed accord-
ing to the clear language of Witherspoon.").
43. See, e.g., State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 53-56, 292 S.E.2d 203, 236-40, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
474 (1982); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 135-37, 261 S.E.2d 803, 809-10 (1980).
44. See, e.g., State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983). In Kirkley a juror was
excused for the following answers:
Q: If you were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the things the law requires you to
be satisfied about then would you recommend, in accordance with the law, recommend
[sic] a sentence of death, or do you have such strong feelings about the death penalty that
even though you were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to those things, you would
not vote for the death penalty?
MRs. McKEE [prospective juror]: I don't feel like I would.
Q: You feel that even though the state had satisfied you of the three elements of the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, that it was sufficiently substantial to call for the
imposition of the death penalty, and that any mitigating circumstances were insufficient
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you still feel that you could not vote for the
death penalty, even though you were convinced of those things?
MRs. McKEE: I don't think I could.
Examination by defense attorney, Mr. Chapman.
Q: Could you tell us what your personal views are on the death penalty?
MRs. McKEE: I'm not sure I know exactly how I feel about it definitely. Given a
certain set of personal circumstances, I might have had one feeling one way and another
feeling the other way.
Id at 206-07, 302 S.E.2d 144, 150. See also State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 53-56, 292 S.E2d 203, 239-
40 (Exum, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 136-37,
261 S.E.2d 803, 809 (1980).
45. See State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 207, 302 S.E.2d 144, 150-51 (1983); State v. Williams,
305 N.C. 656, 664-68, 292 S.E.2d 243, 249-52, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982).
46. See State v. Bernard, 288 N.C. 321, 325-27, 218 S.E.2d 327, 330-31 (1975).




must determine from the words and manner of a prospective juror how the
juror feels about the death penalty and how those feelings would affect
deliberations. 48
Justice Exum of the North Carolina Supreme Court has written strong
dissents in several death qualification cases. 49 In these dissents, he analyzes
the Witherspoon decision and subsequent Supreme Court decisions affecting
the death qualification issue. One such dissent is found in State v. Pinch.50 In
Pinch defendant was charged with two counts of first degree murder. The jury
found defendant guilty of both offenses and recommended imposition of the
death penalty. The court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced
defendant to death.5 1 Prior to the guilt determination phase of the Pinch trial,
however, the trial court had excused eight veniremen for cause because of
their opposition to the death penalty. Defendant argued that he was deprived
of the "constitutional rights of due process and trial by jury."52
The majority opinion in Pinch routinely dismissed defendant's conten-
tions. The Witherspoon holding was mentioned briefly as the "applicable con-
stitutional standard."53 The majority found that seven of the eight excused
jurors had expressed unequivocally that they could never impose the death
penalty and that their excusal was proper in light of Witherspoon.54 Although
the statements of the eighth juror concerning the death penalty were equivo-
cal, the majority concluded that "[c]onsidering her answers contextually, we
find that [the putative juror] expressed a sufficient refusal to follow the law."55
48. See supra text accompanying note 45.
49. See, e.g., State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 38-61, 292 S.E.2d 203, 230-43 (Exum, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 139-50, 261 S.E.2d 803, 811-18
(1980) (Exum, J., dissenting).
50. 306 N.C. 1, 38, 49-56, 292 S.E.2d 203, 230, 236-40 (Exum, J, dissenting), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 474 (1982).
51. Id at 7, 292 S.E.2d at 212.
52. Id at 9, 292 S.E.2d at 213.
53. Id
54. Id
55. Id One excused juror had responded to some of the district attorney's questions as
follows:
Q: I understand this is a tough area, but we have to inquire about this now and every-
one is entitled to their own opinion. Are you saying, Ma'am that you could not and you
would not vote to impose the death penalty in this case, regardless of the evidence?
A: I don't know. I guess if it was proven to me, I guess I could.
Q: If what was proven to you?
A: I would have to be-I would have to absolute [sic] know for sure, I mean no doubt
whatsoever.
Q: You could not impose the death penalty regardless of what the evidence is?
A: I don't believe so.
MR. WANNAMAKER [district attorney]: If your Honor please, we challenge for cause.
THE COURr. I understand, Mrs. Neal. I know this is very difficult for you, but it's
necessary to have your candid and frank answers and I thank you for them. Do I under-
stand that you could not even before you hear the testimony under any circumstances,
impose the death penalty?
MARY D. NEAL [prospective juror]: No, I just don't think so.
Id at 54-55, 292 S.E.2d at 239 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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Justice Exum's dissent in Pinch analyzed the Witherspoon decision and
subsequent Supreme Court decisions that aid in the evaluation of death-quali-
fication practices. 56 He concluded that at least two prospective jurors had
been excluded improperly for cause.5 7 Although the majority thought the
proper standard was whether it was established that a potential juror "'would
automaticalo vote against the imposition of capital punishment without re-
gard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case,' "58 Jus-
tice Exum determined that Witherspoon had been more explicit in its
guidance. Quoting extensively from Witherspoon, Justice Exum identified key
language in that decision. 59 According to Justice Exum's interpretation of
Witherspoon, the prospective juror must make it "unmistakably clear" that he
is "irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against [the pen-
alty of death] regardless of the facts and circumstances" that might emerge in
the course of the proceedings, before excusal for cause is proper.60 This inter-
pretation is consistent with several subsequent Supreme Court decisions that
Justice Exum also discussed.6 1
56. Id at 49-56, 292 S.E.2d at 236-40 (Exum, J., dissenting).
57. Id at 49, 292 S.E.2d at 236-37 (Exum, J., dissenting).
58. Id at 9, 292 S.E.2d at 213 (Exum, J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522
n.21).
59. Id at 49-50, 292 S.E.2d at 237 (Exum, J., dissenting).
"A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the
discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes
as a juror. But a jury from which all such men have been excluded cannot perform the
task demanded of it . . . .[A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and
capital punishment can do little more-and must do nothing less--than express the con-
science of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. . . . [A] jury com-
posed exclusively of. . .people [who believe in the death penalty] cannot speak for the
community. Culled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital punishment-
of all who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty--such a jury can speak
only for [those who believe in the death penalty]."
"If the State had excluded only thoseprospectivejurors who stated in advance oftrial
that they would not even consider returning a verdict of death, it could argue that the
resulting jury was simply 'neutral' with respect to penalty. But when it swept from the
jury all who expressed conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment and
all who opposed it in principle, the State crossed the line of neutrality. In its quest for a
jury capable of imposing the death penalty, the State produced a jury uncommonly will-
ing to condemn a man to die."
Id at 49-50, 292 S.E.2d at 237 (Exum, J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 5 19-21)
(emphasis added in Pinch).
Justice Exum added:
"[A] prospective juror cannot be expected to say in advance of trial whether he would in
fact vote for the extreme penalty in the case before him. The most that can be demanded
of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided
by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before trial has begun, to vote
against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge
in the course of the proceedings. If the voir dire testimony in a given case indicates that
the veniremen were excluded on any broader basis than this, the death sentence cannot
be carried out. ...."
Id at 50-51, 292 S.E.2d at 237 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21).
60. Id at 51, 292 S.E.2d at 237-38 (Exum, J., dissenting).
61. Id at 51-53, 292 S.E.2d at 237-39 (Exum, J., dissenting). See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38
(1980) (juror may not be excused simply because deliberations "affected" by death penalty atti-
tudes); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam) (if even one juror is excused in viola-
tion of Witherspoon, death sentence cannot stand); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 483-84
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later decision, Duren v. Missouri,9 6 the Court placed the burden upon defend-
ant to prove that a jury was not representative. 97 Once a defendant establishes
the prima facie case of an unrepresentative jury, the state must justify the
practice causing systematic exclusion.98 If systematic exclusion is shown, it is
presumed that the defendant was prejudiced.9 9
These arguments-that death qualification results in a conviction-prone
jury and that death qualification denies a defendant his right to a representa-
tive jury-call into question the conviction, as well as the death penalty sen-
tence of a capital defendant. Several courts have analyzed the studies on death
qualification and have considered the fair cross-section argument as it affects
the validity of the defendant's conviction. 100 Until recently, both arguments
have been rejected. 10'
In 1983 and 1984, however, two federal district courts accepted both argu-
ments and held that death qualification prior to the guilt phase of the capital
trial is unconstitutional and a conviction rendered by a death-qualified jury
must be reversed.'0 2 One of these decisions, Keeten v. Garrison,0 3 was ren-
dered by Judge McMillan of the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina. Several studies were presented to the court in
Keeten. Judge McMillan held that these studies clearly established that death
qualification yielded a conviction-prone jury.' ° n In addition, Judge McMil-
district. Id at 531. The result in Taylor is consistent with Justice Douglas's opinion that death
qualification should be forbidden because it results in the "systematic exclusion of qualified
groups, and the deprivation to the accused of a cross-section of the community for decision on
both his guilt and his punishment." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510, 528 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Previous Supreme Court decisions had forbidden the exclusion of various classes from a jury. See
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (systematic exclusion of blacks violated due process); Her-
nandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (systematic exclusion of Mexican-Americans violated due
process); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (systematic exclusion of women violated
due process); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (jury selection system which
systematically excluded daily wage earners invalid); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879) (statute which effectively denied blacks the right to serve as jurors unconstitutional).
96. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
97. The Court declared that:
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the
defendant must show (I) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in
the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the com-
munity, and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group
in the jury-selection process.
Id at 364. See also United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153, 168 (4th Cir. 1981) ("Systematic
exclusion must be proven; it will not be presumed.").
98. The state must prove that "a significant state interest [is] manifestly and primarily ad-
vanced by those aspects of the jury selection process. . . that result in the disproportionate exclu-
sion of a distinctive group." Duren, 439 U.S. at 267-68.
99. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-05 (1972).
100. See, e.g., Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
976 (1979); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
101. See supra note 100.
102. See Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C. 1984); Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F.
Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
103. 578 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C. 1984).
104. Id at 1181-82. Judge McMillan analyzed the results of twelve different studies. These
studies consistently revealed that death qualification resulted in prosecution-prone juries. The
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lan, analyzing death qualification in North Carolina in light of Duren, con-
cluded that defendants had established a prima facie case of systematic
exclusion of a distinct group and that the state interests could be advanced
equally by using a bifurcated jury system as suggested in the Witherspoon
footnote.105 The studies presented on the conviction-prone issue also applied
to the cross-section issue, establishing that those who would never impose the
death penalty were a "distinctive group" for Duren purposes.' 0 6 Keelen
granted habeas corpus relief to three North Carolina defendants who had been
denied relief by the North Carolina Supreme Court.' 07
The North Carolina Supreme Court has been presented with some of the
same studies as those that were before the Keeten court. 108 All contentions
that death qualification violates the defendant's rights to a representative jury
or results in a conviction-prone jury, however, have been rejected. The
supreme court has based its holdings on language in Witherspoon that rejected
the studies presented in that case. 109 The majority of the court, however, has
totally ignored the Witherspoon footnote suggesting that a future case might
establish prejudice due to death qualification."10 The Witherspoon footnote
has been discussed by Justice Exum in dissent. In his dissent in State v. Av-
ery,' Justice Exum concluded that defendant had proved both the fair cross-
section and conviction-prone jury arguments. Justice Exum analyzed the data
before the supreme court and concluded that defendant had met the stronger
court found a consensus among trial judges and academic authorities that the most critical factor
in a juror's determination of guilt or innocence is the weight of the evidence, Consequently, the
exclusion of those unwilling to impose the death penalty becomes most significant in close cases,
The court concluded that: "It is in these close cases that criminal defendants most need the protec-
tion of the Sixth Amendment." Id at 1185. Based on the studies examined and expert testimony,
Judge McMillan found that there is as much as a 10% higher conviction rate in close cases when
juries are death-qualified. Id
105. Id at 1181, 1186-87.
106. Judge McMillan found that those unwilling to impose the death penalty shared common
attitudes toward the criminal justice system that separated them from other groups, even those
generally opposed to the death penalty, and that those attitudes favored the defense. Id at 1181.
If these persons are excluded from jury service, "[n]o one else will represent their strong viewpoint
on the jury in their absence." Id at 1182 (quoting Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1283
(E.D. Ark. 1983)). In addition to finding that those unwilling to impose the death penalty shared
common views and attitudes, the studies showed that a disproportionate number of blacks and
women are excluded due to death qualification. Id See also Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp.
1273, 1283 (E.D. Ark. 1983); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 144-45, 261 S.E.2d 803, 814-15 (1980)
(Exum, J., dissenting). Thus the group excluded by death qualification is distinct and identifiable,
in attitude, composition, and size.
107. Keeten, at 1187.
108. In his dissent in State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E.2d 803 (1980), Justice Exum ana-
lyzed several studies. Among them were Boehm, supra note 86; Harris-1971, supra note 86;
Jurow, supra note 86; Ziesel, supra note 86. Professor Ziesel has appeared before the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court. See 299 N.C. at 143-45, 261 S.E.2d 813-14 (Exum, J., dissenting).
109. The court has insisted on quoting the following Witherspoon language: "We simply can-
not conclude, either on the basis of the record now before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that
exclusion ofjurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue
of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 5 17-18. See,
e.g., State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 137, 261 S.E.2d 803, 810 (1980).
110. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
II. 299 N.C. 126, 139-40, 147, 261 S.E.2d 803, 811, 816 (1980) (Exum, J., dissenting).
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evidentiary showing suggested by the Witherspoon court.1 12 Justice Exum ap-
plied the Duren reversal requirements and concluded that those who would
never impose the death penalty do form a distinct, identifiable group and that
death qualification results in the systematic exclusion of that group.1 3 In ad-
dition, Justice Exum found that the data indicated that those not opposing the
death penalty did favor the prosecution. 14 The evidence was more persuasive
than that available to the Supreme Court in Witherspoon;' 5 death qualifica-
tion resulted in a conviction-prone jury that was not impartial as required by
the sixth amendment. 16
Is Witherspoon adequate protection for capital defendants? To determine
the adequacy of Witherspoon there must be two levels of analysis, the ade-
quacy of protection at the guilt stage and the adequacy of protection at the
sentencing stage of the capital trial.
Witherspoon and the subsequent Supreme Court decisions afford a capital
defendant adequate protection at the sentencing stage of trial. It is accepted
that those who automatically would vote against the death penalty in any case
should be excluded from sentencing because they are unable to apply the law
impartially.1 17 Supreme Court limitations forbid the exclusion of those with
less than unequivocal resolution never to impose the death penalty. If death
qualification practices truly conformed with the Supreme Court standards, the
constitutional rights of capital defendants would be protected at the sentencing
phase of their trials. North Carolina practice, however, does not conform with
those Supreme Court limitations.
Witherspoon does not, however, afford adequate protection at the guilt
phase of a capital trial. The Court in Witherspoon left open the possibility that
defendants might establish prejudice from death qualification at the guilt
phase of trial. 118 Although at the time Witherspoon was decided a single jury
decided guilt and fixed the sentence, the Court recognized two separate jury
functions.' 19 Presently, all states that retain capital punishment provide for a
bifurcated jury system in capital trials.' 20 The Witherspoon Court suggested
that a bifurcated trial, in which separate juries determine guilt and sentence,
would adequately protect a capital defendant should death qualification ever
be proved to result in a less than impartial jury at the guilt phase.12 1 Because
112. Id at 147, 261 S.E.2d at 816 (Exum, J., dissenting).
113. Id at 145, 261 S.E.2d at 815 (Exurn, J., dissenting).
114. Id at 143-47, 261 S.E.2d at 813-16 (Exum, J., dissenting).
115. Id at 147, 261 S.E.2d at 816 (Exum, J., dissenting).
116. Justice Exum based his dissent on the fact that death qualifying resulted in an unrepre-
sentative jury, depriving defendant of his right to a jury of a fair cross-section of the community.
Justice Exum concluded, however, that "studies and data presented in this case do consistently
and forcefully suggest that a jury culled of those who would not vote for the death penalty is in
fact a jury prone to convict on the guilt phase." Id at 147, 261 S.E.2d at 816 (Exum, J.,
dissenting).
117. See Keeten at 1183.
118. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
119. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 518.
120. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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state courts probably are unwilling to use separate juries absent a mandate
from the United States Supreme Court, 122 the Supreme Court should mandate
one of two procedures. The more extreme and costly option would be to re-
quire entirely separate juries to determine guilt and the appropriate sentence.
The more practical option is to forbid death qualification at the guilt phase,
but allow excusal of those who would refuse automatically to impose the death
penalty at the sentencing stage. Those excused could be replaced by alternate
jurors. The North Carolina death penalty statute could be read to provide for
this second option,123 but the North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted
the statute to require a single jury. Therefore, the guidance of the United
States Supreme Court is necessary to force the steps to protect adequately the
rights of capital defendants. It is likely that the Supreme Court will have the
opportunity to render such guidance as Keeten and Grigsby v. Mabry,t24 a
second case reversing defendant's conviction on death qualification grounds,
are appealed.
Until the North Carolina Supreme Court properly applies the standards
established in Witherspoon and the United States Supreme Court provides ad-
122. See e.g., State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 260, 283 S.E.2d 761, 769 (1981), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 3552 (1983) ("lit is intended that the same jury should hear both phases of the trial unless
the original jury is 'unable to reconvene.' ") (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-2000(a)(2) (1983)).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983):
(a) Separate Proceedings on Issue of Penalty.-
(1) Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. A capital felony is one which may be
punishable by death.
(2) The proceeding shall be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as
practicable after the guilty verdict is returned. If prior to the time that the trial jury
begins its deliberations on the issue of penalty, any juror dies, becomes incapacitated or
disqualified, or is discharged for any reason, an alternate juror shall become a part of the
jury and serve in all respects as those selected on the regular trial panel. An alternatejuror shall become a part of the jury in the order in which he was selected. If the trial
jury is unable to reconvene for a hearing on the issue of penalty after having determined
the guilt of the accused, the trial judge shall impanel a new jury to determine the issue of
the punishment. If the defendant pleads guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be con-
ducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose. A jury selected for the purpose of
determining punishment in a capital case shall be selected in the same manner as juries
are selected for the trial of capital cases.
(3) In the proceeding there shall not be any requirement to resubmit evidence presented
during the guilt determination phase of the case, unless a new jury is impaneled ....
Three provisions in the statute seem to indicate that the legislature did not intend an absolute
"same jury" requirement. First, the statute allows for an alternate juror to become part of the
sentencing jury if any of the convicting jurors are "disqualified" or "discharged for any reason."
This would permit substitution for those unwilling to impose the death penalty who served on the
guilt phase jury. Second, "[i]f the trial jury is unable to reconvene for a hearing on the issue of
penalty . . . , the trial judge shall impanel a new jury to determine the issue of punishment."
Finally, the legislature made provision for a second presentation of evidence in the event a newjury is impanelled for sentencing.
The only argument made against bifurcated trials by the State in Kee/en was that the cost
"would be too much of a burden . . . on the taxpayers." Keeten, 578 F. Supp. at 1186. The
argument was dismissed summarily by the court. "Such costs, if any, are trivial compared with
the human rights and constitutional issues at stake." Id at 1167-68. "North Carolina can afford
the few extra dollars, if any, that it might cost to provide fair trials to persons accused of capital
felonies." Id at 1187.
124. 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
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equate guidelines eliminating death qualification at the guilt phase of capital
trials, it appears that the rights of North Carolina capital defendants will con-
tinue to be violated. The existing law in North Carolina provides for adequate
protection of capital defendants' sixth amendment rights. This law, however,
has been thwarted by the North Carolina Supreme Court's limited
interpretation.1 25
A criminal defendant has a guaranteed right to be tried by a jury of his
peers. This jury must be impartial and composed of a representative cross-
section of the community. Anything less violates a defendant's sixth and four-
teenth amendment rights. Death qualification prior to a determination of guilt
threatens not only the liberty of North Carolina defendants, but the very life
that both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions have long
sought to protect and preserve.
RAMONA J. CUNNINGHAM
125. In 1983 five North Carolina defendants appealed their convictions and death penalty
sentences. In each case, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected any attacks on death qualifi-
cation and refused to reexamine its position. This position will continue to allow the sixth amend-
ment rights of capital defendants to be violated in North Carolina.
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The Safe Roads Act: The Constitutionality of the Roadblock
and Chemical Test Affidavit Sections
In 1983 the North Carolina General Assembly passed the Safe Roads
Act.' Enacted in response to the growing public concern over drinking and
driving, the Act brings about many changes in the state's driving-while-intoxi-
cated (DWI) laws. This note examines the constitutionality of section 22 of
the Act,2 which authorizes the use of roadblocks as an enforcement tool
against drunken driving, and section 26 of the Act,3 which governs procedure
for chemical testing for intoxication and the use of test results at trial. The
note concludes that the roadblock provision has minor constitutional flaws
that can be remedied easily, and that the chemical testing statute, while raising
more serious constitutional issues, probably will also withstand constitutional
attack.
Section 22 of the Act4 authorizes law enforcement agencies to conduct
impaired driving checks (better known as roadblocks) to enforce the DWI
laws. While many states have resorted to the roadblock as a method of de-
tecting DWI offenders, 5 North Carolina is the first state to enact a law ex-
pressly sanctioning the use of this technique. The law establishes three
prerequisites for a valid DWI check. First, the police must develop a "system-
atic plan in advance that takes into account the likelihood of detecting im-
paired drivers, traffic conditions, number of vehicles to be stopped, and the
convenience of the motoring public. ' '6 Second, the police must designate in
advance "the pattern both for stopping vehicles and for requesting drivers that
are stopped to submit to alcohol screening tests."'7 Contingency plans may be
developed that permit deviation from the pattern upon the occurrence of spec-
ified conditions, but no individual officer may be given discretion regarding
which vehicle is stopped or which driver is subjected to an alcohol screening
test.8 Finally, the police must mark "the area in which checks are conducted
to advise the public that an authorized impaired driving check is being
made."9
Any roadblock stop made pursuant to section 20-16.3A is a "seizure"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitu-
1. Safe Roads Act of 1983, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 435.
2. Id § 22 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A (1983)).
3. Id § 26 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1 (1983)).
4. Id § 22 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A (1983)).
5. See Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of
Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEo. LJ. 1457, 1460 n.16 (1983).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A(1) (1983).
7. Id § 20-16.3A(2).
8. Id Notwithstanding the limits placed on the exercise of discretion by individual officers,
the section also provides that any officer may request a screening test of a driver if he has in-
dependent adequate grounds under the general preliminary test statute, id § 20-16.3.
9. Id § 20-16.3A(3).
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tion.10 The fourth amendment11 protects citizens against searches and
seizures that are unreasonable; therefore, the North Carolina statute must sat-
isfy a fourth amendment analysis to be constitutional.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Delaware v. Prouse 12 pro-
vides the proper framework for analyzing the constitutionality of North Caro-
lina's roadblock statute. In Prouse the Court considered the constitutionality
of Delaware's practice of randomly stopping motorists for license and registra-
tion checks. The Court stated that the "the permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests."13 Applying this test, the Court held that the intrusiveness of the
stop outweighed the state's interest in promoting safety on its roads. In strik-
ing down the Delaware practice, the Court relied heavily on its prior decision
in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.14 In that case the Court had considered
the constitutionality of roving border patrols that stopped cars at random to
search for evidence of illegal aliens. The Court held that the intrusiveness of
the stop, which created substantial anxiety for the detained motorist, interfered
with his freedom of movement, presented the opportunity for abuse of discre-
tion by individual officers, and outweighed the strong state interest in policing
the border.15 The Court held that such an intrusion could be justified only by
a showing of reasonable suspicion.16 The Prouse Court found Delaware's
practice equally intrusive, and further questioned whether randomly stopping
cars advanced the state's safety interest any more than did the more conven-
tional practice of stopping cars based on observed violations. 17 Finally, noting
that the same potential for abuse of discretion was present in Prouse as in
Brignoni-Ponce, the Court held Delaware's practice unconstitutional in the ab-
sence of some reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver in question
should be stopped.' 8
Despite holding Delaware's practice unconstitutional, the Court implied
in dicta that a checkpoint stop at which all oncoming traffic was questioned
would be constitutional even without reasonable suspicion.19 This conclusion
10. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
11. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV
12. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
13. Id at 654 (footnote omitted). Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (warrantless "stop and
frisk" for weapons constitutional if based on reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity).
Reasonable suspicion permits the officer to make a brief investigatory stop, but a full search or
seizure is unconstitutional unless based upon probable cause, which requires a higher quantum of
proof.
14. 422 U.S. 873 (1975)..
15. Id at 882, 884.
16. Id
17. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657-60.
18. Id at 661, 663.
19. See id at 663. Justice Blackmun suggested that a nonrandom stop at which less than
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was based on the Court's prior holding in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.20
In that case a permanent border checkpoint at which all motorists on an inter-
state highway were required to slow for inspection for signs of illegal aliens
was upheld as constitutional. The permanent checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte
was distinguished from the roving patrols disapproved of in Brignoni-Ponce
because it involved a lesser degree of intrusion and a lesser risk of officer abuse
of discretion.21 A roadblock at which all cars are stopped briefly would be
more akin to the permanent stop upheld in Martinez-Fuerte than to the discre-
tionary stop disapproved in Brignoni-Ponce. Thus, such a roadblock would be
constitutional even if conducted without reasonable suspicion.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet considered a case specifically
involving a DWI roadblock, the Court would apply a test similar to that used
in Prouse. Lower courts considering the constitutionality of roadblocks for
drunken-drivers have applied the Prouse test, weighing the intrusiveness of the
stop in question against the state interest advanced by the police practice. 22
Courts generally have upheld stops that conformed with the procedure sug-
gested in the Prouse dicta, emphasizing the lesser degree of intrusion involved
in such a stop and the important state interest in reducing the incidence of
drunken driving.23 For example, in State v. Coccomo 24 a New Jersey superior
court upheld a roadblock at which every fifth car was stopped for license and
registration checks, during the course of which the officer looked for signs of
intoxication.
Not all state DWI roadblocks have been upheld under the standards es-
tablished inProuse. Courts that have struck down DWI roadblocks have done
so primarily on three grounds: (1) too much discretion vested in the officers
conducting the roadblocks, due to the lack of specific directions or guidelines
1007o of the cars were stopped (for example, every tenth car) also would be constitutional. Id at
664 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This reasoning has been adopted by some state courts. See, e.g.,
State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980) (every fifth car stopped by police).
20. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
21. Id at 560. Because all motorists were required to slow, the subjective intrusiveness of the
stop was lesser than in Brignoni-Ponce. The checkpoint stop was not as unsettling to the motorist
as the individual stop by a roving border patrol. A final factor distinguishing Marlinez-Fuerle was
the presence of signs on the highway notifying motorists of the immigration checkpoint, thus
informing them that the stop was a valid exercise of the police power of the state and reducing the
level of anxiety generated by the stop.
22. See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of Ariz., 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983);
Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983); State v. Coccomo, 177
N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980); see also State v. Cline (unreported Maryland trial court
opinion), discussed in Note, supra note 5, at 1471.
23. The Supreme Court recently has acknowledged the national importance of the drunken
driving problem. See South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 920 (1983) ("The carnage caused by
drunk drivers is well documented and needs no detailed recitation."). In Neville the Supreme
Court held that the introduction into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to chemical
testing did not violate defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The Court
reasoned that the privilege did not attach to the refusal because the refusal had not been "co-
erced." The North Carolina Court of Appeals has reached the same conclusion, though by differ-
ent reasoning, regarding N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(f) (1983), which expressly provides that
defendant's refusal to submit to testing shall be admissible in a criminal proceeding against him.
See State v. Flannery, 31 N.C. App. 617, 230 S.E.2d 603 (1976) (physical test results not "testimo-
nial" in nature and thus not within scope of fifth amendment).
24. 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980).
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from higher authorities on the exact procedure to be followed;25 (2) inade-
quate notice to drivers that they were being stopped pursuant to a valid DWI
roadblock;26 and (3) lack of proof that the roadblock technique is any more
effective in detecting drunk drivers than the routine practice of stopping cars
based on observed driving irregularities.27 Applying the balancing test of
Prouse, these courts have found that the state interest promoted by the stop-
ping of motorists was insufficient to justify the intrusiveness of the roadblocks
in question.
Although North Carolina's new roadblock statute has constitutional
problems of its own, it avoids these potential problems.2 8 The problem of lack
of specific guidelines from higher authorities is avoided by the requirement
that the law enforcement agency develop a "systematic plan in advance" for
conducting an impaired driving check. 29 Officer discretion regarding which
cars are stopped is limited by the provision requiring designation in advance
of the pattern both for stopping vehicles and for requesting alcohol screening
tests.30 The problem of inadequate notice to drivers about the reason for the
stop is avoided by section 20-16.3A(3), which requires that the area in which
cars are being stopped be marked to notify the public that a statutory impaired
driving check is being conducted.3 1 If the procedure established by the new
statute is followed by the police, the practice almost surely will withstand the
constitutional challenges that have invalidated other roadblocks.
While North Carolina's statute avoids the problems presented by prior
roadblocks, it may be subject to constitutional challenge on other grounds.
The legislature properly was concerned with unbridled officer discretion, and
thus required that the roadblocks be conducted according to a predetermined
pattern.3 2 The statute fails, however, to delineate the procedures that may be
employed once a vehicle has been stopped.33 It speaks of "the pattern both for
stopping vehicles and for requesting drivers. . . to submit to alcohol screen-
ing tests."'34 This use of the word "pattern" suggests that the North Carolina
25. See State ex rel Ekstrom v. Justice Court of Ariz., 136 Ariz. 1, 4-5, 663 P.2d 992, 996
(1983); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983).
26. See State ex rel Ekstrom v. Justice Court of Ariz., 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996
(1983).
27. Id at 5, 663 P.2d at 996. The State argued that despite the intrusiveness of the road-
blocks, the procedure was justified by the state's strong interest in apprehending drunk drivers.
The court acknowledged that interest, but questioned whether the roadblock technique advanced
the state interest any more than did less intrusive procedures.
28. The statute was drafted carefully. It is essentially a codification of constitutional law
precedent in the roadblock field.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A(l) (1983). See supra text accompanying note 6.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A(2) (1983). See supra text accompanying note 7.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A(3) (1983). See supra text accompanying note 9.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A(2) (1983).
33. The term "impaired driving check" is used as a term of art in the statute, yet it is not
defined in the definitional section of the motor vehicle chapter, id § 20-4.01. Section 20-16.3A
states that it does not limit "the authority of a law enforcement officer or agency to conduct a
license check independently or in conjunction with the impaired driving check." The language
implies that the "impaired driving check" is something more than just a license check, though the
exact extent of the stop contemplated by the legislature is unclear.
34. Id § 20-16.3A(2) (emphasis added).
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statute would permit a scheme whereby drivers, once stopped, are required to
submit to sobriety tests according to a pattern. For instance, every car is
stopped for a routine check and every tenth driver is required to submit to an
alcohol screening test. The fact that the roadblock statute authorizes the po-
lice to require a driver to submit to an alcohol screening test based on a ran-
dom pattern rather than on reasonable suspicion gives rise to the best
constitutional challenge to the statute.
The constitutionality of a police practice must be determined by weighing
its intrusiveness against the state interest it advances. Even if a stop involves
no officer discretion, it still may be unconstitutional because it intrudes too
greatly on an individual's privacy. Most roadblocks consist of a brief stop,
during which the motorist is required to produce his license and registration
while the officer looks for signs of intoxication. 35 The stop is only minimally
intrusive, and thus is constitutional. More intrusive subsequent measures,
such as roadside sobriety tests, may be permissible, but generally only upon
reasonable and articulable suspicion as described in Prouse.3 6 The language
of section 20-16.3A suggests, however, that alcohol screening tests could be
administered even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Under the Supreme
Court's balancing tests developed in Prouse and the border search cases, re-
quiring a driver to submit to further tests, if based neither on probable cause
nor reasonable suspicion, is unconstitutional.37 Subjecting a motorist to ex-
tended roadside testing entails a much greater intrusion, both in time delay
and invasion of privacy, into the individual's fourth amendment rights than
does the usual license and registration check. Such an extensive intrusion
should be permitted only if based on reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
driver is intoxicated. 38
35. See Note, supra note 5, at 1463.
36. See, e.g., State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980). In Coccorno de-
fendant was stopped according to a policy of stopping every fifth vehicle. Defendant was asked to
produce his license, registration, and insurance card. When the officer noticed that defendant had
bloodshot eyes and alcohol on his breath, he requested defendant to get out of the car. Defendant
failed two roadside sobriety tests and was arrested. The officer's inital observations concerning
defendant's breath and eyes provided reasonable suspicion to justify the further tests.
37. A stop requiring a motorist to submit to an alcohol screening test is a far greater intrusion
than the warrantless and suspicionless stops authorized by the Supreme Court in Martinez.Fuerte
and Prouse. In Martinez-Fuerte the average length of the stop, even for those referred to the
secondary inspection area, was 3 to 5 minutes, and inquiry was limited to questioning about citi-
zenship and immigration status. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 546. The detention implicitly ap-
proved by dicta inProuse similarly was limited both in duration and scope of inquiry. Prouse, 440
U.S. at 663. Neither case can be read as approving a warrantless and suspicionless intrusion as
extensive as a roadside sobriety test. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3(a)(1) (1983), preliminary
testing may be performed upon a reasonable belief that the driver has consumed alcohol and has
committed a moving violation. The same "reasonable belief' standard also should apply to road-
side tests administered in the context of an impaired driving check.
38. See Note, supra note 5, at 1485-86 (arguing that "articulable suspicion" should be re-
quired before extended DWI investigation may be performed). The commentator argues that
imposing such a requirement does not hinder the advancement of the state's interest in appre-
hending drunk drivers. A recent case, People v. Carlson, 52 U.S.L.W. 2465 (Colo. Feb. 28, 1984),
imposed an even higher standard, requiring that probable cause be found before roadside sobriety
tests may be performed. Probable cause requires a higher quantum of proof than reasonable,
articulable suspicion. See supra note 13.
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This potential constitutional problem could be remedied by a short
amendment to the statute. The legislature need only add a statement that al-
cohol screening tests may not be administered according to a pattern, but must
be based on reasonable suspicion.39 Such a clarification would limit police
inquiry at a roadblock to license and registration checks, clearly within the
constitutional limits set by the Supreme Court in Prouse.
Section 26 of the Act40 deals with chemical analysis for intoxication and
admissibility of chemical test results. This section also raises important consti-
tutional questions. Of particular significance is North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 20-139.1(el), 4 I which allows admission of an affidavit certifying
blood alcohol test results without requiring the analyst who performed the test
to appear in court and testify. The analyst still may be required to appear, but
only if subpoenaed by the defendant.42 The results of blood alcohol concen-
tration (BAC) tests are of great importance in any DWI proceeding, 43 and the
new law exempting the chemical analyst from testifying raises serious ques-
tions about the criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to confront the
witnesses against him.44
39. Alternatively, the statute could be amended to provide that alcohol screening tests may
be administered only in accordance with the requirements of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3 (1983),
the general preliminary test statute. See supra note 37. The problem also could be remedied by a
judicial reading of the "pattern" for requiring drivers to submit to screening tests to mean that
further testing may only be required if certain predetermined factors indicating possible intoxica-
tion are present. Such an interpretation would be a strained reading of the statutory language,
however, and an amendment expressly establishing a reasonable suspicion standard would be
preferable.
40. Safe Roads Act of 1983, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 435 § 26 (codified at N.C. GEN
STAT. § 20-139.1 (1983)). Section 26 of the Act rewrote the old § 20-139.1, adding new subsections
while changing some language in the sections already in existence.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(el) (1983).
42. Id
43. Although results of BAC tests in some states give rise to specified presumptions regarding
defendant's guilt or innocence, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1005 (1982), North Carolina makes
driving with a BAC of .10% or greater a separate offense. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(a)(2)
(1983). The new law also allows for a 10 day pretrial license revocation if defendant has a BAC of
.10% or more within a relevant time after driving. See id § 20-16.5(b)(4)(a). Given the potential
ramifications of an unfavorable test, the results of chemical analysis are of utmost importance to
defendant.
The criminalization of a. 10% blood alcohol level is another aspect of the drunk driving law
that may be subject to constitutional attack. Although the statute has been upheld against an
arbitrariness challenge as a constitutional exercise of the police power of the state, see State v.
Basinger, 30 N.C. App. 45, 226 S.E.2d 216 (1976), one commentator has suggested that such stat-
utes may be unconstitutionally vague. See Thompson, The Constitutionality of Chemical Test Pre-
sumptions of Intoxication in Motor Vehicle Statutes, 20 SAN DIEGO L. Rnv. 301, 335 (1983). The
premise of this argument is that the driver has no way of knowing his precise BAC, and thus
cannot conform his behavior to the statutory norm. While North Carolina courts have not yet
addressed this argument, the courts of other states have rejected it. See Roberts v. State, 329 So.
2d 296 (Fla. 1976); Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974). Given the increasing public con-
cern over drunken driving, it is unlikely that a North Carolina court would invalidate so integral a
provision of the statute.
44. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him. ... U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The
confrontation clause is applicable to the states by incorporation into the due process requirements
of the fourteenth amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The North Carolina
Constitution has a provision analogous to the sixth amendment. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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The constitutional issue raised by the new version of section 20-139.1 is
best understood by comparing it to its predecessor. Under the prior statutory
scheme, the validity of a chemical analysis hinged on whether it had been
performed in compliance with the requirements of the State Commission for
Health Services, and whether it had been performed by a person possessing a
valid permit issued by the Department of Human Resources.45 Any failure to
comply with these requirements rendered the test inadmissible, and the State
had the burden of proving the validity of the chemical analysis.46 For in-
stance, in State v. Gray47 the North Carolina Court of Appeals found prejudi-
cial error in the state's failure to "lay the foundation" for the introduction of
breathalyzer test results and granted defendant a new trial.48
The new section 20-139.1 preserves the valid procedure and valid permit
requirements, and adds a further admissibility requirement that the instru-
ment used to measure defendant's BAC must have had an up-to-date preven-
tive maintenance record, according to regulations prescribed by the
Commission for Health Services. 49 The important change is in the procedure
for introducing the test results into evidence. Section 20-139.1(el) provides
that a properly executed affidavit of a chemical analyst is admissible, without
further authentication, as evidence of: (1) defendant's blood alcohol level, (2)
the time of the sample, (3) the type of analysis administered and procedure
followed, (4) the type and status of the analyst's permit, and (5) the preventive
maintenance record of the breath-testing instrument, if that is the method
used, as reflected by its maintenance records.50 This amendment obviates the
need for any foundation-laying by the State, provided the analyst has executed
a proper, sworn statement, because such a statement is automatically
admissible.
An argument may be made that the admission into evidence of the chemi-
cal analyst's affidavit, without his live testimony, violates a defendant's sixth
amendment right to confrontation. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
held that the admission into evidence of a death certificate containing a hear-
say and conclusory statement about a victim's cause of death violates an ac-
cused's right to confront the witnesses against him.5' If the analyst's affidavit
is analogized to the death certificate, it follows that admission of the affidavit
45. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(b) (1983) (substantially preserving requirements of pred-
ecessor section). The requirements apply to testing of both breath and blood samples.
46. See State v. Powell, 279 N.C. 608, 184 S.E.2d 243 (1971); State v. Gray, 28 N.C. App. 506,
221 S.E.2d 765 (1976); State v. Warf, 16 N.C. App. 431, 192 S.E.2d 37 (1972); State v. Caviness, 7
N.C. App. 541, 173 S.E.2d 12 (1970).
47. 28 N.C. App. 506, 221 S.E.2d 765 (1976).
48. Id at 507, 221 S.E.2d at 766.
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(b2) (1983). The burden is on the defendant both to object to
the evidence and to demonstrate that the required preventive maintenance procedures had not
been performed.
50. Id § 20-139.1(el). The analyst is not required to swear to an affidavit, but may choose to
do so for his own convenience. The analyst is required to record defendant's alcohol concentra-
tion and the time of collection of the sample, and to furnish a copy of this record to defendant or
his attorney. See id § 20-139.1(e).
51. See State v. Watson, 281 N.C. 221, 188 S.E.2d 289 (1972).
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also is unconstitutional. The supreme court has indicated that the admission
of chemical test results to prove the identity of a drug in a drug prosecution
does not violate the right to confront.5 2 This case, however, is distinguishable.
The identity of a drug in a drug prosecution is seldom the ultimate issue in the
case; more often the circumstances surrounding defendant's connection with
the drug are being disputed. By contrast, in a DWI proceeding defendant's
blood alcohol content is often the dispositive issue in the case, for a blood-
alcohol level of .10 percent is a per se criminal violation in North Carolina.53
Thus, it may be argued that convenience to the State, in not having to produce
the chemical analyst, is outweighed by defendant's overriding interest in ex-
amining the analyst, whose report may be dispositive on the question of de-
fendant's guilt or innocence, and that admission without the appearance of the
analyst is unconstitutional.
Although this argument is persuasive, it overlooks the statute's provision
that defendant may require the analyst to appear at trial by subpoenaing him
as an adverse witness. 54 This provision would seem to satisfy the constitu-
tional confrontation requirement, but two plausible arguments can be made
that it does not. First, it may be unconstitutional to shift to defendant the
burden of producing the analyst.55 Second, the opportunity for direct exami-
nation as an adverse witness may be an inadequate substitute for cross-exami-
nation. The Supreme Court has recognized that cross-examination is an
essential element of the sixth amendment's safeguards.5 6 On conventional
cross-examination defendant's counsel may impeach the testimony of the wit-
ness based on the statements he has made on direct, but this type of impeach-
ment is not possible when the witness is subject only to direct examination,
even as an adverse witness. Thus, it may be argued that giving a defendant
the right to subpoena a chemical analyst under section 20-139.1(el) is insuffi-
cient to guarantee an accused his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him.
The best argument in favor of the statute's constitutionality is that de-
fendant's sixth amendment rights are protected by his right to a new trial at
the superior court level if he is convicted in district court.5 7 Section 20-
139.1(el) provides that the analyst's affidavit is admissible without authentica-
tion in district court proceedings; therefore, the analyst would have to appear
at trial in superior court. The right to a new trial guarantees the defendant an
52. See In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 231 S.E.2d 614 (1977).
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(a)(2) (1983).
54. See supra text accompanying note 42.
55. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the state to prove a criminal defendant's guilt be-
ond a reasonable doubt. Because the chemical analyst is so important to the state's case, it may
e argued that shifting to defendant the burden of producing this witness is unconstitutional under
the general principles enunciated in Winshop. See e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 487
(1895) (burden of proof on the prosecution to prove defendant's guilt applies to every necessary
element of offense).
56. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
57. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1431(b) (1983).
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opportunity to cross-examine the analyst. It may be argued that the added
time and expense required for a new trial in superior court place an unconsti-
tutional burden on the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights, but the
Supreme Court has rejected this contention with regard to the criminal de-
fendant's right to trial by jury.58 Unless a court were to draw a distinction
between the constitutional right to confront witnesses and the constitutional
right to a trial by jury in a criminal case, an argument in favor of the statute
based on the defendant's right to a new trial probably will be sufficient to
overcome a sixth amendment challenge to the statute.
Precedent from other states also suggests that the statute is constitutional.
The Virginia Code provides that when a blood sample is tested for alcohol
content a certificate is to be executed stating the procedure and results of the
test.59 The certificate, when duly attested, is deemed admissible in any civil or
criminal proceeding as evidence of the facts stated therein.60 In Kay v. United
States61 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
a sixth amendment challenge to a prior version of the Virginia statute. The
court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, stating that the sixth amend-
ment was not intended "to serve as a rigid and inflexible barrier against the
orderly development of reasonable and necessary exceptions to the hearsay
rule." 62 The court further emphasized that the receipt of the certificate into
evidence did not foreclose inquiry into the conduct of the test, but that such
inquiries went to the weight of the evidence, and not to its admissibility.63
The certificate held constitutional in Kay is analogous to the affidavit exe-
cuted by the chemical analyst under section 20-139.1(el). The Kay decision,
although not binding on North Carolina courts, is highly persuasive. It is un-
likely that a North Carolina court would hold the provision unconstitutional
in light of the decision in Kay. Kay may be distinguishable on the ground that
Virginia's statute did not criminalize a .10 percent BAC, while North Caro-
lina's DWI law does, and thus defendant's interest in cross-examining the ana-
lyst is greater in North Carolina. Although this distinction might lessen the
importance a North Carolina court would give to the Kay holding, the case
probably still would be given substantial weight. Taken together, an argument
based on defendant's right to subpoena the analyst, his right to a new trial in
superior court at which the analyst must appear, and the practice in other
states as represented by Kay with respect to admission of blood test results in
DWI cases, would be sufficient to uphold section 20-139.1 (el) against constitu-
tional attack.
In conclusion, both statutes suffer from some constitutional defects. Sec-
tion 20-16.3A (section 22 of the Safe Roads Act) seems to authorize an uncon-
58. See Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 626 (1976).
59. See VA. CODE § 18.2-268(e) (Supp. 1983).
60. Id § 18.2-268(f). See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-717.2 (Supp. 1983); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-306 (1984).
61. 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958).
62. Id at 480.
63. Id
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stitutional intrusion into fourth amendment rights, but this problem can be
eliminated by a short amendment without upsetting the basic thrust of the
roadblock statute. Section 20-139.1(el) (section 26 of the Safe Roads Act) on
its face seems to deprive a defendant of his sixth amendment right to confront
the witnesses against him. Other statutory provisions, however, such as the
right to a new trial in a higher court at which the chemical analyst must ap-
pear, are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the sixth amendment.
DAVID THOMAS GRUDBERG
State v. Jackson: Police Use of Trickery, Threats, and
Deception-What Price Confession?
For a criminal confession to be admissible, it must have been given vol-
untarily.' Involuntary confessions are excluded because such statements are
unreliable as evidence, and because of the belief that coercive techniques
should not be countenanced by a civilized society, regardless of the impor-
tance of the information they may yield.2 In determining whether a confes-
sion was rendered voluntarily, courts have applied a "totality of
circumstances" test.3 Under this test a court examines the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding a confession and then decides whether it was given
voluntarily or whether the defendant's will was "overborne.' 4
In State v. Jackson5 the North Carolina Supreme Court applied the total-
ity of circumstances test and reached a decision that broadens the parameters
of acceptable police conduct during noncustodial interrogations6 to previously
unimagined dimensions. By holding that the use of fabricated evidence, false
statements, and implied threats was not sufficient to render defendant's confes-
sion involuntary, 7 the court implicitly condoned such unconscionable behav-
1. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959);
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
2. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.01 (1980).
3. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963). In Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558
(1954), the Court emphasized that each case involving a question of voluntariness must be decided
on its own facts. It was not until 1956, in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957), however,
that the Court first used the phrase "totality of the circumstances" in relation to voluntariness. See
also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) ("[v]oluntariness is a question of fact
to be determined from all the circumstances"); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963)
(courts must look to the "context in which [the confession was] made" to determine voluntariness);
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) (voluntariness depends on the "pertinent circum-
stances"); Crooke v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 440 (1958) (the court must weigh the "sum total of
the circumstances" in determining voluntariness).
Many commentators have suggested that the totality of circumstances approach is simply a
means for a court to express its opinion that, in a given case, there was a causal relationship
between police misconduct and the subsequent confession. See Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will,
and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. Rav. 859 (1979); White, Police Trickery in Inducing Coofes.
sions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581 (1979); Note, Police Use ofTrickery as an Interrogation Technique,
32 VAND. L. REv. 1167 (1979).
4. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961) (confession is invountary if the behavior of
the police caused the suspect's will to resist to be overborne).
5. 308 N.C. 549, 304 S.E.2d 134 (1983).
6. Noncustodial interrogations are distinguished from custodial interrogations on the basis
of whether defendant's freedom of action is restricted. During noncustodial interrogations, the
defendant is free to leave at will. At custodial interrogations the defendant's presence can be
compelled. Furthermore, Miranda warnings are required for custodial interrogations but not for
noncustodial interrogations. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
Miranda warnings are the procedural safeguards that must be read to a defendant prior to a
custodial interrogation. The defendant must be warned that "he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
7. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 574, 304 S.E.2d at 148 ("while deceptive methods or false statements
by police officers are not commendable practices, standing alone they do not render a confession
of guilt inadmissible").
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ior and virtually emasculated the principle of fundamental fairness.8 In
analyzing the court's decision, this note will discuss whether defendant was
seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment 9 and analyze whether de-
fendant's subsequent confession was given voluntarily under the "totality of
circumstances" test. 10
In Jackson defendant initially was sought by the police as a possible wit-
ness in the stabbing death of Leslie Hall-Kennedy. Jackson had been at the
scene of the murder when the body was discovered; but he left the scene soon
after the police arrived and did not speak to them.
Jackson was interviewed by members of the Raleigh Police Department
on three occasions during the course of the investigation." During the second
interview the police told Jackson that they had found bloodstains on the pants
he had given them the previous day and that tracks from his tennis shoes had
been found in the victim's house. 12 Jackson knew that the police did not have
such evidence, however, because he had not given them the clothes he had
worn on the night of the murder.' 3 Jackson denied committing the crime and
stated that "he went with other persons into the apartment . . . after they
heard screams coming from the apartment."' 4
Defendant did not hear from the police again until almost two weeks
later, when a detective approached him on a downtown street to tell him that
8. But cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (due process expresses a sense of
"fair play"); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (due process protects against funda-
mental "unfairness" in the use of confessions). See generally Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment
and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411 (1954) (court will measure police conduct against
certain basic standards of fundamental fairness that are essential to our system of justice).
9. The fourth amendment provides that: "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV. See infra note 33.
10. See supra note 3. In ruling that defendant's confession was involuntary and therefore
inadmissible, the trial court relied on language in State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 259 (1827). In
Roberts the court stated that "[c]onfessions are either voluntary or involuntary. They are called
voluntary, when made neither under the influence of hope or fear, but are attributable to that love
of truth which predominates in the breast of every man. ... Id. at 261. The trial court con-
cluded that defendant confessed because his guilt had been ascertained rather than for a "love of
truth"; thus, the confession was ruled involuntary. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 584, 304 S.E.2d at 154.
In reversing the trial court, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that "it has never been
held by this Court that a confession is inadmissible in evidence unless it is 'attributable to that love
of truth which predominates in the breast of every man.'" Id (quoting Record at 25). The court
stated that "[t]he North Carolina test to determine the admissibility of a confession continues to be
whether the confession is voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the case." Id. at 585,
304 S.E.2d at 154. In his dissent, Justice Exum claimed that under North Carolina case law,
trickery or deception on the part of the police rendered a confession involuntary and inadmissible.
Id. at 599, 304 S.E.2d at 162 (Exum, J., dissenting).
11. The investigation lasted from March 15, 1983, until April 8, 1983. Jackson was ques-
tioned by the police on March 26th, March 27th, and April 8th. The April 8th interview, during
which the defendant confessed, lasted approximately five hours. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 551-59, 304
S.E.2d at 135-39.
12. Id. at 566, 304 S.E.2d at 143. Both of these statements were false, id., and presumably
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Detective Mack wanted to talk with him about the Hall-Kennedy murder.
Defendant was not arrested; he voluntarily got into the detective's car and
went to the police station.' 5 During the course of the five-hour interroga-
tion,' 6 defendant was told that "the police had a murder weapon; they had
defendant's fingerprints. . . and that they had a witness who saw the defend-
ant coming out the door carrying a knife."'17 The police, in fact, had not found
defendant's fingerprints on the weapon nor was there any such eyewitness ac-
count.18 Shortly after the recitation of these facts, defendant confessed.' 9
On April 27, 1981 a grand jury returned a bill of indictment charging
defendant with first degree murder.20 Defendant filed a motion to suppress
the use of oral and written statements that the officers had solicited from him.
He alleged that his statements had been obtained in violation of his fourth and
fifth amendment rights under the constitutions of North Carolina and the
United States, and in contravention of North Carolina case law.2' The supe-
rior court granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, stating that his
confession failed to meet the North Carolina standard for the admissibility of
confessions articulated in State v. Roberts.22
On appeal23 to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the State argued that
the trial court had applied an improper standard in determining whether the
confession had been voluntary.24 The supreme court agreed, stating that "the
North Carolina test to determine the admissibility of a confession continues to
be whether the confession is voluntary under the totality of the circum-
stances."'25 In reversing the superior court, the court concluded that police
15. Id. at 566, 304 S.E.2d at 144. Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect is
taken into custody. See supra note 6.
16. See supra note 11.
17. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 568, 304 S.E.2d at 144. Although defendant probably knew that
earlier statements made by the police were untrue, there was no evidence nor any finding by the
trial court that defendant knew that the evidence concerning his fingerprints or the witness who
saw him was fabricated. Id. at 601, 304 S.E.2d at 163.
18. Id. at 601, 304 S.E.2d at 163.
19. Id. at 568, 304 S.E.2d at 144.
20. Id. at 550, 304 S.E.2d at 135.
21. Id. Defendant argued that his fourth amendment rights were violated because he had
been seized illegally, and that his fifth amendment rights were contravened because the coercive
methods employed by the police had elicited an involuntary confession. Id.
22. State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 259 (1827). The superior court stated that "the defend-
ant 'confessed' because he was found out and caught, rather than because such confession was
'attributable to that love of truth which predominates in every man, not operated upon by other
motives more powerful with him, and thus the confession was not admissible under state law."
Jackson, 308 N.C. at 562, 304 S.E.2d at 141. See supra note 10.
Although the court granted defendant's motion to suppress, defendant's contention that the
police violated his rights under the constitutions of the United States and the State of North
Carolina was rejected. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 562, 304 S.E.2d at 141. Justice Exum, in his dissent,
challenged this conclusion. Id. at 602, 304 S.E.2d at 164 (Exum, J., dissenting).
23. The State appealed pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-979(c) (1983) and rule 4 of the
North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedures. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 550, 304 S.E.2d at 135.
24. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 584-85, 304 S.E.2d at 153-54.
25. Id. at 585, 304 S.E.2d at 154. See State v. Schneider, 306 N.C. 351, 355, 293 S.E.2d 157,
160 (1982) ("Voluntariness is to be determined from consideration of all circumstances surround-
ing the confession."); State v. Booker, 306 N.C. 302, 311, 293 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1982) (key question
concerning voluntariness is "whether the totality of the evidence, including both the uncontro-
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methods had not been so coercive as "to make an innocent person confess." '2 6
The court balanced the societal interest in obtaining confessions against the
interest in safeguarding defendants' rights, and concluded that the interest
served by extracting confessions should prevail unless the methods employed
were likely to produce an unreliable confession.2 7 With this conclusion the
court sought to avoid the situation in which relatively harmless police miscon-
duct renders an otherwise valid confession inadmissible. 28 Jackson presents
two critical issues: whether defendant's confession was inadmissible because it
followed an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment and whether the
confession was inadmissible because it was given involuntarily.
The fourth amendment protects an individual from unreasonable
searches and seizures by law enforcement officials.29 This safeguard applies to
seizures of individuals as well as seizures of tangible goods.30 The linchpin of
the fourth amendment is probable cause.31 For police officers to effect a law-
ful arrest or seizure, there must be probable cause for their action. In Brinegar
v. United States32 the United States Supreme Court held that probable cause
"exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and
of which [they] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an of-
fense has been or is being committed." 33
The protection afforded by the fourth amendment is effectuated by the
exclusionary rule,34 a judicial device requiring the suppression of evidence ob-
tained by law enforcement officers in contravention of the Constitution. The
policy underlying this sanction against illegal police conduct is to "compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty [of the fourth amendment] in the only
verted evidence and the evidence in conflict, amounted to such coercion, actual or psychological,
as would render defendant's confession involuntary"); State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 419-20, 290
S.E.2d 574, 586 (1982) (voluntariness is determined "based upon. . . examination and considera-
tion of the entire record on appeal"); State v. Morgan, 299 N.C. 191, 198, 261 S.E.2d 827, 831-32
(1980) (test for voluntariness is "whether, from the totality of the circumstances,. . . such mental
or psychological pressure was brought to bear against defendant so as to overcome his will").
26. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 573, 304 S.E.2d at 148. (citing the standard for admissibility of
confessions suggested in F. IMBAU, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 218 (1967)).
27. Id. at 573-74, 304 S.E.2d at 148.
28. Id. at 573, 304 S.E.2d at 148.
29. See supra note 9.
30. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390-
92 (1914).
31. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.02 (1980). Because police conceded there
was no probable cause to arrest or seize Jackson, his status during the interrogation was a pivotal
issue at the suppression hearing. In his concurring opinion to the 4-3 decision, Justice Mitchell
stated, "Had it not been established. . . that the defendant was not in custody at the time of his
confession, I might well join the dissenters." Jackson, 308 N.C.'at 587, 304 S.E.2d at 155.
32. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
33. Id. at 175-76 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
34. The exclusionary rule was established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURES: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§§ 1.1 to 1.1 1 (1978). The United States Supreme Court carved out exceptions to the exclusionary
rule in opinions announced July 5, 1984. See United States v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 5155 (1984);
Segura v. United States, 52 U.S.L.W. 5128 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 52 U.S.L.W. 5177
(1984). These decisions do not change the arguments made in this note.
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effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."' 35 Thus,
any evidence, including verbal and written statements made by defendant, ob-
tained pursuant to an illegal arrest or seizure must be excluded from use at
trial.
In United States v. Mendenhall36 the Supreme Court articulated the rea-
sonable man standard for determining whether a defendant had been seized
properly under the fourth amendment. The Court stated that "a person has
been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of
all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed he was not free to leave." 37 The following circumstances might
indicate a seizure: "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, and
the use of language or a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer's request might be compelled. '38
The North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the Mendenhall standard in
State v. Freeman.39 In Freeman the court ruled that defendant was entitled to
a new trial because inculpatory statements made by defendant and introduced
at trial were the product of an illegal seizure.40 Defendant was "picked up" by
the police after his sister made statements to the police that incriminated him
in an arson case. When an officer from the police force confronted defendant
at his home, he stated: "Detective Parham. . .asked me to come by and pick
[you] up."41 The officer also informed the suspect about the incriminating
statements his sister had made to the police. Defendant accompanied the of-
ficer to the law enforcement center and was taken to a small room where he
was advised of his Miranda rights. After being interrogated for approximately
three and one-half hours, defendant confessed.42 At trial, the State introduced
defendant's confession into evidence, and defendant was convicted. 43
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court granted defendant a new
trial, stating that his confession was inadmissible because it was the product of
an illegal seizure.44 The Court emphasized that the officer's declaration that
he was there to "pick him up," coupled with his revelation of defendant's sis-
ter's accusatory statement, could have led a reasonable person to believe that
his compliance with the deputy's request might be compelled.45
35. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
36. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
37. Id. at 554.
38. Id.
39. 307 N.C. 357, 298 S.E.2d 331 (1983).
40. Id. at 358, 298 S.E.2d at 332.
41. Id. at 361, 298 S.E.2d at 333.
42. Id. at 361, 298 S.E.2d at 333-34.
43. At the pretrial hearing, defendant argued that his confession should be excluded from
trial because it was the product of an illegal seizure. After hearing the evidence, the Court denied
this motion, stating that defendant's confession was given voluntarily and that "applicable proce-
dures concerning custodial interrogation of defendant. . . were complied with." Id.
44. Id. at 363, 298 S.E.2d at 335.
45. Id. In Freeman the North Carolina Supreme Court cited its landmark decision in State v.
Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 290 S.E.2d 574 (1982), the first case in which the court applied Mendenhall.
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In Jackson the critical encounter for purposes of fourth amendment anal-
ysis occurred on April 8, 1981-it was during that interrogation that defendant
confessed. Based on the reasonable man standard enunciated in Mendenhall
and applied in Freeman, the court's conclusion that defendant had not been
seized was warranted. Two key facts support the court's finding. First, de-
fendant was not arrested when confronted by police on April 8, 1981, but was
simply told that "the [police] wanted to talk with him again in reference to the
murder on Cox Avenue."'46 Following this exchange with the police, defend-
ant voluntarily entered the police car and accompanied the officers to the sta-
tion. The circumstances surrounding this encounter were different from those
in Freeman, in which defendant was told specifically by the officer that he was
there "to pick him up." In Freeman there was no doubt that, given the officer's
authoritative command, defendant's presence would have been compelled had
he resisted. The same conclusion, however, cannot be drawn in Jackson; the
officer merely requested defendant's presence at the station.
The second key fact is that Jackson was told by officers that he was free to
leave.47 This statement certainly would have served notice to a reasonable
person that his participation in the interrogation would not be compelled.
This conclusion is buttressed by defendant's own testimony that the officers
did not arrest him but just wanted to talk with him.48
The facts in Jackson clearly indicate that defendant had not been seized
on the evening he confessed. There was nothing in the conduct of the officers
during the initial encounter on April 8, 1981, or the interrogation that ensued,
which would have indicated to a reasonable person that he had been taken
into custody or deprived significantly of his freedom of movement. The rec-
ord does not reveal any of the circumstances delineated by the Supreme Court
in Mendenhall as indicia of seizure. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that
defendant was given water and coffee, and was allowed to use the bathroom at
his request.49 Thus, the facts of the case support the court's conclusion that
defendant had not been seized.
In Davis a member of the Asheville Police Department received information that led him to con-
sider defendant as a suspect in a recent murder. At the police's request, defendant came to the
station for questioning. After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant was interrogated
concerning the murder. Defendant disavowed any knowledge of the crime, but agreed to take a
polygraph test. Once inside the polygraph room, however, defendant refused to take the test.
Following his refusal to take the test, at approximately 8:00 p.m., a detective gave defendant a ride
home and asked him to return to the station at 10:00 p.m. The defendant agreed to do so. Upon
returning to the station, defendant again was advised of his Miranda rights and, after a brief
period of interrogation, defendant confessed. Davis, 305 N.C. at 403-04, 290 S.E.2d at 577.
At the pretrial hearing, defendant argued that his confession should be suppressed because it
was the result of an illegal seizure. Because the State conceded there was no probable cause to
arrest defendant, the defendant's status during the interrogation period was the pivotal issue in the
case. Applying the reasonable man standard enunciated in Mendenhall, the court held that de-
fendant had not been in custody or deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Id. at
419-20, 290 S.E.2d at 581.
46. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 576, 304 S.E.2d at 149.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 578, 304 S.E.2d at 150.
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The next issue for determination is whether defendant's confession was
voluntary and therefore admissible. The United States Supreme Court has
held that, to comport with the fourteenth amendment due process require-
ment, confessions must be given voluntarily.50 Resolution of the voluntariness
issue hinges on whether tactics used by the police caused defendant's will to
resist to be "overborne." 5 1 If a defendant's confession is given freely, without
physical or mental duress, it is admissible. If, however, defendant confesses
because police methods overbear his will, then it is given involuntarily and is
not admissible at trial. The due process voluntariness standard seeks to ensure
the reliability of a defendant's confession by prohibiting the use of coerced
confessions to convict a defendant.52
Although the thrust of the voluntariness standard is stated easily, it is
difficult to apply because there is no single test for determining when interro-
gations are constitutionally permissible. As Justice Goldberg noted: "The line
between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods
offensive to due process is. . . difficult. . . to draw, particularly. . . where it
is necessary to make fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive
pressures and inducements on the mind and will of an accused."53 In the
absence of specific guidelines categorizing particular methods as per se viola-
tions of due process, courts have applied the "totality of the circumstances"
test.5
4
Although the Jackson court applied the proper "totality of circum-
stances" standard55 for determining voluntariness, the court erred in conclud-
ing that Jackson's confession had been rendered voluntarily.5 6 Two elements
can be found in the Jackson case which require a finding that the confession
was involuntary. First, the police used threats and promises to overcome de-
fendant's will to resist.5 7 Second, the police used trickery and deception to
elicit the confession.5 8
The facts support the argument that the police used threats and promises
50. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown a deputy sheriff, after severely beat-
ig one of the defendants, claimed that he would continue the beatings until the suspect confessed.
The defendant then agreed to confess. The Court ruled that the use of physical torture had vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment requirement of due process. The Court stated that, "state action
* * . shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of our civil and political institutions." (d. at 286 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316
(1926)). For additional cases applying the due process voluntariness standard, see supra note 1.
51. See supra note 4.
52. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
53. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
54. See supra notes 3 & 25.
55. See supra note 10.
56. In ruling to suppress confessions for lack of voluntariness, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has emphasized various elements that, under the totality of the circumstances, caused the
defendant's will to be overborne. See, e.g., State v. Stevenson, 212 N.C. 648, 194 S.E. 81 (1937)
(misrepresentation of the quantum of evidence); State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975)
(suggestions of hope or fear); State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259 (1 Dev.) (1827) (false statements con-
cerning the admissibility of evidence).
57. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 586-90, 304 S.E.2d at 155-57 (Exum, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 553-59, 304 S.E.2d at 137-39.
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to induce Jackson's confession. The officers admitted to telling defendant,
among other things, that "if he did go to the gas chamber, nobody, after the
pill was dropped in the bucket of water, would rush in to save his life,"59 and
that "he could go into court and plead not guilty and if he did that then the
other officers would probably go into court and testify that he was a black man
out here viciously raping and murdering white women."' 60 Moreover, one of-
ficer told defendant that "if he would tell the truth about the incident that it
would certainly come out in court that he cooperated." 6 1 The police officers
also intimated that if defendant did not confess, they would introduce
fabricated evidence against him at trial.62 These statements clearly are indicia
of "threats or promises" calculated to induce defendant's confession. In nu-
merous cases, the court has declared confessions involuntary on facts far less
compelling than those in Jackson 63
In addition to inducing Jackson's confession through the use of implied
threats and promises, police unduly influenced the substance of his statements
by raising the specter of the death penalty.64 During the interrogation, officers
told Jackson that first degree murder carried a sentence of death unless there
were "extenuating circumstances. s65 In explaining what would constitute ex-
tenuating circumstances, one of the officers stated:
[I]f you did kill the girl and you done it by accident, or it wasn't
premeditated, or it happened at a rational moment, irrational mo-
ment or something to that effect, that the judge and jury should know
that. . . not that you premeditated, set there with a knife and went
through the house and stabbed her without some other circumstance
besides premeditation. 66
Jackson clearly incorporated the officer's admonition that extenuating cir-
cumstances could spare him from the death penalty into his confession. He
59. Id. at 587, 304 S.E.2d at 155 (Exum, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 590, 304 S.E.2d at 157 (Exum, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 589, 304 S.E.2d at 156 (Exum, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 590, 304 S.E.2d at 157 (Exum, J., dissenting).
63. In State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975), police officers told defendant that
they knew he was "lying" and that they did not want to "fool around." In addition, defendant
was told that it would be "harder on him" if he did not cooperate. The North Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that the confession had been given involuntarily because it had been "made under the
influence of fear... growing out of the language and acts of those who held him in custody." Id.
at 458, 212 S.E.2d at 102-03. In State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E.2d 492 (1968), interrogating
officers told the accused that it would be "a lot better" if he would tell the truth about what
happened, and that he would probably only "be charged with being an accessory" to murder.
Again, the court ruled that admission of the confession was prejudicial error because the state-
ments by the officers constituted suggestions of hope and fear. Id. at 292-93, 103 S.E.2d at 503.
Finally, in State v. Stevenson, 212 N.C. 648, 194 S.E. 81 (1937), a case similar to Jackson, the
court ruled defendant's confession involuntary because it had been induced by officers' claims that
they had sufficient evidence to convict defendant.
64. One of the reasons the United States Supreme Court promulgated the voluntariness stan-
dard was to ensure the reliability of confessions. The Court was concerned that in the absence of
such a safeguard, police coercion would cause defendants to skew their confessions to fit the fact
scenarios suggested by the police. Jackson vividly illustrates this phenomenon. See supra note 52
and accompanying text.
65. Jackson, 308 N.C. 587, 304 S.E.2d at 155-56 (Exum, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 588, 304 S.E.2d at 156 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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admitted committing the murder, but stated that the victim, a recently married
woman, had invited him to come to her home and, once there, had indicated a
willingness to have sexual relations with him. He claimed that upon his ad-
vances toward her she began to scream and, in a state of panic, he "stabbed
her in the back." 67
The reliability of Jackson's confession is questionable. The correlation
between defendant's statements and the officer's suggestions concerning the
mitigating effect of extenuating circumstances is too great to disregard. In fact,
the trial judge ordiered the suppression of defendant's confession because he
doubted its veracity.68
The second, and perhaps most compelling, reason for concluding that
Jackson's confession was given involuntarily is that the police used trickery
and deception to extract his statements. During the second interview police
told defendant that they had found bloodstains on the pants he had given
them, and that tracks from his tennis shoes had been found in the victim's
house. Both statements were false.69 Furthermore, in preparation for the
third interview, one of the detectives obtained a knife identical to the one be-
lieved to be the murder weapon, smeared blood on it, and placed his right
thumb print in the blood.70 Then, with the bloody knife lying on the interview
table, another detective told defendant that the police had found the murder
weapon, a knife, and that his fingerprints had been lifted from the weapon.
Defendant also was told that the police had a witness who saw him coming out
of the victim's front door carrying a knife.71 After being confronted with these
falsehoods, defendant confessed.
Based on the extreme fact situation in Jackson, it is inconceivable that a
court, applying the totality of circumstances test, could conclude that defend-
ant's confession was voluntary. The error of the court's conclusion is demon-
strated by the fact that any one of the tactics used by the police-threats, false
statements, or trickery-might have been sufficient to cause defendant's will to
be overborne. Any test that purports to measure whether a defendant's will
has been overborne, yet is flexible enough to accommodate the unconscionable
methods used by the police in Jackson, is seriously deficient.
In his dissent, Justice Exum argued that prior to Jackson72 the use of
trickery and false statements had been sufficient to render the resulting confes-
sion involuntary under State v. Stephens73 and State v. Anderson. 74 In Ste-
phens investigators told defendant and his attorney that the attorney could not
be present during the polygraph examination but that he could be present dur-
ing the subsequent interrogation. The investigators started questioning the de-
67. Id. at 563, 304 S.E.2d at 141-42.
68. Id. at 600, 304 S.E.2d at 163 (Exum, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 566, 304 S.E.2d at 143-39. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
70. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 553, 304 S.E.2d at 137.
71. Id. at 558-59, 304 S.E.2d at 139.
72. Id. at 599, 304 S.E.2d at 162 (Exum, J., dissenting).
73. 300 N.C. 321, 266 S.E.2d 588 (1980).
74. 208 N.C. 771, 182 S.E. 643 (1935).
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fendant immediately after the polygraph, however, without informing his
attorney, who had been waiting outside the door. The court suppressed the
confession and stated that "[i]f the totality of circumstances indicates that de-
fendant was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver of his rights, his state-
ments are rendered involuntary as a matter of law."75
Stephens fails, however, to support Exum's claim that trickery alone will
render a confession involuntary. The court stated specifically that its decision
to suppress defendant's confession was based on the "totality of the circum-
stances." 76 Also, Stephens' relevance to Jackson is questionable because it can
be distinguished on its facts. In Stephens the police's trickery effectively de-
prived defendant of his sixth amendment right to counsel.77 No correspond-
ing right-to-counsel issue existed in Jackson because the defendant had
waived his sixth amendment right.78 Also, unlike Stephens, Jackson was not
in custody at the time of his confession. Consequently, the procedural safe-
guards79 offered to people in custody were not in effect.
In Anderson,80 the second case cited by Justice Exum, defendant con-
fessed after being informed that some of his codefendants had "talked" to
police officials. 8 ' The court granted Anderson's motion to suppress. Anderson
supports Justice Exum's proposition that a confession induced by trickery or
deception is inadmissible as a matter of law. The only impropriety by law
enforcement officials was the false allegation concerning statements made by
his accomplices. 82 Furthermore, the pertinent facts in Anderson were similar
to those in Jackson. In both cases false statements concerning the quantum of
evidence possessed by the interrogators caused the defendants to confess.
Because the court did not articulate clearly the standard it was applying,
the precedential value of Anderson is diminished. The court simply stated that
"inasmuch as the involuntariness of the alleged confession is apparent from
the testimony of the state's witness. . . we are disposed to disregard form for
merit and to hold that the alleged confession should have been stricken out."'83
Although Stephens and Anderson do not support Justice Exum's assertion
that prior to Jackson trickery and false statements rendered a confession invol-
untary, serious attention should be given to promulgating such a rule. In Mi-
randa v. Arizona,84 the Supreme Court attempted to eliminate the "inherently
75. Stephens, 300 N.C. at 327, 266 S.E.2d at 592.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 576, 304 S.E.2d at 149 (court held that although defendant knew he
could have attorney present during questioning, he never requested one).
79. See supra note 6.
80. State v. Anderson, 208 N.C. 771, 182 S.E. 643 (1935).
81. Id. at 780, 180 S.E.2d at 648-49. This precipitous statement by police officials was false.
Id.
82. Because the false statements were the only impropriety mentioned by the court, one can
infer that trickery alone was sufficient to render the confession inadmissible.
83. Anderson, 208 N.C. at 783, 182 S.E.2d at 650.
84. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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coercive" nature of custodial interrogation. 5 By extending certain fifth
amendment protections8 6 to the interrogation room, the Court theorized that
the coercive atmosphere would be reduced. In practice, however, this result
has not occurred because most suspects waive their Miranda rights and, as a
result, interrogation proceeds much as it did prior to Miranda.87 Conse-
quently, the policy goal underlying Miranda-reducing the coercive atmos-
phere that permeates police interrogation-has not been realized. Thus, more
effective steps must be taken to defuse the coercive nature of interrogation.
That trickery is an especially coercive interrogation technique is indispu-
table. Its powerful effect stems in part from the fact that once a suspect be-
lieves that evidence of his guilt exists, he may see no further reason to resist
interrogation. The Miranda Court sought to blunt the adverse effect of trick-
ery by prohibiting its use to obtain a waiver of rights.88 The Court, however,
did not expressly ban the use of trickery once a waiver was secured. A study
conducted by Professor Driver suggests that the Court did not extend its prohi-
bition against trickery far enough.89 In his study, Driver concluded that "[t]he
Miranda warnings failed to provide safeguards against the social psychologi-
cal rigors of arrest and interrogation except to the extent that they prevent
interrogation altogether." 90
If the deceptive methods, including trickery, threats, and false statements,
employed by the police in Jackson are not sufficient to render a confession
involuntary, one wonders what measure of psychological coercion would tran-
scend the threshold of acceptable police behavior. Unfortunately, the court
did not address this critical question directly. It can be inferred from the
court's silence, however, that police officers are to be given considerable lati-
tude in employing psychological measures of coercion when interrogating
suspects.
As a safeguard against the abusive methods used by the police in Jackson,
North Carolina should adopt the standard on deceptive practices promulgated
in the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.
The Code stipulates that:
No law enforcement officer shall attempt to induce an arrested
person to make a statement or otherwise cooperate by. .. any...
85. See supra note 6. Although the Miranda Court was addressing custodial interrogations
specifically, it is arguable that the same policy rationale should apply to noncustodial interroga-
tions as well. As Professor LaFave has noted, "the person who honestly but unreasonably thinks
he is under arrest has been subjected to precisely the same custodial pressures as the person whose
belief in this regard is reasonable." LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry,
Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MicH. L. REv. 39, 105 (1968).
86. Miranda held that the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause requires that a person
undergoing custodial interrogation be informed of his right to silence as well as of his right to the
presence of counsel, either obtained or appointed, during interrogation. See supra note 6.
87. See Medalie, Zeitz and Alexander, CustodiaIPolice Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital
TheAttempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1394-95 (1968); Comment, Interroga.
tions in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1562-78, 1613-16 (1967).
88. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
89. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 42 (1968).
90. Id. at 59.
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method which, in light of such person's age, intelligence and mental
and physical condition, unfairly undermines his ability to make a
choice whether to make a statement or otherwise cooperate.9 1
Under this provision, a suspect's confession would be inadmissible if police
tactics impaired his ability to make a rational decision. This standard would
protect the fifth amendment and due process rights of defendants without hin-
dering police interrogation.
In conclusion, the Jackson court's decision increases the quantum of evi-
dence a defendant must present to demonstrate that his will was overborne by
the circumstances surrounding his confession. This undermines the United
States Supreme Court's objective in promulgating the voluntariness stan-
dard.92 As a consequence, it is probable that confessions will be less reliable
and defendants subject to greater coercion than before Jackson. To defuse the
coercive atmosphere that envelops police interrogation, North Carolina should
adopt the deceptive practices standard recommended by the American Law
Institute.
ROBERT MANNER HURLEY
91. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 140.4 (Proposed Official Draft
1975).
92. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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Post-Conviction Rights of Pregnant Women Under
North Carolina Law
Under North Carolina law a convicted criminal defendant generally be-
gins to serve her sentence on the date that the court issues the order of commit-
ment.1 During the 1983 session of the North Carolina General Assembly,
legislation was passed to allow a judge to defer the imprisonment of a preg-
nant defendant convicted of a nonviolent crime until six weeks after either the
birth of the child or the termination of the pregnancy.2 The new amendment
is one of two statutory provisions for pregnant inmates under North Carolina
law. The other provision requires the surrender of a child born to a female
prisoner while in custody to the department of social services unless the
mother places the child with the legal father or another suitable relative. 3 Al-
though the amendment allowing sentence deferral for pregnant inmates is a
positive step toward adequate statutory provisions for these inmates, the lim-
ited scope of North Carolina's statutes dealing with the treatment of pregnant
inmates represents a failure on the part of the legislature to consider ade-
quately either the best interests of the inmate's child or the rehabilitation of
the mother. These statutes fail to address whether an incarcerated mother
should have the right under certain circumstances to care for her child in
prison.
This note examines the rights of pregnant defendants and inmates within
the framework of existing North Carolina law. The note addresses two issues:
whether allowing an incarcerated mother to care for her child is in the best
interest of the child, and whether an incarcerated mother has a constitutional
right to care for her child. Although reaching the conclusion that an incarcer-
ated mother does not have a constitutional right to care for her child, the note
urges the legislature to adopt statutes that will consider more adequately the
best interests of the child and allow, in some circumstances, an incarcerated
mother to care for her child.
During the 1983 legislative session the General Assembly amended North
Carolina General Statutes section 15A-1353(a) to allow a judge to defer the
imprisonment of a pregnant defendant convicted of a nonviolent crime. As
amended, the pertinent portion of section 15A-1353(a) provides:
If a female defendant is convicted of a nonviolent crime and the
court is provided medical evidence from a licensed physician that the
defendant is pregnant or the court otherwise determines that the de-
fendant is pregnant, the court may specify in the order that the date
of service of the sentence is not to begin until at least six weeks after
the birth of the child or other termination of the pregnancy unless the
defendant requests to serve her term as the court would otherwise
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1353 (1983). The court may grant a stay so that the defendant
can get her affairs in order.
2. Id.
3. Id. § 148-47.
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order. The court may impose reasonable conditions upon defendant
during such waiting period to insure that defendant will return to
begin service of the sentence.4
The statute's basic meaning is clear. The term "nonviolent," however, is
not defined. Presumably, a woman convicted of either a misdemeanor or a
felony could be eligible for sentence deferral if the judge determines that her
crime was nonviolent.5 The language of the statute encourages the judge to
defer the sentence; the judge is allowed expressly to defer the sentence unless
the defendant requests to serve her term as the court otherwise would order.
This statute provides a benefit both to the defendant and the State. The
defendant is spared the emotional and physical trauma of beginning a term of
imprisonment while pregnant.6 Deferral of imprisonment allows her to retain
the assistance and emotional support of family and friends and the freedom to
pursue medical care as needed. The primary benefits to the State are eco-
nomic and administrative. By allowing pregnant women convicted of nonvio-
lent crimes to defer their imprisonment, the State reduces the number of
pregnant women inmates in the prison population.7 Because pregnant women
often require special medical treatment, special diets, hospitalization for deliv-
ery, and transportation to hospital facilities for treatment, the reduction in the
number of pregnant women inmates through sentence deferral reduces costs to
the Department of Corrections.
Another result of sentence deferral is that the Department of Corrections
does not become involved as an intermediary in the process of arranging for
the care of the child. Since imprisonment is delayed until six weeks after the
child's birth, the woman is free to make arrangements for care of the child
4. Id. § 15A-1353. The commentary to the statute states that the section applies both to an
initial sentence of imprisonment and to activation of a sentence following probation revocation.
5. See REPORT OF THE CITIZENS COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION
(1982) (available in the library of the Institute of Government, Chapel Hill, N.C.) [hereinafter
cited as Alternatives to Incarceration] which suggests that "nonviolent" offenders should include
misdemeanants and persons guilty of felony offenses in classes H, I, and J. Misdemeanor offenses
for which individuals are sentenced to prison in North Carolina include writing worthless checks
and nonsupport of dependents. H, I, and J felons are persons convicted of larceny, breaking and
entering, forgery, embez.zelment, and credit card crimes. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1.1(a) (1981). See
Alternatives to Incarceration, supra, at II (advocating community based alternative penalties for
those convicted of nonviolent crime).
6. For a discussion of some of the potential adverse affects of prison on a pregnant inmate's
physical health, see McHugh, Protection of the Rights ofPregnant Women in Prisons and Detention
Facilities, 6 NEw ENG. J. PRISON L. 231, 235-45 (1979-80) and Resnik & Shaw, Prisoners of Their
Sex: Health Problems of Incarcerated Women, 3 PRISON L. MONITOR 57, 75-77 (1981). See also
United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (a woman seven
months pregnant was twice forced to painfully bend over for vaginal searches conducted in an
unsterile environment by two untrained policewomen). Other cases specifically citing lack of ade-
quate medical facilities and medical care for pregnant women inmates include Lasky v. Quinlan,
419 F. Supp. 799, 802-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated as moot, 558 F.2d 1133 (2d. Cir. 1977); Morales
v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 102 (E.D. Tex. 1974); and Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278,
282-83 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
7. Pregnancy is not a problem limited to female convicts who have not yet begun to serve
their sentences. An incarcerated female may become pregnant as a result of "intercourse or rape
by guards or jail officials, intercourse with other inmates in a sexually integrated prison, conjugal
visits, furloughs and work releases, and even prostitution." Note, Nine Months to Lpfe-The L-aw
and the Pregnant Inmate, 20 J. FAM. L. 523, 525 (1981-82).
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personally or, if she cannot provide for the child, to place the child with the
Department of Social Services in her home community. If the Department of
Social Services or the domestic court is involved, sentence deferral increases
the likelihood that the woman will be able to participate actively in the process
of determining where the child will be placed. Thus, deferral of imprisonment
has many benefits for both the mother and the Department of Corrections.
When considered separately, the amendment to section 15A-1353(a) rep-
resents a positive change in North Carolina correctional law. The statute es-
tablishes a reasonable compromise between the physical and emotional well-
being of pregnant defendants and the requirements of the correctional system.
Because sentence deferral is limited to nonviolent offenders, the State's interest
in the safety of its citizens is not compromised. The statute also is fair. Preg-
nant defendants do not receive more favorable treatment than others con-
victed of similar crimes, just a temporary deferral of their sentences. Thus, the
statute does not create an incentive for female defendants to attempt to be-
come pregnant to receive lenient treatment.
Despite the positive benefits of section 15A-1353, North Carolina law
fails to address other crucial issues that arise when a pregnant woman is sen-
tenced to a prison term. Apart from the recent amendment to section 15A-
1353, the only statute that addresses the subject of pregnant inmates is section
148-47,8 which provides:
Any child born of a female prisoner while she is in custody shall as
soon as practicable be surrendered to the director of social services of
the county wherein the child was born upon a proper order of the
domestic relations court or juvenile court of said county affecting the
custody of said child. When it appears to be for the best interest of
the child, the court may place custody beyond the geographical
bounds of Wake County: Provided, however, that all subsequent
proceedings and orders affecting custody of said child shall be within
the jurisdiction of the proper court of the county where the infant is
residing at the time such proceeding is commenced or such order is
sought: Provided, further, that nothing in this section shall affect the
right of the mother to consent to the adoption of her child nor shall
the right of the mother to place her child with the legal father or
other suitable relative be affected by the provisions of this section. 9
Unlike section 15A-1353, which strikes a balance between state correc-
tional goals and the mother's emotional and physical needs, section 148-47
fails to provide a framework for considering the best interests of the child and
the mother's relationship with the child. The statute assumes that the infant
will not be allowed to remain with the mother in prison. This assumption,
8. In comparison, the federal regulations, applicable only to federal prisoners, are quite
comprehensive, ensuring medical and social services, birth control, and abortions if desired. De-
livery of a child must take place in a hospital outside of the institution. No provision, however, is
made for mothers to keep their infants with them in prison. The child only is allowed to visit the
institution. 28 C.F.R. §§ 551.20-24 (1980).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-47 (1983).
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however, has been criticized by commentators, 10 and some states have statutes
that allow inmates to care for their newborns under certain circumstances.II
Of the states that permit mothers to care for their infants on more than a
temporary basis, one allows the child to stay with the mother until two years of
age, 12 and the other provides for care until the child is six years old.13 Some
commentators have suggested that, after the child reaches the age- of two, any
positive benefits the child might gain from its mother's care are offset by the
prison's restrictive environment.' 4 A consideration of whether and under
what circumstances an imprisoned inmate should be allowed to care for her
child requires a balanced examination of the best interests of the child and the
mother's parental rights within the context of the correctional system.
Proponents of statutes allowing incarcerated women to care for their in-
fants argue that under some circumstances, it is in the child's best interest to be
cared for by its mother even if the mother is in prison.' 5 The "child's best
interest" argument is based upon psychological studies showing the impor-
tance of mother-child bonding.' 6 Research has shown that one of the critical
factors in the formation of an emotionally healthy child is the development of
an enduring attachment to at least one care-giver during infancy. 17 The for-
mation of this bond also increases the likelihood that the mother and child will
readjust successfully after the mother's release from prison.18 Psychological
studies also provide support for the contention that after two years of age, the
restrictive environment of a prison would be detrimental to the child's
10. See Fabian, Toward the Best Interests of Women Prisoners: Is the System Working?, 6
NEw ENG. J. PRISON 1, 58 (1979-80); Comment, The Prisoner-Mother and Her Child, 1 CAP.
U.L. REv. 127, 138-44 (1972); Note, The Loss of Parental Rights as a Consequence of Conviction
andlmprisonment: UnintendedPunishment, 6 NEw ENO. J. PRISON L. 61, 111 (1979-80) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Loss of Parental Rights]; Note, Mothers Behind Bars: A Look at the Parental
Rights of Incarcerated Women, 4 NEw ENG. J. PRISON L. 141, 152-55 (1977-78) [hereinater cited
as Note, Mothers Behind Bars]; Comment, Babies Behind Bars: Should Incarcerated Mothers Be
Allowed to Keep Their Newborns with Them in Prison? 16 U. RICH. L. REv. 677 (1981-82) [herein-
after cited as Comment, Babies Behind Bars]; Note, On Prisoners and Parenting: Preserving the Tie
That Binds, 87 YALE L.J. 1408, 1422-29 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tie That Binds].
11. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3410-3422 (West 1982), authorizes the development of a commu-
nity treatment program for prison mothers with children under six years of age. Other states allow
the child to stay with the mother on a temporary basis until permanent placement elsewhere can
be arranged. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-69 (West Supp. 1984) (baby can stay for 60 days
while permanent placement arranged); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-2 (Smith-Hurd 1982)
(allowing a child to remain with its mother until the child is one year old if the Director of Correc-
tions determines that there are special reasons why the child should continue in custody of the
mother); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 1968). For over 50 years New York's policy has
been to allow inmate mothers to keep their newborn infants. Apgar v. Beauter, 75 Misc. 2d 439,
441, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (1973). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-47 (1983) (baby can stay only until
permanent placement is made elsewhere).
12. N.Y. CORRET. LAW § 611 (McKinney 1968).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3410-3422 (West 1982).
14. See Note, Tie That Binds, supra note 10, at 1424-25.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 1411-22 for further discussion of the pyschological results of the formation of
the parent-child bond.
17. Id. at 1411-12. See also Comment, Babies Behind Bars, supra note 10, at 680-82.
18. See Note, Loss of Parental Rights, supra note 10, at 99.
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development. 19
These arguments in favor of allowing the mother to care for her infant
until age two are most persuasive under circumstances in which the mother's
sentence is relatively short and will be served in a minimum security environ-
ment,20 the mother will assume full-time care of the child upon her release, 2'
and the mother's background and crime provide no indication of parental un-
fitness.22 Care by the mother also is preferable when the infant's only other
alternative would be undesireable institutional or foster care.2 3 Conversely,
the best interests of the child militate against care by the mother if she has a
history of violence or of abusing or neglecting her children.24 Also, when the
mother's sentence is long and chances of parole are nonexistent during the
early years of the child's life, it would seem undesirable for the infant to be-
come emotionally attached to the incarcerated mother.
Opponents of statutes allowing women to care for their infants in prison
argue that prison is no place for a child and that the idea of babies behind bars
is shocking.25 The lack of adequate facilities and trained personnel, possible
physical danger to the child, and a negative moral influence upon the child are
advanced as reasons why inmate mothers should not be allowed to care for
their infants.26 Proponents of statutes allowing infants to remain with their
incarcerated mothers, however, counter that the fears of physical danger to
children have proved unfounded at facilities where mothers are allowed to
care for their children.2 7 Furthermore, the risk that a child's morals will be
influenced negatively by exposure to inmates is slight due to the highly super-
vised living situation and the infancy of the child.28
Although the child's best interest often might be served by allowing her
mother to care for her while in prison,29 the idea has not been adopted by the
majority of state legislatures.30 Only New York and California expressly al-
low the child to stay with her mother for a definite period of time.31 Other
states allow the child to stay only until other arrangements for care can be
19. See Note, Tie That Binds, supra note 10, at 1425. See also Comment, Babies Behind
Bars, supra note 10, at 681.
20. See Note, Tie That Binds, supra note 10, at 1423.
21. See Comment, Babies Behind Bars, supra note 10, at 680-81.
22. Bailey v. Lombard, 101 Misc. 2d 56, 420 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1979).
23. See Note, Tie That Binds, supra note 10, at 1418-22 for a discussion of the potential harm
to a child as a result of institutional or foster care. See also, Fabian, supra note 10, at 49-50
(example of inadequate foster care for incarcerated mother's child).
24. Bailey v. Lombard, 101 Misc. 2d 56, 420 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1979) (incarcerated mother who
previously had exhibited lack of parental concern for her other children was denied permission to
care for her newborn infant).
25. See Note, Tie That Binds, supra note 10, at 1424.
26. See Comment, Babies Behind Bars, supra note 10, at 681. See also Note, Tie That Binds,
supra note 10, at 1424 n.79.
27. See Comment, Babies Behind Bars, supra note 10, at 681-82 & n.31.
28. See Note, Tie That Binds, supra note 10, at 1423 n.74 (discussion of residential facilities
for adult offenders).
29. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 11.
31. Seesupra notes 11-13.
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made.32 In some states, litigation by women inmates seeking to enforce ex-
isting statutory provisions allowing women inmates to care for their infants
has triggered repeal of those statutes.33
Given the lack of statutory provisions allowing women inmates to care for
their children, several commentators have attempted to develop constitutional
theories to support a claim by a woman inmate of the right to care for her
infant while in prison. One possible theory advanced is that the parent-child
relationship is fundamental34 and therefore protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 5 Parents, however, never have pos-
sessed an absolute right to raise their children. The state always has retained
the power to intervene on the child's behalf when necessary to protect the
child's best interest. 36 The state's power to terminate permanently parental
rights against the wishes of the parent is drastic, but constitutional.37 At most,
society seems to recognize that parental rights include some sort of interest in
the care, custody, and nurture of one's child.38
32. See supra note 11.
33. Wainwright v. Moore, 374 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). A 22 year old pregnant
inmate brought suit to enjoin Florida correctional officials from separating her from her child
after the child was born. She based her suit on Act of May 16, 1957, ch. 57-121, § 22, 1957 Fla.
Laws 186, 193 (repealed 1981), which allowed women inmates to care for their babies in prison if
they so desired. The court of appeals reversed a lower court decision in the inmate's favor on the
grounds that the statute merely permitted the child to remain with her mother if the court deter-
mined that to do so was in the child's best interest. Since the trial court had made no determina-
tion of the child's best interest, the court of appeals remanded the case for this determination.
Before the trial court could rehear the case, however, the mother was paroled and left prison with
her infant. After the Wainwright case, the Florida legislature repealed the statute upon which the
suit was based. See Comment, Babies Behind Bars, supra note 10, at 678 n.8.
A similar sequence of events occurred in California. In Cardell v. Enomoto, Memorandum
of Intended Decision, No. 701-94 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1976) a prison mother sued for enforcement of
Act of April 15, 1941, ch. 106, § 3401, 1941 Cal. Stat. 1080, 1116 (repealed 1980), which allowed
young children to stay with their mothers in prison. Her suit failed because the court interpreted
the statute as discretionary rather than mandatory. California subsequently repealed the statute.
A new statute was adopted authorizing the development of a community program for prison
mothers with children under six years of age. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3410-3424 (West 1982).
Funding for the development of the program is uncertain, however, and the restrictive qualifica-
tions for the program ensure that few women actually would be eligible to participate if the pro-
gram were developed. See Fabian, supra note 10, at 50-51.
34. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The
entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate
that the rights to marital privacy, to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude
as the fundamental rights specifically protected."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (In addressing the issue of a parent's right to control the religious training of a child, the
court stated that, "it is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents.").
35. See Comment, Babies Behind Bars, supra note 10, at 682.
36. Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393, 396 (1970):
ITihe venerable common law doctrine of paren patriae. . . declares the state to be the
ultimate guardian of every child. Under this doctrine, with its great emphasis on the
correlation of the welfare of the child with the welfare of the state, the state has not only
the right, but the duty to establish standards for a child's care. The only constitutional
check on this responsibility is that the standards so established must bear a reasonable
relationship to the community's health, safety and welfare.
37. See Comment, Child Custody. Best Interests of Children vs. Constitutional Rights of Par-
ents, 81 DICKINSON L. REv. 733 (1976-77) for a discussion of the violation of parents' constitu-
tional rights in the process of determining the best interests of the child.
38. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (an unwed father is entitled to a forum and
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Because parental rights never have been defined in absolute terms, argu-
ments that an incarcerated mother has a fundamental constitutional right to
care for her child in prison are not persuasive. Even if raising one's child is a
fundamental right, "[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary with-
drawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system."' 39 Litigation asserting claims to
other rights related to maintaining familial bonds has not been successful.
Conjugal visitation rights are not required by the Constitution.40 Inmates
have no constitutional right to physical contact with family or to sexual inti-
macy with their spouse or anyone else.4 1 One court has held that neither pris-
oners nor their potential visitors have a constitutional right to prison
visitation.42 Given the hostility of the courts towards recognizing a constitu-
tional right to simple family visitation privileges, it is highly unlikely that
courts would recognize that an incarcerated mother has a constitutional right
to care for her infant while in prison.
Other commentators have suggested that deprivation of parental rights is
a form of cruel and unusual punishment,43 unconstitutional under the eighth
amendment.44 Historically, violations of the eighth amendment have been
found when inmates were subjected to abusive physical punishment, intolera-
ble living conditions, or excessively long sentences for minor crimes. 45 Find-
ings of cruel and unusual punishment have not been frequent when the
inmate's deprivation is unrelated to his physical well being or the fairness of
his sentence. One commentator who asserts that loss of parental rights consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment46 cites Trop v. Dulles47 to support the
proposition that the eighth amendment proscription is not limited to physical
punishment. The Supreme Court held in that case that loss of citizenship, a
nonphysical punishment for military desertion, was unconstitutional under the
eighth amendment. Furthermore, in Trop Chief Justice Warren stated that the
scope of the amendment is not static, but "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 48
the opportunity to show why his interest in his children should not be terminated after the death
of the children's mother).
39. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). See also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
40. Tarlton v. Clark, 441 F.2d 384 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 934 (1971); Payne v.
District of Columbia, 253 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
41. Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975); Lyons v. Gilligan, 382 F. Supp. 198
(N.D. Ohio 1974); Stuart v. Hand, 359 F. Supp. 921 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
42. White v. Keller, 438 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md.), aj'd, 588 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1978).
43. See Comment, Women, Prison and the Eighth Amendment, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 434, 448-
50 (1980-81); Note, Female Offenders: A Challenge to Courts and the Legislature, 51 N.C.L. REv.
827, 842 n. 11 (1974-75); Note, Loss of Parental Rights, supra note 10, at 97.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
45. Fair, The Lower Federal Courts as Constitution-Makers: The Case ofPrison Conditions, 7
AM. J. CRIM. L. 119, 122-23 (1979); Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions ofPrison Confinement:
An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration under
the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893, 900-06 (1977).
46. See Note, Loss oParental Rights, supra note 10, at 97.
47. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
48. Trap, 356 U.S. at 101.
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Commentators assert that parental rights are of at least comparable sig-
nificance to rights of citizenship.49 Their argument-that forfeiting one's pa-
rental rights is cruel and unusual punishment-is most persuasive in states
whose statutes permit the permanent termination of parental rights without
the parent's consent simply because the parent is incarcerated.5 0 The argu-
ment is less persuasive when an incarcerated mother is deprived of her right to
care for her infant while she is imprisoned, but retains all of her other parental
rights. The likelihood that the courts would characterize the latter type of
deprivations as cruel and unusual is remote.
A final argument in favor of allowing incarcerated mothers to keep their
infants with them is that it may further the state's goal of rehabilitating the
inmate. Inmates may not have a constitutional right to rehabilitation, but it is
in the best interest of the inmate, the state, and the state's citizenry to promote
responsible behavior among inmates who will be released from prison.
In conclusion, an inmate has no constitutional right to care for her new-
born infant in prison. Thus, in states such as North Carolina, in which no
statutory provision is made for pregnant mothers who wish to care for their
newborns, an inmate has no legal grounds to assert a right to care for her
child. The argument can be made, however, that separating the mother from
her infant without making a determination of the best interest of the child
undermines the State's goal of protecting the best interests of the child.5 1 Fur-
thermore, statutory provisions that are less destructive of family relationships,
such as one allowing women inmates to care for their infants, would further
the State's goal of rehabilitating the inmate. Provisions should be made for
women inmates to care for their infants based upon a determination that this
is in the best interest of the child and upon a consideration of the mother's
circumstances, including the nature of her crime, the length of her sentence,
and her chances of parole. North Carolina General Statutes section 148-47,
which requires incarcerated mothers to relinquish the care of their newborns
to others, fails to consider the best interests of the child.
The 1983 amendment to section 15A-1353(a) demonstrates legislative rec-
ognition of the need for the correctional system to consider the circumstances
of the pregnant defendant while enforcing the requirements of the penal code.
The amendment is a significant first step towards accommodating the require-
ments of the legal system to the needs of pregnant defendants. Further legisla-
49. See Note, Loss of Parental Rights, supra note 10, at 97.
50. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 11 l(2)(d) (McKinney 1977) ("The consent shall not be
required of a parent or of any other person having custody of the child. . . who has been de-
prived of civil rights pursuant to the civil rights law and whose civil rights have not been restored
.... See also In re Anonymous, 79 Misc. 2d 280, 359 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1974). Some states have
equated parental incarceration with abandonment of parental responsibility and have implied the
power to terminate parental rights upon incarceration. See, e.g., Logan v. Coup, 238 Md. 253, 208
A.2d 694 (1965); In re Jacques, 48 N.J. Super. 523, 138 A.2d 581 (1958), cited in Note, Mothers
Behind Bars, supra note 10, at 145-46.
51. See Note, Tie Thai Binds, supra note 10, at 1419.
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tion is needed, however, to ensure that the best interests of the child of an
incarcerated woman are protected adequately.
JANINE ELIZABETH MCPETERS
The North Carolina "Canary" Rule-Protection for an
Endangered Species?
For a forty-three day period beginning July 14, 1983, the North Carolina
statute that allows criminal defendants discovery of their past oral statements'
was among the most liberal of such statutes in the United States. The statute
allowed defendants discovery of all of their past statements, regardless of to
whom they were made, and seemed to require prosecutors to make a "diligent
search" for all such statements. Many North Carolina district attorneys be-
lieved that the statute was too liberal and would be harmful to law enforce-
ment efforts. They feared that it would impose a tremendous paperwork
burden and would have a detrimental effect on the use of confidential infor-
mants.2 Because of these concerns, the North Carolina General Assembly met
in a special session on August 26, 1983, and amended the statute.3 Although
this amendment limited the scope of discovery, criminal defendants in North
Carolina remain in a better position than they were prior to 1983. The
amended statute balances the defendants' interests in expansive discovery with
the State's interests in less burdensome procedures and the use of confidential
informants. This note considers the concerns that prompted the General As-
sembly to limit discovery of defendants' past statements and concludes that,
although many of these concerns are supported weakly, the amended statute
represents an effective compromise.
By liberalizing defense discovery the legislature probably hoped to make
trial" 'less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic
issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.' "4 Allowing a de-
fendant to discover his past oral statements that are known to the prosecution
is supported on the ground that "it is especially helpful to defense counsel in
preparing for trial or in determining whether a guilty plea is advisable. ' 5
Prior to 1983, a North Carolina defendant's right to discovery of such state-
1. Act of July 14, 1983, ch. 759, § 3, 5 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 39, amended by Act of
Aug. 26, 1983 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2)(b) (1983)).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 18-28.
3. Act of Aug. 26, 1983. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53.
4. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1147 (5th ed.
1980) (quoting United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)) [hereinafter cited
as Y. KAMISAR].
5. Y. KAMISAR, supra note 4, at 1155. The American Bar Association Standards for Crimi-
nal Justice identifies as one of its "General Principles" that "procedure prior to trial should:...
[p]rovide the accused with sufficient information to make an informed plea." STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 1l-1.1(a)(ii) (1978). In its comments, the ABA notes,
[A] defendant who is ill-informed about the circumstances of the case may make judg-
ments that are costly to the individual as well as the system. An overly optimistic view of
the circumstances may lead to a wasteful trial, while an unduly pessimistic view of the
circumstances may lead to a premature plea which is subsequently challenged. The fi-
nality of guilty pleas is particularly important when a substantial majority of all cases are
resolved by plea.
Id. § 11 commentary at 11. In its comments regarding the principle that pretrial procedures
should "permit thorough preparation for trial and minimize surprise at trial," the drafters note
that "preparation is essential to proper conduct at trial. . . . [T]he realist knows that effective-
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ments was governed by the limiting language of North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 15A-903(a)(2). 6 Section 15A-903(a) provided that:
Upon motion of a defendant, the court must order the prosecutor:
(2) To divulge, in written or recorded form, the substance of any oral
statement made by the defendant which the State intends to offer in
evidence at trial.7
Disclosure of the substance of the defendant's oral statements that the prose-
cutor intended to use at trial was mandatory. An additional limitation im-
posed by the judiciary restricted mandatory disclosure to statements that had
been made to a person acting on behalf of the State.8 Both these limitations
were modeled on rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
model for the more restrictive discovery statutes in the United States.9
In July of 1983 the North Carolina General Assembly significantly broad-
ened the scope of mandatory disclosure by amending the statute to eliminate
both limitations. Amended section 15A-903(a)(2) required the prosecutor:
To divulge, in written or recorded form, the substance of any oral
statement made by the defendant, regardless of to whom the state-
ment was made, within the possession, custody, or control of the
State, the existence of which is known or by the exercise of due dili-
gence may become known to the prosecutor.10
Thus, the July amendment removed the "intended for use at trial" limitation
and specifically removed from the coverage of the statute any limitation to
statements made to persons acting on behalf of the State. t l Those who fa-
vored the amendment stated that it ensured that "all the cards are on the ta-
ble"12 during trial, and gave "the defendant the opportunity to know what he
is dealing with."' 3 These proponents noted that the defendant would no
longer "be confronted by nameless accusers. ' 14
ness at trial depends upon meticulous evaluation and preparation of the evidence to be presented
at trial. Id.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2) (1983), amended by Act of Aug. 26, 1983. North Caro-
lina has recognized that "no right to pretrial discovery existed at common law." State v. Hardy,
293 N.C. 105, 124, 235 S.E.2d 828, 840 (1977). Instead, a defendant's right to discovery in North
Carolina is governed by Article 48 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes. Section 15A-903(a)
governs discovery of statements made by the defendant; subdivision I governs written or recorded
statements. Subdivision 2, with which this note is concerned, covers oral statements.
7. N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2) (1983).
8. See State v. Mills, 307 N.C. 504, 299 S.E.2d 203 (1983).
9. See id. at 509, 299 S.E.2d at 206; State v. Crews, 296 N.C. 607, 619, 252 S.E.2d 745, 753-
54 (1979). Federal rule 16 limits discovery of a defendant's oral statements to those intended to be
used at trial and those made "in response to interrogation by any person then known to be a
government agent." FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
10. Act of July 14, 1983, ch. 759, § 3, 5 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 39, amended by Act of
Aug. 26, 1983. (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2)(b) (1983)).
I1. See id.
12. Interview with Alan D. Briggs, Lobbyist for the N.C. Academy of Trial Lawyers, quoted
in Raleigh News and Observer, July 29, 1983, at ID, col. 3.
13. Interview with Rep. Allen Adams, D-Wake, quotedin Raleigh News and Observer, July




The July amendment made North Carolina one of the more liberal juris-
dictions under this category of defense discovery. The North Carolina statute
no longer resembled federal rule 16, but came closer in form to the American
Bar Association Standards, 15 the primary model for many of this country's
most liberal discovery statutes. 16
Although proponents of liberal discovery supported this change, many
North Carolina district attorneys disagreed. The district attorneys contended
that the amended statute would harm law enforcement efforts. They argued
against the statute, asserting two criticisms that traditionally are directed at
broad discovery: first, the statute's vague and undefined boundaries would
increase the prosecutor's paperwork burden; and second, the statute would
lead to harassment of informants.17 The argument that the broadened scope
of the prosecutor's duty would greatly increase their paperwork burdens' 8 was
based on the requirement that the prosecutor disclose to the defendant all
statements made by the defendant to any person, regardless of whether that
person would be testifying at trial. The limits of this duty were marked by
vague and undefined boundaries. The prosecutor was to disclose all such
statements "within the possession, custody, or control of the State" that are
"known or by the exercise of due diligence may become known to" the prose-
cutor. 19 The statute did not indicate whether the prosecutor's duty was limited
15. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 11-2.11 (1978) provides for open fie discovery.
16. "By 1975, twenty-two states had substantially implemented the ABA standards through
judicial or legislative action." Id. § 11-1.1 commentary at 11.8, n.3 (citing Robinson, The AB.4
Standardsfor Criminal Justice: What They Mean To The Criminal Defense 4ttorney, 1 NAT'L J.
CRIM. DEF. 3 (1975)); see generally Y. KAMISAR, supra note 4, at 1155.
17. See infra note 24.
18. See L. WATTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE THE PRETRIAL
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY PROVISIONS OF SECTION 3 OF CHAPTER 759 (HousE BILL 1143), SESSION
LAWS OF 1983 7 (Aug. 24, 1983) (Mr. Watts is Assistant Director, The Institute of Government,
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.). The report concluded that "paperwork is the
most important single factor in the acceptance or rejection of any new procedure." Id. at 12. See
also M. EASLEY, INTERVIEWS WITH FLORIDA STATE'S ATTORNEYS AND FLORIDA LAW ENFORCE-
MENT OFFICERS (Aug. 23, 1983) (Easley is the District Attorney for the 13th Judicial District of
North Carolina.). Easley's report placed great emphasis on the greatly increased time and expense
burdens.
The ABA Standards recognize that pretrial procedures should "effect economies in time,
money, judicial resources, and professional skills by minimizing paperwork." STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § I 1-1.1(vi) (1978). Although the ABA Standards provide for broad, liberal-
ized discovery, the policy of minimizing paperwork is accomplished by allowing "open file" dis-
covery-the prosecutor's files are open to the defendant. This minimizes the prosecutor's burden.
Because the North Carolina statute denies discovery for much information, such as the names of
witnesses, and witness statements, see supra text accompanying note 8, disclosure must be accom-
plished by defining the prosecutor's duty.
19. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Since one does not ordinarily use the language "possession, custody, or control," when
speaking of things that do not have physical existence (such as oral statements), it is not
possible to predict with reasonable certainty how this limitation will be interpreted ....
It is unclear whether oral statements known to non-law-enforcement potential State's
witnesses are included within "possession, custody, or control," but once anyone investi-
gating or prosecuting the case learns of it, the State would seem to have possession,
custody, or control .... [T]he statute places a further limitation based on the knowl-
edge of the prosecutor in the case. He must know of the statement or be able to know of
it through the exercise of due diligence. This raises an issue whether a discovery request
by a defendant requires a prosecutor to begin a diligent search for any oral statements.
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to disclosure of statements that were relevant to the offense charged, or
whether there was a limitation with respect to the time when the statement was
made.20 Thus, the new statute arguably expanded the prosecutor's duty far
beyond his own trial preparation to require a "diligent search" 21 for any oral
statements made by the defendant. The statute created an expensive, time-
consuming paperwork burden for the State.
The paperwork argument, though important for the policy of effecting
economies in the discovery process,22 was not the pivotal reason for the
amendment by the North Carolina General Assembly. The needlessly vague
and overreaching aspects of the statute could be changed easily and without-
controversy to appease the district attorneys.2 3 The district attorney's second
argument-that the Act would lead to harassment of confidential infor-
mants-goes to the heart of the broad-versus-limited discovery argument and
was the focal point of the controversy that led to the second amendment in
August 1983.24
The district attorneys contended that the July amendment would lead to
the disclosure of the identities of confidential informants, 25 and that such dis-
closure would give rise to threats, and, in many cases, harm to informants.
Although the July amendment did not order specifically the disclosure of the
The likelihood, however, is that the prosecutor-with his continuing duty to disclose
under G.S. 15A-907-must, at a minimum, disclose oral statements when he learns of
them.
K. CANNADAY, MEMORANDUM TO REPRESENTATIVE ALLEN ADAMS 2 (Aug. 11, 1983) (Carnaday
is Assistant Director, The Institute of Government, The University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.)
20. [M]ust the statement have some apparent relevance to the crime charged to be dis-
coverable? No such limitation is explicitly contained in G.S. 15A-903(a)(2) as amended.
Probably some apparent relevance is required. The question of whether that relevance
was "apparent" would be for ad hoc determination in a hearing conducted in the ab-
sence of the jury. This issue did not arise under the old law since all statements intended
for use at trial have apparent relevance.
Second, is there a limitation with respect to the time when the statement was made?
Under the old law, this issue did not arise, since discovery was limited to statements
made to persons acting on behalf of the State, which normally occur during the investi-
gation of the alleged crime. This is in accord with the use of the word "statement"
which, especially in the context of litigation, normally refers to formal declarations, re-
ports, or narratives. However, "statement" can also mean a single declaration or remark.
Thus, the new law may be interpreted to mean that the prosecutor must reduce to written
or recorded form everything said by the defendant during the commission of the alleged
offense, as well as anything relevant that he said before or afterward, no matter how
voluminous this material may be.
K. CANNADAY, supra note 19, at 2-3.
21. See supra note 19.
22. See supra note 18.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
24. According to newspaper reports, the concern that led to the August amendment was the
protection of confidential informants. See Raleigh News and Observer, July 16, 1983, at IC, col.
5; id. July 29, 1983, at ID, col. 3; id. July 30, 1983, at IA, col. 6; id. Aug. 5, 1983, at IA, col. 1; Id.
Aug. 13, 1983, at IA, col. 1; id. Aug. 16, 1983, at IA, col. 5; id. Aug. 21, 1983, at 29A, col. 3; Id.
Aug. 23, 1983, at IA, col. 1; id. Aug. 25, 1983, at IA, col. I.
25. North Carolina recognizes the privilege to withhold the identity of informants in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-978(b) (1983). See also State v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E.2d 476 (1957). This
privilege is constitutional, at least as long as the issue is the lawfulness of the arrest. Rugendorf v.
United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
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identities of prosecution informants, as do the statutes of the most liberal dis-
covery jurisdictions,2 6 opponents argued that a defendant who learned the in-
criminating statements from the prosecutor, as required by the July
amendment, often would be able to determine the identity of the informants. z7
At a minimum, opponents argued that the possibility of exposure of the identi-
ties of informants and the resulting reluctance of informants to come forward
would have a "chilling effect" on the use of this important prosecution
device.2 8
Proponents countered by arguing that this "chilling effect" would not re-
sult because district attorneys under existing state law would be able to obtain
protective orders to shield informants.z 9 Prosecutors, however, argued that
protective orders do not guarantee satisfactorily informant anonymity. What
a prosecutor might consider to be good cause for a protective order might not
satisfy the judge who issues the orders. Thus, policemen and prosecutors
would not be certain whether they could obtain a protective order. Without
such guarantees most informants likely would not come forward.30
These witness harassment arguments are speculative.3 1 The evidence
presented to the legislative committee that examined the difficulties exper-
ienced by other states in implementing similar statutes demonstrates that, with
the possible exception of Florida, no state has had any difficulty with witness
harassment. 32 A report on Florida's witness harassment experience was the
26. See Y. KAMISAR, supra note 4, at 1158.
27. Raleigh News and Observer, July 29, 1983, at ID, col. 3.
28. Id., Aug. 16, 1983, at IA, col. 5.
29. Id. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-908 (1983); infra text accompanying note 55.
30. Raleigh News and Observer, July 30, 1983, at IA, col. 6; id. Aug. 13, 1983, at IA, col. 1.
31. The ABA finds such arguments unconvincing:
Some of the traditional reasons for denying or restricting discovery have been the fear
that pretrial disclosure will subject victims and witnesses to threats or other abuse ...
However, experience with broad discovery suggests that discovery does not pose such
problems in the majority of cases and that protective orders are an appropriate method
of coping with the occasional case in which pretrial disclosure will jeopardize victims,
witnesses, or evidence.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 11 commentary at 11.16-.17.
32. See M. EASLEY, supra note 18; L. WATTS, supra note 18. The difficulty of making com-
parisons with other states was recognized in the L. WArrs report:
Other states usually enacted broad discovery as a package, and the respondents from
other states had difficulty in focusing upon the problems specifically caused by the por-
tion on oral statements of defendants.
Most of the sixteen states surveyed require the provision of witness lists to defend-
ants, and in many instances the statements of those witnesses. Thus a major criticism
made here that furnishing the oral statements of defendants made to third parties will
reveal the identity of those parties has no force in those states. Many other jurisdictions
have specific provisions for keeping the identity of confidential informants secret, in the
absence of constitutional prejudice to the defendant. In some states the privilege is in the
section concerning what need not be disclosed along with the work-product exception; in
others the maintenance of confidentiality as to an informer's identity is specifically a
factor to be considered by the judge in fashioning protective orders. The most pervasive
problem of comparability, though, arises from the fundamentally different way that
prosecutors screen and prepare cases in the other jurisdictions contacted and contrasted
with the way the majority of North Carolina prosecutors do.
L. WATTS, supra note 18, at 8.
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instrumental factor in prompting the August amendment of the North Caro-
lina statute.33 To evaluate the effect of the August amendment, an analysis of
the Florida experience is necessary.
Initially, it must be emphasized that any comparison between Florida's
discovery laws and the July amendment to section 15A-903(a)(2) is critically
suspect. The Florida law specifically requires the disclosure, prior to trial, of
the names and addresses of all people whom the prosecutor believes have in-
formation concerning the case.34 Furthermore, it allows the defendant to see
the statements of informants. 35 Under North Carolina's July amendment,
however, informants who did not offer prior statements of the defendant re-
mained anonymous. Defendants were not entitled to see the exact statements
or know the identity of the source. Therefore, Florida law differs substantially
from the North Carolina law in a way that makes witness harassment consid-
erably more likely under the former's version.
Although both states have protective order provisions to deny discovery
when necessary to protect informants, 36 the effectiveness of such orders on an
informant's willingness to come forward depends on the informant's certainty
that the order will be issued.37 Because Florida's discovery statute is much
broader than the July amendment, there is a much greater risk to informants,
and much less certainty about the effectiveness of protective orders. Thus, it
does not follow that the July amendment would have caused any of the Flor-
ida witness harassment problems or the "chilling effect" on use of informants.
Although the Florida statute is distinguishable from the July amendment,
Florida's experience contributed significantly to the North Carolina General
Assembly's decision to amend the statute. It appears that the General Assem-
bly was impressed by the similarity between both states' experience with drug
trafficking, and the large amount of drug-related deaths in Florida that are
connected with witness harassment. 3s Interestingly, the evidence presented to
33. Act of Aug. 26, 1983.
34. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220.
35. Id., which states in part:
(a) Prosecutor's Obligation.
(1) After the filing of the indictment or information, within fifteen days after written
demand by the defendant, the prosecutor shall disclose to defense counsel and permit
him to inspect, copy, test and photograph, the following information and material within
the State's possession or control:
(i) The names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have infor-
mation which may be relevant to the offense charged, and to any defense with respect
thereto.
(ii) The statement of any person whose name is furnished in compliance with the
preceding paragraph....
36. See id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-908 (1983). In Florida, the "general rule is that the State
has the privilege of nondisclosure of the identity of a confidential informant and the burden is on
the defendant to show why disclosure should be compelled." Elkins v. State, 388 So. 2d 1314,
1315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
37. This conclusion follows from the argument of the North Carolina district attorneys who
feared a "chilling effect" on the use of confidential informants. See supra text accompanying note
30.
38. See infra note 42.
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the General Assembly demonstrates that Florida's problems with witness har-
assment are not widespread,39 but apparently confined to a single county. In
his report to the General Assembly,40 Michael F. Easely, a North Carolina
district attorney, noted that drug-related homicides were the second-highest
category of murders in Dade County during 1981 and 1982.4 1 He also noted
that Florida's discovery law, which requires disclosure of the names of wit-
nesses, "contributed heavily to the drug-related murders." 42
The North Carolina General Assembly was concerned with the possibility
of a similar increase in drug-related homicides as a result of the July amend-
ment. The North Carolina district attorneys who were most unhappy with the
July amendment were those in the coastal counties where, because of the "ex-
tensive coastline and expansive rural areas," drug smuggling is "rampant."
43
It was argued that under the liberal discovery provision of the July amend-
ment, "[a]n attempt by the state, under those circumstances, to continue to
aggressively prosecute all drug trafficking cases would be irresponsible. It
would result in intimidation, serious bodily injury and death of potential state
witnesses." 44 The district attorneys argued that in drug-related cases, "crimi-
nal penalties are stiff and defendants go to great lengths to avoid convic-
tion.' 45 Thus, because of organized crime's involvement in drug trafficking,
4 6
there would be a dangerous likelihood of harassment and harm to informants
if their identity could be ascertained from the disclosures required by the July
amendment. The General Assembly apparently was persuaded.
In response to the issues raised by the liberalized discovery statute the
39. See, e.g., Raleigh News and Observer, Aug. 21, 1983, at 29A, col. 3 (quoting Steve Mas-
terson, Executive Director, Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers):
Masterson said his state has no problems prosecuting criminal cases while operating
under a far more liberal disclosure rule than North Carolina's law officers are fight-
ing....
When informants do need to be kept confidential, Florida's rules permit statements
and identities to be withheld from the defendant if "there is a substantial risk to any
person of physical harm, intimidation, bribery, economic reprisals or unnecessary an-
noyance or embarrassment resulting from such disclosure."
According to Masterson, "If the prosecution can go in and show with any kind of
reasonable prospect that there is going to be danger, it can get a protection order. In our
area, many judges are former prosecutors, and they understand well the problems."
40. See M. EASLEY, supra note 18.
41. Id. at 2.
42. In a summary of his interview with Mike Diaz, a detective with the Homocide Division in
Dade County, Easley noted the statement by Diaz that "the name of a witness must be disclosed
prior to trial under their current discovery law and that this contributed heavily to the drug related
murders." Id. at 2.
43. Raleigh News and Observer, July 30, 1983, at IA, col. 6; id. July 29, 1983, at 1D, col. 3.
44. Raleigh News and Observer, July 30, 1983, at 1A, col. 6.
45. Id., July 29, 1983, at 1D, col. 3.
46. Officer Diaz stated that these murders are difficult to solve because it was very easy
to have Colombians and other Latins to fly in, get off the airplane, go to the victim's
home, do the killing, go back to the airport and leave the country. Under those circum-
stances even if they could determine who did the killing it would not be practical to
attempt to extradite the defendant from Colombia.
M. EASLEY, supra note 18, at 3.
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General Assembly again amended the statute in August 1983. As amended,
section 15A-903(a)(2) requires the prosecutor:
To divulge, in written or recorded form, the substance of any oral
statement relevant to the subject matter of the case made by the de-
fendant, regardless of to whom it is made, within the possession, cus-
tody, or control of the State, the existence of which is known to the
prosecutor or becomes known to him prior to or during the course of
the trial. .... 47
Thus, amended section 15A-903(a)(2) limits the prosecutor's duty to disclose
to defendants, statements "relevant to the subject matter of the case" and elim-
inates the "diligent search" requirement. By more clearly defining this duty,
the August amendment rids the statute of much of the vagueness of the July
amendment, and makes certain that this duty is not as broad as the July
amendment implied.4 8
The August amendment also reduces the prosecutor's paperwork burden.
The statute continues with the limitation that "disclosure of such a statement
is not required if it was made to an informant whose identity is a prosecution
secret and who will not testify for the prosecution, and if the statement is not
exculpatory." 49 This limitation also reduces significantly the paperwork bur-
den since prosecutors need only be concerned with documenting statements
made to witnesses who will testify at trial-a burden that merely is incidental
to normal trial preparation. Moreover, the prosecutor no longer will have to
worry about divulging statements of his informants as long as they do not
testify at trial. This latter aspect should eliminate fears of witness harassment
and reduce any "chilling effect" on witnesses or informants. Furthermore, the
reference in the statute requiring the disclosure of "exculpatory statements"
known to the prosecutor is consonant with the due process requirement that
exculpatory evidence be made available to the defendant.5 0
As a safeguard to the defendant's interests in not being surprised at trial,
the new statute adds: "If disclosure of the substance of defendant's oral state-
ment to an informant whose identity is or was a prosecution secret is withheld,
the informant must not testify for the prosecution at trial."'" This addition
ensures that if a statement is withheld from a defendant because it became
known to the prosecution through a confidential informant, the informant will
not be allowed to testify for the prosecution at trial--even if the informant
47. Act of Aug. 26, 1983 (emphasis added) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2)(b)
(1983)).
48. See supra text accompanying note 21.
49. Act of Aug. 26, 1983 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2)(b) (1983)).
50. The disclosure of known exculpatory evidence that has been "requested" and is "mate-
rial" is mandated by the due process guarantee of a fair trial. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 105 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady the Court stated:
A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made avail-
able, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears
heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a pro-
ceeding that does not comport with the standards ofjustice. ...
Id. at 87-88.
51. Act of Aug. 26, 1983.
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later decides to give up his confidential status. Thus, even though the defend-
ant will be deprived of the knowledge that the prosecution is aware of this
statement, the defendant does not need this information for preparing his case.
The prosecutor is prohibited from using this witness at trial.
Finally, the new statute adds the requirement that:
If the statement was made to a person other than a law enforcement
officer and if the statement is then known to the State, the State must
divulge the substance of the statement no later than 12 o'clock noon,
on Wednesday prior to the beginning of the week during which the
case is calendared for trial.52
In so doing, the prosecutor's paperwork burden is eased as he is ensured a
certain amount of time before his duty of disclosure is triggered. More impor-
tantly, it reduces the likelihood of harassment of witnesses whose identity
eventually will become known to the defendant. The prosecutor now can pro-
tect his witnesses until the latest practical date. The significance of the
"Wednesday prior to the beginning of the week" of trial, and the reason that
this is the latest practical date, relates to the statutory deadline for pretrial
motions, which falls on such Wednesdays at five o'clock P.M.5 3 The new stat-
ute sets twelve o'clock as the prosecutor's disclosure deadline to permit the
defense attorney five hours to move for a continuance in light of this new
evidence. 54
Simultaneously with the amendment of this section of the statute, North
Carolina General Statutes Section 15A-908(a) was amended to provide protec-
tion in, as specific examples of what may constitute "good cause" for the issu-
ance of a protective order, situations where "there is a substantial risk to any
person of physical harm, intimidation, bribery, economic reprisals, or unnec-
essary annoyance or embarassment." 5 5 This amendment apparently was an
attempt to add a degree of certainty to the process of obtaining protective or-
ders so that confidential informants can be given guarantees of remaining
anonymous. Such guarantees, it is hoped, will help avoid any "chilling effect"
on informants.
The August amendment is a compromise. On the one hand, it balances
the interests of providing defendants with the broadest possible discovery and
avoiding surprise at trial. On the other, it balances the interest of effecting
economies in the discovery process by limiting the prosecutor's paperwork
burden, and protecting the interests of confidential informants. The compro-
mise is sound. A defendant in North Carolina is in a much better position
than he was prior to 1983. He will be allowed discovery of all statements he
made that became known to the prosecutor through witnesses who will testify
52. Id.
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-952(c) (1983).
54. Act of Aug. 26, 1983. Arguably, five hours is too short a time for this decision to be made
by anyone, except possibly an attorney whose single client is this defendant. Delaying disclosure
to this late moment may be unfair, as there is no guarantee a continuance will be granted, and,
even where one is granted, inconvenience would still result.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-908(a) (1983).
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against him at trial. In addition, the defendant's position has been improved
with a minimal effect on the prosecutor's burden and use of confidential
informants.
It can be argued that all of a defendant's known statements should be
discoverable,56 and that the North Carolina General Assembly's decision to
exclude those made to a confidential informant was based on inconclusive
comparisons with a single county in Florida. As long as the protected infor-
mants do not testify at trial, however, it is difficult to argue that excluding
these statements will hurt the defendant in his trial preparation or in determin-
ing whether a guilty plea is advisable. The North Carolina district attorneys'
arguments in favor of protecting the identities of confidential informants,
though weakly supported in evidence, have some logical appeal. A test period
in which the legislature could study the effects of the more liberal discovery
rules would have been worthwhile. This test period would have been espe-
cially appealing in light of the August amendment to the protective order stat-
ute. The safety of confidential informants, however, is a significant concern
and justifies the less expansive new statute.
JONATHAN M. POLK
56. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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Compelling Competence Through the Use of Psychotropic
Drugs: A Due Process Analysis
The United States Constitution has long been construed to require that
criminal defendants be competent to stand trial.' Recent advances in the sci-
ence of psychiatry have clouded significantly the issue of competency by mak-
ing it possible to compel a defendant to become competent through the forced
administration of drugs. 2 The legal repercussions of compelled competency
have been addressed by a significant number of courts, and the issue was
raised before the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Monk.3 Al-
though the court declined to decide the issue, it noted that compelled compe-
tency, when presented squarely, will raise issues of constitutional significance.
These issues include the right to bodily integrity free from unwarranted in-
fringement by the state,4 the right to control one's own thought processes,5 and
the right to appear before the jury free from drugs that affect one's thought,
expression, and manner.6 This note analyzes the issues surrounding com-
pelled competency, and recommends an approach for resolving them. The
proposed resolution requires the courts to apply a strict scrutiny due process
analysis to determine if the administration of psychiatric drugs has been con-
ducted in the least restrictive manner consistent with bringing the defendant to
trial.
The issue of compelled competency in State v. Monk arose when James
Levone Monk was committed to Dorothea Dix Hospital for a competency ex-
amination.7 At a hearing following his examination Monk was found incom-
petent to stand trial.8 The court ordered defendant returned to Dorothea Dix
for treatment and authorized the administration of drugs. 9
1. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
2. See generally Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 769.
3. 63 N.C. App. 512, 305 S.E.2d 755 (1983).
4. Id at 516, 305 S.E.2d at 758.
5. Id
6. Id
7. Defendant was committed for evaluation pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002
(1983). Monk, 63 N.C. App. at 515, 305 S.E.2d at 758. The North Carolina statutory scheme
allows the question of a defendant's capacity to proceed to be raised at any time on motion by the
defendant, defense counsel, prosecutor, or court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002(a) (1983). Once
raised, the judge may commit the defendant to a state mental health facility for observation and
treatment for a period not to exceed 60 days. Id § 15A-1002(b)(2). Following the defendant's
release from the facility, the judge must hold a competency hearing. Id § 15A-1002(b)(3).
8. Monk, 63 N.C. App. at 513, 305 S.E.2d at 757.
9. Id. at 513-14, 305 S.E.2d at 757.
The treating physician in his or her discretion shall administer such medication at such
times as is necessary to make the defendant likely to become competent to assist in prep-
aration of his defense and to participate in his trial so long as such medications do not
create a substantial risk of serious or long term side effects. If the defendant refuses to
voluntarily take the required and necessary medication, the attending physician or physi-
cians and their staff assistants, are authorized and are directed by this court to utilize
such medically safe procedures as they reasonably believe necessary to compel the pa-
tient to take the medication ....
Id at 515, 305 S.E.2d at 758.
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Monk's second commitment to Dorothea Dix lasted fifty-three days,' 0
during which time the drugs Haldol" I and Artane' 2 were administered to him
by the hospital staff. After this treatment, he was returned to court for a sec-
ond competency hearing, at which time he was adjudged competent to stand
trial.' 3 Following his second commitment, Monk moved for the discontinu-
ance of medication to enable him to appear before the jury free from the influ-
ence of drugs.' 4 Such a motion was unnecessary, however, because the trial
court's order did not contemplate compelled medication following his release
from Dorothea Dix.15 The administration of Haldol and Artane terminated
three months prior to Monk's trial.' 6 Consequently, the issue raised in Monk's
motion, whether he had a right to appear before the jury unmedicated, was
rendered moot before it reached the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
17
Monk was tried for slaying his father and was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter. '8
When the issue is raised properly the court will be forced to confront the
constitutional issues surrounding compelled competency. Competency to
stand trial refers to the mental capacity required of a defendant by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 9 In North Carolina the stan-
dard for competency is set out in State v. Buie.20
"The test of a defendant's mental capacity to stand trial is whether he
has, at the time of trial, the mental capacity to comprehend his posi-
tion, to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against
him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate
10. Id at 514, 305 S.E.2d at 757.
11. Id Haldol is one of a group of drugs known as the "major tranquilizers." See, e.g.,
Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L.
REv. 461,474 n.77 (1978). The major tranquilizers are antipsychotic drugs used primarily to treat
schizophrenia. The major tranquilizers (e.g., Thorazine, Stelazine. Trilafon, Prolixin, Navane,
Mellaril, and Haldol) together with antidepressant (e.g., Elavil and Aventyl), antianxiety (e.g.,
Vistaril and Valium), and sedative-hypnotic (e.g., chloral hydrate) medications comprise the field
of psychotropic or psychoactive drugs. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 2, at 778.
Antipsychotic drugs influence the chemical transmissions in the brain, affecting both ac-
tivatory and inhibitory functions. They are mind-altering drugs used to reduce the level of
psychotic thinking. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-67 (D. Mass. 1979), affidin
part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (Ist Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982). The psychotic symptoms suppressed by the major tranquilizers include hallucinations and
delusions; the drugs do not affect the cortex-the "thinking" part of the brain. See, e.g., Note, The
Case ofthe Tranquilized Defendant, 28 LA. L. REV. 265, 266 (1968).
12. Monk, 63 N.C. App. at 514, 305 S.E.2d at 757. Artane is a drug used to control the side
effects of psychotropic medication. For a discussion of the side effects associated with chemical
competence see infra note 57.
13. Monk, 63 N.C. App. at 514, 305 S.E.2d at 757.
14. Id. at 516, 305 S.E.2d at 758.
15. Id. See supra note 9.
16. Monk, 63 N.C. App. at 516, 305 S.E.2d at 759.
17. Id. at 517, 305 S.E.2d at 759.
18. Id. at 514, 305 S.E.2d at 757.
19. See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); People v. Bilyew, 55 I1l. App. 3d
69, 370 N.E.2d 585 (1977), rev'd, 73 Ill. 2d 294, 383 N.E.2d 212 (1978); State v. Buie, 297 N.C.
159, 254 S.E.2d 26, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 971 (1979).
20. 297 N.C. 159, 254 S.E.2d 26, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 971 (1979).
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with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be
interposed."'
The right to be competent during trial is guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment's command that the accused be permitted to confront adverse wit-
nesses.22 The right to be present and confront witnesses includes not only
physical presence in the courtroom, but mental "presence" as well. 2 3 An in-
competent defendant is afforded no meaningful opportunity to defend himself.
The mental state necessary to defend oneself may be achieved through
the use of medication. In spite of some early resistance to "synthetic sanity"
and "chemical competence," 24 courts now agree that the method by which the
defendant attains the requisite mental standard does not affect the finding of
present competency. 25 "'Any other holding would constitute an atavistic re-
pudiation of the advances made in the treatment of the mentally ill during the
past two decades.' "26
In determining whether a defendant may use a drug to become competent
to stand trial, the scope of the court's inquiry should be limited to whether the
medication adversely affects the "thought, expression, manner and content of
the person using the drugs." 27 If the medication has a substantial effect, then
the defendant is not competent to stand trial under its influence.28 If the medi-
cation administered enhances the defendant's cognitive abilities, however, he
21. Id at 161, 254 S.E.2d at 28 (quoting State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 565, 213 S.E.2d 305,
316 (1975)). The requirement that the defendant have the capacity to proceed, and the definition
of capacity, are codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001(a) (1983).
22. See, e.g., State v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 28, 426 P.2d 872, 875 (1967).
23. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (some view the prohibition against trying an
incompetent as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia); State v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 28,
426 P.2d 872, 875 (1967).
24. See State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399, 218 So. 2d 311 (1969); see generaly Winick, supra
note 2.
25. See United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.) (Aventyl and Mellaril), reh'g denied,
591 F.2d 1343, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States ex rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563
F.2d 86 (3d Cir.) (Equanil and Thorazine), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978); Mines v. State, 390
So. 2d 332 (Fla.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 916 (1981); People v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 809, 373
N.E.2d 583 (1978); State v. Lawrence, 368 So. 2d 699 (La. 1979) (Mellaril); State v. Hayes, 118
N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978) (Lithium, Stelazine and Valium); State v. Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 553
P.2d 1296 (Ct. App. 1976) (Thorazine); State v. Buie, 297 N.C. 159, 254 S.E.2d 26, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 971 (1979); State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238, 204 S.E.2d 649 (1974) (Haldol); State v. Norris, 40
Or. App. 505, 595 P.2d 1261 (1979); State v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 426 P.2d 872 (1967) (Valium);
State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978) (Haldol and Loxatain); State v. Stacy, 556
S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) (Haldol), afid, 601 S.W.2d 696 (Tenn. 1980); In re Pray, 133
Vt. 253, 336 A.2d 174 (1975) (Thorazine, Phenobarbitol, Tofranil, and Chlorohydrate); State v.
Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 492 P.2d 239 (1971); State v. Gwaltney, 77 Wash. 2d 906, 468 P.2d 433
(1970); State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960) (Equanil and Trancopal).
The principle that drug use does not render one per se incompetent applies to controlled
substances as well as psychotropic medication. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 542 F.2d 50 (8th
Cir.) (heroin), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837 (1976); United States ex rel. Fitzgerald v. LaValle, 461
F.2d 601 (2d Cir.) (heroin), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Grennet v. United States, 403 F.2d
928 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (heroin and methedrine).
26. State v. Stacy, 556 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) (quoting People v. Parsons,
82 Misc. 2d 1090, 1093, 371 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (1975)), af'd, 601 S.W.2d 696 (Tenn. 1980).
27. State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 97, 492 P.2d 239, 240 (1971).
28. Id See also Whitehead v. Wainwright, 447 F. Supp. 898 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (defendant so
heavily sedated he fell asleep at counsel table).
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is competent to stand trial while medicated. 29
The inquiry is more complex, however, when the state seeks to compel the
defendant to become competent to stand trial. The first point of inquiry must
be the nature of the defendant's interest in being free from medication. The
courts that have addressed this issue have found that the defendant's interest
in being free from compelled medication is a fundamental right.30 This right
has its roots in a number of constitutional protections that the courts have
identified.
The most frequently identified source of the right to be free from the com-
pelled administration of psychotropic drugs is the first amendment.3t The first
amendment protects not only the communication of ideas, but also the free-
dom to generate ideas.32 Psychotropic drugs are mind-altering chemicals that
potentially may infringe on the defendant's right to control his own thought
processes. 33
The administration of drugs against the defendant's will also interferes
with his right to bodily integrity.34 Although not specifically protected by the
Constitution, bodily integrity falls squarely within the right to privacy the
Supreme Court has recognized surrounding the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and
fourteenth amendments.35 One court has found that this right to privacy en-
compasses the right to protect one's mental processes from governmental inter-
ference.3 6 Courts also have noted that the coerced administration of
psychotropic drugs may infringe upon the right to freedom of religion37 and
29. See, e.g., State v. Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 553 P.2d 1296 (Ct. App. 1976) (no evidence
presented that Thorazine affected defendant's thought processes or the content of defendant's
thoughts); State v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 426 P.2d 872 (1967) (Valium did not affect defendant's
ability to communicate with other people, did not affect his memory, and did not impair his
mental functioning); State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978) (evidence indicated that the
medication was beneficial to defendant's thought processes).
30. See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976) (civil action); Winters v. Miller, 446
F.2d 65 (2d Cir.) (civil action), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342
(D. Mass. 1979) (civil action), ajd in part, rev'd inpart, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub
nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (civil
action), modNed, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982); State v. Law,
270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978); State v. Mayott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 492 P.2d 239 (1971);
Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65 MINN. L. Rav. 331 (1981);
Winick, supra note 2.
31. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 70
(2d Cir 1971); State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 98, 492 P.2d 239, 240 (1971).
32. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979) (first amendment's protection of
the right to communicate ideas presupposes the capacity to produce ideas), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacatedsub nom. Mills v Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
33. Winick, supra note 30, at 366 (psychotropic drugs intrude directly upon mental
processes).
34. See State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 674, 244 S.E.2d 302, 307 (1970); Winick & DeMeo, Coln-
petence to Stand Trial in Florida, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 31, 63-64 (1980).
35. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
36. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) ("[The right of privacy is broad
enough to include the right to protect one's mental processes from governmental interference."),
modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), reheard, 720
F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
37. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.) (court held that state must have compelling inter-




the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.38
Once the court has determined that the defendant has a fundamental
right to be free from compelled psychotropic medication, due process 39 re-
quires that any infringement of the right be strictly scrutinized.40 Strict scru-
tiny demands that the state have a compelling interest that is furthered by the
restriction,4' and that the restriction be the least restrictive means to achieve
that end.42
The state's interest in compelling the administration of psychotropic
drugs is to try currently incompetent defendants. The Supreme Court has
noted that the "Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamen-
tal to a scheme of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and
peace." 43 The state's interest in bringing to trial one accused in good faith and
with probable cause lies at the very heart of its police power. 4 If the state is
unable to try those accused, it will be forced to release them or institute civil
commitment proceedings. 45 In light of these considerations the state's interest
in forcing defendants to become competent is compelling.
Although the presence of a compelling interest does permit the state to
infringe upon the fundamental right of an incompetent accused, the infringe-
ment must be tailored by the courts to achieve the permissible end in the least
restrictive manner.46
The method chosen for returning the defendant to competence is the first
consideration in determining whether the compelled competence of a defend-
ant comports with the least restrictive means test. If there is any indication
38. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946-47 (3d Cir. 1976); but see Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.
Supp. 1131, 1143 (D.N.J. 1978) (no eighth amendment claim because psychotropic drugs are a
justifiable method of treatment; side effects of psychotropic drugs not disproportionately harsh
compared to benefits), modffled, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982).
For a discussion of the side effects of psychotropic medication see infra note 57.
Compelled competency may infringe on a defendant's eighth amendment rights in the situa-
tion hypothesized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Burrows, 250 La. 658, 659, 198 So.
2d 393, 394 (1967). The trial judge asked: "Can he be compelled to take drugs that will produce
sanity sufficient for him to stand trial and, if found guilty of the death penalty, [sic] compelled to
take drugs so that he may remain sane in order that his life may be taken?" Id. The court never
resolved the issue, however, because the trial court's finding of competency was interlocutory and
not appealable. Id. at 667, 198 So. 2d at 395-96.
39. "Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those per-
sonal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for the Court, are 'so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,' Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) or are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (footnote omitted).
40. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
42. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
43. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
44. Winick & DeMeo, supra note 34, at 64.
45. See State v. Stacy, 556 S.W.2d 552, 558 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977), aqj'd, 601 S.W.2d 696
(Tenn. 1980). The state may not deprive indefinitely the incompetent defendant of his liberty
without due process. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Steinberg, Summary Commit-
ment of Defendants Incompetent to Stand Trial A Violation of Constitutional Safeguards, 22 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 1 (1978).
46. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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that the defendant can be returned to competence within a reasonable time
using a less intrusive method of therapy,47 such as traditional verbal psycho-
therapy, that does not violate the defendant's right to bodily integrity, or a less
potent drug, that is less violative of defendant's freedom of thought, then the
defendant should be permitted to try that mode of treatment until it is clear
that improvement is not being made.48 A significant factor that must be
weighed in determining the least restrictive mode of treatment is the likelihood
and potential severity of side effects from the use of psychotropic
medication. 49
If treatment with psychotropic drugs is the least restrictive means for re-
turning a given defendant to competency,50 the trial judge must conduct the
defendant's trial in a manner that minimizes the effects of compelled medica-
tion. The least restrictive means standard mandates that the medication be
used only to effect the defendant's return to competency and not to infringe on
any of the defendant's other rights. Consequently, sensitivity to the effects of
psychotropic medication is essential when the defendant is to be tried before a
jury.51
At the very least, the jury must be informed that the defendant is receiv-
ing psychotropic medication and of the effects of the medication. 52 This may
be done through the defendant's testimony or through an expert witness.5 3
The jury must be made aware that the demeanor of the defendant in the court-
room, particularly if he appears calm, callous, and incapable of feeling re-
morse,5 4 does not reflect the defendant's personality, but is a result of the
state's action in medicating him against his will. 55 Because the effect of the
medication may go beyond merely returning the defendant to competence and
may affect adversely his demeanor before the jury, an explanation that the
defendant is medicated should be required to minimize any unnecessary in-
47. For a discussion of the various modes of psychotherapy and an evaluation of the degree
of intrusiveness of each method, see Winick, supra note 30, at 351-73.
48. Winick & DeMeo, supra note 34.
49. See infra note 57.
50. The decision to medicate a defendant never should be made without informing counsel.
Should the state try a medicated defendant without revealing the details of his medication to
counsel, the defendant will have a claim against the state under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), for withholding exculpatory evidence. See United States ex rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563
F.2d 86, 93 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978) (court did not reach the Brady issue in
habeas corpus petition because defendant had not exhausted state remedies).
51. These considerations are no less important in trying a defendant who is voluntarily
medicated.
52. In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 257-58, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975); see also FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.214(c)(2) (requiring that the jury be instructed before trial and in the charge regarding the medi-
cation and its effects).
53. See United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 824 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Jojola, 89 N.M.
489, 493, 553 P.2d 1296, 1300 (1976); State v. Gwaltney, 77 Wash. 2d 906, 909, 468 P.2d 433, 435
(1970) ("The inability of a defendant to effectively express to a judge or jury his true emotional
feelings on a subject is a fact that can be adequately explained to a trier of fact by either the
defendant himself or another witness.").
54. See Haddox & Pollack, Psychopharmaceutical Restoration to Present Sanity (Mental Caon-
petency to Stand Trial), 17 J. FORENSIC Scl. 568, 574 (1972).
55. State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 766, 355 P.2d 323, 326 (1960).
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fringement on his right to appear and testify on his own behalf.5 6
The trial judge dealing with a medicated defendant also must familiarize
himself with the side effects of psychotropic drugs57 so that he can act to mini-
mize any prejudicial effect on the jury that may deprive the defendant of a fair
trial.58 A liberal recess policy during trial may be sufficient to accommodate
minor side effects after administration of medication.59 Serious side effects,
however, may require more drastic measures. In cases in which the defend-
ant's symptoms from psychotic medication are so severe as to be distracting or
prejudicial, the trial court may excuse the defendant's presence during trial.60
The defendant's right to testify in his own behalf and present evidence
will be infringed most seriously in cases in which the defendant places his
mental state in issue by raising the defense of insanity or diminished capacity.
When the mental state of the defendant is in issue, it is the mental state at the
time of the alleged crime, and not at the time of trial, that is relevant.6 1 The
56. The defendant's right to testify in his own behalf derives from statutes that make the
defendant competent to testify, contrary to the common-law rule making defendants incompetent
because of interest. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-54 (1981); see generally Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967).
57. The toxic side effects of psychotropic medication vary from individual to individual and
with the particular drug, the dosage, and the length of treatment. The most serious side effect of
antipsychotic drugs is tardive dyskinesia, which some studies indicate strikes about 50% of chroni-
cally hospitalized schizophrenics and about 40% of those treated on an out-patient basis. Rogers
v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360 (D. Mass. 1979), aft'dinpart, rev'dinpart, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980), vacatedsub nom. Mills v Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). Tardive dyskinesia produces invol-
untary motor movements, particularly of the face and lips. Involuntary movements also may
strike the fingers, hands, legs, and pelvic area. Id. See also Plotkin, supra note 11, at 476. "In its
most progressive state, the disease can interfere with swallowing and can affect all motor activity.
Although in mild cases the disease can simply be a source of embarrassment, it can be physically
and psychologically disabling." Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1360. There is no known effective treat-
ment for tardive dyskinesia. Winick, supra note 30, at 366.
A group of less severe neurological side effects of antipsychotic drugs are known as ex-
trapyramidal effects. The symptoms include: akathisia (motor restlessness and agitation); akane-
sia (physical immobility and lack of spontaneity); dystonic reactions (muscle spasms in face, neck,
and arms characterized by irregular flexing or writhing); and pseudoparkinsonian syndrome
(mask-like face, drooling, muscle rigidity, and tremors). These extrapyramidal effects cease when
the drug is terminated. See Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1360; Plotkin, supra note 11, at 475.
In addition to tardive dyskinesia and the extrapyramidal effects, a variety of nonmuscular
side effects may occur. These include drowsiness, blurred vision, lack of sexual desire, frigidity,
depression, constipation, diarrhea, rashes, and menstrual changes. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d
939, 945 n.8 (3d Cir. 1976); See Plotkin, supra note 11, at 476; Winick, supra note 30, at 366. More
serious nonmuscular side effects include ocular changes, cardiovascular changes, convulsions, and
sudden death. See Plotkin, supra note 11, at 476; Winick, supra note 30, at 366.
58. Due process requires that the defendant receive a fair trial by an impartial jury free from
improper influences. See, e.g., Estell v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (fourteenth amendment
prohibits state from compelling defendant to stand trial in prison garb due to prejudicial effect on
jury); United States v. Garcia, 456 F. Supp. 1354 (D.P.R. 1978) (right to fair trial requires suppres-
sion of right to free speech when trial publicity will prejudice jury or potential jurors).
59. See Winick, supra note 2, at 789.
60. State v. Larson, 94 N.M. 795, 797, 617 P.2d 1310, 1313 (1980) (although denying defend-
ant's motion to excuse his presence during trial, the court indicated that the trial judge may have
discretion to excuse a defendant in appropriate circumstances). See also In re United States, 597
F.2d 27, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1979) ("We think, however, that there is a residue of judicial discretion in
unusual circumstances where good cause is shown such as physical endangerment of the defend-
ant to permit temporary absence.").
61. State v. Law, 270 S.C. 669, 671-72, 244 S.E.2d 302, 306 (1978) (jury was well aware that
issue was mental state at time of alleged crime, not time of trial).
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demeanor of the defendant at the time of trial, however, is probative evidence
of his mental state at the time of the offense.62 Consequently, by compelling
the defendant to take medication that alters his attitude, appearance, and de-
meanor, the state can determine the evidence the jury will see on the issue of
the defendant's mental state.63
Precluding the defendant from presenting evidence relevant to his mental
state does not comport with the least restrictive means standard. Such an im-
balance in the adversary system may be remedied in part by permitting the
defendant to appear before the jury unmedicated for some portion of the
trial64 if he so requests.65 The Supreme Court of Vermont noted the impor-
tance of such an opportunity in In re Pray:66 "Yet his deportment, demeanor,
and day-to-day behavior during the trial, before their eyes, was a part of the
basis of their judgment with respect to the kind of person he really was, and
the justifiability of his defense of insanity."67
The trial judge should arrange for the defendant to be free from medica-
tion, to the extent it is consistent with the progress of the trial and the safety of
the public, 68 whenever evidence of the defendant's demeanor will be probative
of a fact in issue or help the jury make a decision, including whether to impose
the death penalty.69 Denial of such a request is an infringement of the defend-
ant's right to testify effectively in his own behalf and is a denial of due process.
Finally, the trial judge should not hesitate to appoint an independent psy-
chiatric expert, at the defendant's request or sua sponte, to review the defend-
ant's medication records to ensure that he is receiving the proper drug, correct
dosage, and any medication necessary to combat disabling side effects. This
will provide the trial judge with the information necessary to determine if the
defendant's competence is being maintained in the least restrictive manner
during trial.
In summary, the use of psychotropic drugs to compel competency in-
62. See, e.g., State v. Babin, 336 So. 2d 780, 781 (La. 1976); State v. Bundridge, 294 N.C. 45,
49, 239 S.E.2d 811, 815 (1978); In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 257-58, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975); State v.
Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 101-02, 492 P.2d 239, 242 (1971); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1160
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1972).
63. State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 102, 492 P.2d 239, 242 (1971).
64. See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 462, 389 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1978). Of course, a
request to appear before the jury unmedicated should be granted only if the defendant was, in
fact, unmedicated at the time of the alleged offense. Id at 462, 389 A.2d at 1382. (Hayes had
been taking psychotropic drugs until the day before the alleged crime; he requested to be taken off
psychotropic medication seven days before trial.)
65. That the defendant will be incompetent for a portion of the trial if his request is granted
will not violate due process in this context. If the defendant chooses, while competent, to become
incompetent, then he effectively waives his right not to be tried while incompetent. See State v.
Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 103, 492 P.2d 239, 243 (1971) (construing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 350 (1970)).
66. 133 Vt. 253, 336 A.2d 174 (1975).
67. Id at 257, 336 A.2d at 177.
68. Id
69. State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 766, 355 P.2d 323, 326 (1960) (defendant's demeanor
was "casual, cool, [and with a] somewhat lackadaisical attitude"; a new trial was necessary be-
cause court could not know to what extent the defendant's appearance as a witness affected the
jury).
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fringes on the defendant's fundamental rights, including his right to testify in
his own behalf. Given the state's compelling interest in bringing the defendant
to trial, this infringement will not amount to a denial of due process of law as
long as the use of the psychotropic drugs is necessary and is implemented in
the least restrictive manner. Reviewing courts must examine each instance of
compelled medication to determine whether psychotropic drugs have been
used solely to bring the defendant to trial and in the least intrusive manner. If
a reviewing court finds that the only effect of the medication is the defendant's
return to competence, there has been no denial of due process. If the court
finds, however, that, in spite of protective measures, the influence of psycho-
tropic drugs has precluded the defendant from presenting relevant evidence or
confronting the witnesses against him, the defendant has been denied due pro-
cess and his conviction must be reversed.
NANCY PRAHOFER
The Fair Sentencing Act Meets the Tender Mercies of
North Carolina Trial Judges
In 1979 the North Carolina General Assembly passed the Fair Sentencing
Act.' The Act establishes a framework whereby each felony is assigned to a
class of offenses.2 Each class is assigned a maximum 3 and a presumptive4
prison term. During the sentencing portion of a criminal trial, the judge, if he
imposes a prison term, "must impose the presumptive term provided in [the
statute] unless, after consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors, or
both, he decides to impose a longer or shorter term." 5 The Act enumerates
several aggravating and mitigating circumstances that the judge must consider,
but also allows the judge to consider any other factors he believes are related
to the purposes of sentencing and are supported by a preponderance of the
evidence.6
In the two and one-half years since the Fair Sentencing Act went into
effect, distinct trends have developed in the judicial interpretation of the Act.
Foremost among these trends is limited review of both the trial judge's defini-
tion of aggravating or mitigating circumstances and his factual determination
that these circumstances exist. This note contends that such limited review
defeats the Act's original purpose of providing greater certainty in the length
of prison sentences and increases the danger of convicting a defendant of a
crime with which he never was charged.
The Act had its genesis in several years of study by the General Assem-
bly's Commission on Correctional Programs. 7 The Commission found that
broad disparities in sentences and actual prison terms were a primary cause of
prison unrest,8 and concluded that sentences certain in length would be more
effective deterrents to crime.9 The Commission observed that disparities in
sentencing generally were caused by the broad discretion allowed to trial
judges and parole authorities. 10 Influenced by the report of the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing, " the Commission recom-
I. Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 15A-1340.1 to .7 (1983)). The Act applies to felonies committed on or after July 1, 1981. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.1(a) (1983).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.1(a) (1983). Specific felony classifications are found in each
felony subsection of the criminal law section of the North Carolina General Statutes.
3. Id. § 14-1.1(a) (1981).
4. Id. § 15A-1340.4(f) (1983).
5. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a).
6. Id.
7. Comment, The North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act, 60 N.C.L. REV. 631, 631 (1982).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. NORTH CAROLINA ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAWYERS EDUCATION FOUNDATION, HISTORY
OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING AND PROVISIONS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW, PRESUMPTIVE
SENTENCING AND JURY TRIAL OF A DUI CASE 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HISTORY OF PRE-
SUMPTIVE SENTENCING].
11. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CER-
TAIN PUNISHMENT (1976).
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mended the use of a presumptive sentencing system in North Carolina.' 2 It
theorized that greater uniformity in sentencing would be encouraged by a sys-
tem that forced a judge wishing to deviate from the presumptive term both to
make written findings and to risk reversal on appeal. 13 In 1977 a bill based on
the Commission's findings was introduced in both houses of the General As-
sembly. In both houses it died in committee. 14 The bill's defeat was caused
largely by trial judges and practicing attorneys who feared that the bill would
curtail severely judges' sentencing discretion.' 5
After the 1977 defeat, the North Carolina Bar Association established a
Committee on Sentencing.' 6 The bill was revised and renamed the Fair Sen-
tencing Act.' 7 The Act contained four stated purposes. The most important
purpose of the bill was "to impose a punishment commensurate with the in-
jury the offense has caused, taking into account factors that may diminish or
increase the offender's culpability."' 8 The next two purposes were "to protect
the public by restraining offenders" and "to assist the offender toward rehabil-
itation and restoration to the community as a lawful citizen."' 9 The Act's final
stated purpose was to deter crime by creating more uniform sentences. 20 The
bill was enacted with only minor changes by the 1979 General Assembly. 2'
Because of postenactment controversy regarding the Act, its effective date was
delayed,22 and, in response to concern over the length of prison terms,2 3 the
presumptive sentences for several classes of felonies were reduced by as much
as one-fourth.2 4
The North Carolina Supreme Court first fully discussed the Act in 1983.
In State v. Ahearn2 5 defendant had battered his girlfriend's child to death.2 6
At the guilt-determination phase of the trial, defendant entered pleas of guilty
to felonious child abuse and voluntary manslaughter.2 7 The trial judge found
three aggravating factors and five mitigating factors.28 He filled out only one
12. HISTORY OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 26.
13. Comment, supra note 7, at 649-50.
14. Id. at 631.
15. Id. at 631-32 & n.8.
16. Id. at 632.
17. Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 15A-1340.1 to .7 (1983)).
18. Id. at 851.
19. Id.
20. Id. The fourth purpose stated in the Act was to "provide a general deterrent to criminal
behavior." Id.
21. Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 15A-1340.1 to .7 (1983)).
22. Comment, supra note 7, at 633. The Act originally was applicable to felonies committed
on or after July 1, 1980, but enforcement was delayed until after July 1, 1981. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1340.1(a) (1983).
23. North Carolina had the third-longest average time served for felonies in the United
States. Nat'l L.J., Feb. 23, 1981, at 21, col. 1, 28, col. 3.
24. Comment, supra note 7, at 633.
25. 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983).
26. Id. at 586-87, 300 S.E.2d at 691-92.
27. Id. at 585, 300 S.E.2d at 690-91.
28. The aggravating factors were: (1) the especially heinous nature of the offense; (2) the age
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sentencing form, however, thereby treating the aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors together for both child abuse and manslaughter sentencing purposes. 29
He then concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating fac-
tors,30 and sentenced defendant to five years on the child abuse charge and
sixteen on the manslaughter charge.3 1 Because both sentences exceeded the
presumptive term, defendant was entitled to appeal to the North Carolina
Court of Appeals as a matter of right.32 Defendant argued that none of the
aggravating factors were supported by the evidence. 33 The court of appeals,
lacking any other indication of the trial judge's interpretation, assumed that all
factors were relevant to both charges. 34 Although the court invalidated sev-
eral of the factors,35 it refused to find prejudice toward defendant because the
trial judge could have determined that the remaining aggravating factors out-
weighed the mitigating.36 Defendant appealed to the North Carolina
Supreme Court, arguing that the court of appeals' refusal to find prejudice was
error.
37
In reversing the court of appeals and remanding the case, 38 the supreme
of the victim; and (3) defendant's dangerousness to himself and others. The mitigating factors
were: (1) defendant's lack of a criminal record; (2) defendant's mental and physical conditions; (3)
defendant's immaturity or limited mental capacity; (4) defendant's voluntary acknowledgement of
wrongdoing; and (5) defendant's good reputation. State v. Ahearn, 59 N.C. App. 44, 45-46, 295
S.E.2d 621, 622-23 (1982), rev'd, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983).
29. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 592, 300 S.E.2d at 694. Because only one sentencing form was com-
pleted, it was impossible to determine which aggravating and mitigating factors applied to each
charge.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 585, 300 S.E.2d at 690-91.
32. Appeals are authorized as a matter of right by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1444(al) (1983).
33. State v. Ahearn, 59 N.C. App. 44, 48, 295 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1982), rev'd, 307 N.C. 584, 300
S.E.2d 689 (1983).
34. 4hearn, 307 N.C. at 592, 300 S.E.2d at 694 (describing court of appeals' analysis).
35. State v. Ahearn, 59 N.C. App. 44, 48-49, 295 S.E.2d 621, 623-25 (1982), rev'd, 307 N.C.
584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983). The court of appeals invalidated the first aggravating factor-the
heinous nature of the offense-as to both charges because defendant's actions were no more hei-
nous than those of others convicted of child abuse and voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 49, 295
S.E.2d at 624. The second aggravating factor-the age of the victim-was invalidated as to the
child abuse charge because the victim's age was an essential element of the crime. Id. at 48-49,
295 S.E.2d at 624.
36. Id. at 49-50, 295 S.E.2d at 624-25. The court of appeals had applied more stringent
criteria to refuse a finding of prejudice in State v. Locklear, 61 N.C. App. 594, 301 S.E.2d 437
(1983). The Locklear court held that even though an aggravating factor found by the trial court
was improper, defendant had failed to show prejudice because the trial judge, in his discretion,
could have ordered defendant to serve his multiple sentences consecutively for an even longer
term. Id. at 596-97, 301 S.E.2d at 439.
37. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 585-86, 300 S.E.2d at 690-91.
38. The supreme court concluded that the nature of the manslaughter offense was especially
heinous, Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 606-07, 300 S.E.2d at 703, although it agreed with the court of
appeals that the child abuse actions were not. Id. at 599, 300 S.E.2d at 698-99. The supreme court
also disagreed with the court of appeals' determination that the victim's age could not be an
aggravating factor as to the child abuse charge. Although the age of the victim is an essential
eement of the crime, the court found that the extreme youth of Ahearn's victim (24 months)
supported the trial court's aggravation conclusion. Id. at 603, 300 S.E.2d at 701. Although de-
fendant's dangerousness to others was upheld as an aggravating factor, defendant's dangerousness
to himself was invalidated as an aggravating factor to both charges. d. at 603-04, 300 S.E.2d at
701-02. Finally, the court invalidated defendant's plea of guilty of child abuse as a mitigating
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court held that a separate sentencing form is required for each offense.39 This
requirement resembles that provided for special verdicts. 40 Separate listing of
factors enables a reviewing court to determine precisely which factors have
been found in aggravation or mitigation for each particular crime. Thus, if
any factor later is invalidated, the case can be remanded on that count alone.4 1
Otherwise, as was the case in Ahearn, the case must be remanded for resen-
tencing if any factor is invalidated.4
2
TheAhearn court also held that since the trial judge did not enunciate the
weight to be applied to each factor, a reviewing court that struck down an
aggravating factor was required to find prejudice to defendant. 43 Because that
particular violation may have prompted the trial judge to disregard the pre-
sumptive sentence, only a remand to the trial judge could result in a redeter-
mination of the proper sentence.
The Ahearn court, however, was not satisfied with its settlement of the
separate findings and prejudice questions. The court sent an important
message to North Carolina trial judges. The court stated that "[tihe Fair Sen-
tencing Act is an attempt to strike a balance between the inflexibility of a
presumptive sentence which insures [sic] that punishment is commensurate
with the crime, without regard to the nature of the offender; and the flexibility
of permitting punishment to be adapted. . . to the particular offender" 44 and
reiterated the language of section 15A-1340.4(b). "The sentencing judge's dis-
cretion to impose a sentence . . . greater . . . than the presumptive term, is
carefully guarded by the requirement that he make written findings in aggra-
vation and mitigation, which findings must be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence." 45
After these statements expressing strong support for the Act, the Ahearn
court proceeded to undercut its requirements by announcing a narrow stan-
dard of appellate review; the Act "was not intended. . to remove all discre-
tion from our able trial judges."' 4 6 The court concluded that, although trial
factor to the manslaughter charge because defendant denied wrongdoing in connection with the
baby's death. Id. at 607-08, 300 S.E.2d at 704.
39. Id. at 598, 300 S.E.2d at 698.
40. N.C.R. Ctv. P. 49(a). Special verdicts require a specific finding with respect to each ele-
ment. This process enables a reviewing court to determine exactly what the fact-finder decided
and whether any overruled aspect of the case would have affected the holding.
41. The policy of favoring the special verdict is reflected by N.C.R. Civ. P. 40(d), which
states: "Where a special finding of facts is inconsistent with the general verdict, the former con-
trols, and the judge shall give judgment accordingly."
42. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 594, 300 S.E.2d at 696. For example, inAhearn the supreme court
agreed with the court of appeals that the nature of the child abuse was not especially heinous.
Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 599, 300 S.E.2d at 698. It is possible that the trial judge meant only for this
aggravating factor to apply to the manslaughter charge, a determination which was upheld. Id. at
606-07, 300 S.E.2d at 703-04. The lower court's failure to specify the charge to which the aggra-
vating factor applied forced the appellate courts to examine the factor's relevance to all charges,
and to remand for resentencing any charge that was not aggravated by that factor.
43. Id. at 601, 300 S.E.2d at 701. See also State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 301 S.E.2d 71
(1983).
44. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 596, 300 S.E.2d at 696.
45, Id.
46. Id. at 596, 300 S.E.2d at 697.
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judges were required to make written findings about the existence of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors, they "should be permitted wide latitude in arriving
at the truth as to [their] existence. . . for it is only [the trial judge] who ob-
serves the demeanor of the witnesses and hears the testimony." 47
The Ahearn court confused the trial judge's ability to weigh the credibility
of the witnesses-and thereby determine whether or not the factors exist on
the evidence-with the trial judge's ability to define the factors that should be
considered. Although reviewing courts usually do, and indeed should, defer to
trial courts' findings on witness credibility,48 there is no reason for them to do
so on the definition of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Determining
whether an established fact is "reasonably related to the purposes of sentenc-
ing" is a matter of statutory interpretation, and therefore a matter of law, not
fact. 49 After making it clear that the trial court's written findings regarding the
existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would be reviewed nar-
rowly, the court stated that the trial judge, in determining whether and to what
degree the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating, "need not jus-
tify the weight he attaches to any factor."50
The court should not have reached this conclusion; the statutory language
on which the court was relying is subject to a different interpretation. After
requiring the trial judge to list specifically the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, 5' the statute states only that in imposing a sentence longer than
the presumptive sentence the judge "must find that the factors in aggravation
outweigh the factors in mitigation."5 2 This statute could be interpreted either
as requiring the judge to state the weight attached to each factor, or as requir-
ing that the balance tips in favor of the aggravating factors. The supreme
court, by choosing the latter interpretation, effectively foreclosed judicial re-
view of the weight attached to each factor.5 3
Trial and appellate judges have taken the Ahearn court's narrow review
standard to heart. Appellate courts have upheld determinations of the follow-
ing as aggravating circumstances: lying on the witness stand,54 prior offenses
bearing no relation to the crime charged,55 and premeditation in a second-
47. Id.
48. See General Specialties Co. v. Nello L. Teer Co., 41 N.C. App. 273, 254 S.E.2d 658
(1979).
49. See Young v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D.N.C. 1972) (statutory interpreta-
tion is duty of higher courts).
50. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 597, 300 S.E.2d at 697.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.1(a) (1983).
52. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a).
53. Ahearn concluded that the trial judge could assign the same factor a different weight in
different cases. Thus, the court did not require him to state the weight given. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at
597, 300 S.E.2d at 697. The two concepts, however, are not synonymous. The trial judge need not
be required to give the same factor equal weight in all cases and yet could be required to make a
written finding as to the weight given the factor in each case. The reviewing court then could
ensure that undue weight was not placed on any single factor to avoid the intent of the legislature.
54. See State v. Thompson, 62 N.C. App. 38, 302 S.E.2d 310 (1983). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 83-93.
55. See State v. Teague, 60 N.C. App. 755, 300 S.E.2d 6 (1983) (minor financial crimes con-
sidered by judge during a trial on attempted sodomy charges).
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degree murder case.56 All findings of aggravating circumstances that have
been invalidated, except one,57 involved factors that were essential elements of
the crime for which the defendant was convicted 58-a result mandated by stat-
ute.59 Narrow review seriously undermines one of the theoretical bases for
presumptive sentencing-that the trial judge will be reluctant to sentence for
longer than the presumptive term when by so doing he runs a significant risk
of reversal. 60
There are more difficulties raised by the developing trend of narrow re-
view than simply the defeat of the Act's attempts to limit the trial judge's dis-
cretion. To the extent that unbridled judicial discretion exists, past disparate
sentencing is perpetuated. When narrow review of the definition of aggravat-
ing factors is coupled with the Act's preponderance of the evidence standard,
possibilities of new abuse arise.
An example of such abuse occurred in State v. Melton. 6' In Melton de-
fendant borrowed a pistol, purchased bullets, and test-fired the gun in a re-
mote area.62 Defendant then drove to the victim's home, had a beer with the
victim, presumably to quell the victim's suspicions, and shot the victim
through the heart.63 He then drove to a police station and turned himself in.64
In exchange for the State's promise not to prosecute for first-degree murder,
defendant entered a plea of guilty to second-degree murder.65 A Class C fel-
ony, second-degree murder carries a presumptive sentence of fifteen years.66
At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge found only one aggravating factor-
that the killing had been committed with premeditation 7-and sentenced de-
fendant to life in prison.68 Defendant appealed to the North Carolina
Supreme Court. He argued that facts supporting a charge that has been dis-
missed pursuant to a plea bargain may not be considered as aggravating fac-
tors of the lesser admitted charge69 and that the judge could have found
premeditation only by relying on the evidence presented at trial. This
56. See State v. Melton, 307 N.C. 370, 298 S.E.2d 673 (1983). See infra text accompanying
notes 61-82.
57. See State v. Setzer, 61 N.C. App. 500, 301 S.E.2d 107 (factor that defendant had lied on
voir dire invalid), disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 680, 304 S.E.2d 760 (1983). See ii!fra text accompany-
ing notes 94-99.
58. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 62 N.C. App. 38, 302 S.E.2d 310 (1983) (facts that defendant
armed and seeking pecuniary gain disallowed as aggravating factors in an armed robbery case);
State v. Massey, 62 N.C. App. 66, 302 S.E.2d 262 (1983) (fact that defendant travelled to apart-
ment with a shotgun to seek revenge disallowed as an aggravating factor in attempted burglary
case).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1) (1983) ("[e]vidence necessary to prove an element of
the offense may not be used to prove any factor in aggravation").
60. See supra text accompanying note 13.
61. 307 N.C. 370, 298 S.E.2d 673 (1983).
62. Id. at 371, 298 S.E.2d at 675.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 372-73, 298 S.E.2d at 676.
66. Id. at 373, 298 S.E.2d at 676.
67. Id. at 372, 298 S.E.2d at 675.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 373, 298 S.E.2d at 676.
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"amounted to the use of the same evidence to prove the elements of murder in
the second degree as well as the aggravating factor of premeditation and delib-
eration." 70 Defendant argued that the trial judge effectively had convicted
him of the higher crime. 7 1
Although the Act specifically exempts sentences to which both sides agree
pursuant to a plea arrangement,72 there had been confusion about whether
bargained-for guilty pleas implicitly included an agreement to the presumptive
term for the crime. 73 The supreme court ended this confusion and rejected
defendant's assertion that he had bargained for a fifteen-year sentence by
agreeing to plead guilty to second-degree murder. 74 Thus, after Melton de-
fense attorneys should be careful in agreeing to have their clients plead guilty
to specific sentences.
More importantly, Melton rejected defendant's argument that the trial
court incorrectly had included an essential element of the crime of first-degree
murder as an aggravating circumstance to the charge of second-degree mur-
der.75 The court grounded its decision on the fact that premeditation is not an
essential element of second-degree murder and, therefore, its inclusion is not
prohibited by the Act.76 The court asserted that such a factor is reasonably
related to the stated purposes of the Act.77 Although Melton noted that some
difficulties might arise, the court stated that the bargained plea situation dif-
fered from the situation in which a jury acquitted defendant of first-degree
murder but convicted him of second-degree murder.78 The court, however,
refused to conclude that premeditation could not constitute an aggravating
circumstance even in that situation, 79 despite the fact that the court seemingly
would be invading the province of the jury.
A more subtle problem than invading the province of the jury arises with
allowing the essential elements of a higher crime to be used in aggravation of
the lower one. Ordinarily, each essential element of the crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.80 In finding the existence of an aggravating fac-
tor, however, the trial judge is held only to a preponderance of the evidence
standard.8' Under Melon, it is not difficult to envision a situation in which a
prosecutor, uncertain of his ability to sway a jury to find all the elements of the
higher crime beyond a reasonable doubt, could charge defendant with the
lower crime and hope that, at the sentencing hearing, he could convince the
trial judge of any remaining elements of the higher crime under the lower
70. Id. at 373-74, 298 S.E.2d at 676.
71. Id.
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(b) (1983).
73. Comment, supra note 7, at 637.
74. Id.
75. Melton, 307 N.C. at 373-74, 298 S.E.2d at 676.
76. Id. at 375, 298 S.E.2d at 677. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983).
77. Melton, 307 N.C. at 376, 298 S.E.2d at 678.
78. Id. at 375 n.2, 298 S.E.2d at 677 n.2.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., State v. Batts, 269 N.C. 694, 153 S.E.2d 379 (1967).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983).
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standard of proof. Such presentation to the judge during sentencing could
result in surprise to defense counsel, with the end result being inadequate de-
fense to the additional essential elements.82
State v. Thompson 83 is illustrative of the worst scenario that has occurred
under the Act. In Thompson defendant was convicted of armed robbery.84
The trial judge found four aggravating factors.8 5 The fourth factor was that
"defendant deliberately presented, during the course of the trial, evidence
which he knew to be false about his presence on the day in question and delib-
erately presented false evidence concerning the statement attributed to him
and obviouslyfound by the jury to be false."8 6 After finding that the aggravat-
ing circumstances outweighed the mitigating, the trial judge sentenced defend-
ant to twenty years in prison.8 7
Defendant sought relief in the North Carolina Court of Appeals on the
ground that all four aggravating factors were improper. 8s The court con-
cluded that two of the factors were essential elements of the armed robbery
charge,8 9 and that defendant had waived his objection to the third.90 Finally,
the court, emphasizing the stated purpose of the Act, held that the fourth ag-
gravating factor was:
[a]cceptable as an aggravating factor because it is reasonably related
to the purposes of the statute and the rehabilitation of the offender
and provides a general deterrent to criminal behavior. A defendant's
truthfulness under oath is probative of his attitudes toward society
and his prospects for rehabilitation and is therefore relevant to
sentencing.9 1
Although defendant contended that by allowing lying on the stand to be an
aggravating circumstance the court had enabled the trial judge to convict de-
fendant of perjury, a crime with which he was not charged,92 the court con-
cluded that, "[t]he fact that defendant could be tried for perjury at another
trial before another judge and jury pales in the face of the immediate need for
truth at the initial trial."'93 This conclusion, however, ignores the significance
of defendant effectively having been convicted of perjury without the benefit
of a jury or any of the other safeguards of a criminal trial, such as cross-
examination of the witnesses. The court attempted to distinguish State v.
82. In addition, when a crime lower than a Class A or B felony is charged, such action may
avoid the additional safeguards reserved for these felonies by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983).
These safeguards include jury determination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
stricter appellate review. See infra note 106.
83. 62 N.C. App. 38, 302 S.E.2d 310 (1983).
84. Id. at 39, 302 S.E.2d at 311.
85. Id. at 42, 302 S.E.2d at 313.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Seeid. at 39, 43, 302 S.E.2d at 311, 313.
88. See id. at 42, 302 S.E.2d at 313.
89. Id. at 42-43, 302 S.E.2d at 313.
90. Id. at 43, 302 S.E.2d at 313.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 43, 302 S.E.2d at 314.
93. Id.
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Seizer,94 a case that the court of appeals remanded because of an improper
finding that lying on voir dire was aggravating, by stating that Selzer "in-
volved contradicted testimony at a voir dire hearing which is a far cry from a
finding of perjured testimony before a judge and jury."95 In Thompson, how-
ever, no finding of perjury ever was made by a jury, nor was the issue debated
in open court.
Sound objections to this reasoning in Thompson were raised by Judge
Becton, who concurred in the result. 96 Judge Becton first noted that Selzer
held that "a judge cannot find as an aggravating factor that the defendant did
not testify truthfully when the only evidence of his untruthfulness is his con-
tradicted testimony at avoir dire hearing or during trial."97 Any other holding
would increase defendant's sentence based on an alleged crime with which he
was not charged.98 Judge Becton noted:
In adopting the Fair Sentencing Act, our legislature rejected the
prevalent sentencing philosophy of fitting the punishment to the of-
fender through long statutory maximum terms and broad judicial
discretion and adopted a sentencing philosophy of fitting punishment
to the crime by application of presumptive sentences. Therefore, as
suggested by defendant, if the Fair Sentencing Act is to achieve its
goal of eliminating disparate sentencing, it must be read to limit the
myriad of factors that were considered appropriate when fitting the
punishment to the offender was the watchword. 99
In addition, in finding that lying on the stand was an acceptable aggravat-
ing circumstance, the majority relied heavily upon the United States Supreme
Court decision in UnitedStates v. Grayson. t°° In Grayson the Court refused to
overturn the use of a finding of false testimony as an aggravating circum-
stance. Argument, however, centered on the constitutionality of sentencing a
criminal defendant for false testimony-to do so arguably "chills" defendants'
first amendment rights to testify on their own behalf.' 10 The lack of a charge
and a jury finding was addressed directly only in the dissent. 10 2 Justice Stew-
art, refusing to join the majority, stated:
The Court begins its consideration of this case. . . with the assump-
tion that the respondent gave false testimony at his trial. But there
was no determination that his testimony was false. This respondent
was given a greater sentence than he would otherwise have re-
94. 61 N.C. App. 500, 301 S.E.2d 107, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 680, 304 S.E.2d 760 (1983).
95. Thompson, 62 N.C. App. at 44, 302 S.E.2d at 314.
96. Id. at 44, 302 S.E.2d at 314 (Becton, J., concurring). Judge Becton concurred in the re-
mand to resentence defendant, naming the incorrect use of untruthfulness as an additional aggra-
vating factor.
97. Id. (Becton, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Setzer, 61 N.C. App. 500, 505, 301 S.E.2d
107, 110, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 680, 304 S.E.2d 760 (1983)).
98. Id. at 45, 302 S.E.2d at 314 (Becton, J., concurring).
99. Id. (Becton, J., concurring).
100. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
101. Id. at 52-53. The Court held that the right guaranteed defendant was the right to testify
truthfully; therefore, punishment for lying under oath was not a first amendment violation, Id.
102. Id. at 55-56 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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ceived-how much greater we have no way of knowing-solely be-
cause a single judge thought that he had not testified truthfully.10 3
Thus, the Grayson case is inadequate support for the Thompson court's hold-
ing that separate crimes should be considered aggravating factors.'0 4
The Fair Sentencing Act is in danger of being "interpreted away." Judi-
cial emasculation of the Act's effectiveness would represent a loss to North
Carolina. To the extent that judges' discretion is upheld uniformly, the
problems sought to be remedied by the General Assembly's Commission on
Correctional Programs 0 5 will be perpetuated. The Act's deterrent effect will
be lost as the certainty of sentence terms erodes. Finally, as trial judges have
shown themselves more willing to find aggravating than mitigating factors,
North Carolina's burdensome prison population will not be reduced. There is,
however, more at stake than the General Assembly's stated goals. All too
often the criminal justice system focuses on the individual rather than the
crime. This focus raises the possibility of personal prejudice. Since the physi-
cal freedom of the defendant is dependent on the expansive exercise of the
trial judge's discretion, outside safeguards are necessary to protect both the
defendant and the integrity of the criminal justice system. Such safeguards are
in place for North Carolina capital defendants,'0 6 but also are necessary to
protect noncapital defendants' rights. The Fair Sentencing Act erected safe-
guards by shifting the focus away from the individual and by requiring a re-
viewable trial record. Unless these safeguards are defended, trial judges will
continue to focus on individual defendants rather than on the crimes with
which they were charged.
GRADY LEE SHIELDS
103. Id.
104. The North Carolina courts probably will not abandon this position on their own, but will
continue to construe the Act with the same hostility demonstrated by the General Assembly's first
attempt at passage. Legislative clarification would be helpful.
105. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
106. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983). These protections include jury determination
of aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. § 15A-2000(b). Section 15A-2000(c)(2) requires that
the jury make a written finding that the aggravating factors themselves are substantial enough for
imposition of the death penalty, not merely that they outweigh the mitigating factors. Section
15A-2000(d) provides for automatic review of the jury's written findings, including a review of
whether the findings were made as a result of passion or prejudice. Finally, § 15A-2000(e) limits
aggravating factors to eleven enumerated areas.
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The New North Carolina Rules of Evidence:
Privileges, Relevancy, Competency, Impeachment,
and Expert Opinion
On July 7, 1983 the North Carolina General Assembly adopted the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence and Official Commentary. The Code became ef-
fective July 1, 1984.1 The major impetus for the adoption of an evidence code
was the concern that North Carolina evidence law had become unwieldy.2
Having developed over the years through a number of narrow statutes and
conflicting judicial decisions, North Carolina evidence law was confusing and
difficult to master.3 The advantages of the Code will be its clarity and
accessibility.4
Despite codification, the law of evidence in North Carolina will not be
changed substantiay.5 Such changes would have defeated the utility of the
Code by forcing trial judges and lawyers to relearn the law of evidence. Al-
though there are important differences between the Code and previous North
Carolina law, the transition should be manageable.
The drafters based the Code on the Federal Rules of Evidence 6 for two
reasons. First, the federal rules are familiar to practitioners in North Caro-
lina.7 They consist of generally accepted rules that have been followed in
North Carolina and other states,8 and are typically the basis of instruction in
1. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION EVIDENCE LAWS
STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT TO 1983 GENERAL ASSEMBLY (Jan. 12, 1982) at v. [hereinafter cited
as Committee Report]. The lapse between the adoption and effective dates was necessary to allow
practitioners to become familiar with the rules. Id. at v-vi. The effectiveness of evidence rules
depends on their familiarity, because attorneys and judges must make decisions in court within
seconds. Blakey, Moving Towards an Evidence Law of General Principles: Several Suggestions
Concerning an Evidence Codefor North Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 5 (1981).
2. Committee Report, supra note 1, at iii.
3. Patrick, Toward a Codfication ofthe Law oEvidence in North Carolina, 16 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 669 (1980).
4. Id. at 670.
5. 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 2, at 2 n.6 (1982 & Supp.
1983).
6. Committee Report, supra note 1, at iv.
7. Blakey, supra note I, at 4, 9.
8. Id. at 4. There have been cases in which the federal rule differed from the North Caro-
lina rule, but the trial court applied the federal rule. For example, under FED. R. EVID. 405, on
cross-examination of a character witness, inquiry is allowed into specific acts of the person whose
character is in issue. Prior to the enactment of the new North Carolina Rules of Evidence, how-
ever, the North Carolina rule had been that such cross-examination into specific acts was not
allowed. In State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978), a homicide case, the trial
court had allowed the prosecuting attorney to cross-examine defendant's mother, a character wit-
ness, as to defendant's participation in two gang shootings. The North Carolina Supreme Court
held that the trial court had erred by permitting such inquiry into prior acts of misconduct, but
that the error had not prejudiced defendant. Id. at 573-74, 247 S.E.2d at 912-13.
In State v. Chapman, 294 N.C. 407, 241 S.E.2d 667 (1978), a prosecution for felonious assault,
the court held that it was error to allow the prosecutor to ask defendant's character witness about
an occasion when defendant "got his gun and went after some black people in Charlotte." Id. at
law school evidence classes. 9 Second, the Federal Rules of Evidence were
used as a model because they have proved both thorough and manageable. 10
The first major change under the new code is rule 301, Presumptions in
Generalin CivilActions and Proceedings.1" Under prior North Carolina law, a
presumption shifted the burden of persuasion in some cases, 12 and the burden
of going forward with evidence in others. 13 Under new rule 301, unless a
court decides otherwise, a presumption shifts the burden of going forward with
evidence rather than shifting the burden of persuasion. 14 The new North Car-
olina rule differs from the majority rule, which shifts the burden of persua-
sion.' 5 Shifting only the burden of production of evidence has been criticized
because it "gives too little weight to the concerns that cause the initial creation
of presumptions."'16 Those who support shifting only the burden of produc-
tion, however, assert that presumptions are artificial rules to cope with difficult
problems of proof, and that they should not compel one conclusion if evidence
to the contrary exists.' 7
Rule 301 differs from the corresponding federal rule by recognizing judi-
cially created presumptions.' 8 The Official Commentary to the North Caro-
416, 241 S.E.2d at 673. The error, however, was not prejudicial because defendant admitted his
guilt at the trial. Id.
In State v. Hunt, 287 N.C. 360, 215 S.E.2d 40 (1975), a prosecution for rape, felonious assault,
and armed robbery, it was held prejudicial error to permit the prosecuting attorney to ask defend-
ant's character witness about defendant's prior convictions for crimes, including assault.
9. Blakey, supra note 1, at 9.
10. Committee Report, supra note 1, at v. (citing Mueller, Symposium on the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 585 (1977)).
11. For a discussion of presumptions in general and a specific proposal for a different pre-
sumption rule in North Carolina, see Broun, The Unfulfillable Promise of One Rulefor All Pre-
sumptions, 62 N.C.L. REv. 697 (1984).
12. 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 218 at 276-80. See, e.g., id. § 246, at 256 (presumption that
child born in wedlock is legitimate is "one of the strongest known to law" and "can be rebutted
only by proof that the husband could not have been the father"). If a presumption shifts the
burden of persuasion, rule 301 does not apply. N.C. R. EVID. 301 comment. The "burden of
persuasion" means that if the party having the burden fails to persuade the trier of fact, the issue
must be found against that party. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336
(E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
13. 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 218. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Republic Bank & Trust Co., 35
N.C. App. 101,239 S.E.2d 867 (1978). A bank has the burden of going forward with evidence that
there was no active loss when a customer shows that the bank paid a check despite a stop order.
Id. at 104, 239 S.E.2d at 869. The "burden of going forward with evidence" means that the party
having the burden must produce evidence "such that a reasonable man could draw from it the
inference of the existence of the particular fact to be proved" or the trier of fact must find against
him. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 338, at 789.
14. N.C. R. EVID. 301. McCormick defines "presumption" as "a standardized practice,
under which certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof
of other facts." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 342, at 803. Rule 301 states clearly that once the
presumption is rebutted the issue goes to the jury and the jury may, but does not have to, infer the
existence of the presumed fact.
15. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE at T-16 to -19 (1979); Patrick, supra note 3, at
681.
16. Patrick, supra note 3, at 681.
17. IX J. WIGMOtE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2491 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
18. The new North Carolina rule governs presumptions "not otherwise provided for by stat-
ute, by judicial decision, or by [the North Carolina Rules of Evidence]," N.C. R. EVID. 301, the
federal rule covers presumptions "not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by [the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence]." FED. R. EVID. 301.
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lina Rules of Evidence states that "the General Assembly and the courts retain
power to create presumptions having an effect different from that provided for
in this rule"; 19 however, "a presumption created by a prior statute or judicial
decision should be construed to come within the scope of this rule unless it is
clear that the presumption was not intended to be a 'mandatory presump-
tion'[-a presumption that a court must follow a finding of a preliminary fact
unless there is sufficient evidence that the presumed fact does not exist]."'20
The commentary has been criticized for favoring uniformity at the expense of
the policies underlying previous judicial decisions.21 This rule probably will
have little impact, however, because courts have the discretion to adopt those
rules existing before rule 301.22
Article Four deals with relevancy. 23 Rule 404, Character Evidence not Ad-
missible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes,24 is virtually the same as
Federal Rule of Evidence 404.25 The general rule that character evidence is
not admissible as circumstantial evidence of conduct 26 is consistent with prior
North Carolina practice.2 7 There also remains an exception allowing the ac-
cused to offer evidence of his character and allowing the prosecution to rebut
this evidence;28 however, the type of evidence permitted under this exception
has been changed by rule 404(a)(1). 29 Previously, North Carolina would al-
low evidence of the accused's general character to be admitted in evidence
under this exception, 30 but rule 404(a)(1) limits the character evidence to "per-
tinent trait[s] of his character,"' 3' or those character traits relevant to the con-
duct being investigated. The old North Carolina rule had originated in the
ambiguous language of an earlier opinion, which subsequently was misinter-
preted.32 The old rule was construed to allow the witness to testify about rep-
19. N.C. R. EVID. 301 comment.
20. Id. Another limitation on the scope ofthe rule is that, "[i]fby statute or judicial decision
a particular presumption shifts the burden of [persuasion], Rule 301 does not apply." Id.
21. 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 215, at 173-74, nn.93-95 (Supp. 1983).
22. There is some benefit in uniformity. A uniform rule is easier to learn and apply. See
supra note I. Furthermore, the strongest policies that underly presumptions probably will be
those shifting the burden of persuasion; for those presumptions, rule 301 will not apply. See supra
note 20.
23. Relevancy, when used to describe evidence, means "render[ing] the desired inference
more probable than it would be without the evidence." C. MCCoRMICK, supra note 12, § 185, at
437.
24. N.C. R. EVID. Rule 404.
25. The North Carolina rule adds the word "entrapment" to the nonexclusion list of "crimes,
wrongs, or acts" that may be admitted for a purpose other than to prove the conduct of a person.
Id. 404(b).
26. Id. 404(a).
27. Id. 404 comment.
28. Patrick, supra note 3, at 684.
29. N.C. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
30. Id. 404 comment.
31. Id. 404(a)(1).
32. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 114 (1982). In State v. Perkins, 66 N.C. 126 (1872), the
court spoke in terms of "general character" but clearly meant "reputation" when it held that "a
witness who swears to the general bad character of another witness on the other side, may, upon
cross-examination, be asked to name the individual whom he heard speak disparagingly of the
witness and what was said." Id. at 127. In a later decision, State v. Hairston, 121 N.C. 429, 28 S.E.
1292 Vol. 62
utation for specific traits of character, whether relevant to an issue in the
case.33 The new rule eliminates the danger that the prosecution will use the
exception to introduce irrelevant evidence prejudicial to the defendant. 34
Rule 405, Methods of Proving Character, which is very similar to federal
rule 405, changes North Carolina law by allowing opinion evidence to prove
character. 35 Previously, questions concerning character had to be stated in
terms of "reputation." 3 6 Questions phrased with the terms "general character"
or "reputation and character" also were permissible because it was understood
that the question dealt with reputation.37 The practical result of such leniency
in the framing of questions, however, was the admission of opinion evidence,
despite the prohibition against it.38 Witnesses did not understand the distinc-
tion between reputation and personal opinion of character.39 The old rule was
also criticized for admitting "the second-hand, irresponsible product of multi-
492 (1897), the court used the term "general character" but did not mean "reputation." The. court
held that, "[a] party introducing a witness as to character can only prove the general character of
the person asked about. The witness, of his own motion, may say in what respect it is good or
bad.' Id. at 431, 28 S.E. at 494. Although the Hairston court did not cite Perkins, the contrast
between uses of the term "general character" in these cases demonstrates that the exception
evolved from allowing only evidence of reputation to allowing evidence of character.
33. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 114 (1982). In State v. Reagan, 185 N.C. 710, 117 S.E. 1
(1923), the witness was allowed to testify that defendant had a bad reputation for making liquor,
although he was accused of larceny. Similarly, in State v. Fleming, 194 N.C. 42, 138 S.E. 342
(1927), an unlawful entry case, the witness was allowed to testify that defendant had a bad reputa-
tion for making liquor.
34. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 114, at 423 n.91 (1982).
[The old rule] open[ed] the door to evidence of character traits which [were] irrelevant
and prejudicial, and permit[ted] the prosecution, under the guise of impeaching the de-
fendant as a witness, to prove traits having no relation to veracity but which [were] rele-
vant on the issue of guilt, thus evading the rule (see § 104) prohibiting the State from
attacking the defendant's character unless he first puts it in issue.
35. N.C. R. EVID. 405. The North Carolina rule is identical to FaD. R. EviD. 405, except for
North Carolina's explicit limitation on expert testimony: "Expert testimony on character or a trait
of character is not admissible as circumstantial evidence of behavior." N.C. R. EvID. 405(a).
Allowing opinion evidence to prove character opened the door for a new type of character evi-
dence: expert testimony to prove character. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 149 (1977 & Supp. 1978). The Official Commentary to the North Carolina rules explains that
the rule's limitation "is not intended to exclude expert testimony of a personality or character
change as it relates to the issue of damages," but only "to prohibit expert testimony as it relates to
the likelihood of whether or not the defendant committed the act he is accused of." N.C. R. EvID.
405 comment. This limitation is based on the drafters' fear that in most cases such expert testi-
mony would not be helpful and would waste time. Id.
36. N.C. R. EVID. 405 comment.
37. Id. (citing State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 30 S.E.2d 230 (1944)). In King the court stated
that "the test ordinarily applied here [is] that of general character, which with us means reputa-
tion." King, 224 N.C. at 331, 330 S.E.2d at 231. See also State v. Hicks, 200 N.C. 539, 540, 157
S.E. 851, 852 (1933) ("The rule is that when an impeaching or sustaining character witness is
called, he should first be asked whether he knows the general reputation and character of the
witness or party about which he proposes to testify."); State v. Cathey, 170 N.C. 794, 796, 87 S.E.
532, 533 (1916) ("[A] character witness may be asked on cross-examination if there was not a
general reputation as to particular matters.").
38. Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: Relevancy, Competence, Privi-
leges, Witnesses, Opinion, and Expert Witnesses, 14 TULSA L. REV. 227, 265 (1978) (quoting 2 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EvIDENCE § 405[02], at 405-20 (1978). "The average witness is unable
to understand the admonition not to give his opinion, but that of others. He came to give his
opinion and, despite some wrangling among attorneys and judges, that is what he usually manages
to do.").
39. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 110, at 403 n.13 (1982). In State v. Barbour, 295 N.C.
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plied guesses and gossip which we term reputation,"40 but excluding evidence
based "on first hand knowledge and belief."4 1 Underlying the old rule was the
questionable assumption that a witness' bias could affect his opinion of the
character of a person, but not his view of that person's reputation.42 Rule 405
is an improvement over the old rule because, rather than allowing opinion
evidence in disguise, it admits clearly labelled opinion evidence that the trier
of fact can evaluate as such.
A further change in the rules of character testimony is that, contrary to
prior North Carolina law43 but consistent with the federal rule,"4 new North
Carolina rule 405(a) permits inquiry on cross-examination into relevant spe-
cific acts of the person whose character is in question.45 The rationale under-
lying this rule is that evidence of specific examples of conduct is necessary to
evaluate the witness' testimony, which is based only on what he has heard.46
The rule has been criticized because "[t]he probative value of such evidence to
impeach a character witness seldom outweighs the prejudice suffered by the
opponent. '47 Because the rule differs from prior case law,48 however, North
Carolina courts are likely to interpret it strictly to prevent abuse.
Article Six deals with witnesses.49 Rule 601, GeneralRule of Competency,-
Disqualfcation of Witness,50 revises the Dead Man's Statute that, in certain
situations, disqualified persons interested in a transaction when the other party
to the transaction subsequently had died or become insane.5' Rule 601 nar-
66, 243 S.E.2d 380 (1978), the witness answered a question calling for "character" with her own
opinion of the person's character when his reputation was in issue.
40. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 1986.
41. Patrick, supra note 3, at 685.
42. Id.
43. N.C. R. EvID. 405 comment.
44. FED. R. EvID. 405(a).
45. N.C. R. EVID. 405(a).
46. FED. R. EVID. 405 comment.
47. Patrick, supra note 3, at 686.
48. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 115, at 425-26 (1982) & 122 (Supp. 1983). See also id.
§ 115, at 123 n.3.6 (Supp. 1983) ("Of course, it is inconceivable that the Rules intend that ques-
tions about specific conduct may be phrased in any way a master of insinuation may concoct.").
Further support for the federal rule is that it can be remembered more easily. Blakey, aTpra
note 1, at 8. A rule cannot be effective unless it is sufficiently familiar to be followed. See supra
note 1. A number of North Carolina trial judges and lawyers had demonstrated that they believed
the federal rule already was the law in North Carolina. Blakey, supra note 1, at 7. See also supra
note 8.
49. One notable but relatively minor change in North Carolina law occurs under article 6.
Rule 607, Who May Impeach, identical to FED. R. EVID. 607, allows the credibility of a witness to
be attacked by "any party, including the party calling him." N.C. R. EVID. 607. The common-
law rule was that a party could not impeach his own witness. Id. 607 comment. The new rule
should have little impact, because previous decisions and statutes almost had eliminated the com-
mon-law rule in North Carolina. Patrick, supra note 3, at 691-92. The Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Evidence explained that the common-law rule that a party vouches for the
witnesses he calls was unrealistic: "A party does not hold out his witnesses as worthy of belief,
since he rarely has a free choice in selecting them." FED. R. EVID. 607 comment (quoted in N.C.
R. EviD. 607 comment).
50. N.C. R. EVID 601.
51. Upon the trial of an action, or the hearing upon the merits of a special proceeding, a
party or a person interested in the event, or a person from, through or under whom such
a party or interested person derives his interest or title by assignment or otherwise, shall
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rows the scope of excluded evidence under the Dead Man's Statute from "per-
sonal transactions or communications"5 2 to "oral communications" 53 between
the interested party and the deceased or insane person. The original Dead
Man's Statute had been intended to prevent fraud against those unable to tes-
tify in their own behalf.54 The concern that fraud might result was based on
the assumption that a deceased or insane person would be unable to protect
his own interests against a living adversary. This rationale is faulty, however,
because the representatives of a decedent or a lunatic generally will have a
sufficiently strong stake in the outcome to defend the incompetent's interests.55
The Legislative Research Commission as well as several commentators had
recommended the elimination of the Dead Man's Statute,56 which "has fos-
tered more injustice than it has prevented and has led to an unholy waste of
the time and ingenuity of judges and counsel."'57 Dissatisfaction with the
Dead Man's Statute has led to suggestions of better ways to protect the dead
and the insane against fraud; one suggestion was the "creat[ion of] a hearsay
exception for statements about the matter in dispute by the deceased or insane
person."58 The Dead Man's Statute was preserved in its newly restricted form,
not be examined as a witness in his own behalf or interest, or in behalf of the party
succeeding to his title or interest, against the executor, administrator or survivor of a
deceased person, or the committee of a lunatic, or a peron deriving is title or interest
from, through or under a deceased person or lunatic, by assignment or otherwise, con-
cerning a personal transaction or communication between the witness and the deceased
person or lunatic; except where the executor, administrator, survivor, committee or per-
son so deriving title or interest is examined in his own behalf, or the testimony of the
lunatic or deceased person is given in evidence concerning the same transaction or com-
munication. Nothing in this section shall preclude testimony as to the identity of the
operator of a motor vehicle in any case.
Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. 601(c)(1). The rule does not change any cases that have held the Dead Man's Statute
inapplicable. Id. 601 comment.
54. McCanless v. Reynolds, 74 N.C. 301, 314 (1876) (neither parties nor assigness to deed
executed by dead man competent as witness in dispute over rights under deed).
55. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 66, at 258-59 n.621 (1982):
[I]t seems that much of the argument in defense of the statute is based on a tendency to
identify the deceased with his living representatives, and a resultant feeling that in some
manner the controversy is between the dead man whose mouth is closed and his living
adversary whose mouth ought also to be closed as a matter of fair play and sportsman-
ship. If the contest is viewed realistically as one between living individuals who in most
cases are pure donees of the deceased on the one hand, and other living individuals who,
if their stories are true, have parted with value and are asking only the promised
equivalent, one's sympathies are likely to veer in the other direction. Viewed in this
light, it is hard to see any better reason for silencing witnesses in the cases covered by this
statute than in any other case where a party's evidence has been lost by the death, disap-
pearance or forgetfulness of essential witnesses.
56. See Blakey, supra note 1, at 17-18; Patrick, supra note 3, at 691; see also Survey of Devel-
opments in North Carolina Law, 1982-Evidence, 61 N.C.L. REV. 1126, 1141-43 (1983).
57. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 66, at 259 n.62 (1982).
58. Blakey, supra note 1, at 18 (citing Proposalsfor Legislation in North Carolina, 11 N.C.L.
Rv. 51, 63 (1932)). The proposed legislation was as follows:
No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action, suit or proceeding by reason of
his interest in the event of the same as a party or otherwise.
In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representatives of deceased per-
sons, or the committee of a lunatic, including proceedings for the probate of wills, no
statement of the deceased, or lunatic, whether oral or written, shall be excluded as hear-
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however, because "of a concern that fraud and hardship could result if an
interested party could testify concerning an oral communication with the de-
ceased or lunatic." 59 The Dead Man's Statute should have been abolished
entirely, because the dangers it addresses are exaggerated and because the stat-
ute may make proof of honest claims impossible. Although the risk of perjury
remains, the function of the judge and jury is to evaluate the credibility of the
witness' testimony. The new North Carolina rule restricting the scope of the
Dead Man's Statute is a step in the right direction.
Rule 608, Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness,60 is very similar
to Federal Rule of Evidence 608. The only difference is that North Carolina
rule 608(a),6 1 to prevent expert testimony on the credibility of a witness, 62
includes a reference to rule 405(a).63 Rule 608(a) allows a witness' credibility
to be attacked by reputation or opinion of character for untruthfulness, and
supported-only after attack-by reputation or opinion of character for truth-
fulness.64 Before this rule was enacted, opinion evidence was not admissible
to prove a witness' character in North Carolina. Opinion evidence, however,
was inadvertently admitted because questions could be phrased in terms of
"general character" or "reputation and character."65 The new rule will make
clear to the trier of fact whether testimony is based on opinion. Furthermore,
under the old North Carolina rule, evidence of specific traits of character was
admissible whether or not relevant to the credibility of the witness. 66 Rule
608(a)(1) wisely limits evidence to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
Rule 608(b) states the general rule, already adopted in North Carolina,67
that evidence of specific instances of conduct is not admissible to support or
attack a witness' credibility.68 One exception created by this subsection, how-
ever, extends North Carolina law. On cross-examination, specific acts of a
witness relevant to his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness 69 are ad-
say provided that the trial judge shall find as a fact that the statement was made, and that
it was made in good faithe and on the declarant's personal knowledge.
Proposalsfor Legislation in North Carolina, 11 N.C.L. REv. 51, 63 (1932).
59. N.C. R. Evm. 601 comment.
60. Id. 608.
61. Id. 608(a).
62. Id. 608 comment. The concern that led to the express prohibition of expert testimony on
the credibility of a witness was that such testimony usually would not be helpful and would waste
time. See supra note 35.
63. N.C. R. EVID. 405(a).
64. Id. 608(a).
65. Witnesses did not understand the distinction between reputation and personal opinions
of character. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
66. The rule in North Carolina had been that evidence of a specific trait of character was
admissible only if asked on cross-examination, or if "volunteered" by the witness on direct exami-
nation in answer to a question whether the witness knew the subject's general reputation or repu-
tation and character. N.C. R. EVID. 608 comment.
67. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 111 (1982).
68. N.C. R. EvID. 608(b).
69. The practice in North Carolina had been to allow inquiry into any "prior bad acts" of the
principal witness. See State v. Purcell, 296 N.C. 728, 733, 252 S.E.2d 772, 775 (1979). Under the
language of rule 608(b), this practice should be limited to questions concerning acts relevant to
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. N.C. R. EVID. 608(b). The danger exists, however,
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missible at the discretion of the trial judge.70 Previous North Carolina law
had restricted this type of evidence to acts of the principal witness;7 1 the new
rule allows evidence of acts bearing on the credibility of any witness testifying
about the credibility of the principal witness. The Advisory Committee recog-
nized the possiblity of abuse of this rule and created safeguards to prevent
such abuse.72 Subdivision (b) makes clear that a witness does not waive his
privilege against self-incrimination merely by testifying about matters of cred-
ibility.7 3 This rule rejects earlier North Carolina decisions that allowed cross-
examination concerning past criminal acts reflecting on a witness'
credibility. 74
Rule 609, Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime, deals with
impeachment by evidence of criminal convictions.75 Generally, under 609(a),
evidence of a crime punishable by more than sixty day's confinement is admis-
sible. Previously, North Carolina would allow inquiry into any criminal of-
fense to attack the credibility of an witness. 76 In contrast, Federal Rule of
Evidence 609 allows impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime in-
volving dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment,77 or evi-
dence of conviction of any crime punishable by a sentence more severe than
one year's imprisonment if the court finds that the probative value of the evi-
dence outweighs its prejudicial effect.78 Subsection (a) of the North Carolina
rule requires no such balancing of the probative value and the potential
prejudice of the evidence. 79 Thus, the new rule could be criticized for admit-
ting evidence that may have no relation to the credibility of the witness. Rule
403, however, provides that any evidence may be excluded if the danger of
prejudice outweighs its probative value. The new North Carolina rule has the
advantage of being clear and simple to apply;80 the federal rule has created
ambiguity by its use of the term "dishonesty." 8'
that in interpreting rule 608(b), North Carolina courts will read "acts concerning character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness" so broadly as to continue much of the currect practice. This inter-
pretation would be unfortunate and contrary to the spirit with which the rules were enacted.
70. N.C. R. EVID. 608(b).
71. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 111 (1982).
72. N.C. R. EVID. 608 comment. The safeguards mentioned are: that the instances of con-
duct must be probative of truthfulness; that the danger of prejudice or confusion must not out-
weigh the probative value; and that there must not be harassment or undue embarassment. With
these safeguards, the rule can be useful because the credibility of every witness is important to
consider.
73. N.C. R. EvID. 608(b).
74. Id. 608 comment. It is likely that this provision of the rule is constitutionally mandated.
The accused's right to testify would be restricted severely if exercising this right would allow
inquiry into all past criminal acts, in disregard of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
(citing FED. R. EVID. 608 comment).
75. Id. 609.
76. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 112 (1982).
77. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
78. Id. 609(a)(1).
79. N.C. R. EvID. 609(a).
80. See supra note 1.
81. FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(2). The Conference Report to the federal rule explains that crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement include: "crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury,
false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature
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Article Seven provides for opinion and expert testimony. Rule 703, Bases
of Opinion Testimony by Experts,8 2 identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 703,
is consistent with the North Carolina Supreme Court decision in State v.
Wade,83 which allowed an expert to rely on data he observed outside of court.
Rule 703 allows expert reliance on outside data that would not be admissible
in evidence, if the data is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject."'84 Al-
though the Wade court used the term "inherently reliable"85 rather than "rea-
sonably relied upon by experts," 86 the Official Commentary says that the new
rule does not change the holding in Wade. 7 Prior to Wade, North Carolina
Supreme Court decisions concerning whether an expert witness could base his
decision on such data were in conflict.88 Rule 703 appears to adopt any clarifi-
cation of North Carolina law contributed by the Wade opinion; however, use
of the ambiguous phrase "reasonably relied upon by experts"8 9 does not re-
solve the question of what can be the basis for the expert's opinion.90
Rule 704, Opinion on Ultimate Issue, allows an expert to give his opinion
about the "ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." 9 1 This rule is
identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 704. The common-law rule precluded a
of crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsi-
fication bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully." H. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7098, 7103. The extent to
which "dishonesty" extends the scope of convictions admitted into evidence has been a source of
conflict under the federal rule. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 43, at 12 n.60.4 (Supp, 1978)
(citing United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (conviction for attempted robbery
excluded for not involving "dishonesty"); United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 197)
(conviction for petty larceny admitted as involving "dishonesty")).
82. N.C. R. EVID. 703.
83. 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979). The court in Wade held that a "physician, as an
expert witness, may give his opinion, including a diagnosis, based either on personal knowledge or
observation or on information supplied him by others, including the patient, if such information is
inherently reliable even though it is not independently admissible into evidence." Id. at 462, 251
S.E.2d at 412.
84. N.C. R. EVID. 703.
85. Wade, 296 N.C. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
86. N.C. R. EVID. 703.
87. Id. comment.
88. See Blakey, Examination of Expert Witnesses in North Carolina, 61 N.C.L. REV. 1, 21
(1982); Note, State v. Wado--Expert Testimony and the DualReliabili y Test, 58 N.C.L. REv. 1161
(1980). Some pre-Wade cases admitted doctors' opinions derived from patients' out of court state-
ments. See, e.g., Penland v. Bird Coal Co., 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957) (doctor's testimony
that plaintiff had been disabled was based on statements made outside of court by plaintiff that
would have been inadmissible as hearsay); State v. Alexander, 179 N.C. 759, 103 S.E. 383 (1920)
(psychiatrist's testimony that defendant was insane was based on conversations with defendant
outside of court, which conversations would have been inadmissible as hearsay).
Another case excluded doctors' opinions based on statements made outside of court. Todd v.
Watts, 269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967) (doctors' opinions about plaintiff's injuries, based in
part on conversations with plaintiff, excluded because not based on personal knowledge of acci-
dent and consequential injuries).
89. N.C. R. EvID. 703.
90. Blakey, supra note 88, at 26-32. Professor Blakey explores some of the questions remain-
ing after the Wade decision on the subject of the proper bases for physicians' opinions. Id. at 29-
32. One question, with respect to doctors, is whether information from persons who are not pa-
tients would be sufficiently reliable.
91. N.C. R. EvID. Rule 704.
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witness from giving such an opinion.9 2 North Carolina courts had abrogated
the common-law rule to some extent by allowing expert opinion whenever
"the witness because of his expertise is in a better position to have an opinion
on the subject than is the trier of fact." 93 The basis for the common-law rule
was that the witness otherwise would be invading the province of the jury, or
telling the jury how the case should be decided.94 Problems arose in defining
the province of the jury, however, because the jury must resolve a number of
issues with the help of all available evidence before reaching its final decision.
To preclude opinions on every issue to be considered by the jury would elimi-
nate a great deal of relevant opinion evidence.95 Furthermore, the common-
law rule overlooked the more important concern whether the witness' opinion
would help the trier of fact reach a conclusion.96 Safeguards exist in rules
70197 and 70298 to exclude opinion evidence that would not be helpful to the
trier of fact, and rule 403 excludes evidence if there is substantial danger of
confusing the issues or wasting time.99 Thus, an opinion that does no more
than tell the jury how to resolve the ultimate issue would be excluded because
the opinion would not help the jury and would waste time. °°
An important rule that does not change North Carolina law is rule 705,
Disclosure of Facts or Data Underling Expert Opinion,101 which preserves a
recent statutory change. North Carolina General Statutes section 8-58.14, en-
acted in 1981, abolished the requirement of prior disclosure of facts underly-
ing an expert's opinion; thereafter, hypothetical questions to avoid prior
disclosure became unnecessary. 10 2 Rule 705, which replaces section 8-
58.14,103 however, does not permit an opinion based on inadequate data. Rule
705 and its predecessor were enacted in response to the confusion created by
conflicting explanations of the basis for the expert's opinion.'(" Disclosure of
underlying facts, however, will be required if requested by an adverse
party.'0 5 In this respect, rule 705 differs from Federal Rule of Evidence 705
92. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 126 (1982).
93. State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 569, 247 S.E.2d 905, 911 (1975).
94. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 12. The fear was that the jury merely would adopt the
expert's opinion without independent analysis of all the evidence. Id.
95. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 5, § 126 (1982) (witness could invade jury's province with fac-
tual, as well as opinion evidence, and jury is free to reject either.)
96. See Patrick, supra note 3, at 696. Professor Stansbury proposed an alternative rule:
"Opinion is inadmissible whenever the witness can relate facts so that . . . the jury is as well
qualified as the witness to draw inferences and conclusions from the facts." 1 D. STANSBuRY, THE
NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 124 (Brandis rev. 3d ed. 1973). Professor Stansbury's
concern is addressed adequately by rules 701 and 702, which limit opinion evidence to that which
would be helpful to the trier of fact.
97. N.C. R. EvID. 701(b).
98. Id. 702.
99. Id. 403.
100. N.C. R. EVID. 704 comment (quoting FED. R. EvID. 704 comment).
101. Id. 705.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.14 (1981).
103. N.C. R. EvID. 705 comment.
104. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 17.
105. N.C. R. EvID. 705.
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which gives the court, not the adverse party, the discretion to require such
prior disclosure.10 6
FRANKLIN MILLER WILLIAMS
106. FED. R. EvID. 705.
The New North Carolina Rules of Evidence: Hearsay,
Authentication, and the Best Evidence Rule.
Article VIII of the North Carolina Evidence Code establishes six rules
that govern the admissibility of hearsay. Rule 801 defines hearsay,' state-
ment,2 and declarant,3 and specifies that admissions of a party-opponent are
an exception to the hearsay rule.4 Rule 802 provides that hearsay is inadmissi-
ble unless an exception is applicable.5 Rule 803 lists exceptions to the hearsay
rule that apply regardless of the availability of the declarant. 6 Rule 804 lists
five hearsay exceptions that apply only if the declarant is unavailable.7 Rule
805 provides for the admissibility of hearsay within hearsay if an available
exception applies to each part of the combined statements. 8 Rule 806 permits
the credibility of the declarant to be attacked or supported by any evidence
that would be admissible had the declarant testified as a witness. 9
Rule 801(a) defines the "statement" required for hearsay' ° as "(1) an oral
or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by
him as an assertion."' I This definition is identical to the federal rule and ex-
cludes from the definition of hearsay all nonverbal conduct not intended as an
assertion.' 2 A literal reading of the rule leaves unclear whether verbal conduct
1. N.C. R. EVID. 801(c) (" 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.").
2. Id. 801(a) ("A 'statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by him as an assertion."). For a discussion of the effect of the definition of
'statement' in North Carolina, see infra notes 10-30 and accompanying text.
3. N.C. R. EvID. 801(b) ("A 'declarant' is a person who makes a statement.").
4. A statement is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if it is offered against a
party and it is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity,
or (B) a statement of which he had manifested his adoption or belief in his truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or
(D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement
by a coconspirator of such party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Id. 80 1(d). For a discussion of the exception for admissions by a party-opponent, see infra notes
45-53.
5. See N.C. R. EVID. Rule 802. This rule is in accord with North Carolina practice. See 1d.
comment.
6. See N.C. R. EVID. 803. FED. R. EvID. 803 lists 24 exceptions to the hearsay rule. There
are 24 exceptions listed under the North Carolina rule, but North Carolina did not adopt the
exception in FED. R. EvID. 803(22) (judgment of previous conviction). This exception is reserved
for future codification. N.C. R. EvID. 802(22). For a discussion of the various hearsay exceptions
that apply under rule 803, see infra notes 54-81 and accompanying text.
7. See N.C. R. EVID. 804. For a discussion of the exceptions that apply under rule 804, see
infra notes 82-104 and accompanying text.
8. See N.C. R. EVID. 805. This rule is consistent with current North Carolina practice. See
id. comment (citing State v. Connley, 295 N.C. 327, 245 S.E.2d 663 (1978)).
9. See id. 806. 0
10. The definition of "hearsay" under rule 801(c) requires that "hearsay" be a "statement."
See supra note 1.
11. N.C. R. EVID. 801(a).
12. Id. comment (quoting FED. R. EvID. 801 comment). See 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON
NORTH CAROLINA EvIDENCE § 142 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
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not intended as an assertion is hearsay. 13 It is likely, however, that courts will
characterize nonassertive verbal conduct as nonhearsay and therefore admissi-
ble evidence. 14 Prior to the adoption of rule 801(a), North Carolina decisions
as to whether nonassertive conduct should be excluded as hearsay were incon-
sistent.' 5 Some cases designated as hearsay both verbal and nonverbal con-
duct not intended by the declarant to be an assertion.' 6 Thus, the conduct was
not admissible evidence. Other courts, however, admitted similar evidence,
either as nonhearsay or without recognizing its possible hearsay nature.1 7 The
trend has been to classify nonassertive conduct as nonhearsay,' 8 a result that
may have been influenced by the treatment of nonassertive conduct in the
federal rules.' 9 The extent to which the definition of "statement" will change
North Carolina law will depend on the courts' willingness to find that conduct
was an intentional assertion,20 and on their willingness to hold that evidence is
irrelevant or excludable under principles of unfair prejudice, undue consump-
tion of time, or confusion of issues.2 '
By excluding from the definition of hearsay all nonverbal conduct not
intended as an assertion, the Study Committee recognized that the declarant's
perception, memory, and narration of the conduct would be untested. 22 The
Committee, however, determined that in the absence of an intent to make an
assertion, these hearsay dangers and the danger of insincerity would be mini-
mal, and, therefore, the evidence should not be excluded on hearsay
grounds.23 A number of objections were raised to the adoption of this rule.24
13. See 1 H. BRANDIS,supra note 12, § 142 n.56.3 (Supp. 1983). A literal reading of rule 801,
sections (a) and (c), indicates that the phrase "if it is intended by him as an assertion" modifies "an
oral or written assertion."
14. See N.C. R. EVID. 801 comment (quoting FED. R. EvID. 801 comment). "The effect of
the definition of 'statement' is to exclude from the operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of
conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not intended as an assertion." Id.
15. See I H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 142.
16. See id. § 142 at 565 nn.54-55 (1982).
17. See id. § 142 at 565-66 n.56.
18. Id. § 142, at 566 n.57 (citing State v. Tilley, 292 N.C. 132, 232 S.E.2d 433 (1977) (defend-
ant's act in carrying pistol not intended as assertion and was admissible in defendant's trial for
murder and conspiracy); Long v. Asphalt Paving Co., 47 N.C. App. 564, 268 S.E.2d 1 (1980)
(deceased's act of walking around subdivision during trip not intended as assertion and was ad-
missible to show business nature of trip)).
19. See Blakey, Moving Towards an Evidence Law of General Principles.- Several Suggestions
Concerning an Evidence Codefor North Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1981). Professor
Blakey states that, prior to the adoption of the federal rules in 1975, North Carolina did not
recognize an exception to the hearsay rule for nonassertive conduct. Id. at 11.
20. See I H. BRANDIS supra note 12, § 142. "The rule is so worded as to place the burden
upon the party claiming that the intention existed; ambiguous and doubtful cases will be resolved
against him and in favor of admissibility." N.C. R. EVID. 801 comment.
21. N.C. R. EVID. 403. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 142. See also Blakey, supra note
19, at 15-16. Professor Blakey argues that it is difficult for a court to weigh the probative value of
hearsay, especially when the evidence is as weak as nonassertive conduct.
22. See N.C. RA. EvID. 801 comment (quoting FED. R. EvID. 801 comment).
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 19, at 10-21, 24-30. Professor Blakey argues that describing
evidence that is admitted for a testimonial purpose as "not hearsay" complicates the definition of
hearsay. He suggests that North Carolina reject any hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct
used for a testimonial purpose and proposes the following definition of "statement": "The term
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First, by classifying as nonhearsay all nonverbal conduct not intended as an
assertion, such conduct becomes admissible without cross-examination of the
declarant. 25 The Committee concluded that, because the declarant had not
intended the conduct as an assertion, there would be little danger of dishon-
esty.26 This rationale, however, ignores the fact that the declarants' knowl-
edge of the truth will go untested; he may have an honest belief in something
totally false. Second, the nature of nonassertive, nonverbal conduct is ambig-
uous. Thus, it is difficult to determine what the declarant believed to be true.27
Since it also is difficult for a court to assess nonassertiveness, there is a danger
that assertive conduct may be admitted improperly into evidence.28 Third,
weighing the probative value of the evidence is difficult when the evidence is
vague, nonassertive conduct. The danger exists that courts will admit evidence
with insufficient probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect.29 Finally,
by classifying as nonhearsay evidence that actually is hearsay, the Committee
overlooked the testimonial character of the evidence being admitted. 30 Al-
though each of these objections was raised before the rule was adopted, the
Committee determined that the probative value of the evidence outweighed
the possible hearsay dangers.
'statement' includes both written or spoken words and nonverbal conduct by a person when such
words or conduct make an assertion either directly or by implication." Id. at 21.
25. Id. at 25 ("ITlhe effect of a hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct would be to admit
evidence of conduct to prove belief in situations in which a direct statement by the same person of
the same belief would be excluded as inadmissible hearsay.").
26. N.C. R. EvID. 801 comment (quoting FED. R. EvID. 801 comment).
27. See Blakey, supra note 19, at 26-28. Professor Blakey argues that the difficulties involved
in reaching conclusions about the beliefs of the declarant from the nonassertive conduct have been
overlooked because the discussions have centered upon a few, isolated theoretical examples, such
as the crowd of "passers-by with their umbrellas up [offered to prove it was raining]." Id. at 26.
He stated that Wright v. Tathem, 7 Adolph & E. 313, 317-20, 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 490-91 (Ex. 1837)
(three letters written to testator offered to prove persons who wrote the letters considered testator
competent) and People v. Clark, 6 Cal. App. 3d 658, 86 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1970) (wife of murder
suspect fainted when suspect asked her to corroborate his statement to police officer that he did
not own certain type coat) were more representative situations. The conduct in both of these cases
could have more than one explanation. Blakey, supra note 19, at 27-28.
28. Blakey, supra note 19, at 15. Professor Blakey argues that the first two federal cases to
apply the nonassertive conduct exception applied it to assertive conduct. See Muncie Aviation
Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178, 1181 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975) (FAA regulation requiring
every pilot, before beginning a ffight, to familiarize himself with all available information con-
cerning that flight was deemed admissible to show FAA's belief that the procedures recommended
were safer than other procedures); United States v. Snow, 517 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1975) (name tag
affixed to case in which gun was found declared not hearsay and was admissible to show defend-
ant knowingly possessed the unregistered weapon).
29. Blakey, supra note 19, at 15-16. Professor Blakey argues that State v. Garner, 34 N.C.
App. 498, 238 S.E.2d 653 (1977), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 184, 241 S.E.2d 519 (1978), was a case in
which the evidence of nonassertive conduct should have been excluded on relevancy grounds. In
Garner defendant appealed a finding that he was the father of an illegitimate child. To suggest
that defendant's mother believed that defendant was the father of the child, the prosecution intro-
duced evidence that defendant's mother gave the prosecution a check. Id. at 499, 238 S.E.2d at
654. Professor Blakey argues that the court should have excluded the evidence on relevancy
grounds because the mother's opinion would not have been admissible if she had been a witness at
the trial. Blakey, supra note 19, at 16. Professor Brandis also disagreed with the result and analy-
sis in Garner. He stated that the court's conclusion that the mother's credibility was not at stake
was "most doubtful." See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 142, at 566 n.56.
30. Blakey, supra note 19, at 11.
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Rule 801(d), Exception for Admissions by a Party-Opponent,3 ' differs sig-
nificantly from its federal rule counterpart.3 2 Federal rule 801(d)(1) excludes
from the definition of hearsay, and allows as substantive evidence, three cate-
gories of prior statements made by a witness who is subject to cross-examina-
tion at trial.33 The statements excluded are: (1) a prior inconsistent statement
given "under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition"; 34 (2) a prior consistent statement offered to
rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence;
and (3) an identification of a person made after the witness perceived the per-
son.35 The North Carolina common law allowed the use of prior inconsistent
statements, not as substantive evidence, but for purpose of impeachment of the
witness.3 6 North Carolina admitted, without prior impeachment of the wit-
ness, a wide range of corroborative statements to support a witness' credibil-
ity.3 7 Thus, prior identification is admissible either to corroborate or to
impeach a witness's identification in court.38 Because the federal rule differed
substantially from the North Carolina common law, the Study Committee did
not incorporate federal rule 801(d)(1) in the North Carolina rule.39 Although
not expressed, one concern may have been the fear of a criminal conviction or
31. N.C. R. EVID. 801(d).
32. Id. comment.
33. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). The argument against use of prior statements as substantive
evidence is based upon the fact that "the conditions of oath, cross-examination, and demeanor
observation did not prevail at the time the statement was made and cannot adequately be supplied
by the later examination." Id. 801 comment. In adopting the rule for prior statements, however,
Congress took the view that the hearsay dangers of these statements are eliminated because the
witness is available for cross-examination at the trial.
34. Id. 801 comment. There was some support expressed to Congress for this view because
of the concern for witness intimidation in criminal cases. See id. Congress, however, decided to
compromise and limit the admissible statements to those made under oath, including statements
made before a grand jury. Id. The rationale for allowing these statements is that there is no
dispute that the prior statement was made and there was an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness at the formal proceeding. Id.
35. The basis for this rule is the uncertainty and unsatisfactory nature of courtroom identifi-
cations compared to identifications made earlier under less suggestive circumstances, See id.
36. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 46.
37. The rule in North Carolina concerning corroborative statements was less restrictive than
the rule in other jurisdictions, which admitted evidence to support a witness' credibility only when
the witness had been impeached directly. See id. § 50. Although North Carolina courts often
recognized the necessity of impeachment, the requirement was more theoretical than real. Id.
This liberal practice in North Carolina had been subject to severe criticism, but unrestricted use of
corroborative evidence continued. Id. § 52. Professor Brandis approved of the liberal rule for
corroboration in North Carolina. Id. See also Patrick, Toward a Codfication of the Law of Evi.
dence in North Carolina, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 669, 700-01 (1980).
38. See, e.g., State v. Neville, 175 N.C. 731, 95 S.E. 55 (1918).
39. See N.C. R. EvID. 801 comment. In keeping with his theory that North Carolina should
simplify the federal definition of hearsay, Professor Blakey argued that the North Carolina Rules
of Evidence should not include FED R. EvID. 801(d)(l). He stated that the concept of hearsay
would be misunderstood if hearsay statements were defined as nonhearsay. Blakey, supra note 19,
at 20-21. Professor Blakey took the view that the federal rule classifications of prior consistent
statements and statements of identification largely were meaningless. Blakey argued that testimo-
nial use of a prior consistent statement is unimportant and testimonial use of a prior identification
only becomes important if a witness repudiates a prior identification. In the event of repudiation,
Professor Blakey stated that the arguments against testimonial use of the prior identification are
even stronger because, under the federal rule, there is no requirement that the prior identification
be under oath. Id. at 23.
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civil judgment based solely upon an alleged prior statement by a witness. 40
Had the Committee adopted federal rule 801(d)(1)(B), the North Carolina
corroboration rule would have been restricted to cases in which the opposing
party charged the witness with recent fabrication or improper influence. Be-
cause the Committee did not adopt the rule, however, there will be no change
in the North Carolina law on corroboration, except to the extent that rule
608(a) requires that a character witness' character for truthfulness be attacked
before reputation or opinion evidence of his truthfulness can be admitted.41
Since North Carolina already admitted prior inconsistent statements and prior
identification for impeachment purposes, the effect of North Carolina's failure
to adopt the federal rule will be limited. Although a party opposing a state-
ment is entitled to a jury instruction that the statement cannot be used sub-
stantively, it is doubtful that the instruction will have a significant effect.42
The limitation, however, will have a practical effect when the inconsistent
statement or identification is required to satisfy a party's burden of proving an
essential element of the case. If the court admits the inconsistent statement or
identification solely for impeachment purposes, and there is no other evidence
to support a party's claim or defense, the party offering the statement will fail
to meet its burden of proof.4 3 The Study Committee should have adopted a
hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements given under oath. The
oath provides an assurance that the witness made the statement, and the for-
mal proceeding and opportunity for cross-examination provide additional as-
surances of reliability.44
Federal rule 801(d)(2) excludes from the definition of hearsay admissions
by a party opponent statements offered against him if the statements are (A)
the party's own statement, either in an individual or representative capacity;
(B) a statement that the party adopted or manifested a belief in the truth of;
(C) a statement by a person authorized to make a statement concerning the
subject; (D) a statement by an agent or employee concerning a matter within
the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the rela-
tionship; or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator made during the course of and
in furtherance of the conspiracy.4 The North Carolina rule also provides for
admissibility of the evidence, but treats it as an exception to the hearsay rule.46
The North Carolina rule 801(d)(2) exceptions for a statement made by a party-
opponent and a statement adopted by a party are in accord with North Caro-
lina practice.47 North Carolina courts also admitted statements made by an
agent authorized to speak for the principal,48 but new rule 801(d)(2)(C) will
40. See Blakey, supra note 19, at 22.
41. See I H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 50.
42. See T. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 52 (1978).
43. Id.
44. See FED. R. EVID. 801 comment.
45. See id. 801(d)(2).
46. See N.C. R. EVID. 801 comment. See also Blakey, supra note 19, at 23.
47. 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 167.
48. Id. § 169.
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clarify North Carolina law by including statements made by an agent either to
the principal or to a third party.4 9 Rule 801(d)(2)(D) represents a welcome
change from a much criticized North Carolina practice.50 North Carolina tra-
ditionally excluded statements made by an agent or employee if the statements
were narrative of a past event, even though the agency relationship continued.
The courts reasoned that the principal had not authorized the agent or em-
ployee to subject the principal to liability.51 Rule 801(d)(2)(D) adopts a more
logical approach, and makes admissible any statement related to a matter
within the scope of the agency or employment as long as the agent made the
statement during the existence of the relationship.5 2 Rule 801(d)(2)(E) limits
the admissibility of statements made by co-conspirators to those made "during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." This accords with current
North Carolina practice.5 3
Rule 803, Hearsay Exceptions, Availability of Declarant Immaterial,54 is
almost identical to its federal counterpart.5 5 The theory underlying the excep-
tions is that hearsay exceptions possess "circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness" sufficient to dispense with the requirement that the declarant testify in
person even though he is available.5 6 The most important of these exceptions
are for excited utterances, present sense impressions, then existing mental,
emotional, or physical conditions, statements for purposes of medical diagno-
sis or treatment, recorded recollections, business records, and public records. 7
Although North Carolina common law and statutory law already provided for
most of the exceptions contained in rule 803, the rule will change the law in
North Carolina by expanding the scope of some of the hearsay exceptions and
clarifying uncertain points that existed in the law.58 The most significant dif-
49. N.C. R. EVlD. 801 comment. See also 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 169, at 17 n.53.
There was some question whether statements by an employee to the principal or a fellow em-
ployee were admissible. See Bixler Co. v. Britton, 192 N.C. 199, 134 S.E. 488 (1926) (letter from
general manager to salesperson); Willis v. Atlantic & Danville R.R., 120 N.C. 508, 26 S.E. 784
(1897) (conversation between section master and conductor). Although the evidence was excluded
in these cases, Professor Brandis took the view that, in both instances, the court believed there was
no adequate proof of the declarant's authority to speak for the principal. 2 H. BRANDis, supra
note 12, § 167, at 17 n.53.
50. See Pearce v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 299 N.C. 64, 69, 261 S.E.2d 176, 179 (1980)
(Copeland, J., dissenting) (record showed implied authority to make the statement even though
agent who made the statement was not present at time of plaintiff's injury); Branch v. Dempsey,
265 N.C. 733, 756, 145 S.E.2d 395, 411 (1965) (Sharp, J., dissenting) (authority to drive should
include authority to make statements to officer). See also 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 169.
51. [W]hat an agent or employee says, relative to an act presently being done by him
within the scope of his agency or employment, is admissible as a part of the res gestae,
and may be offered in evidence either for or against the principal or employer, but what
the agent or employee says afterwards, and merely narrative of a past occurrence, though
his agency or employment may continue as to other matters. . . is only hearsay and is
not competent as against the principal or employer.
Hubbard v. Southern R.R., 203 N.C. 675, 678, 166 S.E. 802, 804 (1932).
52. N.C. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D). See also id. 801 comment.
53. Id. 801 comment (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801 comment).
54. Id. 803.
55. See id. comment.
56. Id.
57. Id. 803
58. See Patrick, supra note 37, at 702.
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ference between the North Carolina rules and their federal counterparts is in
rule 803(22). Federal rule 803(22) admits evidence of a final judgment, en-
tered after or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere),
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment.5 9
Under the new North Carolina law, a party cannot use a judgment or finding
of a court in another case unless the principle of res judicata applies to make
the former judgment conclusive or unless a common-law or statutory excep-
tion is applicable.60 The Study Committee suggested that this precedent be
retained by not adopting the exception in federal rule 803(22).61
Exception (1) under rule 803 concerns present sense impressions; excep-
tion (2) concerns excited utterances. Although these exceptions overlap con-
siderably, and the basis for each exception is that the spontaneity of a
statement decreases the likelihood of fabrication,62 they differ in their ap-
proach to the time allowed between the event and the statement.63 The excep-
tion for present sense impressions recognizes that a statement usually is not
contemporaneous with an event and allows a slight time lapse between the
event and the statement.64 The time lapse allowed for excited utterances,
however, is the duration of the state of excitement, which is determined by the
nature of each event. 65 The North Carolina common law recognized an ex-
ception for excited utterances,66 but did not recognize an exception for present
sense impressions. Thus, rule 803(1) creates a new exception in North Caro-
lina.67 Under the spontaneous declaration exception, many courts admitted
declarations made shortly after the event. Other courts, however, insisted that
the statement be contemporaneous with the event, excluding narrative state-
ments made after the event. 68 Rule 803(2) should harmonize the discordant
case law regarding the permissible time lapse for the exception to apply.6 9
Exception (3) of rule 803 concerns statements of the declarant's then ex-
isting mental, emotional, or physical condition. The rule excludes statements
of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed because the
inclusion of these statements within the hearsay exception would virtually de-
59. FED. R. EVID. 803(22). The rule admits into evidence a former judgment, but excludes
minor offenses. The Federal Advisory Committee realized that the rule might leave a jury with
evidence of a conviction and no means to evaluate the evidence, but the Committee assumed that
the jury would give the evidence substantial effect unless the defendant offered a satisfactory ex-
planation. See id. 803 comment. The rule was drafted to avoid violation of constitutional issues,
therefore, the exception does not include evidence of the conviction of a third party offered against
the accused in a criminal prosecution. To admit the evidence would be to violate the defendant's
right of confrontation. Id.
60. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 143; see also Patrick, supra note 37, at 702.





66. See 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 164.
67. N.C. R. EvID. 803(l) comment.
68. See 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 164.
69. N.C. R. EvID. 803(2) comment.
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stroy the hearsay rule.70 Exception (3) is identical to its federal counterpart
and is similar to an exception previously recognized in North Carolina.7' The
North Carolina common law, however, did not admit declarations made by an
accused after the commission of a crime. The courts believed that to admit
those statements would allow the accused to fabricate evidence in his favor.72
Although the federal rules do not deal specifically with this issue, new rule
803(3) is sufficiently broad to include the statements, and the Official Com-
mentary indicates that the rule makes them admissible.73
Rule 803(24) is a catch-all exception that admits hearsay statements not
covered specifically by any of the other exceptions if the statement has
"equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness" 74 and the court makes certain de-
terminations regarding the statement's evidentiary value.75 Although at com-
mon law North Carolina did not provide a catch-all exception to the hearsay
rule, the North Carolina courts often admitted hearsay evidence under the
general principle of "res gestae." 76 Courts first used the principle to admit
statements relating to a particular event and did not examine closely the hear-
say aspects of the statements.77 Courts eventually expanded the use of the
principle to include nonverbal acts and circumstances that aided a jury in
evaluating an event.78 Unfortunately, when courts used the "res gestae" con-
cept, they emphasized a requirement of concurrence in time of the hearsay
evidence with the event, and excluded evidence that would have been admit-
ted under independent exceptions. 79 Because of confusion that resulted from
use of the "res gestae" concept, courts and commentators advocated not using
the principle as a basis for a hearsay exception.80 Under the new rules, the
"res gestae" concept no longer creates an exception to the hearsay rule; how-
ever, evidence previously admitted under the "res gestae" formula probably
will fall within the catch-all provision or within specific hearsay exceptions,
such as excited utterances or then existing mental, emotional, or physical
conditions.8t
70. Id. 803(3).
71. See 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 161.
72. Id.
73. See 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 161, at 175 n.16.
74. N.C. R. EvID. 803(24).
75. The court must determine that: (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative than any other evidence that the proponent can procure
through reasonable means; and (C) the general purposes of the rules and the interest ofjustice will
be best served by admission of the statement into evidence. Id. The North Carolina rule differs
from the federal rule in that the North Carolina rule requires that the proponent of the evidence
give written notice of his intention to offer the evidence in advance of offering the statement, .d.
comment. The federal rule requires only that the proponent of the evidence make known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing the intention to introduce the evidence.




80. See, e.g., United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944) (res gestae "has been
accountable for so much confusion that it had best be denied any place whatever in legal
terminology").
81. N.C. R. EvID. 803(24) comment.
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Rule 804, Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable,82 expands similar
exceptions under the common law and expands the North Carolina definition
of unavailability. 83 Under rule 804(a), a declarant is unavailable under the
following circumstances: (1) a court exempts the declarant on the ground of
privilege; (2) the declarant refuses to testify despite a court order requiring him
to do so; (3) the declarant testifies to a lack of memory; (4) the declarant can-
not be present due to death, physical or mental illness, or infirmity; and (5) the
declarant is absent from the hearing, and the proponent of the statement can-
not compel his attendance by process or other reasonable means.84 Under the
North Carolina common law, the grounds that satisfied the requirement for
unavailability varied with the different exceptions.85 With the adoption of
rule 804, however, the grounds for unavailability now apply uniformly to all
rule 804(b) exceptions. 86
Exception (1) to rule 804(b) admits testimony given by a witness either at
another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition, if the
party against whom the testimony is now offered 87 had the motive and oppor-
tunity to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 8
This exception is similar to the common-law rule in North Carolina. 89 Excep-
tion (4), which admits statements concerning the declarant's personal or family
history, or statements concerning the personal or family history of another
closely related person,90 also is similar to the North Carolina common law.9 1
Rule 804(b)(2) admits statements made by a declarant who believed his
death was imminent, if the statement concerned the cause or circumstances of
what he believed to be his impending death.92 The rule is in accord with the
statutory law in North Carolina, 93 but differs from its federal counterpart,
which admits the statements only in prosecutions for homicides and in a civil
proceedings. 94 Since dying declarations are not inherently more reliable in
82. Id. 804.
83. See Patrick, supra note 37, at 702.
84, N.C. R. EVID. 804(a).
85. Under the hearsay exception for testimony at a formal trial, North Carolina recognized
unavailability grounds (1), (4), and (5). See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 145. Grounds (2) and
(3) were neither accepted nor rejected, but Professor Brandis stated that North Carolina courts
should accept these grounds when the occasion arises. Id. In contrast to the federal rule for
statements made under a belief in impending death now adopted in North Carolina, however,
prior North Carolina law required that the declarant be dead. Id. § 146. Under the exception for
statements against interest, any legitimate reason for unavailability was sufficient. Id. § 147, at
589 n.80. Under the exception for statements of family history, older cases in North Carolina held
that the declarant must be dead. Professor Brandis, however, argued that any legitimate reason
for unavailability was sufficient. Id. § 149.
86. See N.C. R. EvID. 804 comment (quoting FED. R. EvID. 804 comment).
87. Or, in a civil action or proceeding, testimony against a predecessor in interest may be
admitted.
88. N.C. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
89. See I H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 145; see also Patrick, supra note 37, at 703.
90. N.C. R. EVID. 804(b)(4).
91. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 149; see also Patrick, supra note 37, at 703.
92. N.C. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
93. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 146.
94. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). See also N.C. R. EVID. 804 comment. The new North
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homicide prosecutions and in civil actions than in other prosecutions, the
Study Committee was justified in eliminating the restriction. 95
Exception (3) under both North Carolina and federal rule 804(b) admits
into evidence a statement that at the time of its making was so much contrary
to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest that a reasonable man
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. 96 The new
North Carolina rule differs from both the federal rule and older North Caro-
lina common law. The last sentence of federal rule 804(b)(3) states that "[a]
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. '97 North Carolina ex-
ception (3) differs from the federal rules by imposing the requirement of cor-
roborating circumstances on both exculpating and implicating statements.9"
Traditionally, North Carolina admitted statements made against the pecuni-
ary or proprietary interest of the declarant, but excluded statements made
against the penal interest of the declarant.99 In 1978, however, the North Car-
olina Supreme Court abandoned the rigid common-law rule in State v. Hay-
wood t °° and listed seven requirements that a declaration against penal interest
must satisfy: (1) the declarant must be unavailable; (2) the declaration must be
an admission that the declarant committed the crime for which the defendant
is on trial, and the admission must be inconsistent with the defendant's guilt;
(3) the declaration must have had the potential of jeopardizing the personal
liberty of the declarant at the time it was made, and the declarant must have
understood the damaging potential of the statement; (4) the declarant must
have been in a position to have committed the crime to which the statement
refers; (5) the declaration must have been voluntary; (6) there must have been
no probable motive for the declarant to make a false statement; and (7) the
facts and circumstances surrounding the declaration and the crime must cor-
roborate the declaration and indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.101
Although the new rule does not restate the specific requirements listed in Hay-
wood, most of them probably will still apply under new rule 804(b)(3).102
The Official Commentary makes clear that the rule 804(b)(3) exception
should not be construed to add any requirements beyond "corroborating cir-
Carolina rule 804(b)(2) is in accord with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51.1 (1981). Some statements not
admissible under the prior statute, however, are now admissible because North Carolina adopted
the federal definition of a qualifying statement and the federal definition of unavailability. For
the changes in the prior statutory law, see I H. BRANDis, sUpra note 12, § 146.
95. See Patrick, supra note 37, at 702.
96. N.C. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
97. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
98. Compare N.C. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) with FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (last sentence). See N.C.
R. EvtD. 804 comment.
99. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 147, at 590 n.86.
100. 295 N.C. 709, 249 S.E.2d 429 (1978).
101. See State v. Haywood, 295 N.C. 709, 730, 249 S.E.2d 429, 442 (1978); see also Patrick,
supra note 37, at 704.
102. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 147, at 164 n.79.4 (Supp. 1983).
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cumstances clearly indicat[ing] the trustworthiness of the statement."103 The
purpose of requiring corroboration is to eliminate fabrication,' 04 and the rule
should be interpreted accordingly.
Article IX,Authentication andIdentfication,105 is similar to existing North
Carolina law. Rule 901(a) states that "the requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims."10 6 Under rule 901(a), the requirement of authentication or identifica-
tion is a matter of relevancy and is governed by the procedure set forth in rule
104(b).10 7 Rule 104(b) makes authenticity and identification questions for the
jury once the judge makes a preliminary determination that the foundation
evidence is sufficient to support a finding of fulfillment of the condition.108
Rule 901(b) lists examples of evidence that conform to the requirement of the
rule, including handwriting, distinctive characteristics, voice identification, tel-
ephone conversations, public records or reports, and ancient documents.' 0 9
The methods of proving authenticity or identity of the examples set out in rule
90 1(b) are, with minor exceptions, in accord with North Carolina practice." 0
Exception (3) provides for comparison of specimens, by the trier or fact or by
expert witnesses, with specimens that have been authenticated."' Prior North
Carolina statutory law permitted witnesses to make "a comparison of a dis-
puted writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be
genuine."" 12 Rule 901(b)(3), in conjunction with rule 104(b), makes this ques-
tion one for the jury, subject to the sufficiency-of-evidence requirement of rule
901(a).1 3
Rule 902 lists ten categories of writings that do not require extrinsic evi-
dence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility. The rule ap-
plies to domestic public documents under seal and not under seal, foreign
public documents, certified copies of public records, official publications,
newspapers and periodicals, trade inscriptions, and other writings whose au-
thenticity generally is assured. 14 Most of the methods of self-authentication
are in accord with North Carolina practice, but rule 902 increases the number
of writings that are self authenticating. For example, rule 902(6) provides that
newspapers and periodicals are self authenticating," 15 and rule 902(7) provides




107. Id. 901 comment (quoting FED. R. EVID. 901 comment).
108. Id. 104(b) ("When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition
of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.").
109. Id. 901(b).
110. See Patrick, supra note 37, at 706.
111. N.C. R. EvID. 901(b)(3).
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-40 (1981).
113. N.C. R. EVD. 901 comment. See also Patrick, supra note 37, at 706.
114. N.C. R. EvID. 902.
115. Id. 902(6).
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that commercial and mercantile labels and inscriptions are self
authenticating.1 16
Article X, Contents of Writings, Recordings, and Photographs,11 7 with a
few exceptions, merely restates or clarifies North Carolina law.I 8 Rule 1001
defines writings and recordings, 119 photographs, 20 originals, 12  and dupli-
cates. 122 Since no authority in North Carolina had defined the original of a
recording or photograph, it was unclear whether the best evidence rule 23 ap-
plied to recordings and photographs.' 24 Rule 1001(1), however, clarifies
North Carolina law by providing that the best evidence rule applies to record-
ings and photographs. 12 5 Rule 1002 is the best evidence rule and requires a
party, except as otherwise provided, to produce the original writing, recording,
or photograph to prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph. 26
An important exception to the requirement of rule 1002 is rule 1003, which
admits a duplicate to the same extent as the original unless an opponent raises
a genuine question concerning the authenticity of the original, or circum-
stances make it unfair to admit the duplicate in place of the original. 2 7 Rule
1003 departs from the law in North Carolina that allowed an opponent of the
evidence to require the original. 2 8 There were, however, several statutory
and common-law exceptions that admitted duplicates.' 29 Rule 1003 elimi-
nates both the need for the exceptions and the technical requirement that a
party produce an original even though no question exists concerning the au-
thenticity of the duplicate. 130
116. Id. 902(7).
117. Id. 1001-1008.
118. See Patrick, supra note 37, at 706.
119. N.C. R. EVID. 1001(1) (" 'Writings' and 'recordings' consist of letters, words, sounds, or
numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating,
photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data
compilation.").
120. Id. 1001(2) (" 'Photographs' include still photographs, x-ray films, video tapes, and mo-
tion pictures.").
121. Id. 1001(3) ("An 'original' of a writing or recording is the writing or recording itself or
any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An 'original'
of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data are stored in a computer or
similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately,
is an 'original.' ").
122. Id. 1001(3) ("A 'duplicate' is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the oripi-
nal, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and minia-
tures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original.").
123. The best evidence rule is codified at id. 1002.
124. See 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 190, at 100 nn.8-9.
125. N.C. R. Evm. 1001 comment.
126. Id. 1002; see Patrick, supra note 37, at 707.
127. Id. 1003; see Patrick, supra note 37, at 707.
128. See 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 190.
129. See, e.g., State v. Schumaker, 251 N.C. 678, 680-81, 111 S.E.2d 878, 879-90 (1960) (de-
posit slips in duplicate); Standard Sand & Gravel Corp. v. McClay, 191 N.C. 313, 316-17, 131 S.E.
754, 756 (1926) (carbon copies of freight waybills). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-45.1 (1981)
(photographic copies of business and public records).
130. See Patrick, supra note 37, at 707. The commentary to rule 1003 states that courts
"should be liberal in permitting questions of genuineness to be raised." N.C. R. EvID. 1003 com-
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Rule 1004, which is consistent with North Carolina practice,13 1 describes
four situations in which a party is not required to produce an original.' 32
Rules 1005 through 1007 describe additional circumstances in which the origi-
nal is not required. These exceptions also are consistent with North Carolina
practice. 133 Rule 1008 states that it is for the court to determine whether the
required condition of fact has been fulfilled in accordance with rule 104, but it
is for the trier of fact to determine questions of fact concerning the writing. 1
34
This rule also is consistent with North Carolina practice.' 35
LINDA K. TEAL
ment. Professor Brandis asserted that the commentary is "attempting to narrow the considerable
modification of the best evidence rule." 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 190, at 103 nn.21-23.
131. See 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 192.
132. The four situations are when: (1) all originals are lost or destroyed, unless the proponent
lost or destroyed them in bad faith; (2) the original is not obtainable by judicial process; (3) the
original is in the possession of the opponent; and (4) the evidence is a collateral matter. N.C. R.
EVID. 1004.
133. Rule 1005 admits copies of public records that are certified as correct in accordance with
rule 902. Rule 1006 admits summaries of the contents of writings, recordings, or photographs that
are too voluminous to examine in court. Rule 1007 admits the contents of writings, recordings, or
photographs when the opponent admits that the copy is correct. Id. 1005-07
134. Id. 1008. The trier of fact determines: (1) whether the writing ever existed; (2) whether
another writing, recording, or photograph at the trial is the original; and (3) whether other evi-
dence of contents correctly reflects the contents. Id.
135. See I H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 8. North Carolina traditionally admitted photo-
graphic evidence that illustrated a witness' testimony, but only as illustrative evidence and not as
substantive evidence. Id. § 34. One commentator asserts that an additional rule needs to be
drafted to clarify the admissibility of substantive photographic evidence. See Patrick, supra note
37, at 709 n.194. The commentator states that a rule admitting photographic evidence substan-
tively is needed to put this "illustrative evidence rule" to rest. Id. at 708-09.
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Privileges: 1983 Revisions to Evidence Law in North Carolina
As of October 1, 1983 any resident judge or presiding judge, if necessary
for the proper administration ofjustice, may compel physicians, psychologists,
school counselors, and marital therapists to disclose confidential information
either at or before trial. I House Bill 235 amended the provisos to North Caro-
lina General Statutes sections 8-53 to 8-53.5-the physician-patient privilege;2
the psychologist-client privilege;3 the school counselor privilege;4 and the mar-
ital therapist-client privilege. 5 The provisos give judges discretion to override
these privileges and compel disclosure of confidential information. The bill
clarifies when a judge has jurisdiction to exercise his discretion to order disclo-
sure, and specifically authorizes compelled pretrial disclosure. A new statu-
tory provision, however, limits the judge's discretion to compel disclosure of
confidential communications in divorce and alimony proceedings. 6 An addi-
tional amendment, 7 House Bill 66, made a more sweeping change in the law of
privileges by declaring that a defendant's spouse is competent to testify against
the defendant in criminal prosecutions.8 This note examines the amendments
made by House Bills 235 and 66.
Privileges are recognized based on society's determination that certain
confidential relationships are important and that preservation of their integrity
outweighs society's interest in learning the truth.9 There are two general privi-
lege categories: absolute privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, and
qualified privileges, such as the physician-patient privilege. 10 In each privi-
lege category, the interest in protection of the relationship is balanced against
1. Act of June 1, 1983, ch. 410, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 235 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-
53, -53.3, -53.4, and -53.5 (1981) and adding id. § 8-53.6) [hereinafter referred to as House Bill
235].
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (Supp. 1983). For a general discussion of the physician-patient
privilege see 1 H. BRA'DIs, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 63 (2d rev. ed. 1982).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (Supp. 1983).
4. Id. § 8-53.4.
5. Id. § 8-53.5.
6. Id. § 8-53.6.
7. Act of Apr. 13, 1983, ch. 170, 1983 Sess. Laws 66 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57
(1981)) [hereinafter referred to as House Bill 66].
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (Supp. 1983). In most instances, however, the court may not
compel the spouse to testify. Id.
9. Note, Privileged Communications between Husbandand Wife, 15 N.C.L. REV. 282, 282-83
(1937) [hereinafter cited as Note, Privileged Communications]; see Note, .4 Surve' of the North
Carolina Law of.RelationalPrivilege, 50 N.C.L. REV. 630, 630-31 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Relational Privileges].
10. Note, RelationalPrivileges, supra note 9, at 631. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (Supp.
1983). Qualified privileges generally are statutory privileges. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2,
§ 54, at 200 nn.93, 95 (psychologist-client and marital therapist-client privileges created by stat-
ute); id. § 63 at 250-51 nn.22-23 (no physician-patient privilege at common law-privilege created
by statute); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 98, at 212 & nn.l-3 and
accompanying text (E. Cleary ed. 1972) (no physician-patient privilege at common law; New York
passed the first statutory privilege in 1828). Absolute privileges, however, have their roots in long-
standing common-law doctrines. See 1 H. BRANDIS,oUpra note 2 § 58, at 229 & nn.12-14; see also
infra note 50 (discussing the common-law origins of the husband-wife privilege).
the need to discover the truth. 1 The absolute privilege gives priority to the
importance of the relationship and does not waive it in the interests of jus-
tice.1 2 The qualified privilege recognizes that the relationship is important,
but that in some instances society's interest in learning the truth requires that
the privilege be waived.' 3
Reflecting this balancing process, the North Carolina legislature long ago
codified the physician-patient, 14 psychologist-client, 15 school counselor-stu-
dent, 16 and marital therapist-client 17 privileges as qualified privileges.' 8 After
defining what information is privileged and in what circumstances the privi-
lege attaches,19 each privilege statute concludes with a qualifying or disclosure
proviso that permits a judge to compel disclosure if he believes it necessary to
11. Note, Relational Privileges, supra note 9, at 630. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 50 (1980) (testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges "must be strictly construed and ac-
cepted 'only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant
evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principal of utilizing all ra-
tional means for ascertaining truth.'") (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
The balancing of these interests is one of the factors in Dean Wigmore's test for the validity
of any confidential communications privilege. To be valid the privilege must meet all of the fol-
lowing criteria:
1) The communication must originate in a confidence that they [sic] will not be
disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory mainte-
nance of the relation between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedu-
lously fostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication
must be greater than the beneft thereby gained for the correct disposal of the litigation.
Note, Pillow Talk, Grimgribbers and Connubial Bliss: The Marital Communication Privilege, 56
IND. L.J. 121, 135 (1980) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285
(J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)) (the author contends that the marital communications privilege,
considered infra at text accompanying note 50, fails the Wigmore test) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Pillow Talk].
12. Note, Relational Privileges, supra note 9, at 631.
13. Id. See Note, Physician-Patient Privilege-Compelling Disclosure of Privileged Informa-
tion-Discretion of the Trial Judge, 41 N.C.L. REV. 627, 628 (1963). See also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 8-53, -53.3, -53.4, -53.5 (Supp. 1983) (permitting judges to compel disclosure of information
privileged under physician-patient, psychologist-client, school counselor, and marital therapist-
client privileges when "necessary to a proper administration of justice").
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (Supp. 1983).
15. 1d. § 8-53.3.
16. Id. § 8-53.4.
17. Id. § 8-53.5.
18. At common law none of these relational privileges existed. See Sims v. Charlotte Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 36, 125 S.E.2d 326, 329 (1962); State v. Bryant, 5 N.C. App. 21, 25, 167
S.E.2d 841, 845 (1969); see also H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, §§ 54, 63; Note, supra note 13, at 627.
19. Generally, the relational privileges can be invoked only when the communications sought
to be excluded are necessary for the professional to effectively render his services. 1 H. BRANDIS,
supra note 2, § 63, at 252 & n.28;see Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Boddie, 194 N.C. 199, 139 S.E. 228
(1927); In Re Johnson, 36 N.C. App. 133, 243 S.E.2d 386 (1978). This necessitates that there be a
valid confidential or professional relationship at the time the information was acquired. 1 H.
BRANDIS, supra § 63, at 251-52 n.27 ; see State v. Hollingsworth, 263 N.C. 158, 139 S.E.2d 235
(1964); Barnhart, Theory of Testimonial Competency and Privilege, 4 ARK. L. REV. 377, 403-04
(1950). Because the communications must be confidential to qualify for the privilege, the presence
of a third party invalidates the privilege. C. McCoRMicK, supra note 10, § 101. The privilege
belongs to the recipient of the services and only he can waive or assert it. I H. BRANDIS, supra note
2, § 63 at 251 nn.24-25; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 102; Barnhart, supra, at 404-05. See
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a proper administration of justice.20 House Bill 235 amended these provisos,
clarifying under what circumstances a judge may exercise his discretion to
compel disclosure and which judges have jurisdiction to so compel disclo-
sure.21 In addition, by making physicians, psychologists, and marital ther-
apists incompetent to testify in divorce and alimony proceedings "concerning
information acquired while rendering [marital] counseling, '22 the bill limits a
judge's discretion to compel disclosure in such actions.
The qualifying proviso to the pre-1983 section 8-53 stated that "the court
... or the Industrial Commission" may order disclosure of privileged infor-
mation.23 Because only the trial judge "[was] so involved in the case as to be
able adequately to protect the rights of a party who asserts his privilege,"24 the
courts held that this language applied only to the judge or Industrial Commis-
sion before which the action was pending. 25 As amended in 1983, however,
section 8-53 permits any resident or presiding judge or the Industrial Commis-
sion to compel disclosure at or before trial.26
House Bill 235's amendments to sections 8-53.3, 8-53.4, and 8-53.5 also
permit compelled disclosure at or before trial.27 This is a significant change.
Although the old sections did not prohibit pretrial disclosure, they did not
authorize it expressly.28 There is little authority interpreting the pre-1983 sec-
tions, but they may have been subject to the same limitation imposed on sec-
tion 8-53 prior to the 1969 amendment expressly permitting pretrial
disclosure. 29 Courts had held that since section 8-53 did not authorize pretrial
disclosure, there could be none.30 When section 8-53 was amended in 1969,
the other privilege sections were not. The court of appeals, however, deter-
mined that, by allowing pretrial disclosure under section 8-53, the legislature
also had intended to allow disclosure under section 8-53.3.31 The 1983
Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962). See generally N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 8-53 to -53.5 (Supp. 1983).
20. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-53, -53.3 to -53.5 (Supp. 1983).
21. See supra note 1. See infra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 1. This act subjects the disclosure provisos in the physician-patient, psy-
chologist-client, and marital therapist-client privileges to the limitations of § 8-53.6. Section 8-
53.6 bars the testimony of these witnesses when their testimony concerns information gained while
rendering marital counseling in divorce and alimony proceedings.
23. As amended in 1969 the disclosure proviso of N.C. GEN. STAT § 8-53 (1981), amended by
id. § 8-53 (Supp. 1983) provided that "the court, either at the trial orprior thereto, or the Indus-
trial Commission pursuant to law may compel such disclosure if in his opinion the same is neces-
sary to a proper administration ofjustice." (emphasis added) The 1969 amendment added the
words ",or prior thereto."
24. Carter v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 52 N.C. App. 520, 528, 278 S.E.2d 893, 897,
disc. re. denied, 304 N.C. 193, 285 S.E.2d 96 (1981).
25. See, e.g., id.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (Supp. 1983).
27. See supra note 1.
28. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-53.3 to -53.5 (1981).
29. Act of June 19, 1969, ch. 914, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1134 at 1059.
30. See, e.g., Johnston v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 262 N.C. 253, 256, 136 S.E.2d 587, 590
(1964); Lockwood v. McCaskill, 261 N.C. 754,758-59, 136 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1964); Carter v. Colonial
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 52 N.C. App. 520, 527-28, 278 S.E.2d 893, 897, disc. rev. denied, 304 N.C.
193, 285 S.E.2d 96 (1981).
31. In re Albemarle Mental Health Center, 42 N.C. App. 292, 299-300, 256 S.E.2d 818, 823
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amendment removes any doubt that judges have discretion under each section
to compel pretrial disclosure.
Unlike the proviso to section 8-53, the new provisos to sections 8-53.3, 8-
53.4, and 8-53.5 do not grant the Industrial Commission power to compel dis-
closure; rather, they limit this power to resident or presiding judges in the
district where the case is pending.32 Since section 8-53 does not use the words
"in the district where the case is pending," it may permit an independent ac-
tion to compel disclosure of privileged information. 33 On the other hand, sec-
tions 8-53.3 to 8-53.5 limit jurisdiction to the "judge in the district in which the
action is pending."'34 Thus, these sections may foreclose independent actions
to compel psychologists, school counselors, and marital therapists to make
pretrial disclosure of confidential communications. 35 The limitation also may
negate or restrict the express grant of authority to compel disclosure prior to
trial.36
The jurisdiction to compel disclosure granted in amended sections 8-53,
8-53.3, 8-53.4, and 8-53.5 may not be as broad as it appears. Each of the new
disclosure provisos concludes: "[I]f the case is in district court the judge shall
be a district court judge, and if the case is in superior court the judge shall be a
superior court judge. ' 37 This language further restricts a judge's discretion to
compel disclosure once an action has been commenced.
Although House Bill 235 expanded the grant of jurisdiction in the disclo-
sure provisos to sections 8-53, 8-53.3, and 8-53.5, the Bill also severely limited
(1979). The court thought it "wholly inconsistent to allow disclosure in the case of a physician-
patient relationship while, in . . . the psychologist-patient relationship, precluding the required
disclosure until the time of trial." Id. at 297, 256 S.E.2d at 822.
Without pretrial compelled disclosure, preparation for trial is difficult. The normal practice
probably has been for parties to waive the privileges before trial to facilitate discovery and settle-
ment negotiations. Blakey, New Statutes and Old Problems in Marital and in Doctor-Patient and
Psychologist-Patient and Other Therapist Privileges in SECOND ANNUAL NORTH CAROLINA EvI-
DENCE SEMINAR JUNE 17-18, 1983 § 8 (available at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
Law Library).
32. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-53.3 to -53.5 (Supp. 1983).
33. Blakey, supra note 31, § 8, at 13.
34. See supra note 32.
35. Prior to the current amendment, the court of appeals approved use of an in camera hear-
ing to determine whether disclosure of confidential information by staff of a mental health center
was "necessary to a proper administration ofjustice." In re Albemarle Mental Health Center, 42
N.C. App. at 298, 256 S.E.2d at 822; see supra note 31. The court stated that the use of a separate
hearing to determine whether the administration of justice required disclosure was the most effec-
tive and practical way "to effectuate the intent of the [disclosure] proviso." In re Albemarle
Mental Health Center, 42 N.C. App. at 296, 256 S.E.2d at 822.
36. Since only judges in the district where the action is pending can compel disclosure under
§§ 8-53.3 to -53.5, it is implied that the action must be commenced before there can be any com-
pulsion of disclosure. Consequently, pretrial disclosure may be restricted to actions that have
been filed but have not yet come to trial.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-53, -53.3, -53.5 (Supp. 1983). The statement of this restriction in
§ 8-53.4 differs slightly by substituting "the" for "a" in the phrase limiting cases in the district
court. See id. §§ 8-53, -53.3 to -53.5. The phrase in § 8-53.4 addressing cases in superior court is
identical to the limitations in the other sections. No explanation is given for this difference in
treatment of cases in district and superior court. It illogically implies that only the judge before
whom the case is pending may compel disclosure when the case is in district court, while any
superior court judge may compel disclosure when the case is in superior court.
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a judge's discretion to compel disclosure in divorce and alimony proceedings.
House Bill 235 added section 8-53.6, which provides:
No disclosure in alimony and divorce actions.-
In an action pursuant to G.S. 50-5, 50-6, 50-7, 50-16.2 and 50-16.3 if
either or both parties have sought and obtained marital counseling
by a licensed physician, licensed psychologist, or certified marital
family therapist, the person or persons rendering such counseling
shall not be competent to testify in the action concerning information
acquired while rendering such counselling.38
This section expressly applies to sections 8-53, 8-53.3, and 8-53.5. 39
Incompetency to testify differs from privilege. Incompetency can be
raised by either party to an action, while a privilege can be asserted only by
the holder of the privilege.n° Making physicians, psychologists, and marital
therapists incompetent to testify in divorce proceedings will have two effects.
First, objection now may be made by either party to prevent the witness from
testifying about information acquired while giving marital counseling.4' Sec-
ond, not only will the witness be prohibited from disclosing information con-
cerning the marital relations, he also will be precluded from disclosing any
information acquired as a marriage counselor. 42
Although codified as a privilege, section 8-53.6 is defined in terms of com-
petency. Thus, it does not belong solely to the person receiving counseling;
either spouse may invoke it regardless of whether he or she participated in the
counseling session.43 Nor may one spouse waive the privilege over the objec-
tion of the other. Even if there is no objection to the witness' testimony, the
court may exclude the testimony on its own initiative.44 Note also, the ordi-
nary physician-patient or other relational privilege can be raised only if the
information sought to be excluded was acquired in a valid physician-patient or
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.6 (Supp. 1983); supra note 1. Although § 8-53.6 is stated in terms
of "competency," the courts may treat it as a privilege. If N.C. R. EvID. 601(a) is interpreted as
abolishing all rules of competency-as making all persons competent to be witnesses- § 8-53.6
could be interpreted as creating a privilege. Rule 601(a) provides that all persons are competent to
be witnesses unless one of the new rules of evidence makes them incompetent. There is no rule of
incompetency comparable to § 8-53.6. New rule 501, however, explicitly preserves the current
statutory and common-law privileges; thus, § 8-53.6 may fall under this heading. See N.C. R.
EviD. 501. It is significant, however, that § 8-53.6 makes witnesses incompetent to testify, rather
than merely granting a privilege to exclude the counselor's testimony. This indicates that the
section should be treated as a rule of exclusion instead of as a mere privilege.
39. The provisos to these sections allow compulsion of disclosure subject to § 8-53.6. The
school counselor privilege § 8-53.4, however, is not subject expressly to § 8-53.6.
40. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 73. Although it makes the witnesses incompetent to
testify, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.6 (1983) resembles a rule of privilege more than a rule of compe-
tency or exclusion-it rests upon the desire to protect and foster the confidentiality of a special
relationship-rather than the desire to bar irrelevant or unreliable evidence.
41. See I H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 63, at 73 n.25 (Supp. 1983).
42. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 63, at 73 n.27.
43. See I H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 63, at 73 n.25.
44. The judge can exclude the testimony because the section makes the witness incompetent
as opposed to merely granting a privilege. See I H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 63, at 73 n.24 (Supp.
1983). Admission of testimony if neither objects, however, is not prejudicial error. Id. See also
Barnhart, supra note 19, at 404-05.
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other professional relationship 4 5 Section 8-53.6, however, probably can be
used to exclude marriage counseling confidences irrespective of whether there
was a formal physician-patient relationship.4 6 The statute is silent about
whether in actions other than divorce and alimony proceedings a judge may
compel disclosure of information acquired during marital counseling. Pre-
sumably, such disclosure would be within a judge's discretion since the statute
does not prohibit it.47
House Bill 235 makes significant changes in the relational privileges stat-
utes. It does not, however, resolve all the issues that have arisen under these
privileges. Foremost among these issues is the scope of judicial discretion to
compel disclosure. 48 Delineation of the bounds of a judge's discretion turns
on the meaning of "necessary to a proper administration of justice." This defi-
nition has been left to the courts.
In addition to amending certain privileges, in 1983 the General Assembly
rewrote the statute governing spousal testimony in criminal actions. House Bill
6649 radically changed the scope of spousal testimony in criminal actions by
permitting a defendant's spouse to testify against him. At common law,
spouses could not testify for or against each other in a criminal action.50 Ex-
ceptions to this rule permit spouses to testify for each other, and in some in-
stances against one another.5 1 Nearly all the exceptions, judicial and
45. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 63, at 251-52 nn.27-28.
46. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 63, at 75 n.27 (Supp. 1983).
47. If the privilege exists to encourage people to seek marital counseling and to make a com-
plete and full disclosure of their marital and personal problems, then the privilege should be
absolute. On the other hand, if society's interest in learning the truth outweighs the importance of
this relationship, then the privilege should be qualified in all actions, even divorce and alimony
proceedings.
48. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that it is not abuse of discretion for a judge
to refuse to compel disclosure of hospital records and medical reports that would have shown the
insured had falsified her claim of good health and medical history on an application for a life
insurance policy. See Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).
A student note criticizing this decision argues that it is abuse of discretion not to compel "disclo-
sure of evidence which would materially alter the outcome of the litigation involved." Note, supra
note 13, at 633. In Sims the jury found for the beneficiaries of the life insurance policy. Sims, 257
N.C. at 34, 125 S.E.2d at 328.
On occasion, the courts have held that a trial judge must enter a finding of necessity to justify
compelling disclosure. Id at 38, 128 S.E.2d at 321; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Boddie, 194 N.C.
199, 139 S.E. 228 (1927). Other decisions presume a finding of necessity when a judge compels
disclosure and reject the premise that a judge must make such an entry in the record. In re
Johnson, 36 N.C. App. 133, 243 S.E.2d 386 (1978); State v. Bryant 5 N.C. App. 21, 167 S.E.2d 841
(1969). See I H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 63, at 253 n.33.
49. Act of Apr. 13, 1983, ch. 170, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 39 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57
(1981)).
50. At common law the husband-wife privilege was absolute; neither could testify in a civil or
criminal action in which the other was a party. See State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. 124, 127 (1852) ("[A]
contrary rule would break down or weaken the great principles which protect the sanctities of the
marriage state."). See also 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, §§ 58-59; C. McCoRMICK, supra note 10,
§ 78. For a discussion of the origins and evolution of the husband-wife privileges, see Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980); State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 593-94, 276 S.E.2d 450,
452-53 (1981); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 78; Note, State v. Freeman: Adverse Marital
Testimony in a North Carolina Criminal Actions-Can Spousal Testimony Be Compelled?, 60
N.C.L. REv. 874, 877-78 (1982).
51. Spouses were made competent to testify on behalf of one another by statute. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1981); 1 H.BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 59; C. McCoRMICK, supra note 10, § 78
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statutory, preserve in some form a privilege making spouses incompetent to
testify as to confidential communications between them.52
Typical of the statutory exceptions to the common-law prohibition on
spousal testimony is former North Carolina General Statutes section 8-57, 5"
which made a defendant's spouse competent to testify on his behalf, while
allowing the defendant to prevent disclosure of confidential communications
made during the marriage.54 Section 8-57 also made a defendant's spouse
compellable to testify against him regarding certain crimes against their chil-
dren or the witness spouse.-5 Otherwise a defendant's spouse remained
(English Act of 1853). Adverse spousal testimony, however, continued to be prohibited although
exceptions evolved making defendants' spouses competent to testify against them in a few situa-
tions. See, e.g., State v. Alford, 274 N.C. 125, 129-30, 161 S.E.2d 575, 578 (1968) (adverse spousal
testimony was permitted at common law when husband struck wife with ax; when wife tried to
murder husband by poisoning; and when wife was charged with assault and battery with a dan-
gerous weapon); State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. 127 (1852) (wife may be a witness against her husband
in prosecution for felonies or attempted felonies perpetrated on her and for assault and battery,
but only for those which inflict lasting and great bodily harm).
52. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 60; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 78. See State v.
Brittain, 117 N.C. 623, 625, 23 S.E. 433, 433 (1895) Communications before or after the marriage,
however, are not protected. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 81; see I H. BRANDIS, supra note 2,
§ 60. This protection of confidential communications is permanent and survives divorce and even
death of one spouse. Id. § 60, at 240 n.72; C. McCoRN1sCK,supra note 10, § 85; Note, Pillow Talk,
supra note 11, at 132.
McCormick argues that the privilege should safeguard only those expressions (acts or state-
ments) "intended by one spouse to convey a meaning or message to the other." C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 10, § 79, at 163-64 n.18. As McCormick points out, however, many courts let the
privilege protect almost any acts done by one spouse solely in the presence of the other, regardless
of whether intended to be communications and any information that would not have been ac-
quired, but for the marriage. Id. § 79, at 164 nn.21-24; Note, Pillow Talk, supra note 11, at 128.
See State v. Alford, 274 N.C. 125, 130, 161 S.E.2d 575, 579 (1968) (privilege protects all matters
that occurred during the marriage). Despite the fact that the confidential communications shield
is a privilege, many courts treat it as a rule of competency and allow any party to object and
prohibit the revelation of confidential communications. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 290 N.C.
431, 226 S.E.2d 487 (1976) (treating privilege as competency); State v. McCall, 289 N.C. 570, 223
S.E.2d 334 (1976) (failure to exclude evidence inadmissible because of this privilege is reversible
error even if no objection made). When treated as a privilege it usually is held that the communi-
cating spouse is the holder of the privilege and therefore the only one who can assert or waive it. I
H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 60, at 240-41 nn.74-76: C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 83, at 169
nn.62-64; Note, Pillow Talk, supra note 11, at 130-31. See Hicks v. Hicks, 271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E.2d
799 (1967) (privilege belongs to communicating spouse and only he can waive); see also infra note
84 and accompanying text. But see Hagedorn v. Hagedorn, 211 N.C. 175, 179 S.E. 507, 509 (1937)
(privilege belongs to witness spouse and she may waive); see also Note, Privileged Communlea.
tions, supra note 9, at 282-85; infra note 54 & 77 and accompanying text.
53. See generally Note, RelationalPrivileges, supra note 9, at 636-38; Note, Spousal Teslitnony.
in Criminal Proceedings-State v. Freeman, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 990, 999-1001 (198 1).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1981) only prohibits compulsion of confidential communica-
tions made during the marriage. It is not clear whether the privilege belongs to the communicat-
ing or hearing spouse, or both. See supra note 52; infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. The
witness spouse should be able to reveal confidential communications when testifying for the de-
fendant spouse. When courts treat this privilege as a rule of competency, however, the State may
be able to prevent such testimony even though both spouses are willing to waive the privilege. See
supra note 52.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1981) made a defendant's spouse competent and compellable to
give evidence against the defendant in any criminal action or proceeding,
to prove the fact of marriage and facts tending to show the absence of divorce or annull-
ment in cases of bigamy and in cases of criminal cohabitation. . . and. . . for an as-
sault upon the other spouse ... for communicating a threat to the other spouse. . . for
trespass upon the separate residence of the other spouse . . . for any criminal offense
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neither competent nor compellable to give evidence against him in any crimi-
nal prosecution.56 The rationale for excluding adverse spousal testimony was
to preserve marital harmony.57
The 1983 revision of section 8-5758 makes a defendant's spouse competent
to testify for the State in any criminal action. Although subsection (a) was
reworded slightly, it continues the rule of old section 8-57---competence to
testify on behalf of a defendant spouse-and preserves the prohibition against
prejudicial use of a defendant's failure to call his spouse as a witness.59 As in
former section 8-57,60 subsection (a) of the revised section subjects a defend-
ant's spouse who testifies on behalf of the defendant to potential cross-
examination.61
Before the current amendment, section 8-57 had been interpreted as pre-
serving, except for the statutory exceptions, the common-law rules against ad-
verse spousal testimony.62 It followed from this interpretation that the
common-law exceptions were preserved as well.63 Consequently, in State v.
against a ... minor child of either spouse or ... for abandonment, or for neglecting to
provide for the spouse's support, or the support of the children of such spouse ....
Id. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 59.
The purpose of these exceptions was to permit a spouse to testify when one spouse committed
a felony against the other or a child of either of them. The narrowness of the exceptions, however,
caused the anomalous result of preventing adverse spousal testimony in many cases involving
serious crimes perpetrated by one against the other. See Blakey, Moving Towards An Evidence
Law of General Principles: Several Suggestions Concerning An Evidence Code for North Carolina,
13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 32 (1981). See, e.g., State v. Reavis, 19 N.C. App. 497, 199 S.E.2d 139 (1973)
(because arson is not one of the exceptions to § 8-57 it was error to permit wife to testify against
her husband for allegedly burning her mobile home even though they had been living apart).
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1981).
57. See State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 595, 276 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1981). This privilege, it is
argued, protects society from the distasteful drama of a wife testifying against her husband. See
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 78; Note, Pillow Talk, supra note 11, at 125.
58. See supra note 7.
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (Supp. 1983). Section 8-57 contains two privileges: one against
compulsion of adverse spousal testimony and one for confidential communications.
60. Compare id. § 8-57 (1981) ("but the failure of such witness to be examined shall not be
used to the prejudice of the defense") with id. § 8-57 (Supp. 1983) ("but the failure of the defend-
ant to call such spouse as a witness shall not be used against him"). Although the language has
been changed, the meaning seems to be the same. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 59, at 70 n.59
(Supp. 1983). This language prohibits the prosecution from commenting on a spouse's failure to
testify for the defendant. See State v. Thompson, 290 N.C. 431, 226 S.E.2d 487 (1976); State v.
McCall, 289 N.C. 570, 223 S.E.2d 334 (1976); 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 59, at 238-39 nn.59-
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1981) (defendant not authorized to compel his spouse to testify for
him-neither before nor after the current amendment). 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 59, at 70
n.59 (Supp. 1983).
61. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1981); id. (Supp. 1983); 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 59, at
239 nn.65-66. Both versions of § 8-57 provide that a spouse called as a witness is subject to cross-
examination.
62. No statute provides that a wife is not a competent witness against her husband in any
criminal action or proceeding. Section 8-57, and statutes on which it is based, simply provide that
rules of the common law with reference to whether a husband is competent to testify against his
wife or a wife is competent to testify against her husband in a criminal action or proceeding are
unaffected by those statutes. State v. Alford, 274 N.C. 125, 129, 161 S.E.2d 575, 577-78 (1968). See
also State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 594, 276 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1981); 1 H. BRANDIs, supra note 2,
§ 59, at 234 n.45.
63. State v. Overton, 60 N.C. App. 1, 38, 298 S.E.2d 695, 717 (1982) (§ 8-57 "is a codification
of a common-law rule" and, therefore, subject to common-law exceptions).
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Freeman64 the North Carolina Supreme Court determined that the common-
law rule against adverse spousal testimony no longer complied "with the pur-
poses for which it was created," 65 and held that "spouses shall be incompetent
to testify against one another in a criminal proceeding only if the substance of
the testimony concerns a 'confidential communication' between the marriage
partners made during the duration of their marriage. '66 This decision abol-
ished all rights of a criminal defendant to prevent adverse spousal testimony
except with regard to confidential communications. 67 The Freeman court ap-
proved the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Trammel v.
United States,68 but adopted a different rule.69 In Trammel, a spouse was
willing to testify against her husband,70 and the Court altered the common-
law rule against adverse spousal testimony by holding that the spouse was
competent but not compellable to testify.7 '
The Freeman court did not explain its reasoning, perhaps because the
question of compellability was not directly before it.72 As a result, although
Freeman clarified that a witness spouse was only incompetent to testify to
"confidential communications," the decision left unclear whether the spouse
could be compelled to testify.
64. 302 N.C. 591, 276 S.E.2d 450 (1981).
65. Id. at 594, 276 S.E.2d at 452.
66. Id. at 596, 276 S.E.2d at 453.
67. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 59, at 234-35 n.46-48; Blakey, supra note 58, at 33;
Note, supra note 50, at 874. The Freeman court's interpretation of § 8-57 and its assertion of
authority to change the common-law privilege against adverse spousal testimony is criticized in
Note, supra note 53, at 990.
68. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
69. The Supreme Court changed the rule of Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958)
(defendant can bar his spouse's adverse testimony) by vesting the adverse spousal testimony privi-
lege in the witness spouse. "[T]he witness spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify [ad-
versely]; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying." Trammel,
445 U.S. at 53. The court reasoned that:
When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding-
whatever the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is
probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve. In these
circumstances a rule of evidence that permits an accused to prevent adverse spousal testi-
mony seems far more likely to frustrate justice than to foster family peace.
Id. at 52.
The North Carolina court also determined that the rule "sweeps more broadly than its justifi-
cation." Freeman, 302 N.C. at 595, 276 S.E.2d at 453. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51. The court was
not convinced that refusing to allow Mrs. Freeman to testify that her husband shot her brother
would bolster defendant's marriage. Unlike the rule in Trammel, the rule announced by the court
in Freeman adopted no position as to whether the adverse spousal testimony was compellable.
70. Their reasons for testifying, however, differed. Mrs. Freeman was estranged from her
husband and was present when he shot her brother. Freeman, 302 N.C. at 592, 276 S.E.2d at 45 1.
Mrs. Trammel agreed to testify against her husband in exchange for a grant of immunity in a
narcotics prosecution. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 42.
71. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53; see supra note 71.
72. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 59, at 235 n.48; Blakey, supra note 31, at 4; Note, supra
note 50, at 876.
In the recent case of State v. Waters, 308 N.C. 348, 302 S.E.2d 188 (1983), the court again was
faced with a spouse willing to testify against her husband. The court reaffirmed the Freeman rule
and stated that it would not address the issue of whether the spouse could be compelled to testify
for the prosecution. Id. at 356, 302 S.E.2d at 193-94. Thus, compulsion of adverse spousal testi-
mony remained an open question.
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Subsection (b) of the new section 8-57 resolved this question by vesting
the privilege in the witness spouse.73 A defendant's spouse remains competent
and compellable to testify against the defendant in the same instances as under
former section 8-57. Under the new rule, however, the spouse of a defendant
is competent, but not compellable, to testify for the State in a criminal trial. A
witness now can choose whether to testify against his or her spouse. Like the
rule announced in Trammel, subsection (b) brings the privilege within the
scope of its justification. If the privilege against adverse spousal testimony
exists to promote and preserve marital harmony,74 it is now available to the
person best able to determine whether there is any harmony to preserve. No
longer is adverse testimony prohibited to promote marital harmony regardless
of whether such harmony exists.
Section 8-57(b) has been criticized for allowing a spouse to choose
whether to testify in most actions for crimes of which she was the victim, while
making her compellable only in cases of assault, threat, or trespass upon her
separate residence.75 Making a witness compellable to testify to crimes against
the children or failure to support them is sound policy; society's interest in
ensuring the safety and support of children outweighs concern for the preser-
vation of marital harmony.76
Although it abolishes a defendant's absolute privilege to prevent adverse
spousal testimony, revised section 8-57 fortifies the confidential communica-
tions privilege.77 Subsection (c) provides that "[n]o husband or wife shall be
compellable in any event to disclose any confidential communication made by
one to the other during their marriage. ' 78 The "in any event" language makes
it clear that the confidential communications privilege applies in all circum-
stances.79 In another change, the confidential communications privilege is
73. By making a defendant's spouse competent but not compellable to testify against him,
House Bill 66 prevents a defendant from barring his spouse's testimony, and gives the decision to
testify to the witness spouse. The defendant, however, still has a privilege for confidential commu-
nications. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (Supp. 1983).
74. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52; Freeman, 302 N.C. at 595, 276 S.E.2d at 452-53; supra notes
60, 67.
75. Blakey, supra note 31, at 5. The effect of giving the spouse the option of testifying may
make the spouse compellable to testify adversely. When spouses are codefendants, the offer of
leniency or immunity in exchange for adverse testimony leaves a spouse with little choice at all.
See, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. at 42; supra note 70.
76. Id.
77. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (Supp.- 1983); 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 60, at 70 n.67
(Supp. 1983); Blakey, supra note 31, at 5. The test for whether something is a confidential commu-
nication is "whether the communication, whatever it contains, was induced by the marital rela-
tionship and prompted by the affection, confidence, and loyalty engendered by such relationship."
Freeman, 302 N.C. at 598, 276 S.E.2d at 454. See supra notes 52-54.
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (Supp. 1983).
79. See I H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 60, at 71 n.79 (Supp. 1983) (" 'in any event' was
intended to make it clear that this privilege still applies in the situations in which. . . testimony of
a spouse is compellable").
If confidential communications are not subject to the compulsion exceptions there is a direct
conflict between § 8-57 and the child abuse statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57.1 (1981). Under § 8-
57.1 the confidential communications privilege cannot be claimed in actions for the neglect or
abuse of a child. Id. § 8-57.1; 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 60, at 241 n.79. Since House Bill 66
does not repeal § 8-57.1, confidential communications still should be subject to the limitation in
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now codified after rather than before the exceptions making spouses compella-
ble to testify in certain criminal prosecutions. From this change in placement,
it can be inferred that the privilege remains in effect even when the testimony
of the spouse is compellable; thus, a spouse never can be compelled to reveal
confidential communications made during the marriage.
Because section 8-57 gives a defendant's spouse the option to testify in
most instances, the statute arguably can be read as vesting the confidential
communications privilege in the witness spouse as well.80 Under this interpre-
tation the witness spouse could testify about confidential communications if
she chose to; only compulsion of confidential communication, not voluntary
disclosure, would be prohibited by revised section 8-57. In Hagedorn v.
Hagedornsl decided under an earlier version of section 8-57, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court adopted just such a position, giving the witness spouse
alone the choice of testifying about confidential communications.8 2 For sev-
enty-five years prior to Hagedorn, the court consistently had interpreted the
statute as preserving the common-law rule that only the communicating
spouse could waive the privilege, and that the hearing spouse could not reveal
such communications over the objection of the communicating spouse.8 3 Sub-
sequent decisions have refused to follow Hagedorn and have held that the
privilege belongs solely to the communicating spouse; the hearing spouse can-
not waive the privilege over his objection.84 This interpretation is consistent
with the rule in most jurisdictions,85 and appears correct in view of the justifi-
cation of the privilege-to allow "marriage partners to speak freely to each
other in confidence without fear of being thereafter confronted with the con-
fession in litigation."86
The full impact of the changes in section 8-57 will not be known until the
courts interpret them. One possible effect is that "confidential communica-
tions" will be given a broader meaning to afford the defendant some protec-
tion since he can no longer prevent his spouse from testifying against him.8 7
that section. See I H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 59, at 69-70 n.51, § 60, at 71 n.79 (Supp. 1983)
(there is no repeal clause but statutes creating exceptions to § 8-57 may be repealed to the extent
they are inconsistent); Blakey, supra 31, at 5 (even if confidential communications are not subject
to the subsection (b) exceptions they are subject to § 8-57.1).
80. Blakey, supra note 31, at 5-6.
81. 211 N.C. 175, 189 S.E. 507 (1937).
82. Id. at 177, 189 S.E. at 509.
83. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 60; Note, Privileged Communications, supra note 9, at 284-
85.
84. Hicks v. Hicks, 271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E.2d 799 (1967). See I H. BRANDIS, supra note 2,
§ 60, at 240 n.76 ("For all practical purposes, Hicks ...overruled Hagedorn."); Blakey, supra
note 31, at 6. But see Biggs v. Biggs, 253 N.C. 10, 116 S.E.2d 178 (1960) (approves rule of
Hagedorn) (dictum).
85. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 2, § 60. See, e.g., ARiz. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2231, -2232 (1980);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90:509, :504 (West 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516: 27 (1974). See also
Freeman, 302 N.C. at 594 n.l, 276 S.E.2d at 453 n.1 (statutes collected); Trammel, 445 U.S. at 40.
86. Freeman, 302 N.C. at 594-95, 276 S.E.2d at 453-54.
87. See Blakey, supra note 55, at 33 (privilege for confidential communications not broad
enough); Blakey, supra note 31, at 7 ("It is possible. . . that the abolition of the separate privilege
for criminal defendants by Freeman and new N.C.G.S. § 8-57 will lead to a broad interpretation
of the term 'confidential communication' in marital situations.").
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This will depend on how the courts interpret the choice given to a spouse in
subsection (b) and the function of the confidential communications privilege
in subsection (c). If the courts adopt a position similar to Hagedorn88 and
allow the witness spouse to choose to reveal confidential communications, a
broader definition of such communications will have little effect unless the
spouse was compelled to testify. On the other hand, if section 8-57 continues
to vest the privilege in the communicating spouse, a broader definition of
"confidential communications" will go far in limiting a spouse's choice under
subsection (b).
Although the biggest change in North Carolina evidence law in 1983 was
the adoption of a code of evidence, certain lesser changes may have a major
impact on North Carolina law. House Bill 235 revised the statutory privileges
accorded certain professionals and clarified when a judge may override those
privileges in the interest of justice. The bill also limited the judge's discretion
to compel disclosure of confidential communications in proceedings for di-
vorce or alimony. House Bill 66 articulated a revised standard for when a
person can choose to testify, or be compelled to testify, against his spouse.
These statutes eliminate some of the confusion surrounding the prior law. At
the same time, however, they create new uncertainties.
WILLIAM R. PURCELL, II
88. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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Continued Resistance to the Inclusion of Personnel Policies
in Contracts of Employment: Griffin v. Housing
Authority of Durham
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the inequality of
bargaining power between employers and employees that often leaves employ-
ees helpless against their employers' arbitrary and reprehensible treatment.,
Under the employment-at-will doctrine, however, unless an employment con-
tract specifies a definite term of employment, an employer may discharge an
employee for "good cause, or for no cause, or even for bad cause."'2 This
doctrine was applied uniformly3 until strong criticism from commentators per-
suaded some courts to develop exceptions.4 Recently, some courts have found
an implied contract right to continued employment, absent a good faith reason
for termination.5 Others have created a cause of action in tort protecting em-
ployees against abusive or retaliatory discharges in contravention of public
policy. 6 The North Carolina courts, however, have been reluctant to follow
the modem trend relaxing the employment-at-will doctrine. In Grfi/n v. Hous-
ingAuthority of Durham7 the North Carolina Court of Appeals again refused
to adopt a rule that would have diminished the harshness of the at-will
doctrine.
In Griffin the city of Durham discharged plaintiff from his position as
Director of Operations as part of a reorganization plan. Plaintiff alleged that
the discharge breached his employment .contract because it did not comply
with the procedures for discharge set forth in defendant's personnel policy.8
Although the court of appeals concluded that the Authority had complied with
1. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1936). See generally, Blades,
Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power,
67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967).
2. Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884). See Hutton v. Waters, 132
Tenn. 527, 540-44, 179 S.W. 134, 137-38 (1915) (upholding employer's right to fire at will).
3. "The rule's influence on the employment relationship in this country has been so perva-
sive that modern legal writing frequently accepts the doctrine without inquiring into its logic or its
applicability to current employment conditions." Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security,
26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 335 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Blades, supra note I; Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissak
Time/or a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Note, supra note 3.
5. Eg., Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
6. Eg., Peterman v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959) (discharge for refusal to give perjured testimony); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260
Ind. 249,297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (discharge for filing workers' compensation claim); Nees v. Hocks,
272 Or. 210,536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge for reporting for jury service in violation of employer's
orders).
7. 62 N.C. App. 556, 303 S.E.2d 200 (1983).
8. Plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to do the following as required by defendant's per-
sonnel policies: (1) dismiss plaintiff pursuant to proper action by defendant's Board of Commis-
sioners; (2) offer plaintiff a position of similar or lower pay with defendant; (3) indicate clearly on
plaintiff's papers that his dismissal in no way reflected his ability or performance, so as not to
hinder his ability to obtain gainful employment elsewhere; and (4) give plaintiff notice and a
hearing prior to being dismissed. Record at 2-3, Grin, 62 N.C. App. 556, 303 S.E.2d 200 (1983).
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its personnel policies, it held that defendant was not obligated to follow its
personnel policies because they were amended after plaintiff was hired and
were not incorporated expressly in plaintiff's contract.9
Griffin denies employees an important protection from the employment-
at-will rule. The proposition that personnel policies may establish terms and
conditions of the employment contract is supported by modem contract theory
and has been adopted by several courts. 10 Further analysis of the case law and
commentary concerning incorporation of personnel policies in contracts of
employment should persuade North Carolina courts to reconsider this ques-
tion. Recognition of personnel policies as part of the employment contract
would constitute an important first step toward the goal of eliminating the
employment-at-will doctrine and provide employees needed protection against
the arbitrariness of the doctrine.
Supporters of the doctrine argue that employer power to discharge at will
is essential to the efficient and profitable operation of a business. To abolish
the doctrine would ignore employers' legitimate interest in hiring and retain-
ing the best personnel available. 12 Employers also question whether judges
and juries should be allowed to question business judgments. 13 Evaluation of
high ranking employees crucial to a business' success often involves highly
personal and intuitive judgments that are not translated easily into concrete
justifications.' 4
In addition, some commentators fear that restriction of the employment-
at-will rule will bring a flood of vexatious and costly litigation 5 before juries
sympathetic to employee's "fabricated tales" of employer unfaimess.16 Fear
of litigation will discourage personnel termination decisions and reduce busi-
ness efficiency. 17 This chilling effect is increased by the lack of standards de-
fining what employer conduct violates public policy or implied promises of
good faith.' 8
Opponents of the employment-at-will doctrine have stressed the doc-
trine's severe effects on employee interests, emphasizing the employee's depen-
9. Griffin, 62 N.C. App. at 557, 303 S.E.2d at 201.
10. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980);
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
11. Note, Recognizing the Employee's Interests in Continued Employment-The California
Cause ofActionfor Unjust Dismissal, 12 PAc. L.J. 69, 79 (1980). See also Pierce v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 166 N.J. Super. 335, 341, 399 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1979).
12. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 181, 319 A.2d 174, 179 (1974).
13. See Note, The Development of Exceptions to At- Will Employment: A Review of the Case
Lawfrom Management's Viewpoint, 51 CIN. L. REv. 616, 631-32 (1982) (The traditional refusal to
review the wisdom of decisions made by corporate boards-the business judgment rule-should
be applied to employment decisions.).
14. See Blades, supra note 1, at 1428; Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Excep-
tions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329, 331 (1982).
15. See Note, supra note 13, at 630; Note, Limiting The Right to Terminate at Will-Have The
Courts Forgotten The Employer, 35 VAND. L. REv. 201, 228 (1982).
16. See Blades, supra note 1, at 1428.
17. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 181, 319 A.2d 174, 179 (1974).
18. See Note, supra note 13, at 631; Note, supra note 15, at 228-29.
1984]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEWV
dence on his job as his sole source of income,19 the loss of self esteem
associated with termination of employment,20 and the lack of mobility that
limits alternative employment opportunities. 21 In addition, abandonment of
the employment-at-will rule may improve long-run business productivity by
promoting a stable and loyal workforce, which would reduce the inefficiency
and training costs that arise from employee turnover.22 The experience of
other industrial countries that protect employees against unlawful discharge
suggests that employer concerns over the impact of expanded job security may
be exaggerated. 23 In sum, the employer's absolute right to discharge, "when
weighed against the interests of the employee as an individual, [is] clearly not
justified by the employer's legitimate concerns."'24
The leading case affirming the employment-at-will doctrine in North Car-
olina is Still v. Lance,25 in which the supreme court upheld a school board's
termination of a teacher's contract without cause and reaffirmed employers'
rights to terminate at will "irrespective of the quality of performance by the
other party."26 The court did qualify its holding, stating in dictum that:
Where. . .there is a business usage, or other circumstance, appear-
ing on the record,. . . which shows that, at the time the parties con-
tracted, they intended the employment to continue through a fixed
term, the contract cannot be terminated at an earlier period except
for cause or by mutual consent.27
The federal district court in Thomas v. Ward28 relied on the Still dictum
in holding that language in an employee handbook "served as prima facie
evidence which could lead a teacher to believe that he had tenure after three
years service in the school system."'29 Thomas concluded that this language
entitled the teacher to a hearing prior to discharge.30 No state court, however,
has relied on the Still dictum to find an unlawful discharge, 3 ' and the employ-
19. "We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our
means of livelihood and most of our people have become completely dependent upon
wa~es. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for relief supplied by the
various forms of social security. Such dependence of the mass of the people upon others
for all of their income is something new in the world. For our generation the substance of
lfe ir in another man's hands."
F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951).
20. See Note, supra note 3, at 339.
21. This decreasing mobility arises from decreasing opportunities as employees grow older
and seniority and pension plans pursued by employers increasingly encourage work force stabil-
ity. d. at 338-339. Furthermore, advancing technology leads employees to acquire specialized
skills not readily transferable to other jobs. See Blades, supra note 1, at 1405.
22. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge- The Duty to Terminate
Onyin Good Faith, 93 HAnv. L. REv. 1816, 1830-31 (1980).
23. Id. at 1835-36 (noting the experiences of West Gerany and Japan).
24. Blades, supra note 1, at 1407.
25. 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971).
26. Id. at 259, 182 S.E.2d at 406.
27. Id.
28. 374 F. Supp. 206 (M.D.N.C. 1974), rev'd in part, 529 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1975).
29. Id. at 210 n.4.
30. Id. at 210.
31. Business custom or usage must establish a definite, fixed term of employment and gener-
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ment-at-will doctrine remains firmly entrenched in the common law of North
Carolina. 32
Enforcement of personnel policies as contractual rights is the most rea-
sonable method of limiting the harshness of the employment-at-will doctrine,
particularly since employers benefit from the personnel policies they enact.
Many personnel policies result from a company's desire to keep unions out of
its plants.33 Personnel policies also can build employee morale and conse-
quently increase employee efficiency.34 In this way, they benefit both the em-
ployer and employee, increasing employees' contentment with their jobs,
causing employees to forego their rights to seek other employment, and help-
ing to avoid labor turnover.35 The impracticality and high costs of negotiating
individual employment contracts containing job security provisions have led
employees to rely on standard employment-at-will contracts, 36 but personnel
policies allow the employer to avoid these transaction costs and provide a con-
tract that satisfies the needs of employees.
Nevertheless, in Grin the North Carolina Court of Appeals chose not to
enforce personnel policies. Other courts generally have given three reasons for
not enforcing personnel policies: the lack of mutuality of obligation; the lack
of necessary additional consideration; and the employment-at-will rule's pre-
cedence over any personnel policy restrictions.37 Recently, courts have been
more willing to discard these traditional contract requirements in favor of
modern contract theories that protect the reasonable expectations of employ-
ees and employers alike.38
The primary legal underpinning of the employment-at-will doctrine was
the principle of mutuality of obligation.3 9 Courts following this principle rea-
soned that if an employee could quit his job at will, the employer must have a
ally cannot limit an employer's right to terminate for good cause only. See Roberts v. Wake
Forest Univ., 55 N.C. App. 430, 435-36, 286 S.E.2d 120, 123-24 (custom for golf coaches to serve
long terms and personnel policy statements that employment became permanent after three
months insufficient to establish a "fixed term"), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 586, 292 S.E.2d 571
(1982).
32. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 80, 221 S.E.2d 282, 288 (1975); Dyer v. Brad-
shaw, 54 N.C. App. 136, 139-40, 282 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1981); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36
N.C. App. 293, 297, 244 S.E.2d 272, 275, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
33. Some companies not only duplicate much of union contracts, but also impose on them-
selves policies that are more restrictive than those that may emerge under union contract arrange-
ments. F. FOULKES, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NON UNION COMPANIES 341 (1980).
34. R. Machol & E. Button, HANDBOOK OF MODERN PERSONNEL ADMWNISTRATION § 74-1
(1972).
35. Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 99-100, 291 P.2d 91, 92 (1955).
See also Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 719, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408, 411
(1978).
36. See Note, supra note 22, at 1830-31.
37. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628-29 (Minn.1983); Comment,
Wrongful Termination of Employees at Will- The California Trend, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 259, 264
(1983).
38. See Note, Challenging the Employment-At- Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract The-
ory, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF., 449, 455 (1983).
39. Note, Judicial Limitation of the Employment A4t- Will Doctrine, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 552,
555 (1980).
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corresponding right to terminate the relationship for any or no reason. 40
Thus, the employers should not be bound by promises not to terminate except
for good cause or unless certain procedures were followed.4 1
Hablas v. Armour & Co. 42 demonstrates the inequitable consequences of
adherence to mutuality requirements. In Hablas plaintiff was fired one year
before retirement, losing all company pension rights after forty-five years of
service to defendant. Plaintiff argued that he had been dissuaded from ac-
cepting more lucrative job offers because of repeated reminders from defend-
ant's managers of the retirement benefits he would lose. Plaintiff further
contended that these inducements constituted an implied promise that he
would be retained until retirement, but the court held that because plaintiff
was "at all times free to terminate his employment at will. . . the purported
employment contract [was] void for want of mutuality."43
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has applied similar reasoning, In
Williams v. Biscuitville44 plaintiff alleged that defendant had breached its em-
ployment contract by failing to give a verbal and written warning prior to
discharge, as provided by the company personnel manual. The court held that
since the warning provisions were part of a policy unilaterally implemented by
the employer, the employer could discharge plaintiff in ways other than as set
forth in the policy manual.45
The notion that either both parties are bound or neither is bound has
been discredited by recognition of the validity of the unilateral contract.46 In
a unilateral contract the offeree's bargained for performance is the detriment
that makes the offeror's promise an enforceable contract, despite the absence
of mutuality.47 In response to a defendant's claim of lack of mutuality in an
employment contract context, the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint v.
40. Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 174 La. 66, 69, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932). See also
Gollberg v. Branson Publishing Co., 685 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1982) (specific performance
would constitute a form of involuntary servitude).
41. "It is ironic that application of the mutuality notion to the employment relationships has
been expressed as arising out of a primary concern for the freedom of employees. . . ." Blades,
supra note 1, at 1419 n.71.
42. 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959).
43. Id. at 78. This principle was followed in Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 165 Ind. App. 1, 328
N.E.2d 775 (1975), in which the court held that a personnel policy providing for three warnings
before discharge was unenforceable for want of mutuality of obligation. The court stated that
"[t]here being no binding promise on the part of the employee that he would continue in the
employment, it must also be regarded as terminable at [the employer's] discretion as well." Id. at
5, 328 N.E.2d at 779. See also Edwards v. Citibank, 100 Misc. 2d 59, 60, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270
(1979) (right to just-cause dismissal in personnel policy held unenforceable as being "utterly lack-
ing in mutuality"), af'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1980).
44. 40 N.C. App 405, 253 S.E.2d 18 (1979).
45. Id. at 408, 253 S.E.2d at 20.
46. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 4-14 (1977); See also Armstrong Paint & Var-
nish Works v. Contintental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102, 108, 133 N.E. 711, 714 (1921) (if mutuality were
held to be an essential element in every contract, there could be no such thing as a valid unilateral
or option contract); Scott v. J. F. Duthie & Co., 125 Wash. 470, 216 P. 853 (1923) (principle of
mutuality has no place in the consideration of a unilateral contract).
47. The typical example of an offer of a unilateral contract is: "If you walk across the Brook-
lyn Bridge, I will pay you ten dollars." In this example, the offeree has not been requested to bind
himself to do anything. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 46, § 4-15.
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Blue Cross & Blue Shield48 stated:
[W]hile defendant's analysis has validity with respect to bilateral
contracts or agreements, we note that the typical employment agree-
ment is unilateral in nature . . . the employer makes an offer or
promise which the employee accepts by performing the act upon
which the promise is expressly or impliedly based . . . there is no
contractual requirement that the promisee do more than perform the
act upon which the promise is predicated in order to legally obligate
the promisor.49
Thus, the Toussaint court's unilateral contract analysis allows a finding of
promissory liability of the employer without the necessity of finding a return
promise by the employee.:50
Several courts, including the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Bis-
cuitville,5t have concluded that personnel policies are not enforceable provi-
sions of an employment contract because they are unilateral, gratuitous
offerings.52 Yet, as noted by the Toussaint court, employment contracts are
unilateral by nature. Bilateral agreements are impractical because of the high
costs of negotiating and monitoring individual contracts with a large number
of employees.5 3 Employee acceptance of unilaterally decided terms spares
employers the expense and uncertainty of bargaining by allowing employers to
calculate terms before entering into contracts.54 Thus, denying employees the
protection of job security provisions voluntarily offered by employers through
personnel policies on the basis of technical requirements of mutuality of obli-
gation ignores the existence of unilateral contract analysis. 5
Lack of consideration has been cited as a second reason for refusing to
include personnel policies in employment contracts. 56 This rationale is based
48. 408 Mich. 599, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
49. Id. at 630, 292 N.W.2d at 900.
50. Difficulty with this analysis arises in light of RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 62 (1981) which states that beginning of performance operates as a promise to render complete
performance. What constitutes complete performance by an employee is unclear. Pettit, Modem
Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U.L. REV. 551, 566 (1983).
51. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 121, 397 N.E.2d 443, 446
(1979); Johnson v. National Beef Packing, 220 Kan. 52, 54-55, 551 P.2d 779, 782 (1976); Gates v.
Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Mont. 1982).
53. See supra text accompanying note 36.
54. Note, supra note 39, at 456.
55. As stated by Professor Corbin, "denial of enforcement [of an employment contract] can-
not be justified by a mere statement that the contract is lacking in mutuality." 1A A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152 (1963). Counsel facing a jurisdiction still clinging to the mutuality
principle should examine closely the personnel policy in question. Some limitations on employee
behavior may be construed as the necessary return promise. See Carter v. Kaskaskia Community
Action Agency, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1059, 322 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1974) (policy requiring employee
to give 30 days notice of resignation or face loss of vacation pay constituted mutuality of
obligation).
56. See Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 121,397 N.E.2d 443, 446 (1979);
Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Mont. 1982). One commentator has noted
that the difficulty of relaxing rigid rules of consideration made it unlikely that the employer's right
to terminate the at will relationship could be limited under contract law. Blades, supra note I, at
1421. Consequently, Professor Blades turned to the law of torts for limitations on employers'
rights to terminate at will.
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on the assertion that limitations on employers' termination powers must be
supported by some independent consideration since the employee is regarded
as fully recompensed for his services by wages.57 This requirement also stems
from a concern for ensuring that the parties intended a continuing relation-
ship.58 This rigid consideration requirement also has been criticized. In Pugh
v. See's Candies, Inc. 59 plaintiff alleged that his unexplained discharge after
thirty-two years of service had violated oral assurances that he would not be
discharged except for good cause. The court agreed, and found "no analytical
reason why an employee's promise to render services, or his actual rendition of
services over time may not support an employer's promise both to pay a par-
ticular wage. . . and to refrain from arbitrary dismissal."' 60 The court noted
that the requirement of independent consideration was contrary to the general
principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of consideration,
and concluded that the employee's services were sufficient consideration. 6'
Similarly, in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille6 2 the Minnesota Supreme
Court enforced procedural discharge provisions of an employee handbook.
The requirement of additional consideration. . . does not preclude
the parties, if they make clear their intent to do so, from agreeing that
the employment will not be terminable by the employer except pur-
suant to their agreement, even though no consideration other than
services to be performed is expected by the employer or promised by
the employee. 63
The court noted that the employer had issued an employee handbook to pro-
mote a more stable and productive workforce, and that plaintiff had continued
working despite his freedom to leave.64 These factors indicated that handbook
provisions on disciplinary procedures had become part of the contract. 65
Thus, under modern contract theory, the consideration provided by an
employee's services may support employer promises of job security expressed
in personnel policies. The detriment an employee suffers by continuing to
work for an employer despite his freedom to leave is not just a creative charac-
terization of the facts. There seems to be much truth in the assertion that "an
employee has suffered real detriment in the irretrievable loss of productive
57. Simmons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 311 So. 2d 28, 31 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
58. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1981).
59. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
60. Id. at 325-26, Cal. Rptr, at 925. See also Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 443 N.E,2d 441,
445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 80, comment a
(1981).
61. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924-25.
62. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
63. Id. at 629. See also Drzewiecki v. H. & R. Block Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703-04, 101
Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1972).
64. Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805, 809 (D. Col. 1983); Wagner v.
Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 624 F.2d 1092 (1980); Langdon v.
Saga Corp., 596 P.2d 524, 527 (Okl. App. 1976); Yartzhoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co.,
576 P.2d 356, 359 (Or. 1982).
65. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 630. See also Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261
(Nev. 1983) (The company's issuance of such handbooks and plaintiff's knowledge of pertinent
provisions suggest that the handbook formed part of the employment contract of the parties.).
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years, especially when his seniority and experience are not likely to be readily
transferable to another job."66 Any evidentiary function of independent con-
sideration has been displaced largely by a willingness to infer an agreement
from an employer's issuance of personnel policies and an employee's knowl-
edge of these policies. 67
The need for additional consideration also may arise when the employer's
personnel policy is promulgated or amended after the employee has com-
menced work. GrJln implied that the amendment of the personnel policies
after plaintiff was hired was a factor in its refusal to enforce the policies.
Traditional contract rules provide that an agreement to alter the terms of a
contract must be supported by new consideration. 68 This rule is intended to
prohibit modifications obtained by coercion, duress, or extortion when one
party agrees to modify the agreement in the face of threats of nonperform-
ance.69 Because contracting parties often desire to alter their agreements in
response to changes in circumstances, 70 modem contract theory changed to
reflect this consideration. The Uniform Commercial Code recognizes that a
modification of good faith sales agreements needs no consideration to be bind-
ing.71 This rationale-promoting enforcement of arm's length alterations of
contract and denying enforcement of coerced modifications72 -suggests that
alterations of an employment contract in favor of the employee should be en-
forced. Because the employer is invariably in the superior bargaining posi-
tion, he is unlikely to be coerced by employees into unilaterally modifying his
promises.
Finally, the third argument cited to support the refusal to enforce person-
nel policies as part of the employment contract, is the belief that the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine takes precedence over any such restrictions. In Chin v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 7 3 the court rejected plaintiff's contract
claim based on provisions of an employee manual because the manual did not
contain all the terms of employment, specifically the length of employment.
The court concluded that in the absence of a specific term, the employment
contract was terminable at will.7 4 Similarly, in Muller v. Stromberg Carlson
66. Blades, supra note 1, at 1420.
67. Employees may not have to be aware of the personnel policy prior to termination. Be-
cause the employer made promises to a class of employees, communication to some members of
the class was sufficient for all. It would be unfair, impractical, and inefficient to base an em-
ployee's right to recover on whether he read the company's benefit policies. See Pettit, supra note
50, at 583.
68. See Brenner v. Little Red School House Ltd., 302 N.C. 207, 215, 274 S.E.2d 206, 212
(1981); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633, 636, 263 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1980).
69. See, e.g., Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co., 103 Mo. 578, 593, 15 S.W. 844, 847-48
(1891); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 46, § 4-8.
70. Hillman, Contract Mod~fcation Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 COR.
L.Q. 680, 681 (1982).
71. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1977). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1979)
("promise modifying a duty ... is binding if the modification is fair and equitable in view of
circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made").
72. Hillman, supra note 70, at 681.
73. 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1978).
74. Id. at 1072, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739. See also White v. Chelsea Ind., 425 So.2d 1090 (Ala.
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Corp. 75 the Florida Court of Appeals held that employment policies did not
give rise to a right to just-cause dismissal because enforcement of such policies
would introduce uncertainty into the employer-employee relationship.76 Like
Chin, the Muller court contemplated an employment contract specifying a
term expressed in months or years.
These arguments, however, misconstrue the employment-at-will doctrine.
The doctrine is a rule of contract construction, and does not impose substan-
tive limits on the formation of an employment contract.77 A rule of construc-
tion should signal a court to construe a contract by looking beyond its face to
the parties' true intentions.78 An employer might reveal his intent to limit his
power of termination by unilaterally offering job security provisions in the
form of personnel policies. The courts should not limit the employer to offer-
ing only terminable-at-will contracts.
Thus, modem contract theory has supplanted the traditional reasons
courts have proffered for refusing to incorporate personnel policies into em-
ployment contracts. North Carolina's continuing refusal to enforce such poli-
cies in cases like Griffin and Biscuitville no longer is justified. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals already has decided a case that supports enforce-
ment of personnel policies. In Brooks v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co. 79
the court of appeals approved plaintiff's claim for severance pay because of
provisions in defendant company's personnel policy. The court accepted
plaintiff's claim that severance pay provisions contained in defendant's per-
sonnel policy were part of the employment contract, stating that "such an em-
ployment contract provision, recognizably cancellable at will by an employer,
would nevertheless operate to protect employees within its coverage during
their employment and during the effective operation of such a provision. ' 80
The court distinguished Biscuitville by stating that Biscuiville "dealt with each
employee's right to continued employment and did not deal with the issue of
benefits or compensation earned during employment."81
This distinction is not convincing. Plaintiffs in Biscuitville and Grffin did
not allege any right to continued or permanent employment; plaintiffs in all
three cases alleged breach of contract based on personnel policy provisions
that were not included expressly in their employment contracts. It is unclear
why the right to warnings, notice, hearings prior to dismissal, or to dismissal
for just cause are not considered benefits earned during employment, whereas
1983) (employee handbook did not vary the common-law rule that an employee is terminable at
will); Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Del. 1982), (handbook did not grant
employee a specific term of employment and does not therefore alter plaintiff's at will status).
75. 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
76. Id. at 270.
77. See Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 599, 292 N.W.2d at 890-91; Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 628;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442, comment a (1958).
78. Note, Job Securityfor the At Will Employee. A Contractual Right of Dischargefor Cause,
57 CH.[-]KENT L. REv. 697, 719 (1981).
79. 56 N.C. App. 801, 290 S.E.2d 370 (1982).
80. Id. at 804, 290 S.E.2d at 372 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 805, 290 S.E.2d at 372.
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severance pay is considered such a benefit.82 By eliminating this artificial dis-
tinction between monetary and procedural benefits, the North Carolina courts
could enforce all personnel policies under the Brooks rationale.
It has been suggested that employers might respond to attempts to enforce
personnel policies by including disclaimers in employee handbooks stating
that employees serve at will and may be discharged at any time and for any
reason.83 Such a disclaimer has been upheld in at least one case, 84 but several
courts have questioned its effectiveness. In Sch~gani v. Ford Motor Co. 8 5 the
court held that despite the disclaimer the employee handbook's allusions to
fairness in any termination may be enforced to prevent injustice.8 6 Similarly,
in Greene v. Howard University8 7 defendant's employee handbook contained a
qualifier that its provisions were not contractual obligations. The court, how-
ever, held that the policies and practices of the University embodied in its
handbook regulations and customs contemplated a hearing prior to termina-
tion, despite the disclaimer.88 These cases indicate that courts will be reluctant
to allow an employer to take back with one hand what it gives with the other.
If the employer chooses to create expectations of entitlement to fair and uni-
form personnel policy application, he may not be permitted to disclaim them.
Giving personnel policies the force of contract has been criticized for fear
that employers will be encouraged to withdraw them.89 Such a consequence is
unlikely since employers would sacrifice the benefits of increased employee
morale and productivity that flow from a sound personnel policy.90 Further-
more, enforcement of personnel policies should not substantially increase costs
to the employer. A policy providing employees the right to just-cause dis-
charge does not require the employer to retain unsatisfactory employees. Re-
tention of the freedom to discharge arbitrarily may lead to a waste of training,
continuity, and expertise.91 Provisions requiring warnings or a predischarge
hearing are not onerous or costly invasions of an employers' freedom; they
actually may improve communication between management and employees.
Any costs of vexatious litigation may be reduced by including binding arbitra-
tion 92 provisions which an employer can draft to fit his needs.
82. "[A]n agreement between an employee and her employer concerning the manner in
which her job could be terminated constitutes an enforceable agreement." Bennett v. Eastern
Rebuilders, Inc., 52 N.C. App. 579, 581, 279 S.E.2d 46, 48 (1981) (plaintiff could be terminated at
will from her supervisor position; however, such termination was not to result in her discharge,
but in her demotion to her former job).
83. Toussaint, 408 Mich at 612, 292 N.W.2d at 891.
84. Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
85. 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
86. 302 N.W.2d at 311 (Mich. App.).
87. 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
88. Id. at 1134.
89. See Note, The Burden of Estabishing Standards of Performance as a Basisfor Employment
Termination Rests upon the Employer, 59 U. DET J. URB. L. 83, 95-96 (1981).
90. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
91. See Note, supra note 22, at 1834-35.
92. See Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 624, 292 N.W.2d at 897. See also Summers, Individual Pro-
tection Against Unjust Dismissal Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 521 (1976) (suggesting
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In conclusion, judicial refusal to allow exceptions to the employment-at-
will doctrine usually is based on dated contract principles or a simple reluc-
tance to let go of a concept that just a few years ago seemed inviolable. Seri-
ous inroads into the employment-at-will doctrine, however, are inevitable.
The recognition that personnel policies constitute enforceable contract rights
can provide many of the protections employees need against abusive discharge
while allowing employers to retain some control and flexibility in shaping
their work force. Both employers and employees can benefit from a decision
to enforce personnel policies as part of the employment contract. North Caro-
lina's courts should take note of current contract and employment trends, re-
examine their personnel policy position, and adopt this personnel policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
HARLEY HARRELL JONES
passage of statutory right not to be dismissed except for just cause with adjudication of the right
through arbitration).
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Mentally Retarded Employees in Day Care Centers in North
Carolina: The 1983 Amendments
The 1983 North Carolina General Assembly changed the carefully delin-
eated requirements for workers at North Carolina day care centers.' North
Carolina General Statutes sections 110-90.1 and 110-91 originally barred em-
ployment of those "mentally retarded or mentally ill to an extent that may be
injurious to children"; this wording was changed in 1983 to prohibit the em-
ployment of those "mentally or emotionally impaired to an extent that may be
injurious to children.' 2 Although this change appears merely to clarify the
language, 3 the amendment's title indicates a broader legislative intent: "An
Act to Remove Mental Retardation From the Conditions Prohibiting a Person
From Work in a Day-Care Center."4
As the Day Care Committee explained:
The Committee recommends legislation rewriting the term "mentally
retarded" from the conditions prohibiting individuals from being
proprietors of day care plans and facilities. There is no reason to
stigmatize the mentally retarded who are not dangerous. Those who
are, of course, remain excluded. 5
Thus, this amendment represents another measured step toward the equal pro-
tection and "normalization"' 6 of the mentally retarded, or, more broadly, the
handicapped. Considered with North Carolina's statute protecting the em-
ployment rights of the handicapped, this amendment further erodes the em-
1. An Act to Remove Mental Retardation From the Conditions Prohibiting a Person From
Work in a Day-Care Center, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 277 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 110-90.1, -91(8) (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.1 (CUr. Supp. 1983) provides:
No day-care plan shall be registered if that plan is operated by or employs any person
who has been convicted of a crime involving child abuse, child neglect, or moral turpi-
tude, or who is an habitually excessive user of alcohol or who illegally uses narcotics or
other impairing drugs, or who is mentally or emotionally impaired to an extent that may
be injurious to children.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91(8) (Cure. Supp. 1983) repeats these qualifications and prescribes age
limits for employees and supervisors.
3. The original wording of the statute ("mentally retarded or mentally ill to an extent that
may be injurious to children") was somewhat ambiguous, since it might ban either all the men-
tally retarded or only those who might be injurious to children.
4. 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 277 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-90.1, -91(8) (Cum.
Supp. 1983)).
5. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, DAY CARE-REPORT TO THE 1983 GENERAL As-
SEMBLY 7 (1983).
In 1979 the statute was amended to remove the upper age limit of 70. presumably out of
concern for employment of the aged. The legislature apparently has developed a similar concern
for the mentally retarded.
6. The principle of normalization, as established by the President's Committee on mental
retardation, entails" 'making available to the mentally retarded, patterns and conditions of every-
day life which are as close as possible to the norms and patterns of the mainstream of society.'"
A. JACOBS, HANDBOOK FOR JOB PLACEMENT OF MENTALLY RETARDED WORKERS 16 (3d ed.
1979) (quoting B. NiRJE, THE NORMALIZATION PRINCIPLE AND ITS HUMAN MANAGEMENT IMPLI-
CATIONS. CHANGING PATTERNS IN SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED (President's Com-
mittee on Mental Retardation, 1969)).
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ployer's common-law discretion to hire and discharge whomever he pleases.7
Removal of the ban against employing mentally retarded day care workers
brings North Carolina's statutes closer to principles of federal law,8 but also
introduces some uncertainty over the extent to which an employer may choose
between mentally retarded job applicants and those of normal intelligence.
Although any initial, broad exclusion of the mentally retarded now is prohib-
ited, the amendment's symbolic effect probably will outweigh its practical
effect.
Recent antidiscrimination laws and other types of labor regulations have
restricted an employer's discretion in hiring and discharging employees;9 his-
torically, however, courts treated the employment relationship like any other
contractual relation.' 0 Absent statutory or contractual restrictions, the public
or private employer has the exclusive right to determine job qualifications for
various positions, and to hire and discharge employees at will. I I Unless the
employer's decisions violate the rights of a member of a protected class or
labor union, or the constitutional rights of an employee, courts tend to afford
the employer wide latitude in basic employment decisions.' 2 Thus, at com-
mon law an employer generally had no obligation to hire handicapped appli-
cants. Furthermore, an employer may discharge an employee with or without
cause absent statutory, contractual, or constitutional restrictions.1 3
7. At common law, the employer was free to hire whomever he desired, and to discharge "at
will" employees who did not have written employment contracts, with or without cause, hearing,
or explanation. See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
8. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1976 & Supp. V 1981), forbids
discrimination against the handicapped by any federally subsidized program. See infra notes 18-
23 & 50-51 and accompanying text.
9. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V
1981), forbids employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. The Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), and the Civil Rights Act of 1871,42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), also forbid employment discrimination based on race. The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982), prohibits employ-
ment discrimination against individuals between the ages of 40 and 70. The National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982), particularly § 158(a)(3), forbids discrimination against
employees for engaging in union activities. Finally, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701-796i (1982), see infra notes 18-23 & 50-51 and accompanying text, forbids discrimination
on the basis of handicap. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATIoN LAW 1-
2 (2d ed. 1983).
10. Alliance Co. v. State Hosp., 241 N.C. 329, 332-33, 85 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1955) stated: "The
relation of employer and employee is essentially contractual in its nature, and is to be determined
by the rules governing the establishment of contracts, express or implied."
11. See, e.g., Charles City Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 291 N.W.2d 663
(Iowa 1980); Burton v. Crawford & Co., 89 N.M. 436, 553 P.2d 716, cerl. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558
P.2d 619 (1976); Mumford v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 47 N.C. App. 440, 267 S.E.2d 511
(1980); Tatum v. Brown, 29 N.C. App. 504, 224 S.E.2d 698 (1976).
Statutory restrictions on the employer's discretion to hire and fire employees usually are
drawn narrowly to address specific problems and not interfere unduly with the employer's right to
select or discharge employees. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46
(1936). See also Sioux Quality Packers, Div. of Armour & Co. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 153 (8th Cir.
1978).
12. See, e.g., Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976) ("A large
corporate employer such as General Motors, except to the extent limited by statute or contractual
obligations, must be accorded wide latitude in determining who it will employ and retain in em-
ployment in high and sensitive managerial positions.").
13. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Prince v.
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Federal and state laws, however, increasingly have restricted this broad
power, and recently the rights of the handicapped have been recognized and
protected. 14 Constitutional challenges to employment discrimination against
the handicapped generally have been unsuccessful. Although the Supreme
Court has not spoken directly on the subject, the lower federal courts generally
have not treated the handicapped as a suspect class. 15 Thus, any equal protec-
tion claims of discrimination are subject to the rational-basis test, which
merely requires an employer to show some rational, nonarbitrary basis for his
actions.' 6 Given the many potential difficulties and inconveniences of em-
ploying the handicapped, employers ordinarily have satisfied this test, and
thus equal protection claims usually have failed to enhance the employment
rights of the handicapped. 17 Furthermore, only state action can violate the
equal protection clause, rendering most employers' decisions immune to con-
stitutional challenge.
Bridges, 537 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1979); Hodgin v. Noland, 435 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972); Nantz v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 290 N.C. 473, 226 S.E.2d 340
(1976); Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971); Wilkinson v. Erwin Mills, 250 N.C.
370, 108 S.E.2d 673 (1959).
A growing doctrine, accepted by some courts, prohibits an employee's discharge for activities
that public policy encourages, for example, objecting to an employer's illegal actions, filing a
worker's compensation claim or serving on a jury. See Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539
F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976), and cases cited therein.
14. For a general history of the treatment of the handicapped in society, see Allen, Historical
Overview: From Charity to Rights, 50 TEMPLE L.Q. 953 (1977) (excerpted from R. ALLEN, LEGAL
RIGHTS OF THE DISABLED AND DISADVANTAGED 1 (1969)).
15. See, e.g., Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316, 322 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 976 (1982); Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1981); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 675-76 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980). See also B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 280 and cases cited therein.
One lower court has held that the handicapped are a suspect class, In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d
441, 447 (N.D. 1974), and another has suggested it in dicta. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp.
946, 958-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
16. The Warren and Burger Courts have developed a three-tier system of equal protection
analysis. A discriminatory practice is subject to strict scrutiny if it: interferes with the exercise of
a fundamental right, or affects a suspect class, a "discrete and insular minority." United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Employment has been held not to be a
fundamental right, so in employment discrimination cases the focus must be on the screened-out
class. Race, nationality, and alienage have been treated as suspect classes. In such cases, there is a
presumption against the discriminatory practice.
The second tier of scrutiny bars discriminatory practices that are not related substantially to
an important governmental objective. It is applied in cases involving a "semi-suspect" class, such
as women or illegimates.
The third tier of scrutiny determines whether a rational relationship exists between the prac-
tice and a legitimate governmental objective, and it applies to all other groups. See Burgdorf &
Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qua'lfcations of Handicapped Persons as a "Sus-
pect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 855, 899-910 (1975);
Comment, The Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses: Two Means of Inplementing "Integra-
tionism"for Handicapped Applicants for Public Emp~'oyment, 27 DEPAUL L. REv. 1169, 1174-89
(1978). The handicapped usually are considered in this category. See cases cited supra note 15.
For commentaries advocating that all or some of the handicapped should be considered a suspect
class, see Burgdorf and Burgdorf, supra, and Comment, supra.
17. See cases cited supra note 15. One of the reasons for the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1976 & Supp. V 1981), was "the lack of action in areas related to rehabilita-
tion which limit a handicapped individual's ability to function in society, e.g., employment dis-
crimination .... " S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2076, 2078.
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In 1973, however, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,18 pro-
viding handicapped plaintiffs a statutory basis for pursuing discrimination
claims. The Act states:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States,
.... ,shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . .9
"Handicapped individual" is defined as one who "(i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having
such an impairment .. ".. -o The Act requires employers to make "reason-
able accommodation" 21 for an otherwise qualified applicant or employee, in-
cluding restructuring physical facilities, modifying job duties, and altering
work schedules. 22 The employer is encouraged to consider each applicant in-
dividually, and although free to consider disability limitations, he may not
exclude categorically on the basis of handicap.23
This federal legislation has been accompanied by corresponding state leg-
18. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
21. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving or
Benefiting From Federal Financial Assistance, 45 C.F.R § 84.12(a) (1983).
22. Id § 84.12(b).
The Supreme Court interpreted "reasonable accommodation" in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). In Davis plaintiff had been denied admission to a nursing
program because of a severe hearing disability. Id at 402. The Court determined that the indi-
vidual attention plaintiff would require exceeded the "modification" required under the Act. Id
at 410. The Supreme Court cautioned against the precedential value of Davis, however, id at 412-
13, and courts have interpreted it to require a great deal of modification to accommodate the
handicapped. For example, in Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (1Ith Cir. 1983), the court held
that the employer had to accommodate the dyslexic plaintiff in administering a preemployment
test, usually given in written form. In Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982), the
court indicated that New York City must provide some type of accommodation for the handi-
capped in its mass transit system. A North Carolina federal district court, while requiringplain-
tiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies before continuing the litigation, implied that
requiring a school board to offer a summer school program for children with cerebral palsy would
not be unreasonable. Phipps v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 551 F. Supp. 732, 734
(E.D.N.C. 1982). ("Davis has been read as not prohibiting all affirmative action but only that
which would entail extensive modification of some existing program.") In Majors v. Housing
Auth., 652 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1981), the court remanded the case to determine whether a low
income housing authority should be required to break its rule barring pets to accommodate plain-
tiff's emotional disability that required the companionship of her dog. But see American Pub.
Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that a regulation requiring every
mode of mass transit to accommodate the handicapped was beyond the scope of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
23. According to B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 282-83, employers practicing
categorical exclusion have not prevailed under federal and state statutes without showing either:
(I) "[That all or substantially all persons in the handicap category could not do the
job," or
(2) That the exclusion was "justified by a high degree of human or economic risk, and
the potential for creating the risk be readily determined" by a less exclusionary handi-
cap or on an individual basis.
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islation. Most states24 have enacted legislation protecting the rights of the
handicapped, although the laws differ as to the types of handicapped people
protected,2 5 the extent of accommodation required,2 6 the type of preemploy-
ment inquiry or test allowed,2 7 and whether a private cause of action is cre-
ated.2 8 Generally, however, the state laws supplement and reinforce the
federal antidiscrimination legislation.
North Carolina has adopted antidiscrimination legislation for the handi-
capped. The overriding philosophy of the statutory scheme is to "encourage
and enable handicapped persons to participate fully in the social and eco-
nomic life of the State and to engage in remunerative employment. ' 2 9 The
statute specifically addressing employment states:
Handicapped persons shall be employed in the State service, the
service of the political subdivisions of the State, in the public schools,
and in all other employment, both public and private, on the same
terms and conditions as the ablebodied, unless it is shown that the
particular disability impairs the performance of the work involved.30
Handicapped persons are defined broadly as those with "physical, mental and
visual disabilities." 3'
The North Carolina statute has been involved in significant litigation only
once. In Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. 32 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that glaucoma, a potentially disabling condition, was not a visual
disability under the statute, and thus the statute did not bar the employer from
24. According to B. SCHLE1 & P. GROSSMAN; supra note 9, at 277 n.87, as of 1983, 48 states
had adopted laws restricting discrimination against the handicapped.
25. Eg., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983) forbids discrimination based
on a physical handicap or medical condition, such as cancer. VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (1981) forbids
only discrimination based on physical handicap.
26. Georgia's statute explicitly states that the employer need not modify his physical facilities
or grounds to accommodate handicapped individuals. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-4 (1981).
27. Texas bars all preemployment tests with a disproportionate impact on handicapped ap-
plicants unless the test has been validated specifically for the job, or no other tests exist. TEX.
HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 121.010(e) (Vernon Supp. 1984). Georgia's statute specifically permits
preemployment inquiry as to handicap, and rejections based on medical examinations, as long as
there is a "good faith reliance" on a doctor's evaluation. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3(c) (1981).
28. Although some statutes clearly provide a private cause of action, others are less clear. In
Dillon v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 43 Md. App. 161, 403 A.2d 406 (1979) the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals held that Maryland's statute did not create a private cause of action. The West
Virginia Appeals Court, however, in Hurley v. Allied Chem. Corp., 262 S.E.2d 757, 765 (W. Va.
App. 1980), found an implied private cause of action in the West Virginia statute. The court
rejected the argument that a private cause of action on the state level would invade an area dele-
gated exclusively to the federal government. Id at 764-65.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-1 (1982). The North Carolina statutes were passed in 1973, pre-
sumably to complement the federal Rehabilitation Act.
30. Id § 168-6 (1982). The statute could be construed to restrict discrimination only in the
"terms and conditions" of employment after hiring already has occurred, as opposed to restricting
discrimination in the hiring decision itself. The statute states, "Handicapped persons shall be
employed ... on the same terms and conditions as the ablebodied," (emphasis added) with no
mention of hiring. InBurgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979),
however, discussed infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text, the North Carolina Supreme Court
applied the statute to a hiring decision without mentioning that hiring was not treated specifically
in the statute.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-1 (1982).
32. 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979).
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refusing to hire any individual with glaucoma.33 Despite this somewhat unset-
tling result, the court suggested that the statute should be interpreted broadly:
"[Tihis statute, being remedial, should be construed liberally, in a manner
which assures fulfillment of the beneficial goals for which it is enacted and
which brings within it all cases fairly failing within its intended scope."'34
Given the apparent contradiction between the court's statement and its result,
the ultimate scope of the statute remains uncertain.
35
Aside from the apparent social benefits of employing the mentally re-
tarded, categorically excluding them from day-care centers might violate fed-
eral or state law. The federal statute36 forbids discrimination against the
handicapped by any program receiving federal financial assistance. A previ-
ous interpretation of the Act by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit limited its applicability to those programs receiving federal
funds for which the primary purpose was to provide employment. 37 The
United States Supreme Court recently rejected this view, however, holding
that the Act, by its own terms, applies to any program receiving federal aid, for
whatever purpose.38 Under this interpretation, North Carolina day-care cen-
ters' federal aid clearly would be threatened by policies that discriminate
against the handicapped in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 39
An employer might argue that the mentally retarded are unqualified to
work in day-care centers, and thus the discrimination is justified for business
reasons.40 This argument is weak, however, considering the extent to which
the retarded already are employed in day-care centers to some extent.4 ' Also,
33. Id at 528, 259 S.E.2d at 253.
34. Id at 524, 259 S.E.2d at 25 1.
35. The only other case arising under the statute is GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C.
App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979), a class action to restrict smoking in public places brought on
behalf of all those with pulmonary problems. The court of appeals held that the class involved-
all those with any pulmonary problem-was too broad to come under the definition of "handi-
capped." This decision, while also restricting the definition of "handicapped," arguably is less
questionable than Burgess because the class that the court declined to label "handicapped" in-
cluded many people with minor pulmonary problems, as opposed to the discrete groupd of those
with potentially disabling glaucoma in Burgess.
For a view that the North Carolina supreme court's definition of "handicapped" was too
restrictive in Burgess, and that the broader definition of the federal statute should apply, see Note,
Employment Discrimination-Judicial IdentFcation of the "Handicapped Person" in North Caro-
ina-Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 836 (1980).
36. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
37. Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 947 (1979).
38. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984).
39. According to a study of North Carolina day-care centers, 554 of the sample 2248, or
approximately 25%, of North Carolina day-care centers are labeled "subsidized" and 1694 of
2248, about 75%, are "nonsubsidized." Subsidized centers receive approximately 39% of their
income from government agencies and 12% from the federal Child Care Food Program. Nonsub-
sidized centers receive approximately 2% of their income from government agencies and 2% from
the Child Care Food Program, and to the extent that their actions might violate the federal law,
would be subject only to losing that small amount. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINIS-
TRATION FOR DAY CARE STUDY COMMITTEE, LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, NORTH
CAROLINA DAY CARE COST STUDY, Day Care Centers, Final Report 53-58 (April 1983).
40. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
41. The frequency of jobs held by the mentally retarded are ranked as follows: (1) food
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given the number and variety of tasks required in a day-care center,42 the
requirement of "reasonable accommodation '43 under the federal law almost
certainly would require an employer to restructure his division of tasks to
place mentally retarded workers in positions for which they are unquestiona-
bly qualified.44
Presumably, the North Carolina legislature originally barred employment
of the mentally retarded to ensure high quality day care. Compared with the
day-care statutes of other states, North Carolina's legislative requirements are
remarkably specific, and set very high standards.45 The North Carolina law
basically adopts the somewhat controversial high staff-child ratios of the Fed-
eral Interagency Day Care Requirements of 1968.46 It bars the employment in
day-care centers of excessive users of alcohol, users of illegal drugs, and those
who have committed certain crimes.4 7 The statute even'states that: "Each op-
erator or staff member shall truly and honestly show each child in his care true
love, devotion and tender care."'4 8 The legislature's concern for high quality
day-care is commendable at one level.
This concern, however, probably was misplaced to the extent that it led
the legislature to bar the mentally retarded from working in day-care centers.
Of the few state laws that specify any requirements for day-care centers, few or
none bar the employment of the handicapped or the mentally retarded.49 Even
services; (2) building services (custodial); (3) domestic services; (4) groundskeeping; (5) office occu-
pations; (6) merchandising occupations; (7) building trades; (8) helpers in hotels; (9) helpers in
nursery schools; (10) helpers in hospitals. A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 20.
42. A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 193-94, 147-48, 174-75. The Nursery School Aide is listed as
having the following specific skill requirements: ability to coordinate work with other employees;
knowledge and observance of hazards to children; knowledge of basic rules and equipment for
indoor and outdoor games for children; knowledge of simple arts and crafts techniques and equip-
ment; ability to use simple cleaning equipment and supplies; ability to enforce simple rules;
knowledge of locations of equipment and supplies; ability to determine when to seek help in an
emergency; ability to handle food in a neat, sanitary manner, ability to interact well with young
children and adults; and ability to observe routines and procedures. Id at 194. For example, food
preparation, maintenance, and clerical work, as well as child care, are all necessary in day care
centers.
43. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., the following statutes, in which the legislature merely delegates responsibility
for establishing standards and requirements for day-care centers to an administrative agency or
board: CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1527 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-
312 (1981); GA. CODE § 49-5-12 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 14, § 104 (1981); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 25.358(12) (Callaghan 1974); N.Y. Soc. SErv. LAW § 390 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-3-
80 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. § 4442a(l) (Vernon 1976); VA. CODE § 63.1-196
(1980); W. VA. CODE § 49-2B-4 (Supp. 1983).
46. 45 C.F.R. § 71 (1970) (no longer in effect). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91(7) (1978) requires
one staff member for every eight children under the age of two, one for every twelve children ages
two to three, one for every fifteen children ages three to four, one for every twenty children ages
four to five, and one for every twenty-five children over the age of five. See also infra note 50 and
accompanying text.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-90.1, 110-91(8) (1978 & Supp. 1983).
48. Id § 110-91(10) (1978).
49. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-311 (1981) (establishing specific standards for in-home
care, requiring that staff members be between 21 and 70, in good health and have prior experience
in child care); VA. CODE § 63.1-196.3(3)(C) (1980) (requiring, for religious institution child care
centers, that supervisors be certified by physicians as free from any disability that would prevent
them from caring for children).
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the strict federal requirements for day-care centers receiving federal aid50 did
not bar the mentally retarded. Those standards merely stated: "Staff of the
facility and volunteers must have periodic assessments,. . . of their physical
and mental competence to care for children." 51 Mental "competence" could
refer to emotional stability or intelligence. This loose definition, therefore,
permitted flexibility in determining a standard of competence-mental retar-
dation could have been one of many factors taken into account. Thus, al-
though the North Carolina legislature undoubtedly meant well in originally
barring the mentally retarded from working in day-care centers, it seems to
have acted alone.
Given the competing policies-the broad common-law discretion of the
employer to hire and discharge his employees, the statutory rights of the hand-
icapped to equal opportunities in employment, and the desire to provide a
high level of child care-the change in the North Carolina law was a good
one. Removing the bar on employment of the mentally retarded would be
meaningless without the nondiscrimination requirement of the North Carolina
handicap law and the federal law. Taken together, however, the statutes re-
quire employers to consider each applicant individually. Rather than estab-
lishing a broad, bright-line test barring employment of the mentally retarded,
or requiring affirmative action in hiring them, considering applicants individu-
ally will provide more flexible accommodation of the competing interests
involved.
Removing this bright-line principle, however, will leave a vacuum of un-
certainty in individual employment decisionmaking. Consider an employer
faced with two applicants: one mentally retarded and one not, otherwise
equally qualified. Given that the employee could affect the intellectual devel-
opment of the children in the day-care center, may the employer justifiably
hire the applicant of normal intelligence on the grounds that he is more quali-
fied to develop the minds of the children? Arguably, unlike a qualification
such as race or, in most instances, physical handicap, mental retardation may
affect the quality of the work performance. Presumably, a careful evaluation
of the job position involved and the actual effect on the children should pre-
cede any decision not to hire the handicapped applicant. A position that pri-
marily involves supervision and playing with children probably would require
less intelligence than, for example, a teaching position. It is particularly diffi-
cult to draw this line in the day-care situation, as opposed to other occupa-
50. The Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements, established in 42 U.S.C. § 1397(a)
(1976) and 45 C.F.R. § 71.1-71.20 (1970), required high staff-child ratios (few children per
caregiver) in all day-care centers receiving Social Security Title XX funds. The standards pro-
voked a "storm of controversy" because of the costs of hiring additional staff. U.S. DEPT. or
HEW, NATIONAL DAY CARE STUDY, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 1(1978).
In Stiner v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Okla. 1977), a suit brought to enjoin enforcement of
the standards, parents argued that the standards would produce prohibitive costs, forcing them to
quit work to care for their children. Id at 801. The standards were considered "wholly unneces-
sary" for the care of children, imposing "severe financial burdens needlessly. . . ." Id at 800.
Although the standards were upheld in Stiner, Congress eventually repealed the requirements.
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, § 1001, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2655 (1980).
51. 45 C.F.R. § 71.16(i) (1970).
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tions, given the uncertainty inherent in the emotional and intellectual
development of children, and the employer's subjective evaluation of who will
work effectively with children.
The effect of removing the ban on mentally retarded day-care workers
will depend on the ultimate judicial interpretation of the North Carolina
handicap statute. Some state laws prohibiting discrimination against the
handicapped have been broadly interpreted and have had a significant effect,
while other state laws have been emasculated by the judiciary.52 The North
Carolina courts should construe the North Carolina handicap statute broadly,
requiring significant accommodation similar to that ordered in liberal inter-
pretations of the federal law.53 The courts should require an employer to
restructure his division of duties to take advantage of the mentally retarded
worker's skills. A mentally retarded worker who is interested in children has
as much to offer as any other employee, and should be as fully integrated into
the day-care system as possible. As noted by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Burgess, the handicap statute was adopted after years of undue dis-
crimination, and thus should be interpreted broadly to remedy any harmful
lingering effects.
54
Although the practical effect of the change in the day-care law in conjunc-
tion with the handicap law is uncertain, the symbolic effect of further includ-
ing the mentally retarded in society probably will exceed the statute's practical
effect. The removal of any stigma of the mentally retarded, however, is, in
itself, a worthwhile accomplishment.
55
NANCY KATHERINE PLANT
52. Compare Panettieri v. C.V. Hill Refrigeration, 159 N.J. Super. 472, 388 A.2d 630 (1978)
(burden on employer to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his action) and Kim-
mel v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 23 Wash. App. 78, 596 P.2d 1069 (1979) (plaintiff's knee injuries
held to be a handicap) with Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 67 Ill.
App. 3d 512, 385 N.E.2d 39 (1978) (plaintiff's kidney transplant made him uninsurable under
defendant's self-insurance program, and thus defendant could discriminate legitimately against
plaintiff) and Providence Journal Co. v. Morgan, 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976) (plaintiff's
whiplash not a physical handicap within the Rhode Island statute).
53. See supra note 22.
54. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Representative Jeanne Fenner, from the Eighth
District of North Carolina, the sponsor of the amendment, stated that she did not consider the
amendment to be a jobs bill, but rather the removal of discriminatory language that perpetuated
the myth that the retarded were completely incompetent or dangerous.
LJBOR L,4W 13451984]
Statutory Protection Against Condominium Conversions for
North Carolina Residential Tenants
On January 1, 1984 North Carolina joined the majority ofjurisdictions by
granting residential tenants statutory protection against conversion of their
leased units into condominiums. I This protection, enacted as an amendment
to the North Carolina Unit Ownership Act,2 requires a landlord or developer
to provide advance notice of the conversion to all residential tenants, and
grants these tenants the first option to purchase their particular unit.3 The
statute was enacted in response to a growing condominium conversion trend
that has been characterized as the "most controversial real estate phenomenon
to strike America in over 100 years.' 4 This note examines the impact of the
conversion trend on residential tenants and analyzes the effectiveness of North
Carolina's response.
States began recognizing condominium ownership during the early
1960s, 5 and over ninety percent of the existing two million condominiums
were created after 1970.6 Condominiums never have been a source of much
legal or political controversy, and they are now recognized in every state.7
Although condominiums frequently are created through new construction,
conversion of rental housing into condominiums recently has become popu-
lar.8 During the first half of this decade, an estimated 1,139,000 rental units
will be converted into condominiums-three times the number converted dur-
1. A condominium consists of "two principal elements: (1) separate ownership of a part of
a building (apartment), coupled with (2) common ownership with other apartment owners in the
land and such part of the buildings as are intended for common use." A. FERRER & K. STECHER,
LAW OF CONDOMINIUM 2 (1967). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-3(5) (1976) ("'Condominium'
means the ownership of single units in a multi-unit structure with common areas and facilities.").
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47A-1 to -37 (1976 & Supp. 1983). The Act recognizes condominium
ownership and establishes procedures for the registration, public sale, and management of a con-
dominium project.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-36 (Supp. 1983). See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
4. Condominium and Cooperative Conversions-The Federal Response: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1 162 (1981) (statement of Kathleen R. Beal) [hereinafter
cited as 1981 House Hearings].
5. U.S. DEe'T OF Hous. & URBAN DE., THE CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CON-
DOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES, A NATIONAL STUDY OF SCOPE, CAUSES AND IMPACTS XI-I
(1980) [hereinafter cited as HUD REPORT].
The condominium originated in the ancient civilizations of the Middle East and the Mediter-
ranean and has long been recognized under civil law. For a discussion of the historical develop-
ment of condominium ownership through ancient, civil, and common law, see A. FERRER & K.
STECHER, supra note I, at 14-81; P. ROHAN & M. REsKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE 2-
1 to 2-9 (1983).
6. Condominium Housing Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Af-
fairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979)
(statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
7. Note, Condominium Conversion Lease Extensions for Elderly and Disabled Tenants: Is
Virginia's New Law a Panacea?, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 207, 209-10 (1982).
8. Condominium conversion involves a "change in the legal form of a multi-family rental
property from single to multiple ownership. The change is made by filing a legal declaration,
master deed, or subdivision application to the appropriate government body. After any necessary
approval is received units in the condominium ... may be sold." HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at
ing the 1970s.9
Several factors have caused this dramatic increase. First, landlords find
conversion economically desirable. The aggregate sale price of units in a con-
verted building will secure a return ten times the building's annual rental in-
come, 10 and from one and one-half to two times the market price of the
building as rental property."I Such an immediate and sizeable return is ex-
tremely attractive, particularly considering the growing body of local land-
lord-tenant regulations' 2 and the increasing cost of maintenance and
administration. 13 Second, a strong market for condominiums has developed
among a wide spectrum of buyers. The condominium offers the economic 1
4
and tax' 5 advantages of home ownership to low-to-middle income families
who cannot afford traditional single-family homes. Upper income families
view condominium ownership as an economically attractive means to enjoy an
urban lifestyle while avoiding the maintenance burdens of the traditional sin-
gle-family home. 16 The condominium also has become an attractive invest-
ment device; one-third of all condominiums are held as investment property
for lease to tenants. 17
The original tenant of the converted unit is the third party (in addition to
the landlord and the unit purchaser) affected by a conversion. Approximately
twenty-two percent of tenants purchase their individual unit.' 8 An additional
twenty-two percent obtain continued lease agreements from the new unit own-
app. ii. For a description of the administrative and financial requirements of conversion, see id at
III-I to -23.
9. Id at VII-37. From 1970 through 1979, 346,476 rental units were converted. The vast
majority of these conversions, 260,730, occurred in the last four years of that decade. Id at IV-6.
10. Judson, Defning Property Rights: The Constitutionality of Protecting Tenantsfrom Condo-
minium Conversions, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 179, 187 (1983).
11. Berger, The New Residential Tenancy Law-Are Landlords Public Utilities?, 60 NEB. L.
REV. 707, 733-34 (1981).
12. Judson, supra note 10, at 187. Such regulations can include rent controls, eviction restric-
tions, and heating standards, as well as general building, fire, and health code requirements. The
more stringent landlord-tenant regulations are found in the large urban centers. As such, the
desire to escape regulation is not as significant a factor in North Carolina as in more populous
states.
13. From 1967 to 1980, general consumer prices increased 148% while rent increased only
92%. Berger, supra note 11, at 729 n.109. Rent has failed to keep pace with other prices because
of local rent controls, organized tenant resistance, and the inability of low and fixed income ten-
ants to pay higher rents. HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-13; Judson, supra note 10, at 187.
14. Because the owner of a condominium possesses an equity interest in his unit, he benefits
from any appreciation in the value of the unit. A tenant possesses no such interest. Berger, supra
note 11, at 734.
15. The condominium owner may deduct payments for mortgage interest, I.R.C. § 163(a)
(1976), and real property taxes, I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (1976), in calculating his federal income tax.
The tenant, however, receives no deduction for rent payments. Furthermore, the condominium
owner can qualify for capital gains treatment of any appreciation in value when the unit is sold.
I.R.C § 1202 (Supp. 1981).
16. Judson, supra note 10, at 186. Thirty-eight percent of condominium purchases are moti-
vated principally by noneconomic reasons. HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at VI-8.
17. HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at VI-2. See also id at VI-1 1 to -14 (analysis of the condo-
minium as investment).
18. Id at IX-10.
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ers and remain in their unit.19 The remaining fifty-six percent, however, are
displaced by the conversion because they cannot or choose not to remain.20
This high displacement rate has caused the current controversy over conver-
sions and has prompted the legislative responses discussed in this note. Dis-
placed tenants must compete among themselves to locate affordable
replacement housing, often in a rental market characterized by a low vacancy
rate.2 1 Because conversion removes rental units from the market, each con-
version makes the search for housing more difficult.22 In addition to this prob-
lem of finding replacement housing, conversion also imposes moving
expenses, as well as the burden of reestablishing a lifestyle in a new building
or community, on the tenant. 23 Although these problems exist in any type of
relocation, conversion is unique because it involves the involuntary simultane-
ous displacement of a large group of people.
Response to the conversion problem began at the municipal level in
North Carolina. In 1980 Chapel Hill, a university town heavily dependent on
rental housing, asserted the authority to regulate conversions through its zon-
ing powers and barred a landlord from converting his apartment building into
condominiums. 24 The North Carolina Court of Appeals held this action inva-
lid in Graham Court Associates v. Town of Chapel Hill.25 The court ruled that
the town's zoning powers provided no right or legal authority to prohibit the
conversion.2 6 The applicable zoning statute 27 authorizes a municipality to
regulate the use of land within its boundaries, but the court found that conver-
sion merely changes the form of ownership. 28 Accordingly, the conversion
was not subject to local regulation.
Two years after this unsuccessful municipal effort, the North Carolina
legislature enacted the tenant protection statute.29 The statute contains two
provisions designed to ease the tenant's burden during conversion. First, it
19. Id at IX-13.
20. Id
21. The national vacancy rate is 4.8%. Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Sen.
Harrison A. Williams Jr.).
22. Comment, The Condominium Conversion Problem: Causes and Solutions, 1980 DuKE L.J.
306, 317. Because of the high cost ofconstruction and mortgage financing, few converted units are
replaced through new construction. Id at 317-18.
23. Judson, supra note 10, at 190-9 1. These relocation problems have a more severe effect on
elderly and disabled tenants. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
24. Graham Court Assocs. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 53 N.C. App. 543, 546, 281 S.E.2d 418,
419 (1981).
25. 53 N.C. App. 543, 281 S.E.2d 418 (1981).
26. Id at 551, 281 S.E.2d at 423.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381 (1981). A similar statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340
(Supp. 1983), authorizes county governments to regulate the use of land within their boundaries,
Presumably, the Graham Court Assocs. ruling would apply to county as well as municipal
governments.
28. Graham Court Assocs., 53 N.C. App. at 551, 281 S.E.2d at 422. Accord City of Miami
Beach v. Arlen King Cole Condominium Ass'n, 302 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); AMN,
Inc. v. South Brunswick Township Leveling Bd., 93 N.J. 518, 461 A.2d 1138 (1983); Maplewood
Village Tenants Ass'n v. Maplewood Village, 116 N.J. Super. 372, 282 A.2d 428 (1971). But see
Goldman v. Town of Dennis, 375 Mass. 197, 375 N.E.2d 1212 (1978) (conversion involving a
probable change in the building's use is subject to zoning regulation).
29. An Act to Protect Renters of Apartment Buildings Being Converted to Condominiums,
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requires the landlord to give the tenant ninety days notice of the conversion.30
If the tenant's lease extends beyond this ninety-day period, presumably he will
be allowed to complete his full lease term.3 1 Second, the landlord must give
the tenant a thirty-day first option to purchase his unit.32 The landlord must
include with the option an offering statement containing a description of the
condominium and any planned improvements, the terms of any warranties,
and any other information given to prospective nontenant buyers.33 Once the
tenant elects to exercise his option, he is granted an additional thirty days to
complete the sale.34
The ninety-day notice requirement is similar to notice requirements en-
acted by twenty-five other states and the District of Columbia.35 The purpose
1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 624, § I (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47A-34 to -37 (Supp.
1983)).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-36(a) (Supp. 1983).
31. The statute is unclear on this point. A landlord could argue that the statute empowers
him to evict a tenant at the end of the 90-day notice period, regardless of the remaining duration
of the lease. One commentator, however, has noted that such a construction would be an uncon-
stitutional taking of the tenant's leasehold without due process. See Note, Condominium Conver-
sions-Balancing Tenants' Rights and Property Owners' Interests, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 349, 359
(1980).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-36(b) (Supp. 1983).
33. Id § 47A-35.
34. Id § 47A-36(b).
The constitutionality of North Carolina's tenant notice and first option provisions is not at
issue. Courts have consistently found these and more stringent tenant protection requirements
constitutional when subjected to due process (uncompensated taking) and equal protection chal-
lenges. See River Park Tenants Ass'n v. 3600 Venture, 534 F. Supp. 45, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (ex-
tended notice requirement for elderly and disabled tenants survives equal protection analysis
(dicta)); Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 692, 418 N.E.2d 335 (1981) (temporary
moratorium on all evictions during conversion upheld against due process challenge); Grace v.
Town of Brookline, 379 Mass. 43, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979) (6 month moratorium on all evictions
during conversion upheld against due process and equal protection challenges); Reiner-Kaiser
Assocs. v. McConnachie, 104 Misc. 2d 750, 429 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1979) (ban on eviction of elderly
tenants during conversion upheld against equal protection challenge); see also Judson, supra note
10, at 198-230; Rosenthal, The Legality and Practicality of Condominium Conversion Moratoriums,
34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1199, 1211-1222 (1980); Note, Ffth Amendment Takings and Condominium
Conversion Regulations that Restrict Owner Occupancy Rights, 62 B.U.L. REv. 467, 486-91 (1982);
Note, The Validity of Ordinances Limiting Condominium Conversions, 78 MICH. L. REv. 124, 134-
35 (1979).
35. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1326(B) (Supp. 1983) (120 day notice); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 66427.1(c) (West 1954) (180 day notice); COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-33-112(3) (1973) (90 day
notice); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-88b(b)(3) (West Supp. 1983) (180 day notice); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 45-1868 (b)(1) (1981) (120 day notice); FLA. STAT. § 718.606(1) (Supp. 1981) (270 day
notice for tenants in possession over 180 days; 180 day notice for all other tenants); GA. CODE
ANN. § 44-3-87(a) (Supp. 1983) (120 day notice); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 330(a) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1983) (120 day notice); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1604-111(a) (Supp. 1983) (120 day
notice); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-102.1(c) (Supp. 1983) (180 day notice); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 26.50(204) (Callaghan Supp. 1983) (120 day notice); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515A.4-1 10(a)
(West Supp. 1983) (120 day notice); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 448.4-112(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (120 day
notice); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356-B:56(II) (Supp. 1981) (90 day notice); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:18-61.2(g) (West Supp. 1983) (3 year notice); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eee(2)(d)(ii) to -
eeee(2)(d)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1983) (local governments in New York City metropolitan area
empowered to require 3 year notice); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(G) (Page 1981) (120 day
notice); OR. REv. STAT. § 94.116(1) (1953) (120 days notice); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 3410(a)
(Purdon Supp. 1983) (1 year notice); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-4.12(a) (Supp. 1983) (120 day
notice); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-31-420(A) (Supp. 1983) (90 day notice); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-27-
123(a) (1982) (60 day notice); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.94(b) (Supp. 1983) (120 day notice); WASH.
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of such notice is to afford the displaced tenant ample time to secure suitable
replacement housing. Although the ninety-day period is shorter than the no-
tice periods provided in most conversion statutes, 36 it gives most tenants suffi-
cient time to find replacement housing since a displaced tenant usually can
find similar housing within thirty to ninety days.37 For these tenants, the
ninety-day notice period will ease the burden of conversion.
Although the notice period is sufficient for the majority of tenants, it is
inadequate for elderly and disabled tenants, two groups with special housing
needs. Conversion particularly harms the elderly. During a conversion, eld-
erly tenants will very likely be among those displaced.38 Because of fixed in-
comes, many elderly tenants are unable to obtain the necessary financing to
purchase their individual unit.39 Moreover, those who can afford to purchase
may have no desire to do so. Given their shorter remaining life expectancies,
the advantages of establishing equity in a condominium are less attractive to
elderly tenants; such tenants may prefer to keep their financial resources in
liquid assets for present use and enjoyment.40
In addition to being highly susceptible to displacement, the elderly have
the most difficulty in obtaining replacement housing. Many elderly tenants
cannot search for new housing without physical assistance. Additional
problems arise from the need to find housing with adequate security, easy
physical access, and sufficient proximity to medical care.4 1 Finally, the elderly
can suffer chronic emotional and psychological harm after being forced to
move. Displacement disrupts established patterns of daily life and causes in-
creased stress and anxiety. The more serious of these disruptions include im-
paired access to family members, friends, church services, and preferred
medical care.42
REv. CODE ANN. § 59.18-200(2) (Supp. 1983) (90 day notice); W. VA. CODE § 36B-4-1 10(a) (Supp.
1983) (120 day notice); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.08(1) (West 1957) (120 day notice).
Congress has conducted extensive hearings on the need for federal conversion rights for ten-
ants. See, e.g., 1981 House Hearings, supra note 5; Condominium Conversions: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Housing and Consumer Interests of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 House Hearings]; Senate Hearings, supra note 6. In the
Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Protection and Abuse Relief Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C.
§ 3605 (1982), however, Congress merely urged state and local governments to enact their own
notice and first-purchase option requirements. This result reflected a belief that the issue of "no-
tice and opportunity to purchase" is "more appropriately addressed at the state and local level."
H.R. REP. No. 1420, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 167, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3617, 3712.
36. -Most states require a 120 or 180 day notice to the tenants. See supra note 35.
37. HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at IX-15.
38. Thirty-seven percent of displaced tenants are over fifty-five years old. 1980 House Hear-
ings, supra note 35, at 7 (statement of Michael A. Stegman, Deputy Ass't See'y for Research, U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.).
39. Note, supra note 7, at 210.
40. Note, Conversion of 4partments to Condominiums and Cooperatives: Protecting Tenants in
New York, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 705, 708 (1975).
41. Comment, Converson of Apartments to Condominiums: Social and Economic Regulations
Under the California Subdivision Map Act, 16 CAL. W.L. REv. 466, 468 (1980).
42. These disruptions and the emotional and psychological harm associated with them are
discussed in several studies. See 1981 House Hearings, supra note 4, pt. I at 162 (report of Kath-
leen R. Beal, Gerontology Program, George Washington Univ.); 1980 House Hearings, supra note
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Like the elderly, the disabled require more time to adjust to the change
and locate a new home. For example, they have specialized housing needs
that require easy physical access and close proximity to medical care. Locat-
ing replacement housing that meets these special needs may be difficult.
Rental costs can further complicate this search since many disabled tenants
depend on fixed incomes.
43
Ten states and the District of Columbia have recognized these special
problems and have enacted either eviction prohibitions or additional notice
requirements for elderly and disabled tenants.44 The North Carolina notice
requirement lacks such a provision. Thus, although the current notice require-
ment is a significant step in the right direction, the legislature should consider
an extended notice requirement of one to three years for elderly and disabled
tenants.
45
The second provision of the North Carolina statute requires a landlord or
developer to grant the tenant a thirty-day first option to buy his apartment.
46
This first-purchase option is designed to prevent developers from securing ad-
vance purchase commitments from third parties before notifying tenants of the
planned conversion. First option requirements have gained wide legislative
acceptance; twenty-one jurisdictions besides North Carolina now require them
in all conversions. 47
35, at 65 (report of Dr. Leon A. Pastalan, Dir., Environment and Aging Program, Univ. of Michi-
gan Inst. of Gerontology); Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 116 (report of Legal Research & Serv.
or the Elderly, Nat'l Council of Senior Citizens).
43. Note, supra note 7, at 210. If the tenant's disability is total, he may be completely depen-
dent on social security, veteran's benefits, worker's compensation, or private insurance benefits for
subsistence.
44. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47(a)-23c(b) (West Supp. 1983) (general prohibition of
eviction of blind, disabled, or elderly tenants); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1616(a) (1981) (prohibits
eviction of elderly tenants with annual incomes below $30,000 during a conversion); MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-137 (Supp. 1983) (3 year notice of conversion to elderly tenants on fixed
incomes); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.50(204b) (Callaghan Supp. 1983) (4 to 10 year notice deter-
mined by tenant's age; 4 year notice to disabled tenants); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515A.4-1 10(a)
(West Supp. 1983) (180 day notice to elderly tenants); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.22 to .39 (West
Supp. 1983) (local government authorized to grant disabled and elderly tenants individual lease
extensions for a maximum of 40 years); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(2-a)(b)(ii) (McKinney Supp.
1983) (prohibits eviction of disabled and elderly tenants during a conversion); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
68, § 3410(0 (Purdon Supp. 19.83) (2 year notice to blind, elderly, and disabled tenants); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-4.12(e) (Supp. 1983) (1 year notice to elderly tenants); S.C. CODE ANN..
§ 27-31-420(A) (Supp. 1983) (120 day notice to elderly tenants); VA. CODE § 55-79.94(f) (Supp.
1983) (local governments authorized to require 3 year notice to elderly and disabled tenants).
45. A I year notice requirement for elderly and disabled tenants is advocated in Note, Munic-
ipalRegulation of Condominium Conversions in California, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 225, 277 (1979). See
also Comment, supra note 22 at 331; Note, supra note 31 at 364.
46. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
47. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1326(B)(2) (Supp. 1983) (30 day first-purchase option);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66427.1(d) (West 1983) (90 day first-purchase option); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 47-88b(c) & (j) (West Supp. 1983) (90 day first-purchase option to individual tenant; 30
day first-purchase option to tenants' association); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1638 (1981) (60 day first-
purchase option); FLA. STAT. § 718.612 (Supp. 1981) (45 day first-purchase option followed by
right of first refusal to subsequent public offers at more favorable terms); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-3-
87(b) (Supp. 1983) (60 day first-purchase option followed by right of first refusal to subsequent
public offers at more favorable terms); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 330(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983)
(30 day first-purchase option); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1604-111 (b) (Supp. 1983) (60 day
first-purchase option followed by 180 day ban on public sale at more favorable terms); MD. REAL
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Although North Carolina's thirty-day option period is shorter than that
provided by most jurisdictions, 48 it should provide a tenant sufficient time to
analyze the relevant information pertaining to the conversion and reach an
intelligent decision. This decision is greatly simplified because the tenant al-
ready is familiar with the layout and condition of the complex and his particu-
lar apartment. Many tenants will desire a longer option period so they can
explore housing and financing options, but this desire must be balanced
against the landlord's interest in proceeding with the conversion. As such, the
thirty-day option, although short, is adequate. The thirty-day period to com-
plete the sale after exercise of the option is also adequate. A condominium
developer usually establishes standard sales terms for all conversion units and
obtains advance financing commitments from area lending institutions for
qualifying purchasers.4 9 Thus, the tenant-purchaser probably will not face
lengthy negotiations or a prolonged search for financing. Any terms subject to
negotiation can be settled within the thirty-day period. If the tenant chooses
to secure his own financing, he has sixty days to accomplish that goal-the
thirty-day option period plus the thirty-day settlement period. Thus, although
the option is not a cure-all, 50 it provides needed guarantees for those tenants
who are willing and able to buy their units.
On their face, the option and settlement provisions should guarantee the
tenant's right to purchase his unit if he so chooses. This result, however, may
be defeated by two further provisions of the statute and by a significant omis-
sion. First, the tenant does not receive the first-option right to his unit if the
"boundaries of the converted unit do not substantially conform to the dimen-
sions of the residential unit before conversion." 51 A landlord could claim that
improvements to the unit constitute a substantial change in dimensions and
PROP. CODE § I I-13 6(a) (Supp. 1983) (60 day first-purchase option); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515A.4-
l10(b) (West Supp. 1983) (60 day first-purchase option to buy followed by 180 day ban on public
sale at more favorable terms); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 356-B:56(II) (Supp. 1981) (60 day first-
purchase option); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.8 (West Supp. 1983) (first-purchase option); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eee(2)(d)(ix) (McKinney Supp. 1983) (90 day first-purchase option); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(G) (Page 1981) (90 day first-purchase option); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 94.122 (1983) (60 day first-purchase option followed by 60 day right of first refusal to any public
offer at more favorable terms); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 3410 (Purdon Supp. 1983) (6 month first-
purchase option followed by 6 month right of first refusal to public offer at more favorable terms);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-4.12(b) (Supp. 1983) (60 day first-purchase option followed by 180 day
ban on public sale at more favorable terms); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-31-420(B) (Supp. 1983) (60 day
first-purchase option followed by 15 day right of first refusal to public offer at more favorable
terms); VA. CODE § 55-79.94(b) (Supp. 1983) (60 day first-purchase option); W.VA. CODE § 36B-4-
110(b) (Supp. 1983) (60 day first-purchase option followed by 180 day ban on sale to public at
more favorable terms); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.08(1) (West 1981) (60 day first-purchase option).
48. A 60 day option is required in 13 of the 21 jurisdictions requiring such options. Three
states have longer option periods. See supra note 47.
49. HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at 111-9. Such advance financing commitments are attractive
to financial institutions because the institution is guaranteed all loan business for the project and
gains a security interest in the entire project.
50. Only those tenants who are financially able to purchase their unit or who qualify for
financing will benefit from this provision. Tenants who are too poor to qualify for financing are
not assisted by this provision; they must rely on the ninety-day notice period to find replacement
housing or negotiate a lease agreement with the new unit owner.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-36(b) (Supp. 1983).
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deny the tenant a first-purchase option. In such a case, the tenant would be
forced into litigation to preserve his option right. More significantly, this pro-
vision can create a dispute over option rights among the tenants if one unit is
divided and merged into adjoining units during conversion.52 For these rea-
sons, the legislature should consider one commentator's suggestion that ten-
ants be given the option to purchase a unit within the conversion project if it is
no longer possible to purchase his particular unit.53
Second, the tenant loses his right to specific performance of the option if
the landlord conveys the unit to a third-party purchaser who records the con-
veyance.54 Although this result follows North Carolina's long-standing status
as a "pure race" recording jurisdiction, 55 it robs the option of any real mean-
ing. If the third-party purchaser records the conveyance, the tenant is limited
to a suit for damages. Damages provide an inadequate remedy because, with
the exception of moving expenses, the tenant can prove no pecuniary loss.
This result, however, could be avoided by a statutory provision for alternative
remedies. Such a provision might include a right to purchase an unsold unit
or to recover liquidated damages in the amount of a set percentage of the
unit's value. Either alternative would discourage landlords from selling units
in violation of the tenant's option right.
A major omission from the North Carolina statute poses the final hazard
to the option right. The tenant's option right may prove meaningless if the
landlord demands an excessive price from the tenant during the option period,
waits for the option to expire, and then offers the unit to the public at more
favorable terms. A landlord might choose this course of action if he wanted to
end relations with the tenant. To prevent such treatment of tenants, several
states provide a statutory right of first refusal for a set period after the option
expires.56 Under this system, if the tenant declines to exercise his option and
the landlord subsequently offers the unit to a third party at more favorable
terms, the tenant has the right to purchase the unit at those terms. This first-
refusal right requires the landlord to negotiate in good.faith and eliminates the
temptation to wait out the option period. It has received support from com-
mentators57 and should be included in the North Carolina statute.
Currently, all residential tenant conversion rights in North Carolina are
provided by state law; local governments apparently lack authority to supple-
52. Wynn, Condominium Conversions and Tenant Rights-isconsin Statutes Section 703.08
What Kind o/Protection Does it Really Provide?, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 73, 80 (1979).
53. Id at 81.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-36(c) (Supp. 1983).
55. Under a "pure race" recording system, the grantee who first records his deed will prevail
over any other conveyance from the title source. This grantee will prevail regardless of any notice
he may have of a prior, unrecorded conveyance. See N.C. GEN.STAT. § 47-18(a) (1976), construed
in Hill v. Pinelawn Memorial Park, Inc., 304 N.C. 159, 282 S.E.2d 779 (1981); Patterson v. Bryant,
216 N.C. 550, 5 S.E.2d 849 (1939).
56. Ten states currently provide a right of first refusal: Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine,
Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and West Virginia. See supra
note 47.
57. See, e.g., Note, supra note 31, at 364.
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ment these state protections either by direct regulation 58 or through the exer-
cise of zoning powers.59 Thus, the North Carolina legislature should enact a
sound and comprehensive tenant conversion rights statute. Although the cur-
rent statute is a significant step in that direction, it is incomplete. The statute
establishes a tenant's right to notice of conversion, a provision characterized as
"the most fundamental tenant protection of all." 60 This notice requirement,
however, fails to address the unique housing needs of elderly and disabled
tenants. These tenants are affected most severely by a conversion and require
more time to locate replacement housing. Accordingly, they should be pro-
vided additional notice of an impending conversion beyond the ninety days
provided to all tenants.
The statute also correctly grants the tenant an option to purchase his con-
verted unit before it is offered for public sale. Such an option will limit the
disruptive effects of a conversion and avoid the expense of a move for those
tenants willing and able to buy their unit. The statute in its present form,
however, cannot fully implement this policy. A tenant can lose his option
right if the conversion involves changes to the building layout or if the devel-
oper demands an excessive option price in an effort to wait out the option
period. Moreover, this option right is unenforceable if the landlord conveys
the unit to a third party who records the conveyance. The legislature should
amend the statute to preclude any of these possibilities.
Condominium conversion is an established phenomenon in the American
housing market. It offers significant benefits to landlords, developers, purchas-
ers, and local communities. 6 1 Conversion, however, can impose severe strain,
even hardship, on the original tenant of the conversion property. This adverse
58. Prior to 1983 city and municipal governments were permitted to supplement all provi-
sions of the Unit Ownership Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-27 (1976) (amended Id. (Cum. Supp.
1983)). When the tenant protection provisions were added as article 2 of the Act in 1983, this
authorization to supplement the Act was limited to the provisions of article 1, which governs the
registration, public sale, and management of condominiums. 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 624,
§ 2 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 47A-27 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
59. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
The problems created by condominium conversion vary from community to community; cit-
ies with a heavy reliance on rental housing experience the most severe impact. The legislature
should permit local governments to respond to conversion problems by granting them some regu-
latory authority. Certainly, no North Carolina city is experiencing the conversion problems of the
large urban centers, but some flexibility of response is needed.
60. Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 132 (report of Legal Research and Servs. for the
Elderly).
61. The advantages to a community of condominium conversion are detailed in Comment,
supra note 22, at 314-17. Because the aggregate value of the individual converted units exceeds
the value of the building as rental property, conversion increases the local tax base. Moreover,
condominiums receive better maintenance than rental property and many buildings and individ-
ual units receive extensive renovation on conversion. Finally, conversion attracts upper and mid-
dle class families back into urban areas. Consumer spending by these families benefits area
businesses. See also HUD REPORT, supra note 5, at VIII-I to -36.
One commentator rejects this conclusion, arguing that, with the exception of the increased tax
base, conversion offers no economic advantages to the community. Senate Hearings, supra note 6,
at 49 (statement of Daniel Lauber, Planning/Communications Assocs.). Lauber argues that con-
versions typically occur in already stable neighborhoods and that the conversion itself is destabi-
lizing because it displaces a large number of tenants.
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impact can be reduced through appropriate legislation. North Carolina has
initiated such a legislative response, one that it should now complete.
DAVID JAMES BURGE
The North Carolina Time Share Act
Whether motivated by the desire for a less expensive vacation, a second
home, a hedge on inflation, or a calculated investment, over a quarter-million
Americans last year each paid between four thousand and twenty-five thou-
sand dollars for a week of vacation time during each of the next five, ten,
thirty, or more years.' Developers in over 900 resort spots sold each unit to as
many as fifty purchasers, at profits far greater than those on traditional condo-
minium sales.2 Consequently, resort timesharing has become the fastest grow-
ing sector of the vacation and resort industries. With sales increasing from
fifty million dollars in 1975 to an estimated one and one-half billion dollars in
1983, 3 timesharing has grown from a clever innovation to a self-contained in-
dustry, with numerous variations, 4 questionable sales practices, and a maze of
regulatory controls.5
With the North Carolina Time Share Act of 1983,6 North Carolina be-
came the fourteenth state to pass an act directly regulating the timeshare in-
dustry.7 Although such legislation varies considerably from state to state,
North Carolina's differs from the majority in one most significant feature: it
has declared all forms of timeshares, "whether or not coupled with a freehold
estate or an estate for years,"'8 to be interests in real property.9 After briefly
describing the development of timesharing and its various forms, this note fo-
cuses on the methods employed in controlling timeshare sales and operation,
and discusses the ramifications of North Carolina's Act.
A classic example of the ingenuity of the entrepreneur, timeshares devel-
oped in response to the needs of both vacation home suppliers and consumers.
The inflationary costs of land and construction in the early 1970s and the in-
creasing administrative expenses of complying with condominium regula-
tions10 had led to declining profit margins for condominium developers." By
employing the "basic principle of subdivision economics" through timeshar-
1. Daniels, When a Week is Realty, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1983, § 12, at 51, col. 3. In addition
to the purchase price of $4,000 to $25,000, the timeshare owner must pay yearly maintenance and
facility fees, maid service fees, and taxes. Id at 51, col. 2.
2. Id at 52, col. 4. This is true despite the additional costs incurred in selling the same unit
50 times.
3. Id
4. See infra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Gunnar, Regulation of Resort Time Sharing, 57 OR. L. REv. 31 (1977).
6. 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis Serv. 401 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93A-39 to -57 (Cum.
Supp. 1983)).
7. Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia also have timeshare acts. For statutory
cites, see infra note 85.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-41(9) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
9. Id § 93A-42.
10. See infra note 77. Condominium sales also are often considered sales of securities, and
subjected to additional regulatory requirements. See Note, New Ideas in the Vacation Home Mar-
ket, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1203, 1205-10 (1974).
11. Roodhouse, Fractional Time Period Ownership of Recreational Condominiums, 4 REAL
ESTATE LJ. 35, 38 (1975).
ing, these developers expected to offset their lost profits by selling "parts" of
the condominiums for an aggregate amount greater than the whole. 12
At the same time timeshares met an increasing consumer demand. Be-
cause of increased leisure and mobility 13 and the need to escape urban nui-
sances, 14 more middle-class Americans were seeking vacation retreats
formerly reserved for the wealthy. The timeshare offered an affordable and
flexible form of second-home ownership. With multiple ownership of a unit,
purchasers could resolve the affordability problems of condominium owner-
ship while getting exactly what they needed, a "place of their own" for a lim-
ited period each year.' 5 The practical problems encountered with group
purchases of vacation homes could be avoided by employing professional
managers to handle scheduling and maintenance. 16 Finally, timeshare plans
often enabled purchasers to trade timeshares with owners in other places, fur-
ther increasing the popularity of timesharing.
A timeshare is the prepurchase of a week's exclusive use' 7 of a resort
apartment or suite 8 each year for a period ranging from five years to the
useful life of the dwelling, or for perpetuity. For descriptive and sometimes
regulatory purposes timeshares can be divided into two categories--"fee" and
"right-to-use" timeshares.' 9 The fee timeshare includes the light to use a unit
coupled with an ownership interest in that unit; a right-to-use timeshare in-
volves simply the right to use a unit either by lease or contract, with no owner-
ship interest. 20
Four types of fee timeshares correspond to four alternatives for conveying
the interest. 21 A "timespan" estate is held by all the weekly owners of a given
12. Id at 38. Even though the costs of marketing a timeshare project are up to 50% higher
than for conventional condominiums, the most expensive part, construction, costs no more. Id at
39. It is estimated that revenues from a timeshare project may be from two and one-half to three
times higher than from condominiums. Pollack, Time-Sharing, or Time Is Money But Will It
Sell?, 10 REAL ESTATE L.J. 281, 287 (1982).
13. Roodhouse, supra note 11, at 36. See also Note, supra note 10, at 1203-04.
14. Note, supra note 10, at 1203.
15. Id at 1210.
16. Gray, Pioneering the Concept of Time-Sharing Ownershp, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1196,
1197-98 (1974).
17. How the period or conditions of the exclusive use is defined varies greatly. North Caro-
lina, for example, defines a timeshare as "a right to occupy a unit or any of several units during
five or more separated time periods over a period of at least five years, including renewal options."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-41(9) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
18. Timeshares are found not only in resort condominiums, but have expanded to "marinas,
recreational vehicle parks, and even to campgrounds, and cities." Daniels, supra note 1, at 52, col.
4.
19. Labels for classifications of timeshares vary; "fee" and "right-to-use," as well as other
labels used in this note are the most commonly used designations. This multiplicity of nomencla-
ture is one of the primary sources of confusion in the timeshare industry.
20. The proportion of fee and right-to-use timeshare sales is close to 50-50. AM. LAND DEV.
ASS'N, RESORT TIME-SHARING FACT SHEET (Oct. 1981).
21. For a complete analysis of the benefits and detriments of each form of fee timeshare, see
generally Comment, Time-Share Condominiums: Property's Fourth Dimension, 32 ME. L. REV.
181 (1980); E. Peirce & R. Mann, Time Share Interests in Real Estate: A Critical Evaluation of the
Regulatory Environment 4-29 (1983) (unpublished article from the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, School of Business Administration); Pollack, supra note 12, at 284-85.
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unit as tenants in common, each having a present undivided interest in a fee
simple estate.2 2 As a supplement to the deed, a timeshare declaration is re-
corded, with restrictive covenants giving each owner the exclusive right to pos-
session for an established period each year.23 With the second form, the
"interval" estate, an estate for years is deeded to each purchaser, with title
rotating among the owners; the possessory rights are determined by the rotat-
ing title rather than by a separate document. 24 The deed also vests a remain-
der in the purchasers as fee simple tenants in common.25 The third form, the
"fee simple" timeshare, grants each purchaser fee simple ownership for a
given period each year.26 Although this form avoids the complications of ten-
ancy in common 27 and interval ownership, 28 it adds the unfamiliar dimension
of time to fee simple ownership, which traditionally has been limited to
dimensions of breadth, depth, and height.2 9 Because of its novelty, fee simple
timesharing may cause confusion in drafting conveyances and infringe the
right to waste, an incident of fee simple ownership. 30 Because it defies these
conventional property law concepts, fee simple timesharing has been used cau-
tiously and infrequently.3' The fourth and newest form of fee timeshare own-
ership is the timeshare "cooperative," under which the purchasers own stock
in a corporation that grants individual use periods through proprietary
leases.32 Although this form is not yet widely used, it "appears to have advan-
tages in the areas of financing, taxation, and regulation. '33
The "vacation license" is the oldest of three widely-used types of right-to-
use timeshares.34 "Developed primarily as a mechanism to avoid real estate
22. See Comment, supra note 21, at 184-85.
23. Id at 186-91.
24. Id at 201-02.
25. Id "At the end of the recurring estates for years, the owners can either reinstate the
interval arrangement or seek partition of their interests." Id at 201 n.35.
26. Id at 211. The fee simple timeshare originally was noted in Roodhouse, supra note 1I, at
41 & nn.19-20.
27. Common problems with tenancy in common include partitioning, allocating the tax bur-
den, enforcing the payment of taxes, and obtaining title insurance. For a complete treatment of
these problems, see generally sources listed in supra note 21.
28. Problems of interval ownership stem from its similarity to a landlord-tenant arrangement
and from the possibility of merger of title. As an estate for years, interval ownership might be
treated under the special laws of landlords and tenants, implying developer liability for tort, war-
ranty of habitability, and a nonequity interest for the purchaser. Comment, supra note 21, at 202,
204. Although a fee simple remainder might lessen the possibility of landlord-tenant treatment, it
raises the possibility for merger of the lesser estate into the greater estate, eliminating the
timeshare portion of the grant altogether. Id at 207-10. For a more complete treatment of these
issues, see generally sources listed in supra note 21.
29. Roodhouse, supra note 11, at 48-50.
30. Id at 50-51.
31. E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 16.
32. PRACTICING LAW INST., THE LEGAL AsPECTs OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 14 (1982).
33. Id While the Institute does not describe these advantages, this form of ownership would
avoid the problems of joint liability for financing and taxes.
34. The North Carolina Act mentions several other forms of right-to-use timeshares-pre-
paid hotel reservations, limited partnerships, and vacation bonds-which are not described in the
literature on timeshares. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-41(9) (Cum. Supp. 1983). The constant develop-
ment of variations on the timesharing concept is evidenced by the fact that these forms of
timeshares were not common when the literature was written.
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regulatory agencies and the necessity of using licensed real estate salesmen,"
this form gives the purchaser the right to use a given unit for a specified por-
tion of each year, for either a number of years or for the useful life of the
unit.3 5 The second form, the "vacation lease," gives the purchaser a leasehold
interest in the unit for a specified period each year; unlike the license form, the
vacation lease may be assigned, transferred, or subleased.3 6 The final form of
right-to-use timeshares is the "club membership," in which the purchaser pays
a membership fee to a club or association that owns and operates the premises
and leases timeshares to the members.
3 7
The numerous existing schemes for timesharing, and the likelihood that
even more variations will evolve, illustrate the need for legislation governing
the sale and operation of timeshares. Commentators have suggested legisla-
tion to protect consumers and establish guidelines for timeshare developers
and managers since early in the development of the timeshare industry.
38
Consumer protection legislation was necessary to combat the questionable
sales techniques employed, 39 such as "bait and switch," 40 deceptive prize of-
fers, and nondisclosure of fine print contract provisions, as well as the confu-
sion caused by the multiple forms of timesharing.4 1 In addition, guidance was
needed for the special management requirements of timeshares-scheduling
and overseeing use and possession of, ensuring the maintenance of, and coor-
dinating the insurance and tax payments on each unit.42 Other legal problems
of timesharing, including tort and tax liability among owners, partition of
units, property rights of timeshare purchasers in registration and transfer of
interests, and the status of timeshares under securities regulation, also require
legislative resolution. Finally, it was believed that "widespread market accept-
ance and legal soundness [of timeshares] might be greatly enhanced" by
amending existing legislation to account for timesharing,43 or passing specific
legislation to govern timesharing.44
Both the federal government and various state governments have recog-
nized the need to protect consumers and guide timeshare operations through
regulation of the timeshare industry.45 Unfortunately, the regulations vary
35. E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 22.
36. Pollack, supra note 12, at 285. The vacation lease commonly has been accepted as a
leasehold interest in real estate and thus may be unaffected by North Carolina's declaration that
all timeshares are real property interests. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-42 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
37. E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 26.
38. Altro, Resort Time-Sharing: Why Real Estate's New Brainchild Needs its Own Legislation,
41 LA REVUE Du BARREAU DU QUEBEC 1054, 1086 (1981). See generally Roodhouse, supra note
11.
39. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
40. See infra note 63.
41. See supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
42. Roodhouse, supra note 11, at 52-54.
43. Id at 52.
44. See generally Altro, supra note 38.
45. Although the most relevant federal legislation is discussed elsewhere in this note, see infra
notes 47-50, 60-65, 69-73 and accompanying text, several other federal acts might also affect
timeshares. These include: Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691(f) (1976) (re-
quires those who "regularly extend credit" to make certain disclosures regarding the cost of in-
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widely among the states both in extent of coverage and regulatory methods,
causing unnecessary confusion for both developers and purchasers. Even
within a state, the inability to classify timeshares in an existing regulatory cate-
gory, such as securities, consumer sales practices, or real estate, has led to an
environment of "potential and actual regulation [that] often results in conflict-
ing and irreconcilable requirements. '46 An examination of this regulatory en-
vironment illustrates this confusion.
One form of regulation that might apply to timeshares at both the state
and federal level is securities regulation. Although the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) has not required registration of timeshare projects,
nor planned any "definitive action" such as guidelines or no-action letters, it
has not specifically exempted timeshares from its authority.47 The SEC has
issued guidelines for condominiums and other real estate securities that also
might be used for timeshares. 48 Condominiums, when coupled with renting
services for the purchaser, are included in the SEC definition of a "security,"
which emphasizes the purchaser's economic gains derived from a third party's
efforts.49 Timeshares might be distinguished, however, since the services pro-
vided are not so much for the purchasers' economic benefits as for their own
use and enjoyment. Federal cases imply that most timeshares fall outside SEC
control since purchases of commodities "for personal consumption or living
quarters for personal use" are excluded from its "investment contract" defini-
tion of securities.50
The majority of states, including North Carolina, apply the investment
contract definition to their own "blue sky" laws. 51 This theory, however, is
stallment credit); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) (1976) (prohibits
discrimination in extension of credit based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, mari-
tal status, or source of income); Civil Rights Act of 1964, title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-(6)
(1976) (prohibits discrimination in public accommodations on basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origins); Federal Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2414 (1976) (availability of insurance
dependent on compliance with certain construction standards in flood prone areas; as of October,
1983, federal flood insurance was not available for structures on "undeveloped" coastal barriers);
Civil Rights Act of 1968, title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1976) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion in housing on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin). For a more de-
tailed discussion of these laws as they apply to timeshares, see Bloch, Regulation of Timesharing,
60 U. DET. J. URB. L. 23 (1982).
46. Gunnar, supra note 5, at 32-33. For example, a potential conflict between real estate laws
and securities laws may require dual licensing of timeshare salespersons or multiple public offer-
ing statements. For a complete treatment of regulatory mechanisms and examples of possible
confusion, see id at 40-43. See also E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 48-65.
47. Bloch, supra note 45, at 37-38.
48. Id at 38.
49. Id at 38 & n.105.
50. In United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Supreme Court held
that the purchasers of "shares" in a cooperative housing project were not buying stock in the
ordinary sense, to make a profit, but rather to acquire low-cost housing. This motive precluded
the cooperative stock from being considered an investment contract under the test set forth in
S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Under this test, a purchaser must invest in a
common enterprise with the expectation of profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or some
third party. Id at 298-99. For a more complete treatment of the securities issue in timesharing,
see Comment, Regulating Vacation Timesharing: A More Effective Approach, 29 UCLA L. Rnv.
907, 911-33 (1981-82).
51. Bloch, supra note 45, at 34 & n.91. As of 1982, 35 states had adopted the Uniform Secur-
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applied only if the legislation does not specify its own applicability or inappli-
cability. Several states expressly include52 or exclude 53 timeshares from blue
sky coverage or limit the coverage to real estate54 or nonreal estate5 5 interests.
North Carolina has chosen to apply its securities laws to the extent that
timeshares are deemed investment contracts;56 thus, while leaving open the
possibility of securities regulation for timeshares, it has not expressly included
or excluded them. Although some favor applying blue sky legislation to
timeshares because of its broad concept of fraud, wider range of civil reme-
dies, and greater authority for substantive regulation,57 "[t]he consensus
among commentators is that securities laws should not apply to most time
share offerings." s5 8 Although treating timeshares as securities might be desira-
ble when no other laws apply, such regulation may create an unnecessary
overlap of authority when specific legislation could perform the same function
more efficiently.59
A second area of regulation involves the prohibition of unfair and fraudu-
lent sales practices. This type of state and federal legislation addresses the
sales and promotion techniques of timeshare developers, a major complaint of
prospective timeshare purchasers. Alleged "misrepresentation of gifts and
prizes offered, misrepresentation of the purpose of the solicitation, failure to
disclose material facts about the offering, 'high pressure' sales, and even 'ver-
bal abuse' of consumers," have resulted in lawsuits, adverse publicity, and leg-
islative and administrative attention.60 The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has informally assisted potential purchasers of timeshares by preparing
a consumer checklist for timeshare offerings. 6 1 It also investigates timeshare
promoters and sellers for "unfair methods of competition or unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices; ' 62 these investigations have led to at least one court ac-
tion.63 A further regulatory provision applicable to timeshares64 is the holder-
ities Act, which applies the "investment contract" definition of security. Id In North Carolina
both the Securities Act and the Time Share Act refer to investment contracts. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 78A-2(l 1) (1981) (definition of "security" includes "investment contract"); Id § 93A-50
(Cum. Supp. 1983) ("time shares deemed to be investment contracts" are subject to securities laws
in addition to real estate laws).
52. These states include Alaska, Maine, Minnesota, and New York. Smith, Timesharing Reg-
ulation by States, NAT'L L.J., May 10, 1982, at 34.
53. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 94.813 (1983).
54. E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.33(B) (Page 1978 & Supp. 1982) (securities regula-
tions applicable to out-of-state real property).
55. Maryland, for example, might classify some timeshares as "limited use resort securities"
subject to its blue sky laws. Bloch, supra note 45, at 28 n.48.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-50 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
57. Gunnar, supra note 5, at 45; see also Comment, supra note 50, at 930-31.
58. E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 36. See also MODEL TIME-SHARE SALES AcT § 1-
106 (Fourth Draft, October 1982) (National Time Sharing Council of the Am. Land Dev. Ass'n)
(timeshare not a security unless the income of the project goes directly to timeshare owners) [here-
inafter cited as MTSA].
59. See infra notes 85-113 and accompanying text.
60. Bloch, supra note 45, at 30-31.
61. I d at 41.
62. Id The authority for these investigations is section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
63. F.T.C. v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, 2 TIMESHARING L. REP. (LDI) 11-7 (No. C81160
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in-due-course rule, which requires "that consumer credit contracts used in fi-
nancing the retail purchase of consumer goods or services specifically preserve
the consumer's rights against the seller." 65
Most states have similar regulations governing fraud, monopolies, and
consumer protection that permit actions for misrepresentation, nondisclosure,
and "high pressure" sales tactics.66 For example, section 75-1.1 of the North
Carolina General Statutes parallels the FTC Act,67 and the North Carolina
Time Share Act expressly requires developers to comply with chapter 75 when
their timeshare promotions include offers of prizes.68
Another type of timeshare regulation involves controls on the subdivision
and sale of land. The Federal Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act of
1968,69 which requires registration of land marketed or sold in interstate com-
merce and provides remedies for victims of fraud and misrepresentation, may
apply to timeshares. Although a federal court has upheld application of this
Act to right-to-use "camping clubs,"70 the Act exempts land that already has
been improved or on which a building is scheduled to be built within two
years, 71 as well as land subject to certain other statutory registration and dis-
closure requirements. 72 Although these provisions would exempt many
timeshares from the Act's coverage, others that include the "right to exclusive
use of a specific portion of land" would be covered. 73
At the state level, inclusion of timeshares under similar land sales and
subdivision acts often depends on whether they are considered an interest in
real estate; thus, some states include fee timeshares under these laws, but ex-
V, W.D. Wash., filed Sept. 28, 1981) (involves alleged "bait and switch" tactics by timeshare
developers, sales organization, and owners association in misrepresenting the availability of Ha-
waiian timeshares to purchasers and then offering only units in Tahoe, Nevada and Ocean Shores,
Washington). Discussed in Dickerson, Litigating Resort Timeshare Abuses, NAT'L L.J., June 7,
1982, at 44.
64. Bloch, supra note 45, at 44-45.
65. FTC Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1982). The holder-in-due-course rule requires a
boldface statement of the consumer's rights on the contract. Id.
66. Bloch, supra note 45, at 30-31.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981). See supra note 62. See Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303,
218 S.E.2d 342 (1975) ("close parallel" to FTC Act); Pedwell v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 51 N.C.
App. 236, 275 S.E.2d 565 (1981) (§ 75-1.1 applied to an agreement to prevent performance of
contracts to purchase condominium); Kent v. Humphries, 50 N.C. App. 580, 275 S.E.2d 176
(rental of spaces in mobile home park is "trade and commerce"), aft'das modfied, 303 N.C. 675,
281 S.E.2d 43 (1981); Kleinfelter v. Northwest Bldrs. & Developers, 44 N.C. App. 561, 261 S.E.2d
498 (1980) ("close parallel to FTC Act"); Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574
(1977) (rental of housing is "trade or commerce"), disc. rev. denied, 294 N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843,
844 (1978).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-46 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1982).
70. See Bloch, supra note 45, at 46.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(2) (1982).
72. Id § 1702(b). Subdivisions involving purely intrastate activity or those meeting local
minimum standards for subdivisions, zoning, and utility provision, and assuring marketable title,
personal inspection of the property, and involving no prize offers are excluded. Id.
73. Bloch, supra note 45, at 48.
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empt right-to-use units. 7 4 Also, some state acts apply only to vacant land 75 or
to land on which there is no contractual obligation to build within two years. 76
Other state laws, such as those requiring timeshare salespersons to have real
estate licenses or including timeshares under condominium statutes, also often
distinguish between fee and nonfee timeshares. 77
Among states that have not expressly excluded right-to-use timeshares
from land subdivision or real estate licensing acts, the courts are split over
whether they are real property interests. In State v. Carriage House Associ-
ates,78 the Nevada Supreme Court determined that the state land sales act did
not apply to a right-to-use timeshare. In so finding, the court cited with ap-
proval the lower court's opinion that although the right-to-use timeshare is
"really -an anomaly. . . [that] doesn't fit neatly into any nice legal terminol-
ogy,. . . an individual entering into the contract [does not acquire] an interest
in real estate." 79 Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals found that vacation
club timeshares were not subject to the state's subdivision control laws, nor to
the condominium regulations promulgated under the authority to regulate the
sale of "an interest or estate" in a condominium unit.80 The Oregon court
clasified right-to-use memberships as "mere contract rights to use unspecified
property."8' Conversely, California's Court of Appeal found the state's land
subdivision sales act applicable to right-to-use timeshares.8 2 Although the
timeshare purchaser had not been entitled to a particular unit, the entitlement
to exclusive occupancy for a specific period of time brought the timeshare
under California's real property law.8 3 Although the specific provisions of the
particular timeshare arrangement in question may be determinative in these
close cases, the divergence of judicial opinion on this issue is clear.84
74. The states are: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, and New Mexico. Id at 25.
75. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 337 to 339-c (McKinney 1916 & Supp. 1984).
76. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. § 30-372a-2A(3) (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-11-4(l)(b)
(1953 & Supp. 1983).
77. Eg., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-33-110 to -111 (1982) (condominium statutes with separate
sections for timeshares apply only to interval and timespan timeshares); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, §§ 591-94 (West Cum. Supp. 1983) (provisions for timeshares within condominium act distin-
guish between timeshare estates and timeshare licenses).
78. 94 Nev. 707, 585 P.2d 1337 (1978).
79. Id at 710, 585 P.2d at 1339 (citation omitted). In 1982, however, the Nevada Attorney
General declared that a right-to-use timeshare is an interest in property and as such is subject to
the Nevada Land Sales Act. PRACTICINo LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 32, at 15. In the same year
an opinion by the Texas Attorney General declared that a right-to-use timeshare is not an interest
in real property. Id.
80. Royal Aloha Partners v. Real Estate Div., 59 Or. App. 564, 651 P.2d 1350 (1982).
81. 651 P.2d at 1353 (Or. App.).
82. Cal-Am Corp. v. Department of Real Estate, 104 Cal. App. 3d 453, 163 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1980) (state act requiring registration of, and public disclosure statements for, subdivisions of real
property).
83. Id. at 458, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 732. The purchaser was given "exclusive occupancy" during
a specific portion of each year "untilprecisely December 31, 2041." Id.
84. Another case, arising in a bankruptcy context, held that a right-to-use timeshare that did
not promise a specific unit was neither an unexpired lease nor an executory contract for the sale of
real property, and gave the purchaser no right in the underlying property. In re Sombrero Reef
Club, Inc., 18 Bankr. 612, 617-19 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
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Instead of depending on these more general regulatory frameworks, the
final form of timeshare regulation specifically regulates timeshares as a distinct
form of sale, subdivision, or security.85 This per se legislation generally entails
a combination of other regulatory methods and covers some combination of
the following: sales practices;8 6 salesperson and project registration;8 7 public
offering statements;8 liens;8 9 partitioning;90 advertising and promotions;91
and project organization and management. 92 Like the other forms of legisla-
tion, per se timeshare laws often distinguish between fee and right-to-use
timeshares; although some portions of most state acts apply to both forms,
other provisions may apply only to one type.93
Although some commentators contend that amendment of existing state
condominium acts might protect timeshare purchasers and owners, or that fee
timeshares are best regulated as condominiums and right-to-use timeshares
under general consumer protection laws, 94 the trend is toward comprehensive
legislation specifically covering timeshare sales and operation.95 Nevertheless,
specific regulation of timeshares varies considerably in comprehensiveness. In
addition to provisions based on the fee and right-to-use distinction, some acts
exclude timeshares from the other means of regulation discussed above,96
while others continue to subject them to multiple regulatory mechanisms. 97
Some states have adopted portions of the three model timesharing acts
that have been drafted, but none of the model acts has been widely accepted.
The Model Time-Sharing Ownership Act,98 known as RTC/NARELLO, is a
"disclosure-type" statute "designed to assure consumer protection while pre-
85. Fourteen states have passed legislation specifically regulating timeshares. They are:
ALA. CODE §§ 34-27-50 to -69 (Cum. Supp. 1983); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-2197 to -2197.17
(West. Cum. Supp.1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-103w to -103bb (West. Cum. Supp,
1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 721.01 to -.28 (Cum. Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-3-160 to -205
(Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 514E-1 to -15 (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1701 to -
1741 (1981); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 119A.010 to -.700 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93A-39 to -57
(Cum Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 94.803 to -.991 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-10 to -230
(Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-15B (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-32-101 to -130
(1982); VA. CODE §§ 55-360 to -400 (1981 & Supp. 1983). In most states, the timeshare acts are
administered by the same entity that administers land subdivision controls.
86. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-103 (West Cum. Supp. 1984).
87. Eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-52 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
88. E.g., VA. CODE § 55-374 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
89. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.16 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
90. E.g., Id. § 721.22.
91. Eg., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-2197.11 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
92." E.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 94.846 to .869 (1983).
93. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 55-363 (only transfer of timeshare "estates" may be recorded); id
§9 55-368, 371 (separate management guidelines for timeshare "estates" and "uses" respectively).
94. Comment, supra note 21, at 223; E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 70.
95. Until 1982, only seven states-Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Nebraska, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, and Virginia-had per se legislation. Since 1982, however, Alabama, Connecticut, Geor-
gia, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Oregon have enacted timeshare legislation. See
supra note 85 (statutory cites).
96. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.23 (Supp. 1981) (timeshare not a security); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 94.813 (1983) (timeshare not a security).
97. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-50 (Cum. Supp. 1983) ("investment contract" timeshare is a
security); id. § 93A-46 (advertising and promotions subject to separate consumer protection laws).
98. MODEL TIME-SHARING OWNERSHIP AcT (1974) (Resort TimeSharing Council of the Am.
serving a reasonable commercial atmosphere." 99 This Act, adopted without
change by Nebraska' 00 and with some variation by at least five other states, 101
includes provisions for a public offering statement, a three-day rescission pe-
riod, and a nondisturbance clause, under which the lender, developer, and
buyer agree to protect the purchaser from loss due to default by the developer
and subsequent foreclosure by the lender.10 2 RTC/NARELLO distinguishes
between a "time-share estate" (timeshare coupled with an interest in property)
and "timeshare use" (no attached property interest). Despite this distinction,
however, RTC/NARELLO does not state explicitly whether a right-to-use
timeshare is to be treated as an interest in real estate.
0 3
In 1982 the American Land Development Association drafted a second
model statute, the Model Time-Share Sales Act (MTSA). More comprehen-
sive than RTC/NARELLO, MTSA includes structural guidelines for
timeshare projects, 1°4 provisions controlling advertising and timeshare ex-
change programs,105 and an exemption of most timeshares from securities
laws. 10 6 MTSA also changed the definition of timeshare so that "no distinc-
tion is made between a so-called time-share use and a so-called time-share
estate."' 1 7 Like RTC/NARELLO, MTSA brings all regulatory power over
timesharing under a single state agency, preferably an agency governing real
estate matters. While MTSA has not been adopted by any states, some of its
concepts have been included in state acts.108
The third model act, also more comprehensive than RTC/NARELLO, is
the Uniform Real Estate Time Share Act (URETSA). 10 9 URETSA distin-
guishes between the "time-share estate" and "time-share license" forms of
ownership."10 It characterizes the "time-share license," however, as an estate
Land Dev. Ass'n & Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate License Law Officials) [hereinafter cited as
RTC/NARELLO].
99. Smith, supra note 52, at 34.
100. Bloch, supra note 45, at 24.
101. Id. These states are Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id.
102. Smith, supra note 52, at 35.
103. Pollack, supra note 12, at 296-97.
104. MTSA, supra note 58, art. III. Article III requires a recorded declaration establishing the
basic scheme of ownership, occupancy, and management in accordance with rules and regulations
to be promulgated regarding the creation of an owners' association, the powers of the association,
the powers of hired management, methods of assessing and collecting fees for maintenance and
operating expenses, and requirements for insurance. Id.
105. Id art. VI. Article VI prohibits misleading advertising, requires that all advertisements
be reviewed by the regulatory agency, and restricts certain advertising techniques, especially those
that offer gifts or prizes. Id
106. Id § 1-106. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
107. Id § 1-102.
108. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-3-185 to -188 (Supp. 1983) (based on MTSA, art. VI -
Advertising); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-48 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (based on MTSA, Art. V - Exchange
Programs); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 119A.590 to .620 (1983) (loosely based on MTSA, art. V - Ex-
change Programs).
109. UNIFORM REAL ESTATE TIME SHARE AcT (1979) (Nat'l Conference of Commissioners
on Unif. State Law) [hereinafter cited as URETSA]. See also Pollack, supra note 12, at 296.
110. E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 46. For comparison of MTSA and URETSA, see
id, at 44-48; Pollack, supra note 12, at 295-301.
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for years with all the incidents that attach to it at common law."' Thus, it
appears that URETSA classifies all timeshares as interests in real property. Of
the states with timeshare legislation, only Oregon has adopted this bifurcated
definition with both types of timeshares classified as real property. 112
URETSA is also broader than the other model acts in that it recognizes both
implied and express warranties of quality, has a seven-day period for rescis-
sion, and establishes a plan for timeshare project management. 13
The North Carolina Time Share Act" 4 includes several features of
MTSA. Most importantly, it defines "time share" without distinguishing be-
tween fee and right-to-use timeshares." 5 Also, like MTSA, it provides for
detailed disclosures regarding vacation exchange programs available to pur-
chasers,' 1 6 and a five-day rescission period during which any money paid is to
be escrowed.1 7 In addition, the North Carolina Act establishes requirements,
procedures, and disciplinary measures for registration of timeshare projects
and salespersons with the North Carolina Real Estate Commission,'" and
requires a public disclosure statement for all timeshare offerings." 19
The Act, however, does not cover many subjects that are included in a
more comprehensive act, such as MTSA and URETSA.' 20 For example, the
North Carolina Act does not address the resale of timeshares, out-of-state
sales, 121 the structure and management of the timeshare project, 122 local regu-
111. Pollack, supra note 12, at 297, 299.
112. OR. REv. STAT. § 94.813 (1983). North Carolina, among other states, has defined
"timeshare" as a single concept and classified it as real property. See infra notes 115, 125, 171.
113. Pollack, sura note 12, at 295-301. Unlike RTC/NARELLO, which requires merely that
management provisions be included in timeshare agreements, URETSA specifically describes
management duties and purchaser involvement in management decisionmaking. Id at 298.
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-39 to -57 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
115. "Time share" means a right to occupy a unit or any of several units during five or
more separated time periods over a period of at least five years, including renewal op-
tions, whether'bfnot coupled with a freehold estate or an estate for years in a time share
project or a specified portion thereof, including, but not limited to, a vacation license,
prepaid hotel reservation, club membership, limited partnership, or vacation bond ....
Id § 93A-41(9).
Under the MTSA:
"Time-share" means the right, however evidenced or documented, to use and oc-
cupy a living unit (either a specifically identified living unit or a living unit of a specific
type or any living unit) which use and occupancy rights are divided among all persons
holding similar interests within that living unit according to a fixed or variable time
schedule on a periodic basis that has been or will be allotted from the use or occupancy
into which the time-share project has been divided. No distinction is made in this Act
between a so-called time-share use and a so-called time-share estate.
MTSA, supra note 58, § 1-102.
116. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-48, -49 (Cum. 1983), with MTSA, supra note 58, art. V.
117. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-45 (Cum. Supp. 1983) with MTSA, supra note 58, §§ 4-
101 to 102.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93A-40, -52, -53 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
119. Id § 93A-44.
120. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text. Though not modeled exactly on either of
the model acts, several state acts, such as those in Georgia, Florida, Oregon, and Tennessee are
fairly complete. For statutory references, see supra note 85.
121. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-15B-7 (1983) (applies to all timeshares located in
South Dakota or sold in South Dakota). The North Carolina registration requirements apply only
to timeshares located in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-40 (Supp. 1983).
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lation of timesharing development, or tort liability of timeshare owners.
Rather than being self-contained, the North Carolina Act delegates some of
the regulatory authority over time shares to administrators other than the Real
Estate Commission; securities violations fall under the jurisdiction of the Sec-
retary of State,' 23 and violations of advertising and promotions laws are inves-
tigated and prosecuted by the Attorney General.' 24 Nowhere does the act
expressly exempt timeshares from the coverage of other laws.
The most significant portion of the North Carolina Act is section 93A-42,
which characterizes all timeshares as interests in real estate. 125 By defining
timeshare to include a periodic right to use "whether or not coupled with a
freehold estate or an estate for years,"126 this provision turns all timeshares,
whether of the fee or right-to-use type, into interests in real estate "governed
by the law of [North Carolina] relating to real estate."' 127 Although insignifi-
cant for those timeshares that always have been considered realty interests,'2 8
this provision subjects arrangements formerly contractual, such as timeshare
licenses and club memberships, to the laws of real property and the rights and
duties incident to ownership of real property. This change, which overrides the
common-law notions that a license to use land is not an interest in land,129 but
rather a mere contract right, 130 has several implications.
First, by statutorily designating right-to-use timeshares as real property
interests, the Act avoids the potential flood of litigation that would result from
a less certain statutory provision. The Act conclusively determines that real
estate laws apply to right-to-use timeshares; if this issue had been litigated, a
North Carolina court probably would have found real estate laws inapplicable
after considering the North Carolina common law' 3' and the decisions of
other states. 132
Second, the Act will promote uniformity of timeshare practices by provid-
ing the same benefits and protections to all timeshare purchasers, regardless
122. MTSA, supra note 58, art. III.
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-45(a) (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983). The North Carolina Time
Share Act provides that the North Carolina Securities Act, applies "to time shares deemed to be
investment contracts or to other securities offered with or incident to a time share." Id § 93A-50.
124. Id § 75-15. The Time Share Act requires full compliance with chapter 75 of the North
Carolina General Statutes for advertisements that include the offer of a prize or other inducement.
Id. § 93A-46.
125. Id § 93A-42 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
126. Id § 93A-41(9). For the full text of this definition, see supra note 115.
127. Id § 93A-42(a).
128. See supra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
129. Hill v. Smith, 51 N.C. App. 670, 277 S.E.2d 542, disc. rev. denied, 303 N.C. 543, 281
S.E.2d 392 (1981) (permission given by licensor without deed of property for wife of decedent to
use house located on land purchased by licensor from decedent's estate was not a life estate but a
mere license, revocable at will of licensor).
130. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
131. Even a leasehold in real estate is treated by North Carolina courts as a "chattel real," or
personal property, except as modified by statute. Moche v. Leno, 227 N.C. 159, 41 S.E.2d 369
(1947); Waddell v. United Cigar Stores, 195 N.C. 434, 142 S.E. 585 (1928). See also supra note 129
and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
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of the type purchased. The legislature apparently recognized that the vacation
license was developed primarily as a mechanism to avoid existing land sales
regulation 33 and subjected all timeshare salesmen and projects to registration
requirements.' 34 Consequently, developers and salespersons will be more ac-
countable for their actions; this will shield the prospective purchaser from
fraud or misrepresentation. Also, because there will be no legal incongruities
to consider in forming and purchasing timeshares, a purer economic market
putting consumers on more equal footing with developers will result.
All timeshare purchasers also will now receive the additional protections
of real property ownership, such as registered and insured title t35 and the eq-
uitable remedy of specific performance. With a contractual timeshare, how-
ever, the licensee would have had little right to keep the timeshare if the
developer defaulted or the title were encumbered. 136 In these situations, the
licensee could sue the developer for monetary contractual damages, but this
action would be "only as good as the solvency of the licensor and [would have]
no reference to the land itself.' 137 Since the defaulting developer probably
would be judgment proof, the licensee might collect nothing.
With a real property interest, the purchaser can purchase title insurance
to protect that interest against failure or defect of title. For example, if the
developer conveys the same timeshare to two purchasers, or possesses an en-
cumbered title to the property, the purchaser might not be able to keep the
timeshare. He would, however, recover his loss in insurance regardless of the
developer's financial status. If, however, the developer has good title, but fails
to deliver it as promised, the purchaser may demand specific performance of
the agreement, a remedy granted only in actions involving real property and
unique goods.t 38 Thus, if a developer fails to cede exclusive occupancy of the
unit for the time period purchased, the purchaser can compel performance. 139
In addition, an interest in real property generally may be sold, mortgaged,
leased, or willed, while contractual rights might be more strictly limited.' 40
Under ordinary contract theory, for example, the purchaser's right to his
timeshare unit probably would terminate upon his death, but a property inter-
est timeshare may be willed to whomever the timeshare owner chooses. Simi-
larly, a contract might restrict the resale of a timeshare. By designating the
timeshare as a property interest, however, this kind of restriction probably
would constitute an unlawful restraint on alienation. The inability to sublease
133. Davis, Time Sharing Ownership-Legal and Practical Problems, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1183, 1184 (1974).
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-40 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
135. Vogel, The Tax Consequences of Time-Sharing, 10 J. REAL EST. TAX. 323, 328 (1983).
Vogel's article is a good general source on the tax implications of timesharing and the differences
between fee and right-to-use timeshares.
136. Davis, supra note 133, at 1185.
137. Note, supra note 10, at 1210.
138. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 795-96 (1973).
139. In the timeshare context, however, this remedy is not as valuable as in other situations,
since the purchaser's possessory period is likely to have passed by the time an action is brought.
140. Note, supra note 10, at 1210.
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or assign often distinguishes vacation licenses from vacation leases, 14 1 but
such a restriction on real property would violate state policy declaring realty
"a basic resource of the people [that] should be made freely alienable and
marketable so far as is practicable."' 42 Given that the constitutional right to
property is also subject to "reasonable regulation for the general welfare,"' 143
however, a less restrictive constraint, such as requiring developer approval of a
proposed sublease or assignment, might be permitted in North Carolina as it
has been elsewhere.' 4
Designation of timeshares as real property interests confers several other
advantages. Although the contractual purchaser receives nothing more than
the use of the unit, the property purchaser acquires an equitable interest in the
property, and may realize a gain upon resale from appreciation in the prop-
erty's value. 145 In addition, the timeshare owner will pay real rather than per-
sonal property taxes, and may deduct these and his mortgage interest
payments from his taxable income.146 Finally, property ownership has an in-
herent status and psychological advantage over a mere rental or contract
right. 147
Although the Timeshare Act is intended to protect the consumer, the clas-
sification of all timeshares as real property may have adverse consequences.
The price of timeshares probably will increase. Because all timeshares are
now considered real property, the developer must employ licensed real estate
salespersons for all timeshares, 48 not just for fee timeshares; these costs, along
141. Pollack, supra note 12, at 285.
142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-I (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1983). A restraint prohibiting the transfer,
sublease, or assignment of real property "is contrary to public policy and void." Williams v.
McPherson, 216 N.C. 565, 566, 5 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1939) (realty conveyed with clause "never to be
sold, bought, or transferred" was void).
143. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
144. See Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 683, 174 Cal. Rptr.
136, 144 (1981) (condominium's requirement that management approve assignments and transfers
is valid, if exercised reasonably).
145. A substantial gain is unlikely, however, since the developer's marketing expenses will
have inflated the original purchase price. Pollack, supra note 12, at 287-88. Many agree that
claiming a timeshare to be a good capital investment is difficult to sustain. "Even using swash-
buckling projections for future inflation and interest rates, timeownership is still likely to take
approximately 20 years to pay for itself against renting equivalent hotel or motel accommoda-
tions." Business Brief Doing Time on Holiday, ECONOMIsT, Apr. 10, 1982, at 81.
146. Vogel, supra note 135, at 336. A tax matter of interest to all timeshare purchasers is the
passage, in 1983, by the North Carolina General Assembly of two statutes declaring that when
real or personal property is owned under a timesharing arrangement but managed by a home-
owner's association or some other managing entity it is to be listed for taxes under the name of the
entity rather than the actual owner. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-302(c)(13) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (real
property), and id § 105-306(c)(9) (personal property). Although these statutes will simplify the
paperwork for tax personnel, they might reduce tax revenues to the local government, since the
aggregate value of separately assessed timeshares is usually much higher than the property's in-
dependent value. Timeshare managers may face problems in allocating the tax burden among
timeshare owners and in deciding whether to include tax expenses in annual maintenance fees, to
assess each timeshare owner, or to absorb the expense. For timeshare owners there is the addi-
tional problem of whether property taxes may be deducted for income tax purposes when they are
not assessed directly.
147. Note, supra note 10, at 1211.
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-40 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (timeshare salesmen must be licensed real
estate agents). Even if salespersons are paid on a commission-only basis, a licensed agent proba-
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with the expenses of complying with disclosure and registration require-
ments,149 likely will be passed on to the purchaser. In addition, the purchaser
will incur the added expenses of purchasing and owning real estate-title
search fees, attorney's fees, and property taxes. The purchaser also will absorb
the risk of damage or destruction to the property, or at least the expense of
insurance. With a contractual relationship, the developer might have retained
these costs.
A final concern is whether the right-to-use arrangements are compatible
with other laws that now govern them. According to the Act, timeshares
"shall be governed by the law of this State relating to real estate,"150 which
includes conveyancing laws,' 51 mortgaging and foreclosure statutes,152 recor-
dation requirements, 15 3 eminent domain powers, ' 5 4 the Uniform Marketabil-
ity of Title Act,155 and the Unit Ownership Act,156 as well as the common law
regarding real property. Although most of these laws present no direct conflict
with the right-to-use form of ownership, and the Act has addressed some of
the conflicts that might arise from applying traditional real estate law to
timeshares, 57 a few potential problem areas remain.
One possible problem not addressed by the Act is presented by the rule
against perpetuities, 158 which invalidates from its creation a future interest in
property if it does not vest "within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years
and ten lunar months thereafter."' 5 9 In North Carolina this rule applies to
bly will demand a larger commission, causing the developer to raise the purchase price
accordingly.
149. Id §§ 93A-40, -52 (application fee for registering timeshare project of up to $1500).
150. Id § 93A-42(a).
151. Id §§ 39-1 to -29 (1976).
152. Id §§ 45-1 to -74 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
153. Id §§ 47-I to -120. Timeshare conveyances, contracts to convey, or leases must be regis-
tered for the buyer to prevail against lien creditors or bona fide purchasers for value. Id § 47-18.
In addition to placing registration and title search duties on timeshare purchasers, and according
them the protection of title registration, this will create a tremendous increase in business in Regis-
trar of Deeds' offices, especially in resort counties.
154. Id §§ 40A-1 to -69 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
155. Id §§ 47B-1 to -9 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
156. Id §§ 47A-1 to -37 (controlling the creation, structure, and management of condomini-
ums and the relations among unit owners and with the management).
157. Although difficulties might occur in a tenancy in common situation with partitioning of a
timeshare, the Act expressly prohibits partitioning of the timeshare unit itself. It allows the parti-
tion, by sale, of a single timeshare interest. Id § 93A-43 (Cum. Supp. 1983). For discussion of the
partitioning problems, see generally supra note 21. Also, the Act requires the developer to release
timeshare owners from any liens affecting that timeshare and provides, unless otherwise agreed,
for the severability of liability for liens against more than one timeshare in the project. Id § 93A-
57. This provision entitles the timeshare owner to a release from such a lien "upon payment of the
amount of the lien attributable to his time share." Id Thus, debts of other timeshare owners will
not affect his interest.
158. The rule against perpetuities is still significant in North Carolina law. See generally Link,
The Rule Against Perpetuities in North Carolina, 57 N.C.L. REv. 727 (1979).
159. American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 463, 46 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1948). North
Carolina has a long history of cases holding that restraints on the sale of conveyed property are
void. See, e.g., Pilley v. Sullivan, 182 N.C. 493, 109 S.E. 359 (1921); Stokes v. Dixon, 182 N.C.
323, 108 S.E. 913 (1921); Brooks v. Griffin, 177 N.C. 7, 97 S.E. 730 (1919); Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C.
717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916); Christmas v. Winston, 152 N.C. 48, 67 S.E. 58 (1910); Wool v. Fleetwood,
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remainders as well as executory interests, 60 to personal as well as real prop-
erty,161 to sales as well as gratuitous conveyances, 62 and possibly even to
commercial contractual arrangements.1 63
In the timesharing context, the rule might cover units conveyed for the
useful life of the building with a remainder in the grantor or in the purchasers
as tenants in common. Like a life estate, this conveyance is for an indefinite
term; however, it is attached only to the life of a building, which is not consid-
ered "a life or lives in being."''64 Although the life of the building might be
estimable, it is not certain. Since it may last longer than twenty-one years and
ten months plus some life in being, the rule would invalidate the remainder.' 65
Although the rule against perpetuities may have been of concern to purchasers
of conventional condominiums 16 6 and interval timeshares, and possibly to
timeshare licensees depending on the rule's applicability to mere contractual
rights prior to passage of the Act, 167 it is of certain concern now that
timeshares are considered real property.
The rule will necessitate change in either the timeshare documents or in
the Act. If the interest is to revert, the useful life of the building will have to
be estimated and a contingency added to the agreement for the possibility of
early destruction of the building. In this case the agreement would be subject
to two contingencies, one stating a definite time period complying with the
rule, the other exceeding the rule (saying, e.g., "so long as the building shall
stand"). With this arrangement, however, the courts may disregard an "or"
between the two contingencies and "hold that such an interest, if void in part,
is void in toto. ,,168 If the possibility of destruction were ignored in the con-
veyance for a term of years, it surely would conform to the rule; with this
136 N.C. 460, 485 S.E. 785 (1904); see also Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960);
Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 35 N.C. App. 346, 241 S.E.2d 397 (1978).
160. Link, supra note 158, at 753.
161. Id See Stellings v. Autry, 257 N.C. 303, 126 S.E.2d 140 (1962) (rule against perpetuities
applied to stock).
162. Link, supra note 158, at 806. See Hardy Bros. v. Galloway, 111 N.C. 519, 15 S.E. 890
(1892) (grantor's right of first refusal to repurchase land if grantee should "ever" sell held void as
contrary to rule against perpetuities).
163. Link, supra note 158, at 754, 804-17. Professor Link discusses the propriety of applying
the rule against perpetuities to commercial interests, saying that although the rule is a "fairly
appropriate yardstick for family settlements. . . [it is] not an appropriate unit of measure for most
commercial interests. Often no lives in being can be related to the commercial interest." Id at
807. See Gay Mfg. Co. v. Hobbs, 128 N.C. 4.6, 38 S.E. 26 (1901) (right to all timber cut by grantee
on grantor's land for five years "from the time [grantee] begins to manufacture said timber into
wood or lumber" invalidated; rule against perpetuities rationale used, though rule not specifically
cited).
164. The lives by which the interest can be measured must be human. Link, supra note 158, at
768.
165. See Farnan v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 263 N.C. 106, 110, 139 S.E.2d 14, 17 (1964);
Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 402-03, 113 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1960) (if controlling event might not
occur within period of the rule, or if any uncertainty or doubt exists, limitation is void, whether or
not event actually occurs).
166. See generally Seeber, Condominiums in North Carolina: Improving the Statutory Base, 7
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 355, 359-64 (1971).
167. Id
168. Id at 361.
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possibility, however, the protection to the developer from the claims of pur-
chasers in the event of destruction is limited. The remaining possibility, and
probably the best, is to amend the Timeshare Act to provide that the rule
against perpetuities will not invalidate any instruments thereunder. 169 Until
the Act is so amended, however, those involved in timeshare transactions
should check every instrument for possible violations, and correct these viola-
tions by making the term more definite or stating that it not exceed the rule.170
Although sellers and purchasers of right-to-use timeshares probably have
intended them not to be real property interests, 171 this intent has been based
on expectations nurtured by the prevailing laws. With a change in the law,
expectations eventually will change as well. Some commentators, however,
believe that designating a new interest in real estate will paralyze the
timeshare industry; they argue that people will avoid timeshares because they
do not know what this new interest means. The fee timeshare, however, has
already fit into existing property interests without destroying the state's prop-
erty law or the timeshare industry. Defining all timeshares as real property
merely affords the protections of property ownership to all timeshare owners,
regardless of the particular timeshare arrangement involved.
The other arguments against North Carolina's decision are similarly sur-
mountable. Although the change will lead to a higher price for timeshares,
this increase should be nominal since the developer's increased expenses may
be spread among the purchasers. The problem with the rule against perpetu-
ities is not necessarily new. North Carolina has applied it to nonrealty con-
veyances in the past. In any case, the problem usually can be avoided by
careful drafting, without substantially changing the relationship of the parties
under the conveyance.
In conclusion, the benefits of North Carolina's Act outweigh its detri-
ments. With timeshares considered real property, timeshare owners will be
given the protection of title insurance and registration, the right of specific
performance, and greater freedom of alienability, as well as the other incidents
of real property ownership. The uniform applicability of real property law to
all timeshare interests will foster a greater uniformity of timeshare projects,
once developers and consumers learn how best to comply with the law's re-
169. Id at 362.
170. For a summary of drafting prescriptions that help avoid the rule, see Link, supra note
158, at 817-18.
171. Case law, though sparse, usually has declared that right-to-use timeshares do not consti-
tute real property interests. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text. Similarly, most state
statutes distinguish between fee and right-to-use timeshares, defining only the fee form as includ-
ing real property interests, E.g., Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Nebraska (except for tax purposes),
Tennessee, and Virginia (except for tax purposes). In addition to MTSA, only five other states
have expressed the same view as North Carolina: California, Hawaii, New Hampshire, Oregon,
and Utah. See supra note 85. Further, commentators express the notion that neither purchasers
nor developers think of timeshares as real estate. "All of the putative advantages of the vacation
license time-share arrangement are founded upon the premise that the interest purchased is not an
interest in real property." E. Peirce & R. Mann, supra note 21, at 22. "But under no circum-
stances do the purchaser and seller of these right-to-use programs intend that this approach will
give rise to what is commonly considered the ownership of land." Vogel, supra note 135, at 327.
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quirements. This uniform applicability will prevent developers from circum-
venting the law merely by structuring the timeshare development as a right-to-
use project.
In addition to declaring timeshares a real property interest, North Caro-
lina has taken another step toward protecting the timeshare purchaser by rec-
ognizing the necessity of enacting per se timeshare legislation. Because
timeshares face problems beyond those of conventional condominiums, con-
dominium laws are insufficient to cover timesharing. Similarly, subdivision
laws, blue sky laws, and general consumer protection laws, while covering
some aspects of timesharing, do not comprehensively regulate the area. Even
if they did, regulation under several different laws and agencies would compli-
cate unnecessarily compliance by a timeshare project.
The substance of North Carolina's Act, however, does not protect con-
sumers completely. The absence of guidelines for the management of
timeshares denies the timeshare owners' right to be represented by manage-
ment. The possibility of applying securities laws to timesharing leaves open
an avenue for litigation that could have been closed by exempting timeshares
from securities laws or by intensifying timeshare registration and disclosure
provisions. In addition, the Act fails to address other problems that are certain
to arise, such as the rule against perpetuities, resale, and out-of-state sales.
Finally, the lack of uniformity in timeshare legislation from state to state,
while not a problem specific to the North Carolina Act, is likely to unnecessa-
rily complicate timeshare sales and operation for interstate developers and
purchasers.
Although the North Carolina Time Share Act is not comprehensive, the
efforts of the North Carolina legislature in enacting it are laudable. The Act
addresses the needs of a growing sector of the population and will eliminate
much of the confusion caused by the multiplicity of timeshare forms and the
questionable promotional techniques of timeshare developers. It should im-
prove relations between timeshare developers and purchasers and provide in-
centive and guidance for the industry to develop in a positive direction.
ROBERT M. KESSLER
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Zoning Ordinances that Exclude Mobile Homes from Districts
Reserved for Single-Family Dwellings
Approximately one North Carolinian in ten lives in a mobile home.t The
demand for this form of housing has increased because of the steadily rising
costs of conventional housing, as well as improvements in the design and con-
struction of mobile homes.2 No longer viewed as an unfortunate necessity, the
mobile home has become a legitimate, even desirable, alternative to a tradi-
tional site-built home.3 As mobile homes begin to look more like conventional
housing, the mobile home owner begins to resemble the conventional home
owner. In age, occupation, number of children, and income, the demographic
characteristics of the mobile home owner approaches the average home
owner.
4
The law, however, has failed to keep pace with these developments. Al-
though the nation has experienced a serious low-cost housing shortage since
World War II, state and federal governments only recently have passed regu-
lations that enable mobile homes to help alleviate this problem.5 Local gov-
ernments, which could stimulate the use of the mobile home through their
zoning power, 6 have responded even more slowly. Although local resistance
to the mobile home may be eroding,7 many ordinances barring mobile homes
1. See Weber, Mobile homes gain ground, respect in NC. communities, The Raleigh News &
Observer, Jan. 8, 1984, at 30A, col. 2. Mobile homes are becoming known as "manufactured
housing." Id.
2. B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, THE LAW OF MOBILE HOMES 7-8 (3d ed. 1974); Anderson,
The Regulation andAccommodation of Mobile Homes, 1975 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT
DOMAIN 151, 151.
3. Anderson, supra note 2, at 151.
4. See Acceptance Grows for Mobile Homes, 16 LAND USE DIG. Aug. 15, 1983.
5. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
6. Although regulation of the location of mobile homes is accomplished chiefly through
zoning, other means are available. The state directly controls the location of mobile homes
through floodplain control laws, see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.51 to -215.61 (1983), and coastal
area management acts, see id. §§ 113A-100 to -128. See Brough, State Laws and the Regulation of
Mobile Homes, POPULAR Gov'T, Summer 1975, at 12.
Municipal regulation of mobile home location may be accomplished not only through zoning
but also through the power to abate nuisances. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-193 (1982). The
North Carolina Supreme Court, however, has determined that mobile homes are not nuisances
per se and therefore may not be excluded from a municipality acting under its power to abate
nuisances. See Town of Conover v. Jolly, 277 N.C. 439, 177 S.E.2d 879 (1970). Local boards of
health are the given authority under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-17(b) (1981) to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the protection of public health. This is a potential means of
regulating the location of mobile homes. See Brough, supra, at 13. Mobile homes also may be
restricted by private covenants. See Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning and Taxation, 55
CORNELL L. REv. 491, 514 (1970).
7. See Weber, supra note 1. See also 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZON-
ING AND PLANNING 19-4 to -5 (4th ed. 1983) (noting the increasing share of the low-cost housing
market captured by the mobile home industry); 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW
§§ 57.01, 57.42 n.280 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1983) (noting the increase in litigation involving mobile
homes). One writer has detected, perhaps over-optimistically, "a shifting of public attitudes from
psychological rejection of manufactured homes to increasingly unqualified acceptance." Dean,
What is a Mobile Home? The Law andManufactured Housing, CASE & COM., Sept.-Oct., 1981, at
10, 16.
from residential districts still exist in city and county codes,8 and likely will
remain there for the near future. This note discusses the development of mo-
bile home law, the types of zoning ordinances that exclude mobile homes from
residential districts, and two possible legal challenges to these ordinances.
The modem mobile home evolved from the travel trailers of the 1920s. 9
Travel trailers originally were designed to be pulled by cars and to serve as
temporary shelter for tourists and itinerant workers.' 0 Because these early
mobile homes were not suited for use as permanent housing,'" communities
objected to their location in conventional neighborhoods. Mobile homes also
were considered unsafe because they were not constructed in accordance with
state or local building codes and their low cost aroused suspicions of shoddy
design and workmanship. Some of the materials found in mobile homes were
highly flammable, and fires posed a danger not only to the occupants of the
mobile homes but to the lives and property of surrounding landowners. Early
mobile homes also were relatively lightweight and when not securely affixed to
the land could be overturned easily by high winds. They were also considered
dangerous to public health because they lacked the sanitary facilities of con-
ventional housing and were not subject to water and sewer regulation. 12
Furthermore, mobile homes were considered a burden to the community.
Their occupants had to be provided with all the municipal services afforded
other residents of the community, such as garbage collection and access to
public schools. 13 When a large number of mobile homes were situated in a
small area the high population density placed a considerable strain on munici-
pal resources. 14 Moreover, the low cost and rapid depreciation of mobile
homes deprived municipalities of tax revenues that might have offset the bur-
dens imposed.15 Mobile homes often were classified as personalty, and many
states taxed personalty at a lower rate than realty.' 6 Consequently, the public
accused mobile home owners of failing to pay their own way.
The public also objected to mobile homes on moral grounds. Mobile
home occupants were considered undesirable nomads with no stake in the
8. See, e.g., oidinance cited infra note 116.
9. See, e.g., 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 14.01 (2d ed. 1976); B. HODES &
G. ROBERSON, supra note 2, at 5.
10. See 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 14.01.
11. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.03.
12. Early mobile homes were exempt from water and sewer regulation because municipali-
ties viewed them as vehicles rather than houses. See, e.g., Napierkowski v. Township Comm. of
Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959); Midgarden v. City of Grand Forks, 79 N.D. 18, 54
N.W.2d 659 (1952). See 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 14.05; 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7,
§ 57.09.
13. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 14.05; 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.09.
14. See, e.g., RezIar v. Village of Riverside, 28 Ill. 2d 142, 190 N.E.2d 706 (1963); Town of
Yorkville v. Fonk, 3 Wis. 2d 371, 88 N.W.2d 319, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 58 (1958). See also 2 R.
ANDERSON, supra note 9, §§ 14.01, 14.05; 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.15.
15. See, e.g., New York Mobile Home Ass'n v. Steckel, 9 N.Y.2d 533, 175 N.E.2d 151 (1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 150 (1962). See generally Kuklin, Housing and Technology: The Mobile
Home Experience, 44 TENN. L. REv. 765, 809-26 (1977).
16. Kuklin, supra note 15, at 812.
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community. 17 The close quarters of the mobile home were suspected of pro-
ducing an undesirable precocity in children, potentially causing moral harm.' 1
Finally, mobile homes were believed to lower the value of surrounding
property.' 9 Mobile homes were considered ugly, or at least sufficiently differ-
ent in appearance to disturb the architectural harmony of the neighborhood. 20
Furthermore, because mobile home occupants were considered undesirable,
the presence of mobile homes was thought to lower the "social tone" of the
neighborhood.21 In response to all these objections municipalities enacted
zoning ordinances restricting the location of mobile homes.22
Despite these zoning ordinances and objections to mobile homes, mobile
home ownership has increased dramatically since the 1920s.23 One reason for
this growth is the serious national shortage of low-cost housing,24 which has
been aggravated by increased unemployment. 25 Since the conventional hous-
ing industry cannot meet the increased need for low-cost housing, more people
have turned to the mobile home as their only form of affordable housing.26 In
the late 1960s the federal government recognized mobile homes as a means of
solving the housing problem. 27 State and local authorities gradually have fol-
lowed the lead of the federal government,28 and mobile homes have become
17. See In re Tradlock, 261 N.C. 120, 122, 134 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1964) (referring to the "unde-
sirable type of people who would live in the mobile homes"). See also Streyle v. Board of Prop-
erty Assessment, Appeals and Review, 173 Pa. Super. 324, 98 A.2d 410 (1953); Crane v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 175 Neb. 568, 122 N.W.2d 520 (1963). See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF,
supra note 7, at 19-4.
18. See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-4.
19. See, e.g., Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964); Town of Manchester v.
Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962). See Kuklin, supra note 15, at 823.
20. See Kuklin, supra note 15, at 823. The aesthetic problem presented by mobile homes
often is compounded by a proliferation of outbuildings around the unit due to a lack of storage
space within. Insofar as zoning ordinances restricting the location of mobile homes are founded
on aesthetic considerations, it should be noted that a majority of American jurisdictions have
approved zoning on aesthetic grounds. See Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder." A New Ma-
jority of Jurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. REv. 125 (1980). The North
Carolina Supreme Court approved aesthetic zoning in State v. Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675
(1982). See Note, State v. Jones: Aesthetic Regulation-From Junkyards to Residences?, 61 N.C.L.
REv. 942 (1983).
21. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 473.
22. See infra notes 57-63, 116 and accompanying text.
23. See B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note 2, at 6; 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 448,
451; Smith, The Impact of Mobile Homes on the Housing Market, 41 POPULAR GOV'T 1, at 1
(1975).
24. See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-4.
25. See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-4.
26. See SHEPARD'S MOBILE HOMES AND MOBILE HOME PARKS, § 1.2 (L. Davis ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as SHEPARD'S]; 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.01.
27. In 1968 Congress launched "Operation Breakthrough" in an attempt to help solve the
nation's housing problem. The Department of Housing and Urban Development was authorized
to subsidize or directly finance 4,000,000 new housing units, including mass-produced low-cost
units, over a 10-year period. See Flippen, Constitutionality of Zoning Ordinances Wlch Exclude
Mobile Homes, 12 AM. Bus. L.J. 15, 16-17, nn.16-17 (1974). In 1970 President Nixon, in a
message to Congress, declared that an increase in the supply of mobile homes was necessary for
the nation to reach its housing goals. M. DRURY, MOBILE HOMES 114 (2d ed. 1972). Later, Con-
gress passed the National Mobile Home Safety and Construction Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401
to 5426 (1976), recognizing mobile homes as a significant form of housing and regulating them.
28. Official recognition of the importance of the mobile home for North Carolina citizens
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more acceptable to the public.2 9
The transformation in design and construction of mobile homes also has
contributed to their increasing popularity. The sudden and large scale de-
mand for the mobile home as alternative permanent housing during and im-
mediately following World War II led to changes in design and construction.30
After the war the dimensions of the standard unit were increased steadily, first
in length and then in width.31 Greater and more versatile interior space was
introduced with the "double-wide," 32 the "expandable," 33 and multistory
units.34 Mobile homes could no longer be pulled behind cars but had to be
towed by large trucks or carried on flatbed trailers to their sites. 35 Today,
mobile homes usually are stripped of their wheels and tongues and placed on
permanent foundations.36
As the mobile home has approached the conventional home in size and
immobility, so also in appearance. Mobile homes now are equipped with all
the amenities of site-built housing, including all major appliances and com-
plete furnishings.37 Pitched and shingled roofing and masonite or wood siding
also are available.38
Thus, many of the objections that led to restrictions on the location of
mobile homes are no longer valid because of changes in design, construction,
and regulation. 39 One objection, however, remains both widespread and ar-
includes the following statements: (1) By the North Carolina General Assembly: "[M]obile
homes have become a primary housing resource for many citizens of North Carolina." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-143.8 (1983); (2) By the North Carolina Supreme Court: Mobile homes are "'a per-
fectly respectable, healthy and useful kind of housing, adopted by choice by several million people
in this country today.'" Town of Conover v. Jolly, 277 N.C. 439, 443, 177 S.E.2d 879, 882 (1970)
(quoting Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 233 (1963)); (3) By the Multi-County Planning Commission, Region G: "One technique
for avoiding the high cost of housing is purchasing a mobile home. As the need for less expensive
housing increases, the importance of the mobile home in housing the people of our region will
emerge." B. CALLOWAY, L. Cox, W. COLONNA, C. Loop, M. BORUM & T. COOKE, REGIONAL
HOUSING PLAN: STATE MULTI-COUNTY PLANNING REGION G 63-64 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
B. CALLOWAY].
29. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 152. Other factors leading to the increased popularity of
the mobile home, include the adoption of industry-wide quality standards, see SHEPARD'S, sufpra
note 26, § 1.2, and the availability of more favorable financing to the mobile home purchaser. See
id.; M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 93-94. Also, the development of more and better mobile home
parks, see SHEPARD's, supra note 26, § 1.2, along with more creative land use planning, see Ander-
son, supra note 2, at 163, have helped foster public acceptance.
30. B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note 2, at 2.
31. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.03.
32. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.03.
33. An "expandable" is a unit with "one or more room sections that fold, collapse, or tele-
scope into the principal unit while transported on the highways and are firmly joined together
when stationed on the site, provid[ing] additional living-room area." B. HODES & G. ROBERSON,
supra note 2, at xxxvii.
34. M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 99.
35. M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 93-94.
36. 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.03.
37. SHEPARD'S, supra note 26, § 1.1.
38. 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-5.
39. For the objections to mobile homes, see supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
One group of objections was based on a concern for the public safety. Mobile homes today
are built in accordance with federal safety and construction regulations, see supra note 27, which
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guably valid: that mobile homes reduce the value of surrounding property.40
Even today some mobile homes, in terms of roof pitch, exterior siding, or
other architectural details, differ from site-built homes. On the other hand, in
size, shape, and materials, many modem mobile homes are "scarcely distin-
guishable from site-built homes."'41 Thus, it is unrealistic to distinguish be-
tween mobile homes and site-built homes per se. The effect of a house on
surrounding property values is a highly subjective determination. Size, age,
appearance, condition, and upkeep must be considered, and in these respects
mobile homes do not differ from other housing.
Given the strong policy arguments for opening more land to mobile
homes,42 it is difficult to justify the persistence of ordinances excluding mobile
homes from zoning districts reserved for single-family dwellings. The persis-
tence of some of these ordinances undoubtedly is attributable to governmental
inertia,43 while the longevity of other ordinances may be the result of the
personal prejudices of local officials. 44 Nevertheless, the majority of these or-
dinances have survived because some measure of public resistance to the mo-
bile home also has survived.4 5
Public attitudes toward the mobile home are in transition. Although the
public accepts mobile homes much more today than it did before,4 6 accept-
ance is by no means unanimous or unequivocal. Because of the shortcomings
of early trailers, communities relegated them to the least desirable areas of the
municipality-often highly visible commercial or industrial areas, or areas
specifically provide for the elimination of fire hazards. Additionally, the mobile home industry
has established its own standards which, in some ways, are more stringent than the federal regula-
tions. See SHEPARD'S, supra note 26, § 1.2. The danger of high winds also has been largely elimi-
nated. The larger and heavier units manufactured today are less vulnerable to high winds than
were their predecessors. The trend towards immobilization, see supra notes 35-36 and accompa-
nying text, has reduced further the threat of wind damage. Both the North Carolina Building
Code and the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance have issued rules regarding the secure
anchoring of mobile homes.
The objections to mobile homes that were based on concern for public health also are no
longer valid. Today, mobile homes are manufactured with all the sanitation facilities of site-built
homes. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
The modem mobile home owner and the site-built home owner are very similar, see spra
note 4 and accompanying text. Thus, there is no longer reason for criticism that mobile home
residents are less respectable than the rest of the population. See, e.g., M. DRURY, supra note 27,
at 71-72; Bartke & Gage, supra note 6, at 495; Kuklin, supra note 15, at 812-19.
Mobile home owners also were considered objectionable because they failed to pay their way
in taxes. Many states today tax mobile homes as realty. Although North Carolina continues to
tax mobile homes as personalty, personalty and realty are taxed at the same rate. It also has been
argued that "higher-end" mobile homes actually appreciate over the years, as do site-built homes,
thus enhancing local revenues. See B. CALLOWAY, supra note 28, at 37-38.
40. See In re Tradlock, 261 N.C. 120, 122, 134 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1964); 2 A. RATHKOPF & D.
RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-5.
41. M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 71-72.
42. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
43. See Bartke & Gage, supra note 6, at 496, 525; Kuklin, supra note 15, at 826.
44. See Bartke & Gage, supra note 6, at 525; Kuklin, supra note 15, at 827.
45. See Bartke & Gage, supra note 6, at 497; Kuklin, supra note 15, at 809. This residue of
public hostility is the chief cause of the continued existence of zoning ordinances excluding mobile
omes. B. CALLOWAY, supra note 28, at 36-38. See also M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 15; Kuklin,
supra note 15, at 825-26.
46. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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along highways.47 These deteriorating units in unattractive locations continue
to influence the public image of the mobile home. Newer and more attractive
units, on the other hand, frequently are located out of public view.48 Perhaps
more fundamentally, the mobile home is resisted because it does not fulfill the
public's image of ideal housing.49 This ideal conflicts with the need for low-
cost housing; until it changes those who cannot afford the ideal home will
continue to suffer. Failure to change public attitudes could result in "an in-
defensible waste of this potentially powerful housing resource."50 Unless the
courts are willing to intervene, the ultimate success of the mobile home indus-
try will depend on the ability of its proponents to convince the public that
highly restrictive zoning ordinances no longer are necessary.5 1
Because such negative attitudes persist a variety of exclusionary zoning
ordinances remain on the books. For example, ordinances establishing mini-
mum floor space52 or minimum lot size 53 requirements indirectly exclude mo-
bile homes. In addition, some zoning ordinances directly restrict the location
of mobile homes. Some ordinances specifically have excluded mobile homes
from the entire community.54 Aside from the constitutional questions they
raise,55 these ordinances force mobile home owners to locate their units
outside the city limits. This unregulated placement of units outside the city's
jurisdiction, however, may hinder a city's expansion.5 6
Rather than excluding mobile homes from the community entirely, most
municipalities exclude them from districts reserved for single-family dwell-
ings.57 Three types of zoning ordinances have been used for this purpose.
First, some ordinances expressly exclude all mobile homes from these dis-
47. See infra notes 57-63, 116, and accompanying text.
48. See Kuklin, supra note 15, at 814.
49. See M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 9.
50. See B. CALLOWAY, supra note 28, at 38. See also Note, Mobile Homes-Some Legal
Questions, 75 W. VA. L. REy. 382, 401 (1973) (growing importance of mobile homes in housing
industry mitigates heavily against their complete prohibition).
51. See Dean, supra note 7, at 10; Kuklin, supra note 15, at 838-42; Note, Zoning Restrictions
Applied to Mobile Homes, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 196, 205 (1971).
52. Even the largest mobile homes are limited in size. Setting minimum floor space require-
ments thus can effectively exclude mobile homes from an area. See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D.
RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-23 to -24.
53. Minimum lot size requirements could place the cost of lots beyond the reach of those
persons for whom the mobile home is the only affordable form of housing.
54. Few North Carolina municipalities have adopted this kind of ordinance. See Comment,
Mobile Homes in North Carolina: Residence or Vehicle?, 50 N.C.L. REv. 612, 615 (1972). For the
classic discussion of the total exclusion of mobile homes, see Napierkowski v. Township Comm. of
Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959).
55. A full discussion of the validity of zoning ordinances that totally exclude mobile homes
from a community is beyond the scope of this note. These ordinances, however, generally have
been held unconstitutional. See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-19 to -20.
See also Brough, supra note 6, at 20. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court never has
faced this issue, it has been suggested that the court would follow the weight of authority. See
Comment, supra note 54, at 623. For cases upholding such ordinances, see Moore, The Mobile
Home and the Law, 6 AKRON L. REv. 1, 8 n.39 (1973).
56. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 165. In North Carolina, cities and counties may mitigate
this problem through their power of extraterritorial zoning. See, e.g., City of Raleigh v. Morand,
247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E.2d 870 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 343 (1958).
57. 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-21.
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tricts. 58 Second, some ordinances restrict mobile homes to mobile home
parks.59 Both of these types of ordinances expressly distinguish mobile homes
from single-family dwellings. 60 Third, some reserve a district for "single-fam-
ily dwellings" without expressly restricting mobile homes from the district or
to any other district.61 Mobile homes are then banned from these areas by
construing the word "dwelling" to exclude mobile homes. 62 All three types of
ordinances can be oppressive if there is a shortage of land zoned for mobile
homes or if this land is in an undesirable location.
63
Two issues frequently have arisen regarding zoning ordinances that ex-
clude mobile homes from districts reserved for single-family dwellings. 6 4 The
first involves the interpretation of the ordinance; the second involves its
constitutionality.
Of the three types of ordinances, only the third presents a significant in-
terpretation problem. Ordinances that expressly restrict mobile homes from
residential districts or to mobile home parks usually avoid interpretation
problems by defining the term "mobile home." Such definitions typically are
very broad, classifying as a "mobile home" any unit designed to be trans-
ported on its own wheels regardless of whether it has become immobilized. 65
But the third type of ordinance, which merely limits a district to single-family
dwellings without specifically defining or restricting mobile homes, 66 presents
the question of whether a mobile home is a "dwelling" within the meaning of
the ordinance. 67
58. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.22.
59. The majority of zoned municipalities in North Carolina have adopted this kind of ordi-
nance. See Comment, supra note 54, at 615-16.
60. 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-23.
61. See, e.g., Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 592 n.l, 180 N.E.2d 333, 334 n.l
(1962). See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.37.
62. See Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962).
63. See Comment, supra note 54, at 624-25; Moore, supra note 55, at 13. In North Carolina
those cities that restrict mobile homes to mobile home parks typically regulate the parks to ensure
some minimum level of quality. See Comment, supra note 54, at 616.
64. Of course, other issues also have arisen, such as whether a zoning ordinance is within the
scope of the enabling legislation, see infra note 97 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., CHARLOTrE, N.C., CODE § 23-2(16a) (1970), HIo POINT, N.C., CODE § 22-
9.1(A)(1) (1971).
66. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
67. The problem of the proper classification of the mobile home, as dwelling or vehicle,
realty or personalty, has arisen in many contexts. Classification may affect the application of
building, health, and tax codes, the Uniform Commercial Code, statutes of descent and distribu-
tion, provisions of wills, restrictive covenants, insurance contracts, and the statute of frauds. See
Kuklin, supra note 15, at 802-05. The question of whether the "automobile exception" to the
requirement of a search warrant applies to mobile homes also has arisen. See United States v.
Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1980).
The courts have held that classification of the mobile home for one purpose does not affect its
classification for other purposes. See Manchester v. Webster, 100 N.H. 809, 128 A.2d 924 (1957)
("Mobile homes" might be "buildings" for tax and insurance purposes without being subject to
local building codes.); Streyle v. Board of Property Assessment, 173 Pa. Super. 324, 98 A.2d 410
(1953) (a "house trailer" might be a "home" for the purposes of police power regulation without
being "realty" for tax purposes).
Although the mobile home industry today rejects the vehicular classification of the mobile
home, see Amicus Curiae Brief, Duggins v. Town of Walnut Cove, 63 N.C. App. 689, 306 S.E.2d
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This question has arisen in two situations.68 In the first, the ordinance
limits improvements on realty to single-family dwellings. The mobile home
owner argues that his unit is a "single-family dwelling," while the municipal-
ity argues that the mobile home is not a dwelling and therefore may not be
placed on the property.69 In the second situation the roles of the parties are
reversed. The zoning ordinance requires that all dwellings on the property
conform to certain requirements, such as minimum floor space. The mobile
home cannot satisfy these requirements, so its owner argues that it is not a
"dwelling" and is therefore not subject to the requirements. The municipality
argues that the mobile home is a "dwelling" that fails to comply with the re-
quirements of the ordinance, and thus cannot be located on the property.70
Courts agree that a mobile home is not a dwelling as long as it remains
inobile.71 Most of the litigation has been concerned with whether a mobile
home becomes a dwelling when it becomes permanently immobilized, that is,
when its wheels and tongue are removed and it is placed on a permanent foun-
dation. On this question the courts are divided. 72 A slight majority have held
that when its wheel and tongue are removed and it is placed on a permanent
foundation a mobile home becomes a dwelling and may not be excluded from
a district reserved for single-family dwellings. 73 This view is founded on the
presumption that the distinguishing characteristic of a mobile home is its mo-
bility, and when this characteristic is removed there is no reason to distinguish
between site-built homes and mobile homes per se. Concerns over property
values and architectural harmony can be satisfied by specific ordinances out-
lining criteria such as minimum floor space and architectural standards.
Given the increasing similarity between mobile and site-built homes, this posi-
tion is reasonable. A growing number of states have adopted the majority
186 (1983), at 2-3, one writer has argued that the success of the mobile home has been linked to its
classification as a vehicle. See M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 123. Some writers have suggested
that rather than trying to pigeonhole the mobile home into some inappropriate existing classifica-
tion, it should be recognized as sui generis. See Carter, Problems in the Regulation and Taxation of
Mobile Homes, 48 IowA L. REv. 16, 57 (1962). One court anticipated this advice. See
Napierkowski v. Town Comm. of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 485, 150 A.2d 481, 485 (1959).
68. See Bartke & Gage, supra note 6, at 499-501; Carter, supra note 67, at 36.
69. See, e.g., Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962); Sioux
Falls v. Cleveland, 75 S.D. 548, 70 N.W.2d 62 (1955).
70. County v. Stanfill, 7 Ill. App. 2d 52, 129 N.E.2d 46 (1955) (minimum lot-size require-
ment); Kimsey v. City of Rome, 84 Ga. App. 671, 67 S.E.2d 206 (1951) (minimum floor-space
requirements).
71. See B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note 2, at 66.
72. P. ROHAN, ZONING & LAND USE CONTROLS 390 (1983). Two distinct questions are
presented by the immobilization of the mobile home: (1) Is an immobilized mobile home still a
mobile home? and (2) If not, is it a dwelling? A court could find that when placed upon a perma-
nent foundation a mobile home ceases to be a mobile home but does not become a dwelling.
Courts, however, have not made this distinction. Evidently, it is assumed that if an immobilized
mobile home is no longer a mobile home it must be a dwelling.
73. See, e.g., Reed v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 31 Pa. Commw. 605, 377 A.2d 1020 (1977);
Mosin v. Zoning Hearing Bd. Review, 162 R.I. 457, 232 A.2d 393 (1967); Lescault v. Zoning Bd.
of Review, 91 R.I. 1277, 162 A.2d 809 (1960); In re Willey, 120 Vt. 359, 140 A.2d 11 (1958).
Among the cases holding that mobile homes are dwellings are Kimsey v. City of Rome, 84 Ga.
App. 671, 67 S.E.2d 206 (1951) and Town of Huntington v. Transon, 43 Misc. 2d 912, 252
N.Y.S.2d 576 (1964).
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view by legislation.74
A minority of the courts have determined that placement of a mobile
home on a permanent foundation does not transform it into a dwelling. 75 The
minority view has been criticized for denying immobilized mobile homes the
status of single-family dwellings merely because of their past mobility.76 The
minority view, however, appears to be tacitly based on an additional principle:
a unit manufactured in a factory and designed to move on its own wheels must
differ from conventional housing in many ways that survive immobilization.
Because of the important changes in the design and construction of the mobile
home, this reasoning no longer is valid. The original mobility of the mobile
home is the last remaining distinction between mobile and conventional
housing.77
No reported North Carolina case has considered whether an immobilized
mobile home is a dwelling. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however,
has twice considered whether an immobilized mobile home is still a mobile
home. In City of Asheboro v. Auman7 s the court considered an ordinance re-
stricting mobile homes to mobile home parks79 and concluded that a unit
stripped of its wheels and tongue and placed upon a permanent foundation
remained a "mobile home."80 In the 1983 case of Barber v. Dixon,81 the court
construed a restrictive covenant82 providing that: "No structure of a tempo-
rary character (including house trailers) shall be used upon any lot at any
time."'8 3 The court could have questioned whether a modem mobile home is a
"house trailer." Instead, the court assumed that the unit in question was a
74. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 712.1 (Smith-Hurd 1966); S.D. New Laws, H.B.
1127 p. 105; UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-3-3 (Supp. 1983).
75. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Louviere, 52 So. 2d 751 (La. Ct. App. 1951); Town of
Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962); Town of Marblehead v. Gilbert, 334
Mass. 602, 137 N.E.2d 921 (1956). See also Comment, supra note 54, at 619; 2 R. ANDERSON,
supra note 9, § 14.05.
76. 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-8 to -9.
77. Seethe discussion of design and construction changes, supra notes 30-36 and accompany-
ing text, and the discussion of the invalidity of original objections to mobile homes, supra note 39
and accompanying text. The presumption of other distinctions between mobile and conventional
housing based upon the original mobility of the mobile home is even more tenuous because of the
growing tendency of the conventional housing industry to use prefabricated materials. Moreover,
modular units, see 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-8 to -9, usually are
classified as dwellings because they were not designed for mobility, although these units also are
produced in factories.
78. 26 N.C. App. 87, 214 S.E.2d 621, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 239, 217 S.E.2d 663 (1975).
79. ASHEBORO, N.C., CODE § 609-12 (1972).
80. Auman, 26 N.C. App. at 88, 214 S.E.2d at 621.
81. 62 N.C. App. 455, 302 S.E.2d 915, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 732 (1983).
82. Most courts construe zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants according to the same
principles, and decisions construing one often are cited in cases construing the other. See Bartke
& Gage, supra note 6, at 515 & n. 113. The Supreme Court of Maine, however, has treated restric-
tive covenants more liberally than zoning ordinances. For cases construing the word "dwelling"
with regard to mobile homes as used in restrictive covenants, see Carter v. Conroy, 25 Ariz. App.
434, 544 P.2d 258 (1976); Mitchell v. Killins, 408 So. 2d 969 (La. Ct. App. 1981); North Cherokee
Village Membership v. Murphy, 71 Mich. App. 592, 248 N.W.2d 629 (1976); Wade v. Anderson,
602 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1977).
83. Barber, 62 N.C. App. at 456, 302 S.E.2d at 916.
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"house trailer" 84 and considered the critical question to be whether a "house
trailer" remains a "house trailer" after it is immobilized. Relying on its deci-
sion inAuman, the court concluded that an immobilized double-wide unit was
still a "trailer and temporary structure"85 because the two sections had been
transported to the site "by wheels, tongues and axles that were bolted on at the
place of manufacture and removed about two days after the units were located
on the lot."'86 These decisions suggest that under North Carolina law a unit
designed to be mobile is forever a mobile home, future immobilization
notwithstanding. The two definitions of the term "mobile home" appearing in
the North Carolina statutes also employ this classification.87
Although the question of whether an immobilized mobile home is still a
mobile home logically is distinct from the question of whether an immobilized
mobile home is a dwelling, courts generally have considered the first question
to be determinative of the second.88 Consequently, if faced with the precise
issue, a North Carolina court probably would adopt the minority view that an
immobilized mobile home is not a dwelling.8 9 Nevertheless, the distinction
between all mobile homes and all site-built homes on the basis of the original
mobility of the mobile home is tenuous and probably will spawn continued
litigation. 90
As statutory terms become defined more specifically through legislation
and litigation, complainants often will need to rely on constitutional chal-
lenges. Zoning ordinances that exclude mobile homes from districts reserved
for single-family dwellings have been attacked as violating the requirements of
substantive due process by going beyond the permissible bounds of the State's
police power.91
The tenth amendment reserves the police power to the states.92 The po-
lice power is incapable of strict definition or limitation93 but was described by
Blackstone as:
84. Ten years earlier, in Van Poole v. Messer, 19 N.C. App. 70, 198 S.E.2d 106 (1973), the
court of appeals ruled that a mobile home was a "trailer" and therefore was excluded from a lot
by a restrictive covenant prohibiting "trailers."
85. Barber, 62 N.C. App. at 459, 302 S.E.2d at 917.
86. Id. at 458, 302 S.E.2d at 917.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-143.9(6), 145(7) (1983).
88. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
89. The North Carolina Attorney General has determined, however, that for the purposes of
relocation assistance a mobile home is a dwelling. See 40 N.C. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 762,
763 (Sept. 2, 1969). Furthermore, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.5(a) (1983) provides that a husband and
wife occupying a mobile home are to be treated as tenants by the entirety. It is not clear, however,
whether the premise of this statute is that mobile homes are realty or whether they are only to be
treated as if they were in this situation.
90. Bartke & Gage, supra note 6, at 498, 500, 504.
91. See, e.g., Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981); City of
Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982).
92. See Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1908); Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E.
638 (1933). The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
93. Pearsall v. Great N. R.R., 161 U.S. 646 (1895); Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E.
638 (1933).
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the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the
individuals of the state, like the members of a well-governed family,
are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety,
good neighborhood, and good manners; and to be decent, industri-
ous, and inoffensive in their respective stations.94
The police power may be exercised to require all citizens to yield property
interests, for the public good, without compensation. 95
The political subdivisions of the states have no inherent authority to exer-
cise the police power.96 The states may, however, delegate to units of local
government so much of the police power as they choose through "enabling
legislation." 97 The power of municipalities to enact zoning ordinances has
long been recognized as a proper exercise of the delegated police power.98 In
North Carolina, cities and counties have been granted general authority to
exercise the police power9 9 and specific authority to enact zoning
ordinances. 100
The police power may restrain enjoyment of private property to further
the public good, yet exercise of the police power must be limited to protect
individual rights. The fourteenth amendment states that no state shall "de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."' 1 1 In
addition to its procedural mandate,102 this due process clause has been inter-
preted as placing substantive limitations on government action.103 Legislative
measures may be void as a violation of substantive due process if they are
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.1°4
The courts have developed a three-part test to determine whether an exer-
cise of the police power survives a substantive due process challenge.10 5 First,
the statute or ordinance must serve some legitimate purpose of the police
power.'06 The purposes of the police power are defined broadly to include the
promotion and protection of the public health, safety, morals, and general wel-
94. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *162. Blackstone used the phrase "public power,"
but it is clear that the two labels are intended to refer to the same authority.
95. See Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057,
1058 (1980).
96. B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note 2, at 190.
97. 1 T. MATTHEWS & B. MATTHEWS, MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES § 1.02 (rev. 2d ed. 1983);
Note, Regulation of Mobile Homes, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 121, 126-27 (1961).
98. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-121(a) (1983) (counties); id. § 160A-174(a) (1982) (cities).
100. Id § 153A-340 to -348 (1983) (counties); Id § 160A-381 to -392 (1982) (cities).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
102. "Taken literally the term dueprocess relates to the mode of proceeding that must be
pursued by governmental agencies. Due process of law, in this sense, denotesproperprocedure,
and it was the meaning primarily intended by the men who drafted the Bill of Rights." B.
SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 165 (1972).
103. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
104. See, e.g., Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 154 F.2d 811, 813 (1st Cir. 1946).
105. See Stoebuck, supra note 95, at 1058.
106. See, e.g., Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Bantor, 273 U.S. 418 (1927);
State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
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fare.' 07 Second, assuming a valid purpose, the means adopted by the legisla-
ture must be rationally related to the attainment of the objective.108 If there is
any reasonable likelihood that the ordinance will tend to accomplish its objec-
tive, it will satisfy this second requirement. 10 9 Finally, assuming a valid pur-
pose and a means rationally related to achieving that purpose, the means itself
must still be reasonable; 110 the courts may strike down unduly oppressive leg-
islation. 1'" This reasonableness requirement involves a balancing of public
gain against private loss."12 Courts are reluctant to question the legislature's
exercise of the police power, 113 but if the public gain is slight and the private
burden great, courts may find a violation of substantive due process. 114
The federal courts never have ruled on whether zoning ordinances that
exclude mobile homes from residential districts violate substantive due pro-
cess. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has not faced this issue, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals has considered the question twice.
In Currituck County v. Willey" 5 the court of appeals upheld as constitu-
tional an ordinance excluding all mobile homes that did not meet certain di-
mensional requirements." 16 The court cited a number of cases for the rule that
an ordinance enjoys a strong presumption of validity and that " 'the burden is
upon the complaining party to show its invalidity or inapplicability.' ""7 In
affirming a judgment for the county the court concluded "that defendant has
not met her burden."'"18
The question was reconsidered by the court of appeals in Duggins v. Town
of Walnut Cove" 9 in 1983. Duggins owned a lot in a district zoned by defend-
107. State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
108. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
109. See, e.g., 1 T. MATTHEWS & B. MATTHEWS, supra note 97, § 2.10.
110. See B. HODES & G. ROBERSON supra note 2, at 204-217.
111. See, e.g., 1 T. MATTHEWS & B. MATTHEWS, supra note 97, § 1.09; Note, supra note 51, at
197 n.6.
112. See, e.g., Dederick v. Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 184 A. 595, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 506 (1936);
Mansfield & Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J. 145, 198 A. 225 (1938).
113. See Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) ("We do not sit as a super-
legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses
offends the public welfare."). The party questioning an ordinance has the difficult burden of
proving that it fails to satisfy one of the requirements of due process. See Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 461 U.S. 1 (1974). See generally Flippen, supra note 27, at 18 &
n.21; SHEPARD'S, supra note 26, § 10.5; Carter, supra note 67, at 39-40.
114. Note, supra note 50, at 197 n.10. The Supreme Court's extreme deference to the legisla-
ture in the area of substantive due process is evidenced by: Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980)
(upholding open space zoning); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(upholding historic landmark preservation). In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494(1977) substantive due process was labelled a "treacherous field."
115. 46 N.C. App. 835, 266 S.E.2d 52 (1980).
116. The ordinance provided: "(a) Permitted uses of buildings, structures and land: Dwellings,
one family detached including modular and double-wide mobile homes with minimum dimen-
sions of 24' x 60', but no other mobile homes." Id at 835, 266 S.E.2d at 52.
117. Wlley, 46 N.C. App. at 836, 266 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting State v. Martin, 7 N.C. App. 18,
20, 171 S.E.2d 115 (1969)).
118. Id
119. 63 N.C. App. 684, 306 S.E.2d 186 (1983), appeal filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3760 (N.C. Mar. 3,
1984).
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ant for residential use exclusive of mobile homes.120 Under the ordinance, all
mobile homes were excluded regardless of their size, appearance, or mobility,
while all site-built homes were permitted. 12 ' Plaintiff contended that this ordi-
nance violated substantive due process because it bore no rational relationship
to any legitimate objective of police power regulation.'2 2 Plaintiff admitted
that the ordinance was presumed constitutional, but argued that he could pres-
ent evidence to overcome this presumption.' 2 3 At the trial level, defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted.
The court of appeals affirmed, 124 mentioning its decision in Willey, but
choosing to consider the question anew.12 5 The court applied the three-part
due process analysis, beginning its discussion by pointing out that the ordi-
nance was entitled to a strong presumption of validity: "If any state of facts
can be conceived that will sustain the zoning ordinance, the existence of that
state of facts must be assumed.'126 The first prong of the due process test
requires that the zoning ordinance be enacted to promote the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare. Plaintiff did not allege that the ordinance had not
been enacted for such a purpose, and defendant did not allege any particular
purpose for which it had been enacted. Although the point thus was not in
issue, the court reasonably assumed that the ordinance had been enacted to
protect the value of the property in the zoned area. 127 Protection of property
values has long been considered a valid purpose for police power regula-
120. Defendant's ordinance created three classes of single-family residences: mobile homes,
modular homes, and site-built homes. _d at 685-86, 306 S.E.2d at 187.
121. Id. at 686, 306 S.E.2d at 187.
122. Record at 7-8 (quoting plaintiff's complaint § 21).
123. Record, Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 11.
124. Duggins, 63 N.C. App. at 689, 306 S.E.2d at 189.
125. The court stated in Willey: "We hold that mobile homes are sufficiently different from
other types of housing so that there is a rational basis for placing different requirements upon
them as was done by Currituck County." Willey, 46 N.C. App. at 836, 266 S.E.2d at 53. Defend-
ant in Duggins relied heavily on this "holding," contending that it established a rule of law bind-
ing on the court.
Thus, the Court of Appeals has unequivocally rejected Appellant's contention that ordi-
nances such as Walnut Cove's violate any constitutional provisions.. . . Appellant's
attempts to distinguish between the Willey holding and the facts of this case ignore the
broad unambiguous language used there indicating that the issue of the rationality of
mobile home zoning ordinances has already been conclusively determined.. . . In con-
clusion, defendants respectfully assert that previously issued opinions of the appellate
court of North Carolina conclusively established that zoning ordinances like Walnut
Cove's are constitutional.
Record, Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 10-12.
Plaintiff in Duggins labelled the "holding" of the Wiley court obiter dictum, asserting that the
case actually had been decided on the grounds that defendant had failed to overcome the ordi-
nance's presumption of validity. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 22, Duggins. Plaintiff argued that
whether a municipality can distinguish validly between mobile and site-built homes is a question
of fact that must be determined on the basis of the complainant's evidence in each case. Id. at 23.
The Duggins court's decision not to rely on Wiley but to consider the matter anew suggests that
the court accepted plaintiff's view of the "holding" in that case.
126. Duggins, 63 N.C. App. at 688, 306 S.E.2d at 189.
127. "The protection of property values in the zoned area is a legitimate governmental objec-
tive. We believe that the method of construction of homes [the basis of defendant's distinction
between mobile and site-built homes] may be determined by a city governing board as affecting
the price of homes." Id at 688-89, 306 S.E.2d at 189.
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tion, t 28 and traditionally has been the primary reason given for excluding mo-
bile homes from residential districts. 129
The second prong of the due process analysis requires that the means
adopted by the ordinance be rationally related to the objective of the regula-
tion. Plaintiff in Duggins argued that defendant's ordinance lacked a rational
relation to any purpose within the police power. 130
Early zoning ordinances enacted to exclude mobile homes from residen-
tial districts were based on legitimate concerns about the dangers actually
posed by trailers unsuited for permanent occupancy. 13t These dangers,
unique to mobile homes, could be eliminated best by excluding all mobile
homes from residential districts. These early ordinances were substantially re-
lated to the ends for which they were enacted. Plaintiff in Duggins argued that
if he could show that mobile homes no longer present these problems, an ordi-
nance excluding mobile homes would not only be unnecessary, but would bear
no rational relation to the purpose of eliminating those problems. 132
Because mobile homes today probably pose no danger to public health,
safety, or morals, an ordinance excluding mobile homes is not likely to have
any rational relation to these concerns. 133 But whether such an ordinance
bears a rational relation to the protection of property values is not as clear. 134
Some mobile homes, like some site-built homes, can reduce the value of sur-
rounding propery. Plaintiff in Duggins contended that a zoning ordinance ex-
cluding all mobile homes while permitting all site-built homes, without regard
to which homes actually would lower property values, is not rationally related
to protection of property values. 135 The court correctly rejected this argu-
ment. 136 If some units of a particular class are likely to reduce property val-
ues, the exclusion of the entire class certainly will protect property values, and
it is irrelevant that the ordinance does not also regulate another class that af-
fects property values. Thus, ordinances such as that passed by the town of
Walnut Cove satisfy the requirements of the second prong of the substantive
due process analysis.
Finally, the due process analysis requires the ordinance to be reasonable.
In determining reasonableness, the courts must balance public gain against
private loss. If the public gain is insignificant and the private burden severe
128. Protection of property values is necessary to the general welfare. This is recognized by
North Carolina statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-383 (1982) lists protection of property values as
a valid purpose of zoning. This statute must be considered as consistent with id. § 160A-381,
which requires that zoning ordinances be enacted only for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare.
129. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
130. See Record, Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 12-19.
131. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
132. See Record, Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 12-19.
133. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 40-41, 128 and accompanying text.
135. Record, Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 12.
136. "The prohibition of such buildings [mobile homes] is rationally related to the protection
of the value of other homes in the area." Duggins, 63 N.C. App. at 689, 306 S.E.2d at 189.
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the ordinance will be considered unreasonable.' 37 Another issue is whether
the restriction is necessary to secure the desired end; if a significantly less re-
strictive ordinance would achieve the same result, the ordinance may be
unreasonable.' 38
The court in Duggins granted defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to meet his burden of
proof and overcome the ordinance's presumption of constitutionality. Instead,
the court went beyond recognizing that the ordinance was presumed constitu-
tional to a conclusion that the reasonableness of the ordinance was beyond the
scope of judicial review. The court stated that it "cannot interfere with this
legislative decision" and that it did "not believe [it] should make this factual
determination. This is a matter for the governing board of Walnut Cove."' 13 9
The court's reluctance to hear plaintiff's evidence is unfortunate because the
reasonableness of this ordinance is highly questionable. The public benefit
secured by the ordinance was slight. Although the ordinance protected against
mobile homes reducing the value of nearby properties, it did not guard against
a similar danger posed by site-built housing. An ordinance requiring that any
improvements to the realty in the restricted area not lower property values
would eliminate this danger without excluding mobile homes per se. Even
granting that the ordinance achieved a significant public gain, it imposed a
considerable hardship on plaintiff and others in his class. In its specific appli-
cation the ordinance had the effect of denying to plaintiff the use of his prop-
erty, as he could not afford any other type of housing. In its general
application the ordinance required all those who could not afford traditional
housing to live in mobile home parks. Given the public policy favoring the
increased use of the mobile home' 40 and the persistence of zoning ordinances
defeating that policy, the North Carolina courts should be more willing to
scrutinize this type of local regulation. 14'
WILLIAM WINSLETT NELSON
137. See supra note 112-114 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
139. Duggins, 63 N.C. App. at 689, 306 S.E.2d at 189.
140. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
141. See Justice Hall's classic dissent in Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester, 37 N.J.
232, 259, 181 A.2d 129, 143 (1962) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963). "[O]ur
courts have in recent years made it virtually impossible for municipal zoning regulations to be
successfully attacked. Judicial scrutiny has become too superficial and one-sided." Id. at 259, 181
A.2d at 143 (Hall, J., dissenting). According to Justice Hall "[t]he judicial branch does not meet
its full responsibility when, as here, its concept of review gives unquestioning deference to the
views of local officials." Id. at 261, 181 A.2d at 145 (Hall, J., dissenting). See also Williams,
Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBs. 317 (1955):
While controversy has often raged about judicial action in other areas, it has always been
recognized that it is an essential part of the judicial function to watch over parochial and
exclusionist attitudes and policies of local governments, and to see to it that these do not
run counter to the national policy and the general welfare.
Id. at 318.
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Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville: A New Analysis of the
Taking Issue or a Step Into Confusion?
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the tak-
ing of private property by the government without just compensation.' The
"law of the land" provision of the North Carolina Constitution has been inter-
preted to impose a similar prohibition.2 Not all interferences with property
rights, however, constitute a taking; otherwise, any land use regulation would
be subject to compensation, rendering government regulation impractical or
impossible.3 The standards for determining what constitutes a taking under
the federal and North Carolina constitutions have developed independently.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that in considering the tak-
ing issue it has conducted a series of "ad hoc, factual inquiries."'4 In Responsi-
ble Citizens v. City ofAsheville s the North Carolina Supreme Court attempted
to develop a coherent approach analyzing what constitutes a taking under the
State constitution. This attempt, however, has left suspect some of the court's
earlier decisions and offers property owners less protection than they receive
under the federal constitution.
In Responsible Citizens several property owners challenged a city flood
zone ordinance that restricted the development of their property.6 Plaintiffs
contended that the cost of meeting the city's development standards was pro-
hibitive and effectively denied them the right to develop their land.7 They
challenged the ordinance on two grounds. First, they argued that the restric-
1. "No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. This prohibition has been made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
2. "We recognize the fundamental right to just compensation so grounded in natural law
and justice that it is part of the fundamental law of this State. . . .This principle is considered in
North Carolina as an integral part of the 'law of the land' within the meaning of Article I, Section
19 of our State Constitution." Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 196, 293 S.E.2d 101, 107-
08 (1982). N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 19 reads as follows:
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges,
or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by
the law of the land. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall
any person be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or
national origin.
3. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). See also Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Penn Cent.
Transp. Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
5. 308 N.C. 255, 302 S.E.2d 204 (1983).
6. Id. at 256, 302 S.E.2d at 206. All new construction or substantial improvements in a
flood hazard district were required to be anchored to prevent flotation, collapse, or lateral move-
ment, and constructed with materials and utility equipment resistant to flood damage. Further-
more, all water and sewage systems had to be constructed to limit infiltration of flood waters. In
floodway and flood fringe districts all residential uses were prohibited; other construction was
permitted if it met the flood hazard district requirements and if its lowest habitable floor was at
least two feet above the regulatory flood elevation. Id. at 257-60, 302 S.E.2d at 206-07.
7. Id. at 264, 302 S.E.2d at 210.
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tions constituted a taking for which they were entitled to just compensation.8
Second, they argued that the ordinance violated the equal protection provi-
sions of both the State and federal constitutions "because it impose[d] a bur-
den only on those citizens in the flood hazard area strictly for the benefit of
those citizens with property outside the flood hazard area."9
The North Carolina Supreme Court stated that in ascertaining the valid-
ity of an equal protection challenge to a legislative classification, "'[t]he test is
whether the difference in treatment made by the law has a reasonable basis in
relation to the purpose and subject matter of the legislation.' "10 Since the city
had classified only lands that were prone to flooding, and the permissible ob-
ject of the legislation was to prevent harm from flooding, the court concluded
that the ordinance was constitutional.1 ' Furthermore, the court concluded
that the restriction did not amount to a taking under either the State or federal
constitution. 12 The court found no taking under the fifth amendment, 13 stat-
ing that nothing distinguished Responsible Citizens from Penn Central Trans-
portation v. City of New York, 14 in which the United States Supreme Court
had upheld an historic district ordinance. The Responsible Citizens court
found no violation of the North Carolina Constitution because plaintiffs had
not been deprived of all practical uses of their property and the property had
not been rendered valueless. 15
The tenth amendment reserves the police power to the states, 16 permitting
state regulation that promotes the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.' 7
Not every exercise of the police power, however, constitutes a taking. "Gov-
ernment could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." 18
If the government were required to compensate every governmentally induced
8. Id. at 256-57, 302 S.E.2d at 206.
9. Id. at 267, 302 S.E.2d at 212. The trial court dismissed the equal protection challenge on
the ground "that all persons, firms and corporations whose properties are located in said Flood
Hazard Districts are treated alike within said classification and the passage of said ordinance was
a valid exercise of the police power ...." Record at 22, Responsible Citizens.
10. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 268, 302 S.E.2d at 212 (quoting Guthrie v. Taylor, 279
N.C. 703, 714, 185 S.E.2d 193, 201 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972)).
11. Id.
12. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that even though the ordinance "seriously
depreciates the value of properties,. . . [the ordinance did] not substantially deprive the plaintiffs
...of the right to reasonable use of their property." Id. at 260, 302 S.E.2d at 208; Record at 22,
Responsible Citizens.
13. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 267, 302 S.E.2d at 211.
14. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
15. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 264-65, 302 S.E.2d at 210.
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. X. See State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 369, 211 S.E.2d 320, 322,
appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975); Keiger v. Winston-Salem Bd. of Adjustment, 278 N.C. 17,
178 S.E.2d 616 (1971); City of Raleigh v. Fisher, 232 N.C. 629, 61 S.E.2d 897 (1950). The cases
refer to police power as being inherent in the states.
17. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Even though this power
is reposed in the state legislature, it can be delegated to municipalities and counties. See State v.
Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E.2d 320, appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975); Keiger v. Winston-
Salem Bd. of Adjustment, 278 N.C. 17, 178 S.E.2d 616 (1971); Marren v. Gamble, 237 N.C. 680,
75 S.E.2d 880 (1953).
18. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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reduction in an individual's net worth, the taxing power would be abrogated.19
Since first permitting land use regulation as an exercise of the police power,20
courts have struggled to determine when such regulation constitutes a taking
and requires compensation.
The North Carolina courts have focused primarily on the extent that an
ordinance interferes with the use of property. Land use regulation has been
held not to be a taking when the interference is minor. In Zopfi v. City of
Wilmington 21 property adjacent to plaintiffs' property was rezoned from resi-
dential to commercial use. The court held that this did not constitute a taking
because it had not interfered with plaintiffs' use of their property; they still
were free to use their property for residential purposes.22 That the rezoning of
the adjacent property reduced the value of plaintiffs' property was of no
consequence. 23
In State v. Joyner24 defendant operated a building material salvage shop
in an area that had been rezoned to prohibit such use. Because defendant held
the property under an oral lease, the lease was valid for no more than three
years.25 Even though defendant's use was frustrated completely, the rezoning
did not constitute a taking because defendant's expectation was only for a
three-year period. The court considered interference with such an insignifi-
cant interest to be insubstantial. 26
As these cases illustrate, insubstantial interference with the use of prop-
erty does not constitute a taking. The North Carolina courts have found a
taking only when property has been rendered valueless or the owner has been
deprived of all reasonable use.27 If the regulation prevents the owner from
conducting all permitted uses of the property, the regulation constitutes a tak-
ing.28 Simply because the landholder can comply with the regulation, how-
ever, does not relieve the government of a duty to pay just compensation. In
Helms v. City of Charlotte29 the trial court had found no taking since the prop-
erty owner still could comply with the uses permitted by the challenged zoning
ordinance. 30 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed because the trial
court had not found that the permitted uses were reasonable. The court con-
cluded that if the permitted uses were unreasonable, the regulation deprived
19. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
20. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 375 (1926) (actions under police
power do not require compensation because they are inherent in ownership).
21. 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325 (1968).
22. Id. at 433, 160 S.E.2d at 329.
23. Id. at 436, 160 S.E.2d at 332.
24. 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E.2d 320, appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1965).
26. Joyner, 286 N.C. at 375-76, 211 S.E.2d at 326.
27. Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 653, 122 S.E.2d 817, 822 (1961).
28. Roberson's Beverages, Inc. v. City of New Bern, 6 N.C. App. 632, 637, 171 S.E.2d 4, 7
(1969), cert. denied, 276 N.C. 183 (1970).
29. 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961).
30. Id. at 656, 122 S.E.2d at 824.
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the owner of all reasonable use and constituted a taking.31
The measure of what is a reasonable use is not a rigid standard. If the
public interest is of lesser importance, the courts will find a lesser intrusion to
have denied the owner reasonable use. In State v. Jones32 the supreme court
imposed a lower threshold for finding an aesthetic zoning ordinance invalid
because such ordinances are of lesser public importance.33
The United States Supreme Court has not adopted such a reasonableness
standard. In addressing taking questions, the Court conducts "'essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries.' ,34 The Court focuses on the character of the govern-
ment's action 35 and the economic impact of the regulation, considering partic-
ularly the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations. 36
The Supreme Court is less likely to find a taking if the government's ac-
tion is a regulation instead of a physical invasion.37 When the government's
action rises to the level of a permanent physical occupation, the Court will find
a per se taking. 38 To evaluate the substantiality of a regulation's economic
impact, however, the Court has adopted a broad view of an owner's bundle of
property rights and a narrow view of the property interest affected. 39 Thus,
the Court has focused on whether the owner could make a reasonable use of
his property after the government's action.40 The Court has been most willing
to protect investment-backed expectations when the government's action
would have had the effect of denying the owner the fruits of some positive
investment.4'
31. The court stated that the permitted uses would have to be "practical, desirable and of
reasonable value." Id. at 657, 122 S.E.2d at 825.
32. 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982).
33. See id. at 526, 290 S.E.2d at 678-79. See also A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C.
207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979) (applying same standard to historic preservation ordinances). See gen.
erally Note, State v. Jones: Aesthetic Regulation-From Junkyards to Residences?, 61 N.C.L. REV.
942 (1983).
34. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (quoting Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
35. Id.
36. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
37. Compare Penn Central (upholding regulation of owner's use of air space over Grand
Central Station) with Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (denying govern-
ment navigational servitude over waters that had been made navigable through private invest-
ment; Court characterized government's action as "physical invasion").
38. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). For a discus-
sion of Supreme Court taking jurisprudence and an analysis of Loretto, see Note, Eminent Do-
main-Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.: Permanent Physical Occupation As A Taking, 62
N.C.L. REV. 153 (1983).
39. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. In Penn
Central the Court stated:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and at-
tempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.
... [The] Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole. ...
Id.
40. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
41. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (expectation that privately
developed marina would remain private),
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In Responsible Citizens the North Carolina Supreme Court applied a
three-part test for analyzing the taking question under the North Carolina
Constitution.42 First, the court examined whether the object of the legislation
is within the scope of the police power. Second, it determined whether the
means employed are reasonably necessary to promote the accomplishment of
that goal. Third, it examined whether the interference with the owner's right
to use his property as he deems appropriate is reasonable.4 3 To determine
whether the object of the regulation in Responsible Citizens was within the
police power, the court looked exclusively at the findings of fact enumerated in
the ordinance. Since the purpose of the ordinance was to further the "public
health, safety, morals, and welfare," 44 the court concluded that the ordinance
fulfilled the first element. Similarly, the court held that the since the enacting
body had found the means to be necessary, the second element was fulfilled.45
The third prong of the test is based on North Carolina reasonable use
cases, but departs from the analysis in earlier supreme court cases. In Helms
the court had concluded that an intrusion is a taking if it deprives the owner of
all reasonable use of the property, or if it renders the property valueless. 46 In
Responsible Citizens, however, the court stated that both elements must be sat-
isfied.47 The pronouncement that both elements are required may have been
an inadvertent error, given that the court gleaned this rule from Helms.4 8
More importantly, however, the passage is merely dictum since neither taking
criterion was found in Responsible Citizens.49
Responsible Citizens identified a new factor to consider in ascertaining the
reasonableness of the restriction-the form of the restriction. The court la-
beled the regulation in Responsible Citizens a "conditional affirmative duty."50
Conditional affirmative duties require landowners to do something before
changing the use of their land.51 The ordinance in Responsible Citizens pro-
hibited new construction or substantial improvements on the affected property
unless specific requirements were satisfied.5 2 If a regulation imposes only a
conditional affirmative duty, it is not an unreasonable burden on the owner's
use because "[t]he regulations do not affect in any way the current use of each
42. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 261, 302 S.E.2d at 208 (citing A-S-P Assocs. v. City of
Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979)).
43. Id. at 261, 302 S.E.2d at 208.
44. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The stated purpose of the ordinance was to
prevent or reduce loss of life, property damage, and the like due to flood. Responsible Citizens,
308 N.C. at 262, 302 S.E.2d at 209.
45. "Indeed, it can be argued that an ordinance requiring, among other things, the flood
proofing of new structures is the only feasible manner in which flood damage can be prevented or
minimized in a flood hazard area." Id. at 263, 302 S.E.2d at 209.
46. Helms, 255 N.C. at 653, 122 S.E.2d. at 822.
47. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 264, 302 S.E.2d at 210.
48. Id. at 263-64, 302 S.E.2d at 209-210 (citing Helms).
49. Id. at 264-65, 302 S.E.2d at 210-11.
50. Id. at 264, 302 S.E.2d at 210.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 257-60, 265, 302 S.E.2d at 206-08, 210.
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plaintiff's property."53 Thus, it is of no consequence that other uses are
prohibited. 54
This conditional affirmative duty analysis departs from the court's prior
holdings and conflicts with Helms. In Helms the land was not in use at the
time of the zoning change. The court examined whether the available uses
were reasonable;55 the option of allowing the unused condition to continue
was only a part of this inquiry. If a plaintiff in Responsible Citizens was not
using his land when the ordinance was adopted, and all development effec-
tively was prohibited by the "conditional affirmative duties" imposed by the
ordinance, he was left with no available reasonable use. Under Helms, this
deprivation would constitute a taking. Responsible Citizens held that it was
not a taking.
The court's analysis fails to consider factors that constitute a taking under
the federal constitution. The court applied the conditional affirmative duty
rationale and relied on Penn Central in dismissing summarily the challenge
under the federal constitution. 56
Both ordinances place conditional affirmative duties on the land-
owner to meet certain requirements if he or she wishes to engage in
new construction or alterations. Indeed, we find no feature of the
Penn Central case which substantially distinguishes it from the case
at bar-at least to the extent that would render the exercise of police
power invalid or justify a different conclusion on the "taking"
issue.57
The court, however, incorrectly relied on Penn Central for its conditional af-
firmative duty analysis. Penn Central does not discuss the doctrine of condi-
tional affirmative duty. Under the federal and State constitutions, the ends of
the ordinance must be permissible, and the means must be reasonably neces-
sary to effectuate those ends.58 Even if an ordinance passes this test, however,
its enactment constitutes a taking "if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the
owner's use of the property."59 Although the United States Supreme Court
has not developed a framework for this analysis, the factors it has identified as
pertinent to the taking issue do not include whether the regulation imposes a
conditional affirmative duty on the owner.
The Responsible Citizens court's analytic framework does not account for
an established federal factor-interference with investment-backed expecta-
tion in the use of property. If land presently is not in use or is held with an
investment-backed expectation for the development of that land, a regulation
53. Id. at 264, 302 S.E.2d at 210.
54. Id. at 265, 302 S.E.2d at 210.
55. Helms, 255 N.C. at 656-57, 122 S.E.2d at 824-25.
56. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 266-67, 302 S.E.2d at 211.
57. Id. at 267, 302 S.E.2d at 211.
58. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127. See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C.
207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
59. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
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that prohibits development may constitute a taking under the federal constitu-
tion.60 Under Responsible Citizens, however, if this prohibition is merely a
constructive prohibition in the form of a conditional affirmative duty, it is not
a taking. Suppose a plaintiff in Responsible Citizens had purchased vacant
commercial property and expended a considerable sum of money to prepare
for construction of a shopping center. If the city council then imposed a con-
ditional affirmative duty that effectively prohibited any development of the
property, a taking would have occurred under the reasoning of Penn Central.6 1
Under Responsible Citizens, however, this zoning would have been a permissi-
ble exercise of the police power.
The court's holding in Responsible Citizens was very broad. The court did
not consider the different possible circumstances of the plaintiffs' property; it
looked only to the form of the ordinance and held it not to constitute a taking.
Furthermore, the trial court had failed to find that the ordinance did not de-
prive plaintiffs of all reasonable use of their property.6 2 If the supreme court
had applied its pre-Responsible Citizens reasonableness standard, it would
have remanded for such a finding.6 3 The court's failure to remand illustrates
that the form of the ordinance as a conditional affirmative duty was crucial to
the outcome.
In Responsible Citizens the North Carolina Supreme Court provided a
simple framework for analyzing the taking issue. The decision, however, casts
doubt on the court's previous taking decisions64 since its conditional affirma-
tive duty analysis has short-circuited the definition of reasonable use an-
nounced in Helms. Although the court attempted to clarify the answers to
questions that have plagued this area of law, it raised more questions than it
answered, leaving the present state of the law uncertain. Because the decision
affords a landowner less protection under the North Carolina Constitution
than under its federal counterpart, the primary question in North Carolina
taking cases will be whether a violation of the fifth amendment has occurred.
Thus, although the court provided a simple framework with which to analyze
North Carolina taking law, it has rendered that framework of little value.
60. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
61. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
62. Record at 20, Responsible Citizens.
63. See Helms, 255 N.C. at 657, 122 S.E.2d at 824-25; Jamison v. City of Charlotte, 239 N.C.
423, 79 S.E.2d 797 (1954). See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
64. Even though the court analyzed the facts broadly, Responsible Citizens seems to be an
example of result-oriented adjudication. The ordinance was enacted for the purpose of allowing
Asheville residents to qualify for federal flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance Act.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4001- 4128 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The court apparently felt compelled to uphold
any such ordinance. This predisposition of the court toward upholding the constitutionality of the
ordinance may have affected its analysis in two ways. First, the court was willing to adopt an
analysis broader than its prior decisions. Second, the court cited cases from other jurisdictions
that do not support its analyis. Each of the cases cited, however, upheld similar flood zone ordi-
nances. See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1975); Cappture Realty Corp. v. Board of Adjustment of Elmwood Park,
126 N.J. Super. 200, 313 A.2d 624 (1973), aft'd, 133 N.J. Super. 216, 336 A.2d 30 (1975). In both
of these cases, however, the courts did not consider whether the ordinance constituted a taking of
the plaintiffs' property. See, e.g., Turnpike Realy, 362 Mass. at 238, 284 N.E.2d at 901-02 (Tauro,
C.J., concurring).
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Once again, practitioners are left to interpret the "ad hoc factual inquiries" 65
of the United States Supreme Court.
MARTIN K. REIDINGER
65. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
Murder in Mecklenburg-To the Issue Go the Spoils
One early summer morning in 1980, Isam Misenheimer was in his
kitchen, cooking up country ham.' His son John appeared, and the men
spoke. They may have fought; at some point John pulled from under his
jacket a .22 caliber rifle shortened by the removal of its stock. A bullet raced
through the older man's brain and soon he lay dead or dying, a small pool of
blood staining the floor around his head.2 John now is serving time at Central
Prison in Raleigh.3
Isam Misenheimer left a will dividing his estate equally among John and
John's seven brothers and sisters.4 The following year, John's siblings sued for
a declaratory judgment5 barring John from taking anything under Isam's will.
The trial court agreed with plaintiffs that John was barred by North Carolina's
slayer statute from taking his one-eighth share of his father's estate. The court,
however, rejected plaintiffs' argument that the slayer statute also barred John's
two sons, ruling instead that they could take their father's share by substitu-
tion.6 The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision
in Misenheimer v. Misenheimer,7 thus determining that the slayer statute will
not deny a slayer's issue benefits from a death the slayer has caused.
The need for determining the rights of the slayer's issue arose because two
succession statutes governed the case. The slayer statute, North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes sections 31A-3 to 31A-15, provides for forfeiture of the slayer's
share through the fiction that the slayer had predeceased his testator-victim. 8
Section 31-42, the anti-lapse statute, provides for the passing of any estate or
I. Record at 32 (testimony of Sharon Misenheimer), State v. Misenheimer, 304 N.C. 108,
282 S.E.2d 791 (1981) Isam was shot on the morning of June 10, 1980. Ivan Misenheimer lived
and died in Charlotte.
2. Id. at 57 (testimony of Dr. Hobart Wood, medical examiner); Id. at 84 (voluntary state-
ment of John Misenheimer, June 10, 1980). The North Carolina Supreme Court found no error in
the trial court's finding of first-degree murder. State v. Misenheimer, 304 N.C. 108, 111, 282
S.E.2d 791, 794 (1981).
3. Record at 3, Misenheimer v. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. 706, 303 S.E.2d 415 (1983).
Unless otherwise noted, subsequent references in the text and notes to Misenheimer refer to the
1983 wills case of Misenheimer v. Misenheimer. Misenheimer v. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. 706,
303 S.E.2d 415 (1983).
4. Misenheimer v. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. 706, 707, 303 S.E.2d 415, 415 (1983). Isam's
will left no specific gifts. After payment of debts, funeral expenses, administration costs, and
death taxes, the will provided for distribution of all the residue to the eight named children.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -267 (1983). The actual alignment of the parties was Don-
ald Misenheimer (John's brother and administrator of Isam's estate) against all the named benefi-
ciaries, including John, and also against John's two sons. References in the text to "the
Misenheimer plaintiffs" refer to the seven siblings who sought to bar John and his two sons from
taking under Isam's will.
6. Misenheimer v. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. 706, 707, 303 S.E.2d 415, 415-16 (1983).
7. 62 N.C. App. 706, 303 S.E.2d 415 (1983).
8. The slayer statute is article III of Acts Barring Property Rights, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 350,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1983). The relevant section of article III is
§ 31A-4 (1976):
The slayer shall be deemed to have died immediately prior to the death of the decedent
and the following rules shall apply:
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part of an estate that would otherwise fail because a beneficiary died before his
testator.9 The anti-lapse statute determines that when a beneficiary prede-
ceases the testator, the beneficiary's issue take the beneficiary's share by substi-
tution.' 0 In reconciling the slayer statute with the anti-lapse statute, the
question was this: If the slayer is deemed to have predeceased the testator for
the purpose of depriving the slayer of any share in the testator's estate, should
the slayer also be deemed to have predeceased the testator for the purpose of
the anti-lapse statute?
A devise lapses when a named beneficiary cannot or will not take the gift
at the testator's death.'" At common law, a lapsed legacy could pass under the
residuary clause of the will, but a lapsed devise had to be treated as intestate
property.'2 North Carolina's statutory provision against lapses grew out of
1844 legislation providing that lapsed devises could pass under a will's residu-
ary clause.' 3 The North Carolina anti4apse statute now provides that, if pos-
sible and if the will shows no contrary intent, 14 a beneficiary's issue should
take the beneficiary's share by substitution when the beneficiary dies before
the testator.' 5 The statute further provides for gifts that cannot be saved from
lapsing. The anti-lapse statute provides that any specific gift that has lapsed
(1) The slayer shall not acquire any property or receive any benefit from the
estate of the decedent by testate or intestate succession or by common law or statu-
tory right as surviving spouse of the decedent.
(2) Where the decedent dies intestate as to property which would have passed
to the slayer by intestate succession, such property shall pass to others next in suc-
cession in accordance with the applicable provision of the Intestate Succession Act.
(3) Where the decedent dies testate as to property which would have passed to
the slayer pursuant to the will, such property shall pass as if the decedent had died
intestate with respect thereto, unless otherwise disposed of by the will.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42(a) (1976) provides for a devise or legacy to a beneficiary who
would have taken had he survived the testator, but who died before the testator did. Such a devise
or legacy passes by substitution to the beneficiary's issue, provided that (I) the beneficiary had
issue living at his own death, and (2) the beneficiary's issue would have been heir of the testator,
under the Intestate Succession Act, in the absence of a will. Section 31-42(b) provides that a
devise or legacy to a class member who predeceases the testator also passes to the beneficiary's
issue. Under subsection (b), if the beneficiary is not survived by issue, the gift devolves upon the
remaining class members who survive the testator. Subsection (b) was not relevant to Misen-
helmer, since there the testator named each of the beneficiaries. Presumably, if Isam Misenheimer
had left his residuary estate to the class "my children," the court would just as easily have found
John's sons entitled to take John's share by substitution. Section 31-42(c) provides for cases in
which subsections (a) and (b) do not apply, and a devise or legacy lapses: if there is a residuary
clause, the gift passes under it; lacking a residuary clause in the will, the gift passes as if the
testator had died intestate with respect to the gift. Further, under subsection (c), if a residuary gift
lapses with respect to one beneficiary, the gift continues in the residue for distribution to the other
residuary beneficiaries. If there are no other residuary beneficiaries, the gift passes as intestate
property. Operation of subsection (a), (b), or (c) is contingent on no contrary instruction appear-
ing in the will.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42(a) (1976). See supra note 9.
11. T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 140, at 777 (2d ed. 1953).
12. N. WIGGINS, NORTH CAROLINA WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH
CAROLINA § 149, at 149 (1983).
13. Id. See 1844 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 88, § 4, reprinted in B. MOORE & A. BoOS, REVISED
CODE OF NORTH CAROLINA 608 (1855).
14. A contrary intent could be shown, for example, by a gift to a beneficiary, "if he survives
me," or by a gift over to another if the beneficiary does not survive the testator. T. ATKINSON,
supra note 11, § 140, at 780.
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42 (1976). See supra note 9.
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goes into the residuary portion of the estate, while any residuary gift that has
lapsed passes to the other residuary beneficiaries. If no other residuary benefi-
ciaries exist, the gift passes as if the testator had died intestate.1 6
In Bear v. Bear 1 7 the court of appeals indicated that the plain meaning of
the anti-lapse statute controlled any construction: subsection (a) of the statute,
which passed the testate gift intended for a predeceased beneficiary to the ben-
eficiary's issue, applied to any devise, residuary or specific. More relevant to
the facts of Misenheimer, the Bear court held that a gift is not lapsed when the
gift can pass to issue of the predeceased beneficiary. This proposition is cen-
tral to the purpose of the anti-lapse statute-to prevent lapses, not just to pro-
vide for their eventuality.' 8
The slayer statute is based on the principle that no one should profit from
his wrongdoing.19 North Carolina's slayer statute was enacted in 1961, replac-
ing inadequate existing statutes and unsatisfactory case law.20 The statutes
had been limited to cases in which one spouse had killed the other and stood
to gain from the victim's death.21 In other cases, courts had applied the equi-
table principle of the constructive trust.2 2 In the absence of an applicable stat-
ute, courts would refuse to invoke a forfeiture against a murderer, and instead
hold that the murderer held his vested interest in the victim's estate in trust for
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42(c)(1)(b) (1976).
17. 3 N.C. App. 498, 165 S.E.2d 518 (1969). In Bear testator executed a will in 1917 and died
in 1968. The will gave the residue of the estate to two brothers, Emanuel and Sigmond. Emanuel
died before the testator, leaving two children who took Emanuel's one-half share by substitution.
Sigmond also died before the testator, but left no issue, so his half of the residue lapsed. Because
there were no other named residuary beneficiaries, Sigmond's half had to be distributed as intes-
tate property.
18. It appears to us that section (a) of the statute is designed and intended to prevent the
lapse of a devise or bequest, whether it be specific or residuary, in a situation where the
devisee or legatee who would have taken had he survived the testator predeceases testa-
tor survived by issue who survive the testator and who would have been heirs of testator
had there been no will.
Id. at 504, 165 S.E.2d at 522.
19. "Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria." See McGovern, Homicide and
Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REv. 65, 71 (1969). See also Dworkin, The Model ofRules, 35
U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967). Dworkin states that courts have applied this principle in the absence of
any preexisting rule, and that the principle illustrates a failure of positivist jurisprudence. The
principle that no one should profit from his wrongdoing was first used to defeat a devise in the
famous case of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889). Defendant in Riggs murdered
his grandfather, and the court held that the slayer-grandson could not take anything under the
will, despite the will's provisions for a gift to the grandson, and despite the lack of any barring
provisions in New York's statutes or case law.
Riggs also served as the point of departure for an imaginative consideration of the predict-
ability of unwritten law in D'Amato, Elmer's Rule: A Jurisprudential Dialogue, 60 IoWA L. REV.
1129 (1975).
20. See N. WIGGINS, supra note 12. See generally Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40
N.C.L. REv. 175 (1962).
21. One year before the New York decision of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188
(1889), the North Carolina Supreme Court had allowed a wife who had been accessory to her
husband's murder to take her intestate share of the husband's estate. Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C.
240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888). The legislature responded to Owens with statutes aimed at preventing a
recurrence of that result. See 1889 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 499 (repealed partially in 1959; balance
repealed in 1973).
22. See, e.g., Garner v. Phillips, 229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E.2d 845 (1948) (constructive trust ap-
plied after son murdered parents).
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the remaining beneficiaries. 23 To cover more situations in which a slayer
might benefit from his wrongdoing, the North Carolina legislature in 1961
turned to the model slayer statute that Professor Wade had proposed in
1936.24
North Carolina adopted most of Wade's model statute, but as the discus-
sion inMisenheimer indicates, the divergences from the Wade model were sig-
nificant. Wade provided that neither the slayer nor anyone claiming through
him could take as a result of the slayer's wrongdoing. 25 The North Carolina
statute provides merely that the slayer cannot benefit, without mentioning
those who might claim through him. Citing its opinion in an earlier slayer
case,26 the court wrote, "the public policy sought to be fostered by the enact-
ment of G.S. 3 IA is predicated upon the theory that the murderer himself will
not profit by his own wrongdoing, however, this principle does not extend to
those related to the slayer."'27 Most important, Wade's statute specifically pro-
vided that the anti-lapse statute would not apply to the slayer's share of the
victim's will. The omission of this provision in the North Carolina statute
strongly suggests that the anti-lapse statute should be read in conjunction with
the slayer statute.28
In Misenheimer the courts found John to be a slayer within the definition
of "slayer" in the statute,29 but the courts still had to determine who would
23. See A. ScoTr, TRUSTS §§ 492-494.4 (1967).
24. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARV. L. REv. 715 (1936).
25. Id. at 724.
26. Gardner v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 22 N.C. App. 404, 206 S.E.2d 818, cert. denied, 285
N.C. 658, 207 S.E.2d 753 (1974). Gardner involved a different problem from Misenheimer. Under
§ 3 lA-II of the slayer statute, the principle that the murderer shall not benefit from his wrongdo-
ing applies to insurance proceeds. In Gardner the insured slayer killed the beneficiary under the
policy, then killed himself. The court held that the slayer's mother, who was named an alternate
eneficiary in the policy, could take the proceeds.
27. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. at 709-10, 303 S.E.2d at 417 (citing Gardner v. Nationwide
Life Ins. Co., 22 N.C. App. 404, 409, 206 S.E.2d 818, 821, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 658, 207 S.E.2d
753 (1974)).
28. See Wade, supra note 24, at 727. Under Wade's model, "the heirs or next of kin of the
slayer may claim the property if they are entitled to it in their own right, but they cannot claim
through an ancestor who has disqualified himself by his wrong." Id.
29. A "slayer" is defined under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-3 (1976) as any person who, as a
principal or accessory in the "willful and unlawful killing of another person," (a) is found guilty,
(b) pleads guilty, or (c) pleads nolo contendere in a criminal action. In addition, subsection (d)
provides that a slayer who commits suicide or otherwise dies before being tried for the slaying,
and before settlement of the estate, can be found a slayer in a civil action. Such an action must be
brought within one year after the testator's death. Subsection (d) thus provides that in murder-
suicide cases in which the slayer cannot be tried for murder, the slayer's share of the victim's estate
will not go into the slayer's estate. One need not be a slayer under the definition of § 3 IA-3(3) to
be barred from taking under the decedent's estate. In Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287
N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975), the beneficiary shot her husband. She was tried for murder, but
found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Quick had stipulated in the subsequent suit for the
husband's insurance proceeds that she had killed her husband, and that the only issue was
whether the slayer statute barred her from taking the proceeds. Apparently, she was under the
"misapprehension that the decisive question was whether she was a slayer as defined by G.S.
§ 31A-3(3)." Id. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569. Since Quick's act was found to have been unwilful, she
could not have met the test of a slayer. But the court went on to apply the common law as
preserved in the statute-the broad construction provision of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-15 (1976)-
'both substantively and procedurally, as to all acts not specifically provided for in Chapter 3 IA."
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receive John's share under Isam's will. To prevent John and his two sons from
taking under the will, John's siblings raised two arguments against the trial
court's finding for John's sons. First, they argued that the slayer statute exclu-
sively controlled distribution of the estate, and that the anti-lapse statute did
not apply when the slayer merely was deemed to have predeceased the testa-
tor. Second, they argued that if the anti-lapse statute did apply, the gift to
John had lapsed and should have passed into the residue for distribution to
the other residuary beneficiaries, under the terms of section 31-42(c)(2).3 0
In rejecting the second argument, the court noted Bear,31 which had sug-
gested that the anti-lapse statute should prevent lapse whenever possible, and
thus, that the statute favors passage of the beneficiary's share to his issue over
a lapse. Thus, once the Misenheimer court decided that the anti-lapse statute
did apply, plaintiffs had to overcome the presumption that a lapse should be
avoided. They failed to overcome this presumption.
The court of appeals briefly considered plaintiffs' argument for the exclu-
sive operation of the slayer statute.32 Plaintiffs had stressed that section 31A-
15 provides that Chapter 31A applies exclusively to all acts it specifically cov-
ers. The court interpreted this argument as a cue to refer to the provision of
the slayer statute governing in the case of a slain testator, North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes section 31A-4. Section 31A-4(3) provides that "where the dece-
dent dies testate as to property which would have passed to the slayer pursuant
to the will, such property shall pass as if the decedent had died intestate with
respect thereto, unless otherwise disposed of by the will." The court con-
cluded: "Since nothing to the contrary appears in the will of Isam R. Misen-
heimer, the anti-lapse statute is deemed a part of the will."
3 3
Thus, the court focused on the last phrase of subsection (3) without ad-
dressing the operative clause, "such property shall pass as if the decedent had
died intestate with respect thereto." This clause suggests that John's one-
eighth share should have been distributed according to the laws of intestate
succession. Since the eight named beneficiaries also would have been Isam's
heirs in intestacy, they would have shared equally in any intestate property,
except John's sons would have taken John's share by substitution. Thus,
under this construction, John's one-eighth share would have been divided
Quick, 287 N.C. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569. Thus, although the specific provisions of the slayer
statute did not cover cases of involuntary manslaughter, the broad construction section could be
invoked when the specific provisions of the slayer statute might otherwise fail to prevent one from
profiting from his wrongdoing. Mr. Quick's death resulted from his wife's "culpable negligence,
that is conduct incompatible with a proper regard for human life . . . . Culpable negligence
proximately resulting in death comes within the purview of the common law maxim that no one
shall be permitted to profit by his own wrong." Id. at 59, 213 S.E.2d at 570-71. Seesupra note 19.See also Note, Decedents'Estates-Fofeitures of Property Rights by Slayers, 12 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 448 (1976).
30. See supra note 9. John's defense counsel in the murder case apparently thought this was
the correct construction, and that it explained the siblings' pecuniary interest in hiring a private
prosecutor at the murder trial. Brief for Appellant at 6, State v. Misenheimer, 304 N.C. 108, 282
S.E.2d 791 (1981).
31. See supra note 17.
32. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. at 708, 303 S.E.2d at 416.
33. Id.
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again by eight, so that John's seven siblings each would have taken an addi-
tional one-sixty-fourth share, while John's two sons would have divided only a
one-sixty-fourth share as a result of intestate succession. 34
Admittedly, this construction lends little grace to the statutory architec-
ture. The Misenheimer court saw a mesh between the slayer and anti-lapse
statutes; although the slayer statute provides that "the slayer shall be deemed
to have died immediately prior to the death of the decedent," the anti-lapse
statute can prevent lapse or provide for passage of the slayer's share after
lapse. The first sentence of the slayer statute, however, continues, "and the
following rules shall apply:. . . (3) Where the decedent dies testate as to prop-
erty which would have passed to the slayer pursuant to the will, such property
shall pass as if the decedent had died intestate with respect thereto, unless
otherwise disposed of by the wil."' 35 Subsection (3) is surplusage if the anti-
lapse statute operates on a testate slaying victim's property, because the anti-
lapse statute itself provides for the possibility that a gift to the slayer might
pass by intestacy.36 In the anti-lapse statute, intestate succession is the final
solution, to be avoided whenever a predeceased beneficiary leaves surviving
issue, or whenever there are other residuary beneficiaries. For example, if
John Misenheimer had predeceased his father without leaving issue, under
section 31-42(c)(2) John's share of the residuary estate would have gone back
into the residue of Isam's estate for distribution to the other residuary benefi-
ciaries. 37 Under section (3) of the slayer statute, however, property "which
would have passed to. . . [John]. . . pursuant to the will. . . shall pass as if
the decedent had died intestate with respect thereto. '38 If the legislature had
wanted the courts to read the anti-lapse and slayer statues together, it would
not have written a section pertaining to wills that so contradicted the anti-
lapse statute. Instead, the legislature could have written a subsection (3) of the
slayer statute specifically applying the anti-lapse statute, or it could have re-
mained silent about wills in the slayer statute, which also would have impli-
cated the anti-lapse statute.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals' construction of the slayer and anti-
lapse statues in Misenheimer is at least consistent with its perception of public
policy-that the murderer's wrongdoing should not bar the murderer's rela-
tives from taking his share. If consideration of the slayer's children indeed
represents the legislature's will, the decision in Misenheimer gives effect to that
will. The Misenheimer decision also ensures that the treatment of bequests to
the slayer will not depend on whether the decedent leaves a will. Under the
Wade model statute, the slayer's issue are not barred from taking an intestate
share, provided they are heirs in their own right. But if the slayer is named in
the testator's will, the slayer's issue only can take a share the testator may have
34. Thus, John's seven siblings would each take a total of 9/64 of the residuary estate, while
John's sons would each take 1/128.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-4(3) (1976).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42(c)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983). See supra note 9.
37. Id.
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-4(3) (1976).
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given them specifically.39 The Uniform Probate Code may operate simi-
larly.40 Section 2-803 of the Code provides that, if the decedent dies intestate,
the slayer-heir's portion passes to the slayer's issue under the Code's intestate
succession provisions.4 1 If the decedent dies testate, however, and the killer is
named in the will, the killer's portion may fall back into the residue or pass on
to another residuary beneficiary.4 2 In Misenheimer the decedent had simply
written into his will the same equal distribution to his eight children that intes-
tate succession would have provided without a will. It would have been unfor-
tunate if the slayer's children's claim to part of the decedent's estate depended
not only on an act of their parent that they could not influence, but also on the
uncontrollable (and normally desirable) decision of the decedent to write a
will.
The decedent's intent is one consideration in determining whether a
slayer's issue should take the slayer's share from the victim's estate by substitu-
tion. Anti-lapse statutes are said to affect the average testator's probable in-
tentions if the testator had considered the possibility of surviving his
beneficiary.43 The intentions of a slain testator are questionable, however, be-
cause the court must speculate about what the testator would have intended
had he known the slayer would kill him. Could Isam Misenheimer have
thought, after having been shot on that fateful June morning, "I do not wish
for John or his two sons to take from my estate"? North Carolina law sup-
plants silence from the grave with a determination of public policy; if John's
sons are innocent in the death of their grandfather, they may take their father's
share.
In addition to policy considerations, a constitutional issue arises in con-
struing the slayer statute. If a slayer statute is read to bar the succession rights
of issue who claim through an ancestor slayer, a court may risk imposing the
ancient penalty of corruption of the blood.44 This penalty, which Blackstone
called an "oppressive mark of [Norman] feodal tenure," 45 extended the forfei-
ture penalty imposed on someone found guilty of treason or other felonies to
his descendants. The descendants could not claim through the convicted an-
cestor and had to take title from a more remote ancestor. Professor Wade
flatly denied that his model statute would work corruption of the blood, "since
it does not prevent heirs of the slayer from inheriting from him property which
he already owns, but merely keeps him from acquiring property in an illegal
39. See supra note 28.
40. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803, 8 U.L.A. 172 (1983).
41. Id. Section 2-803(a) provides as follows:
A surviving spouse, heir or devisee who feloniously and intentionally kills the dece-
dent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under this Article, and the estate of
decedent passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by the
will of the decedent to or for the benefit of the killer passes as if the killer had prede-
ceased the decedent.
42. Id. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 77 (PL Wellman 2d ed. 1977).
43. T. ATKINSON, supra note 11, § 140, at 778.
44. N. WIGGINS, supra note 12, § 203.
45. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *388.
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way."46 Technically Wade is correct, but any law that bars issue from taking
under a will by substitution because their ancestor is deemed to have prede-
ceased the testator rather than actually having predeceased him, comes as
close to a modem enactment of the corruption penalty as would legislation of
the penalty itself. Since the Constitution forbids corruption of the blood,47
any slayer statute should indicate clearly that it prevents only the wrongdoer
himself from profiting from his wrong, and not innocent parties.
Other courts have disagreed about whether slayer statutes bar the slayer's
issue from sharing in the decedent's estate. In addition to North Carolina, six
states have adopted varying forms of the Wade model slayer act.48 Of these
six, only South Dakota adopted verbatim the provisions that unquestionably
would have denied the slayer's share to his issue.4 9 At least one Pennsylvania
case, however, has held that a specific devise or bequest to the slayer would be
included in the residuary estate, and if the slayer was named as a residuary
beneficiary, his share would pass to the other residuary beneficiaries.50
Among states that have slayer statutes not based on the Wade model,
Kentucky has allowed the slayer's children to take from the decedent's estate,
holding that the legislature had not intended to punish "an innocent child." 51
In McGhee v. Banks,52 however, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled against
reading that state's anti-lapse statute in conjunction with the slayer statute. In
McGhee a husband killed his wife. The husband had a daughter from a previ-
ous marriage who was not an heir of the murdered wife. The trial court had
applied the state anti-lapse statute53 so that the entire estate, which would
have gone to the husband under the wife's will, passed to the husband's
daughter. Because under the slayer statute, the property should have gone to
the heirs of the person killed, the court of appeals reversed. Since the hus-
band's daughter was not the wife's heir, the wife's property passed to her own
nieces and nephew.5 4 The Misenheimer plaintiffs cited McGhee as support for
their case, but the court refused to follow it.55
Ironically, a North Carolina court should have no difficulty in following
the Georgia court if faced with facts similar to McGhee. The North Carolina
46. Wade, supra note 24, at 721.
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3: "The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during
the Life of the Person attainted."
48. IDAHO CODE § 15-2-803 (1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 112.455-.555 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 8802 (Purdon 1975); R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-1.1-1 to -1.1-16 (1969); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 29-9-2 (1976); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.84.010 to .84.900 (1967).
For an exhaustive study of slayer statutes in all jurisdictions, see Maki & Kaplan, Elmer'r
Case Revisited- The Problem of the Murdering Heir, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 905 (1980).
49. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 29-9-2 (1976).
50. In re Taylor's Estate, 34 Delaware County 557 (Pa. C. 1948).
51. Bates v. Wilson, 313 Ky. 572, 574, 232 S.W.2d 837, 838 (1950).
52. 115 Ga. App. 155, 154 S.E.2d 37 (1967).
53. GA. CODE § 113-812 (1933) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-103 (1982)).
54. McGhee, 115 Ga. App. at 156, 154 S.E.2d at 39 ("We are convinced that to include heirs
of the person killing who are not also heirs of the person killed . . . would not carry out the
reasonable legislative intent [of the slayer statute].").
55. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. at 710, 303 S.E.2d at 417.
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anti-lapse statute provides that when a beneficiary predeceases the testator, the
beneficiary's issue take the property, provided they also would be testator's
heirs under the Intestate Succession Act.5 6 Under the facts of McGhee the
slayer-husband's daughter was not the wife's heir, so she would not have taken
anything from the victim-wife's estate under the anti-lapse statute. John Mi-
senheimer's sons, however, were also Isam Misenheimer's heirs. If application
of the anti-lapse statute had been the only question in administering Isam's
will, John's sons could have taken John's share by substitution because they
were both John's issue and Isam's heirs.
In considering McGhee, the Misenheimer court also was unpersuaded by
the Georgia court's distinction between the actual death of a beneficiary,
which would trigger the anti-lapse statute, and the fictive prior "death" of a
slayer-beneficiary under the slayer statute. The Georgia court did not agree
that a death in words could operate as a death in deed, so it held the slayer
statute and the anti-lapse statute to operate exclusively of each other.57 The
North Carolina court had no such metaphysical inhibitions. For that, slayer's
issue in this state can be glad.
JAMES R. SAINTSING
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42(a) (1976). See supra note 9.
57. McGhee, 115 Ga. App. at 157-58, 154 S.E.2d at 39-40.
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A Solution for Drafting Errors in Post-December 31, 1978
Charitable Remainder Trusts: State ex ret
Edmisten v. Sands
Federal estate tax laws permit a deduction for transfers to charitable or-
ganizations.' Prior to 1969 estate planners frequently used split-interest gifts
to obtain this deduction. Property would be transferred in trust for both a
private and charitable use and the estate would deduct the present value of the
charitable interest. In the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Congress reacted to a per-
ceived abuse2 of split-interest gifts by prohibiting deduction of the value of the
charitable interest unless the transfer was in a prescribed form. 3 In State ex
rel Edmisten v. Sands4 the testator's will attempted to establish a particular
type of charitable remainder trust known as a charitable remainder unitrust.5
During administration of the estate, it was discovered that the will lacked sev-
eral administrative provisions that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) re-
quires in all instruments governing charitable remainder unitrusts. 6
I. I.R.C. § 2055 (1982).
2. Congressional intent to correct past abuses is set forth in H.R. REp. No. 413, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 58 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1704.
The rules of present law for determining the amount of a charitable contribution deduc-
tion in the case of gifts of remainder interests in trust do not necessarily have any rela-
tion to the value of the benefit which the charity receives. This is because the trust assets
may be invested in a manner so as to maximize the income interest with the result that
there is little relation between the interest assumptions used in calculating present values
and the amount received by the charity.
See also Ellis First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 550 F.2d 9, 15-16 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Gillespie v.
Commissioner, 75 T.C. 374, 377-78 (1980).
3. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(2) (1982). The restrictions on the form of split-interest gifts produce a
high correlation between the interest assumptions used in calculating the present value of the
charitable interest and the amount received by the charity. Thus, the amount of the charitable
deduction matches the amount the charity ultimately receives, eliminating the abuses discussed
supra note 2. The following four types of split-interest gifts are allowed: (1) charitable remainder
trusts, I.R.C. § 664(d) (1982); (2) pooled income funds, id § 642(c)(5); (3) remainder interests in a
farm or personal residence, id § 170(f)(3)(B); and (4) guaranteed annuity interests, id
§ 2055(e)(2)(B).
I.R.C. § 664(d) (1982) defines two types of charitable remainder trusts-charitable remainder
annuity trusts and charitable remainder unitrusts. A charitable remainder annuity trust is defined
in section 664(d)(1) as a trust that distributes at least 5% of the corpus at least once a year to a
private beneficiary. The term may extend for the life of the private beneficiary or not more than
20 years. The remainder must go to charity. A charitable remainder unitrust as defined in section
664(d)(2) is similar, but the private beneficiary receives a fixed percentage of the fair market value
of the corpus, valued annually.
A pooled income fund is a fund established by a charity to which donors contribute property
for which they have retained income interests in a private beneficiary. The annual distribution to
each private beneficiary is determined by the income of the pooled assets. Guaranteed annuity
interests are deductible if the annual income distributed to the charity is either a sum certain or a
fixed percentage of the trust assets. A discussion of pooled income funds, remainder interests in a
farm or personal residence, and guaranteed annuity interests can be found in Moore, Estate Plan-
ning Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969: The Uses of Charity, 56 VA. L. REv. 565 (1970).
4. 307 N.C. 670, 300 S.E.2d 387 (1983).
5. See supra note 3. For a discussion of the charitable remainder unitrust provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code, see infra text accompanying notes 9-16.
6. See infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
Consequently, the IRS denied the deduction claimed for the charitable re-
mainder and proposed an increase in estate tax liability. The North Carolina
Supreme Court, however, upheld an order construing the will and trust to
include the requisite administrative provisions.7
This note examines Sands and other cases granting similar relief for de-
fective instruments governing charitable remainder trusts, the effect on the
IRS of construction orders made during the post-1969 Tax Reform Act transi-
tion period, and the public policy arguments favoring such construction or-
ders. The note also analyzes the North Carolina Supreme Court's use of
North Carolina General Statutes section 36A-53(a)8 to uphold the construc-
tion order entered by the trial court in Sands.
To qualify as a charitable remainder unitrust, the trust must distribute at
least once a year to a private beneficiary a fixed percentage (at least five per-
cent) of the fair market value of the trust assets, valued annually.9 The trust
term may extend for the life of the private beneficiary or for not more than
twenty years. 10 Upon termination of these distributions, the trust must pro-
vide for transfer of the remainder interest to a charitable organization recog-
nized by the IRS. I I In addition to the rules limiting the dispositive terms of
the trust, the regulations promulgated under section 664 by the Treasury De-
partment require that the governing instrument contain certain administrative
provisions. 12 The Code also includes prohibitions against self-dealing, 13 ex-
cess business holdings, 14 investments that jeopardize the charitable purpose of
the trust,' 5 and certain taxable expenditures. 16
The 1969 revisions that contained the split-interest gift restrictions apply
7. See infra text accompanying notes 30-36.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-53(a) (Supp. 1983).
9. I.R.C. § 664(d)(2)(A)-(B) (1982).
10. Id § 664(d)(2)(A).
11. Id § 664(d)(2)(C).
12. See Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(b) (1972) (noting the applicability of I.R.C. § 4947(a)(2) to
charitable remainder trusts). I.R.C. § 4947(a)(2) (1982) subjects charitable remainder trusts to
many of the private foundation rules. I.R.C. § 508(e) (1982) sets forth the rules relating to the
required provisions in instruments governing private foundations and charitable remainder trusts
under I.R.C. § 4947(a)(2) (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 13-16. Section 508(d)(2)(B)
disallows a charitable deduction for transfers to trusts that do not contain provisions required
under § 508(e).
13. I.R.C. § 4941 (1982). Acts of self-dealing as outlined in § 4941(d)(1) may include: (I) the
sale, exchange, or leasing of property between a private foundation and a disqualified person; (2)
the lending of money or other extension of credit between a private foundation and a disqualified
person; (3) the furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between a private foundation and a dis-
qualified person; (4) the payment of compensation by a private foundation to a disqualified per-
son; (5) the transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a disqualified person of the income or assets
of a private foundation; or (6) the agreement by a private foundation to give money or other
property to a government official. A disqualified person is defined in § 4946 and includes any
manager of the foundation, anyone connected with a manager of the foundation, and anyone
connected with the creator of the foundation.
14. Id § 4943. A private foundation has excess business holdings if it and all disqualified
persons own more than an aggregate 20% interest in a business.
15. Id § 4944. Investments made without ordinary business care and prudence jeopardize
the charitable purpose.
16. Id § 4945. Taxable expenditures include amounts paid by a foundation: (1) to influence
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to decedents dying after December 31, 1969.17 The complexity of these restric-
tions, however, led to a series of transition rules allowing amendments to non-
conforming instruments.' 8 The present transition period covers instruments
executed before December 31, 1978, and authorizes amendments through De-
cember 31, 1981.19
In Sands20 the testator's will directed the executor to transfer the residue
of the testator's estate to a charitable remainder unitrust. The trustee was in-
structed to distribute annually the lesser of the trust income or five percent of
the fair market value of the trust assets,21 valued annually, to the decedent's
sisters for life. The trust was to terminate upon the death of the last surviving
sister, with the remainder to pass free of trust to a local church. Clearly, the
trust met the dispositive requirements of Internal Revenue Code section
664(d)(2), 22 but the will creating the trust failed to 'impose a prohibition
against self-dealing and omitted several other required trust administration
provisions.23 Since the will was executed on August 23, 1979, more than seven
months after the last grace period had expired, any reformation of the will
would not have qualified for recognition under the transition rules.24 The IRS
disallowed the deduction of the charitable remainder because of the omission
and proposed an increase in estate tax liability.
North Carolina's Attorney General, representing the charity and the pub-
lic,25 filed a complaint in superior court seeking an order construing the will to
include the administrative provisions or, alternatively, an order retroactive to
legislation; (2) to influence the outcome of a public election; (3) as a grant to an individual for
travel, study, or other similar purposes; and (4) as a grant to an organization other than a charity.
Rev. Rul. 72-395, 1972-2 C.B. 340 gives examples of language that will satisfy the adminis-
trative provision requirements. See also Wren, Charitable Remainder Trusts: Some Considerations
to Draftmanship, 8 U. RICH. L. Rav. 25 (1973).
17. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(d), 83 Stat. 487, 580.
18. The Treasury Department granted the original transition period in Treas. Reg. § 1.664-
1(0(3) (1972). This regulation gave trusts created after July 31, 1969, but before December 31,
1972, until December 31, 1972, time to be amended. If the change resulted from judicial construc-
tion, Rev. Rul. 74-283, 1974-1 C.B. 283 provided that the construction would be effective as long
as legal proceedings were initiated before December 31, 1972.
In 1974 Congress granted instruments executed after July 31, 1969, but before September 21,
1974, a grace period ending December 31, 1975, to amend nonconforming instruments or to initi-
ate legal proceedings for construction. Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-483, § 3(a), 88 Stat.
1456, 1457-58 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2055(e)(3) (1982)). The Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1304(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1715, expanded the transition period to cover instru-
ments executed before December 31, 1977, and extended the cut-off date to December 31, 1977.
The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 514(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2883-84, extended the cut-
off date to December 31, 1978. In 1980 Congress again amended § 2055(e)(3) to extend the cut-off
date for instruments executed before December 31, 1978 to December 31, 1981. Act of Dec. 28,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 301(a), 94 Stat. 3521, 3530.
19. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(3) (1982).
20. 307 N.C. 670, 300 S.E.2d 387 (1983).
21. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(a)(1) (1972), the lesser of the trust income or 5% of the fair
market value of the assets, valued annually, is a permissible alternative for distribution.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
24. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-52(c) (Cum. Supp. 1983) grants the Attorney General power to
enforce charitable trusts.
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the decedent's death reforming the will to include the administrative provi-
sions. 26 The trial court first noted the public policy of preserving charitable
transfers whenever possible.27 The court then reasoned that the failure to
qualify the trust as a charitable remainder unitrust increased the estate tax
liability and reduced the amount of the charitable bequest. According to the
court, the testator intended to leave the maximum amount to charity and any
reduction constituted a partial failure of the charitable bequest. The trial court
concluded that this failure permitted it to invoke North Carolina General Stat-
utes 36A-53(a), (b)28 and order an administration of the trust in accordance
with IRS requirements to fulfill the charitable intention of the testator.
29
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court3" noted that section 36A-
53(b)3 1 applied only to instruments executed before December 31, 1978. The
court rejected application of section 36A-53(b) as the basis for a construction
or reformation order since the will had been executed on August 23, 1979, but
upheld application of section 36A-53(a).32 According to the court, a trust must
meet the three following conditions to qualify for relief under this subsection:
(1) it must be a charitable trust; (2) it must be impracticable of fulfillment; and
(3) the testator must not have provided any alternate disposition of the prop-
erty.33 The court found that the trust in Sands met the first and last condi-
tions.3 4 The court also found that the second condition was fulfilled, because
the phrase "impracticable of fulfillment," as used in section 36A-53(a) and
defined in section 36A-53(d), includes the failure of a charitable remainder
trust "expressly [to] include a provision prohibiting the trustee from engaging
in any act of self-dealing."35 The court reasoned that the legislature intended
26. Sands, 307 N.C. at 672, 300 S.E.2d at 389.
27. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-52(a) (Cum. Supp. 1983):
Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of North Caro-
lina that gifts, transfers, grants, bequests, and devises for religious, educational, charita-
ble, or benevolent uses or purposes. . . are and shall be valid, notwithstanding the fact
that any such gift, transfer, grant, bequest, or devise shall be in general terms, and this
section shall be construed liberally to affect the policy herein declared.
28. Id § 36A-53(a)-(b). Section 36A-53(a) gives superior court judges the authority to order
an administration if. (1) the testator manifested a general intention to devote the property to
charity; (2) the trust has become illegal, impossible, or impracticable of fulfillment; and (3) no
alternative disposition of the property was made. Section 36A-53(b) gives the court the authority
to amend wills executed before December 31, 1978, so that charitable gifts will qualify for a fed-
eral estate tax deduction under the split-interest gift provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
29. Sands, 307 N.C. at 672, 300 S.E.2d at 389.
30. Sands was certified for direct transfer to the North Carolina Supreme Court pursuant to
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
31. See supra note 28.
32. See supra note 28.
33. Sands, 307 N.C. at 675, 300 S.E.2d at 390.
34. Id at 675, 300 S.E.2d at 391 ("Mr. Sands' intent [to provide scholarships for Methodist
children] could hardly be more manifestly expressed . . . . IT]he will does not provide for an
alternate disposition of the corpus in the event the trust fails as a charitable trust.").
35. Id at 676, 300 S.E.2d at 391. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-53(d) (Cum. Supp. 1983) defines
"impracticable of fullfilment as:
[T]he failure of any trust for charity, testamentary or inter vivos, (including, .. chari-
table remainder trusts described in section 664 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
... ) to include, if required to do so by section 508(e) or section 4947(a) of the Internal
1984] TA4XATION 1409
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
section 36A-53(a) to apply whenever a charitable remainder trust failed to in-
corporate "the 'boilerplate' required by IRS regulations. '36 Thus, the applica-
tion of section 36A-53(a) as a basis for relief was justified.
In fashioning an order to fulfill the testator's intent as directed by section
36A-53(a), the court noted that the IRS treats an instrument as speaking from
its effective date.37 A reformation order might be viewed to speak only from
the date of entry,38 and thus would not ensure favorable tax treatment of the
trust. An order of construction, however, treats the instrument as if it had
always contained the provisions, thus ensuring a charitable deduction and ful-
fillment of the trust purpose.39 Consequently, the court affirmed the trial
court's construction order and vacated the order of reformation. In evaluating
the soundness of the court's holding, it is necessary to consider the background
against which the case was decided.
Instruments drafted after the revision of the split-interest gift rules often
proved defective because the complexity of the provisions led many drafters to
omit language critical to favorable tax treatment of the charitable interest.
State courts became an important vehicle for saving the charitable deduction,
and orders construing or reforming charitable remainder trust instruments
similar to that granted in Sands were common under the transition rules.40
For example, in Estate of Bird,41 a New York Surrogate's Court construed a
trust that did not contain administrative provisions required by the regula-
tions. A New York statute had obviated the need for amendment of trust
instruments to preserve favorable tax status by providing for administration of
private charitable trusts and split-interest trusts in accordance with federal re-
quirements. 42 The New York court granted construction of the trust in Bird
based on this statute. Other cases also have demonstrated the willingness of
state courts to grant the relief sought, as long as the executor or trustee was
seeking construction of administrative rather than dispositive provisions.43
These results were justified on public policy grounds. A construction or-
Revenue Code of 1954. the provisions relating to governing instruments set forth in
section 508(e) ....
Since the Sands trust was charitable and required by § 508(e) and § 4947(a) to include the
provisions relating to governing instruments in § 508(e), see supra text accompanying notes 12-16,
any failure to include the various administrative provisions made the trust "impracticable of
fulfillment."
36. Sands, 307 N.C. at 676, 300 S.E.2d at 391.
37. Id at 677, 300 S.E.2d at 392.
38. Id
39. Id
40. See, e.g., In re Estate of Burdon-Miller, 456 A.2d 1266 (Me. 1983); In re Estate of
Barker, 82 Misc. 2d 974, 370 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Surr. Ct. 1975); In re Will of Hammer, 81 Misc. 2d 25,
362 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Surr. Ct. 1974); Estate of Bird, 69 Misc. 2d 1015, 332 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Surf. Ct.
1972).
41. 69 Misc. 2d 1015, 332 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Surr. Ct. 1972).
42. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.8 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
43. See supra note 40. Cf. Shriners' Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Maryland Nat'l Bank,
270 Md. 564, 312 A.2d 546 (1973) (reading the will as a whole testator would prefer enforcement
of dispositive provisions to loss of the charitable deduction; court has no power to modify an
instrument when the action would conflict with testator's intent).
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der during the transition period preserved a charitable deduction for the es-
tate. This decrease in the estate tax liability increased the amount ultimately
available for charitable purposes, which furthered the policy favoring charita-
ble contributions. 44 These orders also promoted the policy favoring enforce-
ment of the Internal Revenue Code. Any relief, to be effective, had to order
compliance with the 1969 Tax Reform Act and regulations. Thus, these orders
helped prevent a recurrence of the earlier abuses of split-interest gifts. Con-
struction orders also made charitable remainder trusts more available to peo-
ple who could not afford an estate planning specialist. The complex 1969
revisions had removed drafting of charitable remainder trusts from the compe-
tency of general practitioners. 45 People unable to retain the services of an
estate planning specialist might have avoided charitable remainder trusts.
Construction orders, however, led more general practitioners to recommend
charitable remainder trusts, since they knew that a minor drafting defect could
be cured. In addition to the public policy favoring construction orders, several
state legislatures explicitly granted relief guaranteeing charitable remainder
trust status.46 Orders construing wills to include the requisite provisions
merely followed public policy and these statutes.
In nontransition-period cases it was uncertain whether state courts would
display the same willingness to grant relief solely on public policy grounds.
Some statutes obviating the need for trust amendments did not apply to non-
transition cases. 47 Additionally, in Commisioner v. Estate of Bosch 48 the
United States Supreme Court held that when federal estate tax liability de-
pends on a state-created property right, the IRS is not bound by a state court
determination of that right unless the state's highest court had ruled on the
question. The IRS implicitly indicated that Bosch would apply to nonqualify-
ing charitable remainder trusts when it suspended the application of Bosch in
transition-period cases. 49 Thus, in deciding whether to grant a nontransition-
period construction order, state courts had to balance public policy in favor of
the order against the absence of a statute and the possibility that the order
might be moot because the IRS would not be bound.
The first test of a court's willingness to grant relief in a nontransition-
period case arose in In re Will ofStalp.5° In Staip the testatrix left property in
44. See, e.g., supra note 27. See also Keith v. Scales, 124 N.C. 497, 515, 32 S.E. 809, 812
(1899) ("Courts incline strongly in favor of charitable gifts, and take special care to enforce
them.").
45. This problem with the 1969 revisions was identified in Pedrick, And then to Charity:
Charitable Remainder Trusts andthe FederalEstate Tax, 17 INST. ON EST. PLAN. §§ 303-07 (1983).
46. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2271.1-2271.2 (West Supp. 1984); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. §§ 14-301 to -308 (1974 & Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-53(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983);
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.8 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
47. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-53(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (applies only to wills executed
before December 31, 1978).
48. 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (IRS not bound by state court's determination of the effect of an
instrument releasing a general power of appointment).
49. Rev. Rul. 74-283, 1974-1 C.B. 157. See also Wissbrun, Bosch andits Aftermath: The Effect
o/State Court Decisions on Federal Tax Questions, 114 TR. & EST. 8 (1975).
50. 79 Misc. 2d 412, 359 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Surr. Ct. 1974).
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trust to pay one hundred dollars a month to her aunt for life and the remain-
der to a hospital. The aunt's income interest did not comply with the required
annual distribution of at least five percent of the trust corpus, as required in
the charitable remainder trust rules.5 1 The executor petitioned for a construc-
tion of the trust instrument to save the charitable deduction even though the
action fell between amendments to the transition rules. The court granted re-
lief by segregating the private annuity interest from the charitable interest,
stating that public policy compelled the result notwithstanding its nonbinding
effect on the IRS. The result in nontransition-period cases remained uncertain
after Stalp, however, because the court seemed influenced by a pending
amendment to the transition rules.5 2
Last Will and Testament of Kander,5 3 however, resolved any remaining
doubt, at least in New York, in favor of nontransition-period construction or-
ders. In Kander the testator directed that ninety percent of the income and
remainder from a trust established by his will be paid to charity. The remain-
ing ten percent was devised to a private beneficiary and an unrecognized char-
ity. Despite the absence of an applicable transition rule, the court ordered
segregation of the two interests into two trusts so that the ninety percent inter-
est would qualify for a charitable deduction. The court reasoned that any
other result "would be inconsistent with reason and justice." 54
The trial court's decision in Sands followed the view of the New York
courts in Stap and Kander that public policy 55 compels a construction order.
The trial court also used the statutory authority in section 36A-53(a) to grant
the construction order. But Sands presented an even stronger case for con-
struction. Not only did public policy and section 36A-53(a) support construc-
tion, but the supreme court did not have to consider the decision's possible
inconclusive effect on the IRS.5 6 Viewed in this light, the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Sands was justified.
Arguably, however, section 36A-53(a) did not support the construction
order in Sands. The words "illegal," "impossible," and "impracticable of ful-
fillment" used in section 36A-53(a) connote a total failure of a charitable gift
rather than mere disqualification for a federal estate tax deduction. Disquali-
fication of the trust in Sands would have reduced the amount available to the
charity but would not have made the gift any less enforceable. A greater fail-
ure than that in Sands should be required to invoke the power granted in
section 36A-53(a). Section 36A-53(b) strengthens this view because it specifi-
cally mentions the failure of a trust to qualify for a federal estate tax deduction
51. See supra text accompanying note 9.
52. Stalp, 79 Misc. 2d at 421, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 756. See also In re Will of Rayvid, 88 Misc. 2d
372, 388 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Surr. Ct. 1976) (later case granting similar relief decided between
amendments).
53. 115 Misc. 2d 386, 454 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Surr. Ct. 1982).
54. Id at 388, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
56. Because the decision came from the state's highest court, the IRS had to accept the court's
determination and allow the charitable deduction. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
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under the charitable remainder trust rules. 57 If the legislature had wanted dis-
qualification to invoke the authority in section 36A-53(a) it would have specif-
ically mentioned it in that section or in the definition of impracticable of
fulfillment.5 8
Moreover, the court was not without a statutory alternative. The Charita-
ble Remainder Trusts Administration Act5 9 states that:
Notwithstanding any provisions in the laws of this State or in the
governing instruments to the contrary, any charitable remainder an-
nuity trust and any charitable remainder unitrust that cannot qualify
for a deduction for federal tax purposes under section 2055 . . . of
the Code in the absence of this Article shall be administered in ac-
cordance with this Article. 60
The Act contains all of the administrative provisions necessary to qualify the
trust as a charitable remainder trust.61 This statute is more clearly applicable
in Sands than is section 36A-53(a) because it specifically mentions failure to
qualify for a deduction as a condition to its applicability. Moreover, the IRS
has recognized this type of statute as effective to preserve a charitable deduc-
tion.62 The trial court did not use the Act because it was not enacted until
after the court had decided the case.63 The Act was passed during the pen-
dency of the appeal, however, and made retroactive to the creation date of the
trust.64 Given the Act's clearer applicability and its acceptance by the IRS, the
supreme court in Sands should have considered employing its provisions in-
stead of affirming the use of section 36A-53(a).
The use of section 36A-53(a) instead of the Charitable Remainder Trusts
Administration Act creates problems because the court had to specify the re-
lief granted to save the charitable deduction.65 The court's distinction be-
tween reformation and construction is not justified. Reformation has been
defined as "a remedy to parties and the privies of parties to written instru-
ments, to rectify them where they fail, through mistake or fraud, to conform
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-53(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983) provides:
In the case of a will executed before December 31, 1978 .. ifa federal tax deduction is
not allowed at the time of the decedent's death. . any judge may. . . order an amend-
ment to the trust so that the remainder interest is in a trust which is a charitable remain-
der [trust].
58. See supra note 35.
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-59.1 to -59.7 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
60. Id § 36A-59.2.
61. Id §§ 36A-59.4 to -59.6.
62. As noted in supra note 12, charitable remainder trusts are subject to the governing instru-
ment requirements of I.R.C. § 508(e) (1982). Treas. Reg. § 1.508-3(d)(1) (1972) states that gov-
erning instruments will be deemed to meet the § 508(e) requirements if valid provisions of state
law either require the foundation to operate in conformity with the mandatory language (as in the
Charitable Remainder Trusts Administration Act) or treat the language as being contained in the
governing instrument. These rules apply without regard to any transition rules. See also Rev.
Rul. 75-38, 1975-1 C.B. 161.
63. The Charitable Remainder Trusts Administration Act was enacted on Ju1ne 18, 1982.
The trial court entered its order on February 16, 1982.
64. Charitable Remainder Trusts Administration Act, ch. 1252, § 2, 1982 N.C. Seass. Laws
149 states that "this act relates back to the date of creation of the trust."
65. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
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with the real agreement." 66 Construction, on the other hand, is "an effort to
find the mind of the testator as expressed in the will. ' '67 In Sands the court
added trust administration language that mistakenly had been omitted from
the will, when it should have discerned the intended meaning of language con-
tained in the will. This process falls within the definition of reformation, yet
the court classified it as construction to save the charitable deduction.68 In-
stead of using the two doctrines interchangeably, the court could have granted
general relief under the Charitable Remainder Trusts Administration Act.
This basis for relief would have preserved the charitable deduction69 and the
integrity of the two doctrines.
Whether based on the Charitable Remainder Trusts Administration Act
or section 36A-53(a), the Sands decision probably will not lead to judicial con-
struction of defectiveprivate trusts so that they too will qualify for favorable
tax treatment. Although the policy that supports making tax favored trusts
more available to the average taxpayer 70 also applies to private express trusts,
no public policy favors these conveyances and no specific statutory authority
to grant relief exists. Furthermore, the use of charitable remainder trusts is
limited. Favorable construction of other trusts would result in increased judi-
cial supervision of private express trusts. This might unduly burden the courts
and probably would override any factors in favor of extending Sands to other
trusts.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's construction of the will and trust in
Sands certainly benefited the private income beneficiaries and the charitable
remainderman. More importantly, the result demonstrated the court's willing-
ness to forgive technical drafting errors that could jeopardize a charitable de-
duction. Yet given the somewhat strained application of section 36A-53(a), in
future cases the courts of North Carolina should consider granting relief pur-
suant to the recently enacted Charitable Remainder Trusts Administration
Act. Either alternative, however, should appeal to attorneys in North Caro-
lina. Armed with a healthy respect for the complex charitable remainder trust
rules and two avenues for correcting mistakes, practitioners should not hesi-
tate to recommend these trusts to effect their clients' charitable aims.
DANIEL Louis JOHNSON, JR.
66. Henderson v. Henderson, 158 Tenn. 452, 453, 14 S.W.2d 714, 715 (1929).
67. Baker v. Edge, 174 N.C. 100, 102, 93 S.E. 462, 463 (1917).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
69. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
70. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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The Safe Roads Act: The Dram Shop Provisions
A study conducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion revealed that in 1979 two million of the nation's traffic accidents were
related to alcoholic beverage consumption.' Fifty-five percent of fatal acci-
dents, twenty-five percent of nonfatal accidents, and eight percent of accidents
causing only property damage involved alcoholic beverage consumption.2
Teenage drivers who drank were involved in accidents more often than older
drivers who drank. 3 If North Carolina statistics mirror these national results,
more than half of the 1320 persons killed last year in North Carolina traffic
accidents 4 died in alcohol-related crashes. The North Carolina General As-
sembly responded to the problem of underage drunken drivers by enacting
dram shop provisions5 as part of the 1983 Safe Roads Act.6 The dram shop
provisions7 allow persons injured in vehicular accidents caused by the negli-
gent driving of intoxicated, underage drinkers to sue the commercial vendors
who furnished the underage persons with alcoholic beverages. Recent com-
mon-law decisions8 have expanded the basis of liability of those who supply
alcoholic beverages. This note reviews the history of dram shop liability, ex-
amines the dram shop provisions of the Safe Roads Act, and explores recent
common-law developments.
At common law a person was not liable for harm caused by an intoxi-
cated person to whom he furnished alcoholic beverages.9 The rationale for
denying recovery was that "the drinking of the liquor, not the remote furnish-
ing of it, was the proximate cause of the injury."'10 In Sutton v. Duke"I the
North Carolina Supreme Court defined proximate cause: "In this jurisdiction,
to warrant a finding that negligence. . . was a proximate cause of an injury, it
must appear that the tort-feasor should have reasonably foreseen that injuri-
1. NAT'L CENTER FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., PUB. No. 806-
269, ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT IN TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS: RECENT ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, 8 (1982). For purposes of these statistics, "alcohol-re-
lated" means an accident involving a driver or pedestrian with a blood alcohol concentration
greater than or equal to .01
2. Id at 6-7.
3. A. WILLIAMS, TEENAGE DRIVERS AND ALCOHOL USE (Insurance Inst. for Highway
Safety, Research Note * 101 1982).
4. N.C. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COLLISION REPORTS AND EVALUATION SECTION, TRAFFIC
DATA BRANCH, NORTH CAROLINA TRAFFIC ACCIDENT FACTS 1 (1982).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-120 to -129 (1983).
6. Safe Roads Act of 1983, ch. 435, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52, 89-92.
7. Id §37.
8. Chastain v. Litton Systems, 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 2454
(1983); Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, disc. rep. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305
S.E.2d 734 (1983).
9. Spencer v. Fisher, 161 N.C. 116, 76 S.E. 731 (1913) (dictum); Hutchens v. Hankins, 63
N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, disc. rep. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 395 S.E.2d 734 (1983).
10. Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 5, 303 S.E.2d 584, 587, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C.
191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983).
11. 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970).
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ous consequences were likely to follow from his negligent conduct."' 12 Be-
cause one can foresee that injurious consequences are likely to follow from
serving alcohol to an intoxicated or underage person, the concept of proximate
causation must embrace more than foreseeability. One commentator has ob-
served that courts sometimes rely on proximate cause to hold a defendant not
liable when the actual basis for the decision is public policy: "These cases
probably reflect a judgment that under the circumstances a wrongdoer other
than the defendant should be held responsible rather than a determination
that the risk causing injury is outside the scope of defendant's conduct. '1 3 The
policy determination that the real culprit is the individual consuming the li-
quor rather than the person furnishing it, is one explanation for the common-
law rule excluding the alcohol provider from liability. Many courts, however,
no longer adhere to the common-law rule. 14 These courts recognize a cause of
action against suppliers of alcoholic beverages either on the basis of negligence
per se' 5-violation of criminal statutes prohibiting the sale of such beverages
to minors 16 and visibly intoxicated persons' 7 -or ordinary negligence. t8
Because no action existed at common law, a number of states enacted
dram shop acts during the prohibition movement in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.' 9 Sixteen states presently have such laws.20 North Carolina enacted a
limited dram shop act in 1874;21 the General Assembly repealed this statute in
1971.22 Thus, no statutory basis for dram shop liability existed in North Caro-
12. Id at 107, 176 S.E.2d at 168-69.
13. Byrd, Proximate Cause in North Carolina Tort Law, 51 N.C.L. REV. 961, 971 (1972).
14. For a discussion of the common-law rule, its underlying rationale, and departures from
the rule, see Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 5-8, 303 S.E.2d 594, 587-89, disc. rev. denied,
309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983).
15. Negligence per se results from the violation of a statute designed to protect the class of
persons in which the plaintiff is included against the risk of harm that has occurred as a result of
the violation. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971); see also
Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 19, 303 S.E.2d 584, 595, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305
S.E.2d 734 (1983).
16. E.g., Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598,
217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968).
17. E.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 903 (1960); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973); Hutchens v. Han-
kins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983).
18. Chastain v. Litton Systems, 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2454
(1983); Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31
N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973).
19. Dram Shop Liability I-Statutory Liability, FOR THE DEFENSE, Dec. 1973, at 129; Mo-
sher, Dram Shop Liability and the Prevention of Alcohol-Related Problems, 40 J. OF STUD. ON
ALCOHOL 773 (1979).
20. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1981); ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1980); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (1975); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.125 (Harr. Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1954); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 18.993 (Callaghan 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. GEN. OBLIO.
LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4399.01 (Page 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (Purdon 1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-11-1
(1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972).
21. Act of Jan. 29, 1874, ch. 68, § 2, 1873 N.C. Sess. Laws 94.
22. Act of July 16, 1971, ch. 872, § 3, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1372.
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ina when the Safe Roads Act23 passed in 1983.
Although the portion of the Act dealing with dram shop liability24 creates
a cause of action traditionally unavailable at common law, it is limited in
scope. Dram shop liability is ordinarily strict liability.25 Section 18B-121(l)
of the North Carolina General Statutes, however, provides that a defendant
seller is liable only if he or his agent negligently furnishes alcohol to an under-
age person.26 Presumably, a defendant would have a defense against liability
under this statute if he reasonably relied on an identification card with a falsi-
fied birth date presented by an underage buyer.27
Another indication of the Act's restricted scope is that while many other
dram shop statutes compensate any alcohol-related injury,28 section 18B-
121(3) provides compensation only in cases of injury arising out of a vehicular
accident.2 9 The injury must also be caused by the impaired driving of a per-
son under the age required for the legal purchase of alcoholic beverages.30
Sales to persons over the drinking age that result in injury do not give rise to a
cause of action under the Act.
Even if these conditions are satisfied, section 18B-121(I) limits the class of
defendants who may be held liable under the Act to licensed suppliers of alco-
holic beverages. 31 Social hosts, therefore, are exempt from statutory liability.
Section 18B-123 also exempts certain enumerated classes of licensees.32
Although the dram shop provisions are limited in nature, a number of
provisions modify the common law. In cases of multiple defendants, anyone
furnishing a beverage will be liable if the beverage "contributes to, in whole or
in part, an underage driver's being subject to an impairing substance. '33 At
common law, when the combined negligence of several actors brought about a
23. Safe Roads Act of 1983, ch. 435, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52.
24. Id § 37.
25. Konsler v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. 111. 1968); W. PROSSER, supra note 15,§ 81.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(l) (1983).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § ISB-122 (1983) provides:
Proof of good practices (including but not limited to, instruction of employees as to laws
regarding the sale of alcoholic beverages, training of employees, enforcement techniques,
admonishment to patrons concerning laws regarding the purchase or furnishing of alco-
holic beverages, or detention of a person's identification documents in accordance with
G.S. 18B-129 and inquiry about the age or degree of intoxication of the person), evi-
dence that an underage person misrepresented his age, or that the sale or furnishing was
made under duress is admissible as evidence that the permittee was not negligent.
28. For example, courts have allowed recovery under the Illinois Dram Shop Act, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) when an intoxicated person fractured another per-
son's skull in a bar, Osborn v. Leuffgen, 381 Ill. 295, 45 N.E.2d 622 (1942), an intoxicated person
killed a bartender, Meade v. Boggiano, 127 Ill. App. 2d 344, 262 N.E.2d 310 (1970), and an intoxi-
cated person shot his wife, Edenburg v. Riggins, 13 Ill. App. 3d 830, 301 N.E.2d 132 (1973).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(3) (1983).
30. Id § 18B-121(l).
31. Id
32. Id § 18B-125. These include licensees who hold a: brown bagging permit, id § 18B-
1001(7), special occasion permit, id § 18B-1001(b), limited special occasion permit, id § 18B-
1001(9), special one time permit, id § 18B-1002, commercial permit, id § 18B-1100, or any com-
bination of the above.
33. Id § 18B-121(2).
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single, indivisible injury to a plaintiff, no one defendant was liable unless his
contribution to plaintiff's harm was "substantial" or "material. ' 34 The Gen-
eral Assembly presumably included section 18B-121(2) in the dram shop pro-
visions to reduce the inevitable litigation and confusion in cases involving
multiple suppliers of beverages. By requiring only that negligently supplied
alcoholic beverages contribute in some "part" to an underage person's impair-
ment,35 this section relieves a plaintiff of the burden of proving that the contri-
bution of any one defendant rises to the elusive level of "substantiality. '36
The dram shop provisions also permit recovery by an expansive class of
plaintiffs for a wide array of injuries. Compensable injury is defined as in-
cluding, though not limited to, "personal injury, property loss, loss of means of
support, or death."37 Under this provision, if an intoxicated, underage person
negligently causes an automobile collision, dependents of injured third parties
as well as the dependents of the intoxicated driver have a cause of action
against the seller of the alcohol for loss of support. Section 18B-121(2) makes
clear that a cause of action by dependents of the intoxicated driver is not
barred by the underage driver's contributory negligence: "Nothing in G.S.
28A-18-2(a) or subdivision (1) of this section shall be interpreted to preclude
recovery under this Article for loss of support or death on account of injury to
or death of the underage person. ' 38 The intoxicated, underage driver, how-
ever, does not have any cause of action against the seller because an "ag-
grieved party" under section 18B-121(l) "does not include the underage
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 433 (1965); W. PROssER, supra note 15, § 41.
Substantiality is a slippery concept usually defined in terms of what it is not--e.g., a match in a
forest fire. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 41.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(2) (1983).
36. The extent that § 18B-121(2) modifies the common law is uncertain. Read literally, this
section dispenses with causation in fact. In cases of multiple suppliers, the alcohol supplied by
any one will always contribute in some "part" to an underage person's impairment. Should liabil-
ity arise when an underage person drinks a small quantity of liquor at a second bar after consum-
ing such a large quantity of liquor at the first bar that the accident would have occurred in spite of
the contribution of the second bar?
The legislature created a cause of action under the Safe Roads Act based upon the negligent
sale of alcoholic beverages. In any negligence action a plaintiff must prove not only that the de-
fendant acted unreasonably but also that the defendant's conduct was the actual cause of injury.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965). Because the accident would have occurred de-
spite the contribution of the second bar, the alcoholic beverages served by the second bar owner
are not the actual cause of injury. Thus, under the common law, the second bar owner would not
be liable. Arguably, the same requirement of actual causation exists in the negligence action
created by the Safe Roads Act. If so, the effect of § 18B-121(2) is to relieve a plaintiff of the burden
of going forward with evidence that the contribution of any one defendant is substantial. A de-
fendant, however, would not be precluded from presenting evidence that the accident would have ''
occurred without its contribution.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(2) (1983). In contrast to this provision, which explicitly al-
lows recovery for economic harm, at common law if a person suffers loss as result of injury to
another, recovery is limited to compensation for harm to relational interests. W. PROSSER, supra
note 15, § 125. In a consortium action, for example, a spouse can recover only for loss of society,
comfort, and affection. See Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Mem. Hosp., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d
818 (1980).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(2) (1983). At common law, contributory negligence of the
underage driver barred recovery by his dependents or survivors for economic or relational losses.
W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 125.
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person."39
Finally, section 18B-121(3) may also revise the common law. This section
provides that "[a]n aggrieved party has a claim for relief for damages against a
permittee or local Alcoholic Beverage Control Board if. .. the injury that
resulted was proximately caused by the underage driver's negligent operation
of a vehicle while impaired."'4 A literal reading suggests that a cause of ac-
tion will be recognized if the underage driver's negligent operation of his vehi-
cle rather than his impaired condition caused the plaintiff's injuries. In most
cases involving drunken driving, a person's impaired condition causes his neg-
ligent driving and the cause of injury is the alcohol negligently supplied. Sup-
pose, however, that an underage person was knowingly driving with bad
brakes, and that brake failure, rather than his impaired condition, caused the
accident. Under common law, the bad brakes would be the proximate cause
of injury, and the party furnishing alcoholic beverages to the underage person
would not be liable.41
Does section 18B-121(3) imply, however, that once an underage person
becomes impaired any subsequent accident caused by his negligence, whether
due to his impaired condition, will give rise to a cause of action against the
party who supplied the underage person with alcohol? The General Assembly
may have recognized that in a small number of cases an underage person's
impaired condition plays no part in bringing about an accident he negligently
caused. Thus, the General Assembly may have assumed that society's interest
in deterring drunken driving and minimizing litigation outweighs the defend-
ant's interests in these few cases. Perhaps the General Assembly consciously
decided to foreclose debate over the cause of accidents involving intoxicated
underage drivers. Read literally, section 18B-121(3) conclusively presumes
that an accident involving an intoxicated, underage driver is caused by his
drunken condition.
On the other hand, section 18B-121(3) can be read to stipulate that "the
underage driver's negligent operation of a vehicle while so intpaired" must be
the proximate cause of the injury.42 Arguably, the words "while so impaired"
require that impairment contribute to the negligent driving. Thus construed,
the statute requires that negligent driving due to impairment cause the injury.
In the context of a negligence action this construction is preferable.
In addition to the statutory cause of action created by the dram shop pro-
visions, a common-law cause of action is available under North Carolina law.
Section 18B-128 provides that "[t]he creation of any claim for relief by the
statute may not be interpreted to abrogate or abridge any claim for relief
under the common law."43 In two recent cases applying North Carolina law,
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(l) (1983).
40. Id § 18B-121(3) (1983).
41. See Bell v. Page, 271 N.C. 396, 156 S.E.2d 711 (1967); Pinyan v. Settle, 263 N.C. 578, 139
S.E.2d 863 (1965); Reason v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 259 N.C. 264, 130 S.E.2d 397 (1963).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121(3) (1983).
43. Id § 18B-128.
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Hutchens v. Hankins44 and Chastain v. Litton Systems,4 5 courts have found
providers of alcohol liable for injuries caused by intoxicated drivers over the
age required for the legal purchase of alcohol-a situation outside the scope of
the dram shop provisions. In these cases, as under the statute, liability was
predicated on negligence.
In Hutchens the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a cause of ac-
tion against a tavern that served a large quantity of beer to an adult patron,
including some allegedly after he had become intoxicated. Fifteen minutes
after leaving the tavern, the patron's car collided with another vehicle, killing
plaintiff's husband and injuring plaintiff and her son.46 Plaintiff argued that
the tavern was negligent per se on the basis of the tavern's violation of North
Carolina General Statutes section 18A-34,47 which prohibited the sale of alco-
holic beverages by a licensee to a person known to be intoxicated. 4 8
The Hutchens court agreed with plaintiff that statutes giving rise to a per
se cause of action based on negligence do not create a new cause of action, but
establish a minimum standard for what constitutes reasonable care.4 9 For a
criminal statute to set a minimum standard of care so that its violation is negli-
gence per se, the court noted that the statute must be one to promote safety,
the plaintiff must be a member of the protected class, and the defendant must
be a person upon whom the statute imposes specific duties.50 The court con-
strued one of the purposes of section 18A-34 to be "the protection of the com-
munity at large from the possible injurious consequences of contact with an
intoxicated person."5 1 Because plaintiff was a member of the general public
and defendant was a licensee to whom the alcohol control laws applied, the
court adopted "the requirements of G.S. 18A-34 as the minimum standard of
conduct for defendant-licensees." 52 Therefore, defendant's conduct in selling
alcoholic beverages to a person known to be intoxicated was negligent per se.
The court, however, did not decide whether social hosts and off-premises re-
tailers were subject to liability, or whether an intoxicated person served alco-
holic beverages could recover for his own injuries.5 3
44. 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983).
45. 694 F.2d. 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2454 (1983).
46. Id at 3, 303 S.E.2d at 586.
47. This statute was repealed in 1981 but a similar statute is codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-305 (1983).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-34(a)(2) (repealed by ch. 412, § 1, 1981 N.C. Session Laws 438)
49. Hutchens, 63 N.C. App. at 13, 303 S.E.2d at 592.
50. Id at 15, 303 S.E.2d at 593 (quoting Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828, 834
(D.C. Cir. 1973)).
51. Id at 16, 303 S.E.2d at 593.
52. Id
53. Id at 5, 303 S.E.2d at 587. The court did find that one purpose of the statute prohibiting
sales to persons known to be intoxicated was the protection of these persons from the adverse
consequences of intoxication. Id at 16, 303 S.E.2d at 593. Nevertheless, Hutchens recognizes a
cause of action based on negligent behavior. Thus, contributory negligence should bar recovery.
See Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965) (statute prohibiting sale of intoxicants to
intoxicated persons and giving rise to action for negligence does not eliminate defense of contribu-
tory negligence). Contra Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
Because N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-305(a) (1983) is violated only by "knowingly" selling to
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Prior to Hutchens the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit had concluded in Chastain v. Litton Systems 5 4 that the North Carolina
Supreme Court would impose civil liability on a licensee who violates a law
prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person.5 5 Defend-
ant in that case, however, was not a licensee but an employer who sponsored a
Christmas party during working hours for its employees, one of whom became
intoxicated and caused an automobile accident after leaving work.56 Because
defendant was not a seller of alcohol, plaintiff could not argue negligence per
se based on a violation of section 18A-34. Nevertheless, the court stated that
the laws prohibiting licensees from selling alcoholic beverages to intoxicated
persons "disclose state policy toward persons who dispense alcoholic bever-
ages in capacities other than as social hosts." 57 On the strength of this policy
the court upheld plaintiff's cause of action against the employer on ordinary
negligence principles:
[W]e conclude that Litton was negligent if it failed to exercise ordi-
nary care in furnishing . ..alcoholic beverages to Beck knowing
that he had become intoxicated. This negligence would be a proxi-
mate cause of Beck's collision with Chastain if Litton could have rea-
sonably foreseen that Beck, while intoxicated, would probably drive
his motor vehicle on a public street and cause a collision. 58
The Chastain rationale is broader than the principles of liability recog-
nized in Hutchens. The court allowed plaintiffs to recover despite the absence
of a statute explicitly proscribing defendant's conduct. The common-law ac-
tions recognized in Hutchens and Chastain supplement the enforcement mech-
anism established in the Safe Roads Act. They fill a void left by the Act's
failure to recognize a cause of action arising out of sales to adult patrons. The
extent to which these cases expand liability, however, depends on what poli-
cies the courts extract from the Safe Roads Act. If the policy behind the Safe
Roads Act is merely the protection of the general motoring public from the
dangers of drunken driving, the application of these cases will be limited.59
Whether state policy includes the protection of other members of the public, or
the intoxicated individuals themselves, must await further development. Al-
though both cases involved automobile accidents, the same negligence princi-
ples also should apply to other injuries caused by intoxicated patrons. An
innocent bystander injured in a barroom brawl, for example, should be able to
maintain a cause of action under the rules laid down in these cases.60 Further-
intoxicated persons, excluding off-premises retailers who have little opportunity to observe the
intoxicated state of customers is unnecessary to protect their interests.
54. 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2454 (1983).
55. Id at 961.
56. Id at 959.
57. I d at 961.
58. Id at 962.
59. Cf Hutchens, 63 N.C. App. at 16, 303 S.E.2d at 593 (purpose of laws prohibiting sale of
alcoholic beverages to persons already intoxicated is protection of community from injurious con-
sequences of contact with an intoxicated person).
60. In Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981), the North
Carolina Supreme Court recognized that injuries inflicted by intentional criminal acts of third
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more, these cases provide broader procedural protection than the Safe Roads
Act. Whereas a three year limitations period applies to common-law claims,61
the statute of limitations applicable to the dram shop provisions is one year.62
In conclusion, the common-law rule that a person is not legally responsi-
ble for harm caused by an intoxicated person to whom he furnished alcoholic
beverages has been substantially modified in North Carolina. The North Car-
olina General Assembly and courts applying North Carolina law have recog-
nized a cause of action against suppliers of alcoholic beverages. The dram
shop provisions are restricted in scope and apply only to sales to underage
persons. In contrast, the judicially recognized cause of action permits recovery
for harm caused by sales to persons over the drinking age. The negligence per
se theory adopted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Hutchens is
based on the violation of a statute prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages
to intoxicated persons. In Chastain the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit extracted from that statute a state policy that supports a cause
of action founded in ordinary negligence. Although these decisions already
provide a significant addition to the statutory cause of action, the ultimate
scope of the judicially created action depends on the way in which the North
Carolina courts construe state policy.
JOHN DAVID MAYBERRY
persons may be compensable in a negligence action. Foster upheld a cause of action against a
shopping mall by a shopper who was assaulted in the parking lot.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (1983) (the three year period does not accrue until injury
becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent, if the action is brought within
ten years).
62. Id § 18B-126. This section adopts the statute of limitations of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54
(1983), which provides for a one year limitations period.
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Martin v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.: Crashworthiness
in North Carolina
In Martin v. Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc. 1 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit returned to the problem of predicting whether
North Carolina would accept the products liability doctrine of crashworthi-
ness. No reported North Carolina case addresses this issue, and given the ab-
sence of any significant production of motor vehicles in the state, the chance of
its being so addressed in the near future is remote.2 Faced with this vacuum in
the state law, the court of appeals followed its own enigmatic precedent, Wil-
son v. Ford Motor Co. ,3 and held that North Carolina would not adopt the
theory. Martin is significant primarily because it provided a forum to discuss
the basis for rejecting the crashworthiness doctrine in Wilson.
Crashworthiness, a relatively recent products liability theory, first gained
prominence in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Larsen v. General Motors Corp. 4 A court applying the crashworthiness doc-
trine imposes liability on a manufacturer for injuries incurred in motor vehicle
accidents to the extent the injuries are enhanced by defects that, though unre-
lated to the cause of the accident, are caused by the "second collision '" 5 of the
occupants with the interior of the passenger compartment. This enhancement
consists of any injuries in excess of those that "probably would have occurred
as a result of the impact . . . absent the defective design."6
Because crashworthiness is a negligence theory,7 the defect must result
from some negligence of the manufacturer in the design or construction of the
vehicle.8 The manufacturer is negligent when it violates the duty to "use rea-
sonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an
unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision."9 This duty of reason-
able care in design also includes a duty to "inspect and to test for designs that
1. 707 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1983).
2. Id at 828 n.1. See infra note 63.
3. 656 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981). In Wilson the court of appeals concluded that the district
court's refusal to recognize the crashworthiness doctrine was not reversible error. The court stated
that the district court had made a careful review of the "related State cases and the several and
divergent federal court determinations on the issue." Id
4. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). General Motors was held liable for negligence in the design
of the Corvair steering assembly which, although not the cause of the accident, resulted in the
transmission of the force of a head-on collision through the displacement of the steering shaft
towards the driver's head. Other designs then in use would not have allowed such displacement.
5. Id at 502.
6. Id at 503.
7. A crashworthiness action could be brought under strict liability or warranty as well as
negligence. Its essential elements-a defect not the proximate cause of the accident and enhance-
ment of crash injuries as a result of the defect-are generally compatible with these theories. A
warranty action would require privity of contract and an express or implied warranty that the
defect was not present. Recent automobile manufacturer advertising in North Carolina could
supply the warranty element. See infra note 108. A strict liability action would require that the
defect be unreasonably dangerous.
8. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503.
9. Id at 502.
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would cause an unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury,"10 and a duty to warn
of the failure to perform such tests and inspections or the presence of a known,
dangerous design feature.'1 There is no requirement, however, that the manu-
facturer "design an accident-proof or fool-proof vehicle or even one that floats
on water."' 1
2
Only two years before Larsen the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit rejected the proposition that Indiana law would recognize the
validity of the crashworthiness theory in Evans v. GeneralMotors Corp. 13 The
Evans court held that while an automobile manufacturer had a "duty to de-
sign its product to be ,reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was made,
without hiding defects which would make it dangerous for persons so using
it, '' 14 the intended purpose did not "include [the car's] participation in colli-
sions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possi-
bility that such collisions may occur." 15  Thus, Evans stands for the
proposition that an automobile manufacturer is not liable for injuries caused
by a defect that did not contribute to the cause of the initial collision. 16
The Larsen definition of the duty of automobile manufacturers generally
has prevailed over the definition in Evans.17 In fact, in 1977 Evans was over-
ruled by the Seventh Circuit.' 8 The Evans rationale, however, is still followed
by those federal courts that reject crashworthiness.
Although no North Carolina court has addressed the issue of
crashworthiness, there is a series of cases in which the federal courts in North
Carolina have attempted to predict whether North Carolina courts would
adopt the doctrine. The first was Bulliner v. General Motors Corp. ,19 decided
in 1971, in which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina determined that North Carolina would not adopt the doctrine
because North Carolina law required a "causal relationship between the al-
leged negligence and the accident."' 20 The court's consideration of
crashworthiness was inappropriate and unnecessary, however, because the al-
10. Id at 505.
11. Id
12. Id at 502.
13. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966). Evans was brought in an Indiana federal district court.
Decedent was killed in a collision when the left side of the car collapsed on him because of the
design of the car's frame. Plaintiff alleged that use of the design was negligent because a frame
design with side rails that would have better protected the decedent was available. Because Indi-
ana law had not addressed the crashworthiness issue the court was forced to anticipate the re-
sponse of the Indiana Supreme Court. Id at 826 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
14. Id at 824.
15. Id at 825.
16. Id
17. See Sealey v. Ford Motor Co., 499 F. Supp. 475, 478-79 (E.D.N.C. 1980). See also Huff
v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 110-11 (7th Cir. 1977).
18. Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977) (brought in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana).
19. 54 F.R.D. 479 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
20. Id at 482. The front wheel of plaintiff's van fell off and caused the vehicle to swerve into
a ditch. The wheel failure allegedly was caused by negligent design of the wheel retention
mechanism.
[Vol. 621424
leged negligence would have been the proximate cause of the accident, not of
any enhancement of injuries.2 1 Thus, the Bulliner holding on crashworthiness
is dictum. 22
After Bulliner the United States District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina decided Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line AR. ,23 which in-
volved the collision of a car with a locomotive. The court reviewed the consid-
erable precedent in accord with Evans24 and what little was in accord with
Larsen.25 The Alexander court read Larsen as requiring a manufacturer to
design a vehicle to be absolutely safe in any conceivable collision, including
one with a speeding locomotive.2 6 Since North Carolina had not addressed
crashworthiness, the district court looked to general North Carolina products
liability law. It found that while a manufacturer has a duty to anticipate the
probable results of normal uses of its product, there was no similar duty re-
garding the results of abnormal, reasonably unforeseeable, or criminal uses.
27
The court considered the "'patently careless and improvident conduct' "28 of
plaintiff to be clearly abnormal and reasonably unforeseeable. Fearing that
acceptance of Larsen would loosen the requirement of causation, and let in a
flood of absurd claims, the court expressly rejected the crashworthiness doc-
trine.29 The court of appeals affirmed, but held it "unnecessary to discern and
apply a nonexistent North Carolina rule of law" 30 because damage from im-
pact with the train was so great that the alleged defect could not have been a
proximate cause of any additional injury.
In Simpson v. Hurst Performance, Inc. ,31 decided in 1977, a floor-mounted
21. Id The court already had ruled that there was insufficient evidence of design negligence.
Id Thus the court's prediction was unnecessary.
22. Sealey v. Ford Motor Co., 499 F. Supp. 475, 478 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
23. 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971), a'd, No. 71-1915, slip op. (4th Cir., Apr. 25, 1972).
The facts inAexander were rather unsympathetic. Plaintiff drove his Volkswagen into the side of
a locomotive as it sped through a railroad crossing. The car traveled a considerable distance
under the wheels of the train, crushing the gas tank located in the front of the car. This resulted in
a fire which completely destroyed the car and injured plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that negligent
design caused the gas cap to fly off on impact, resulting in the fire.
24. Id at 324-26.
25. Id at 323-24.
26. Id at 327. The Alexander court disregarded Larsen's reasonableness limitation as to
risks that must be eliminated, Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503, and asked: "Must [the manufacturer]
foresee and design a vehicle to withstand a collision with a 114-ton locomotive engine pulling a
freight train traveling at 45 miles per hour?" Alexander, 346 F. Supp. at 327. There was little
chance of plaintiff winning regardless of the theory used.
27. Alexander, 346 F. Supp. at 327 (citing Corprew v. Geigy Chem. Corp., 271 N.C. 485, 492,
157 S.E.2d 98, 103 (1967)).
28. Alexander, 346 F. Supp. at 327 (quoting Kientz v. Carlton, 245 N.C. 236, 242, 96 S.E.2d
14, 18 (1957)).
29. Id
30. Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., No. 71-1915, slip op. (4th Cir., April 25, 1972).
31. 437 F. Supp. 445 (M.D.N.C. 1977), aft'd, 588 F.2d 1351 (1981). Plaintiffwas a passenger
seated in the middle of the car's bench-type front seat. The car originally had a gearshift mounted
on the steering column, but a previous owner had replaced it with a floor-mounted gearshift made
by defendant. The auto was involved in a head-on collision and plaintiff was thrown forward and
impaled on the gearshift. Plaintiff alleged that defendant gearshift manufacturer was negligent in
failing to warn purchasers and users that the unit was dangerous when installed in an automobile
with a bench-type front seat.
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gearshift was deemed a patent danger.3 2 Therefore, its manufacturer was not
negligent in failing to warn of the danger of a passenger being impaled on it in
a head-on collision. The court determined, on the strength of the Bulner and
Alexander decisions, that even if negligence had been found, North Carolina
courts would not have imposed liability under the crashworthiness theory.33
Larsen was adopted first in North Carolina by the United States District
Court for the Middle District in North Carolina in Isaacson v. Toyota Motor
Sales.34 InIsaacson a car that had stopped for a raised drawbridge was struck
in the rear. It burst into flames and killed the passengers. The complaint al-
leged that negligent design caused the gas tank to rupture, filling the passenger
compartment with gasoline fumes.35 The Isaacson court rejected the earlier
federal court decisions dealing with the crashworthiness doctrine, 36 and main-
tained that North Carolina, while not a products liability innovator, would be
responsive to the near unanimity in other jurisdictions and adopt Larsen.37
The Isaacson court believed that two arguments from Larsen would be
persuasive to North Carolina courts. First, it would be irrational to differenti-
ate, as the Evans court had, between defects that caused accidents, and defects
that merely enhanced the injuries received in accidents. As long as some other
event, no matter how trivial, actually began the causal chain, a court following
Evans would insulate manufacturers from liability, no matter how gross the
negligence or how catastrophic its consequences. It "would invite a harsh re-
sult to hold as a matter of law that a manufacturer is under no duty to manu-
facture an automobile which is reasonably safe in the event of an accident
when the technology to produce such an automobile may be available."38
Second, despite contentions that Larsen mandated a floating "Sherman
tank"39 design standard, under the crashworthiness theory the manufacturer
need eliminate only unreasonable dangers in accordance with general negli-
gence principles. These principles contemplate a balancing of the burden of
protection against the possible harm to be avoided.40
32. The court stated that:
The duty of reasonable care comprehends a duty to warn of danger and conse-
quently a manufacturer of product which to his actual or constructive knowledge in-
volves dangers to users has a duty to give warning of such dangers. Stegall v. Catawba
Oil Co., 260 N.C. 459, 133 S.E.2d 138 (1963). However, the manufacturer is not liable
for injury to the user by reason of a condition which is plainly observable. Douglas v. W.
C. Mallison & Son, 265 N.C. 362, 144 S.E.2d 138 (1965).
Id at 446-47.
33. Id at 447. The argument could be made that this is dictum. The finding that defendant
manufacturer was not negligent made consideration of the crashworthiness doctrine unnecessary.
34. 438 F. Supp. I (E.D.N.C. 1976). Isaacson was decided 14 months before Simpson.
35. Id at 4.
36. Id at 5-6. The court considered the Bulliner crashworthiness conclusion, see supra note
21, as dictum; it affirmed Alexander on the basis of the severity of the collision, considering treat-
ment of the crashworthiness issue unnecessary. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
37. Isaacson, 438 F. Supp. at 7.
38. Id at 8.
39. See Alexander, 346 F. Supp. at 327.
40. Isaacson, 438 F. Supp. at 8.
"The manufacturer does not have to make a product which is 'accident-proof' or 'fool-
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After ruling that the North Carolina courts would apply the crashworthi-
ness theory, the court examined defendant's contention that even conceding a
duty to make the vehicle reasonably crashworthy, no reasonable steps could
have been taken to make the vehicle safe in such a violent collision.4 1 The
court found insufficient evidence to rule as a matter of law on this contention,
and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. 42
The next case to examine crashworthiness in North Carolina was Sealey v.
Ford Motor Co. 43 In Sealey the passengers burned to death after a ruptured
gas tank leaked fumes into the passenger compartment. Plaintiffs contended
that negligent design of the fuel tank had allowed it to leak when the car rolled
over in an accident. The parties agreed that the facts presented a classic
crashworthiness situation.44 The court then considered the basic rationale for
the doctrine and determined that the reasoning in Evans was unrealistic.
45
The court cast its vote with the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions and
adopted the Larsen doctrine.4
6
In 1981, despite recent cases such as Isaacson and Sealey and similar as-
sessments from courts in other circuits,4 7 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held in Wilson v. Ford Motor Co. 48 that a district court
had not committed reversible error by ruling that "the North Carolina
Supreme Court would not hold a manufacturer liable for injuries arising from
defects which neither caused nor contributed to the accident. '49 The district
court had adopted the questionable, older precedents of Bulliner and Alexan-
der. The court of appeals' three paragraph per curiam opinion gave no spe-
cific reasons for its conclusion; a footnote, however, stated that the North
Carolina Supreme Court's recent rejection of strict liability in Smith v. Fiber
Control Corp. 50 "fortifies our belief that if called upon the Supreme Court of
North Carolina would also reject the second crash theory." 5 1 Given the
proof'. Liability is imposed only when an unreasonable danger is created. Whether or
not this has occurred should be determined by general negligence principles, which in-
volve 'a balancing of the likelihood of harm if it happens against the burden of precau-
tions which would be effective to avoid the harm.'"
Id (quoting Noel, Manufacturer'r Negligence ofDesign or Directionsfor Use of a Product, 71 YALE
LJ. 816, 818 (1962) (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 28.4, at 1542 (1956))). This was the
first opinion of the North Carolina district courts to mention that Larsen does not require manu-
facturers to design a "Sherman tank" as was suggested in Alexander, 436 F. Supp. at 327. The
omission of this reasonableness element from the earlier district court opinions is an indication
that their analyses of Larsen were incomplete.
41. Isaacson, 438 F. Supp. at 9-10.
42. Id
43. 499 F. Supp. 475 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
44. Id at 477-78. The court, however, found no North Carolina precedent to apply to
crashworthiness, and also found a split of authority in the federal courts sitting in North Carolina.
45. Id at 479.
46. Id at 478-79.
47. Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031
(1981).
48. 656 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981).
49. Id
50. 300 N.C. 669, 268 S.E.2d 504 (1980).
51. Wilson, 656 F.2d at 960 n.l.
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supreme court's reasons for declining to accept strict liability, this analogy be-
tween strict liability and crashworthiness is tenuous.52
Thus, the stage was set for Marlin v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. 5 3 The
federal district court had denied summary judgment in favor of defendant
auto manufacturer on a crashworthiness claim.5 4 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that reversal was
required by Wilson, since it is the practice of the court to consider panel deci-
sions as binding precedent until overruled en banc.55 Thus, the denial of a
rehearing en banc amounted to a decision to adopt Wilson as definitive. Judge
Murnaghan dissented from the denial to criticize Wilson's validity. This
prompted Chief Judge Phillips to concur specially in the per curiam opinion.56
Judge Murnaghan argued that Wilson's prediction that North Carolina
would follow Evans and reject Larsen was "simply wrong." 57 First, he stated
that the rule in Wilson was one of proximate cause:
The case holds that, however foreseeable in fact the likelihood of
injury might be, an automobile manufacturer, as a matter of law, is
free to ignore the inevitable consequences of its negligence when the
chain of events triggering a plaintiff's injury (including injury due to
the negligent construction of the vehicle) originates with the negli-
gence of a third party.58
North Carolina tort law, however, recognizes no such bright line test; the issue
of proximate cause in negligence actions goes to the jury in virtually all
cases. 59 Second, Judge Murnaghan cited with approval the 1981 United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit case, Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A. G.,60
which affirmed a New Jersey district court's conclusion that North Carolina
would accept the crashworthiness theory. The Seese court believed that given
the "absence of any expression by North Carolina and a split of authority by
federal courts in that state, a prediction as to the law North Carolina would
adopt can only be based on the greater persuasiveness of one of the conflicting
theories, with an eye to the nationwide trend .... ,,61 Both the majority and
52. The Smith court did not address the merits of strict liability, but based its rejection of the
doctrine on its incompatibility with the requirement of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (1979) that the
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk be available in products liability ac-
tions. Smith, 300 N.C. at 678, 268 S.E.2d at 509-10. Crashworthiness, in contrast to strict liability,
is a negligence theory, Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503, and is compatible with those defenses, see Seese v.
Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 842 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981).
53. 707 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1983).
54. Martin v. Smith, 534 F. Supp. 804 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
55. Martin, 707 F.2d at 827 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
56. Id at 825 (Phillips, C.J., concurring). Judge Phillips served on the panel that decided
Wilson, 656 F.2d 960.
57. Id at 827 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
58. Id
59. Id; See also Williams v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 296 N.C. 400, 403, 250 S.E.2d 255,
258 (1979).
60. 648 F.2d 833 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981).
61. Id at 841. In Seese the court examined the federal precedents in North Carolina on the
crashworthiness issue and decided to follow the reasoning in Isaacson and Sealey as more persua-
sive and consistent with the law in other jurisdictions. Id at 830-40. The court further concluded
that: "'we take it as beyond peradventure that an automobile manufacturer today has some legal
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dissenting opinions in Seese conceded that North Carolina would accept
crashworthiness; the dissent differed principally on the refusal to remand for a
new trial on damages.6 2
Judge Murnaghan also argued that because it was unlikely that a state
court would have an opportunity to consider the issues, 63 it was the duty of the
circuit judges to rehear the case and not "shrug off an erroneous decision on
the grounds that, if incorrect, it will all in due course be set straight by a North
Carolina court."'64 The probable, and in his opinion distasteful, alternative to
overruling the case en banc would be the gradual application of various North
Carolina authorities to "construct narrow distinctions stringently circumscrib-
ing Wilson and in effect restricting it to the very facts of the particular case."'65
In fact, the order reversed in Martin had attempted something analogous, dis-
tinguishing Wilson on the ground that the pleadings in Martin had alleged that
defendant's negligence was a direct and proximate cause of the fatal injuries,
instead of merely enhancing them. 66 In both cases, however, the ultimate
proximate cause of the accident was not the defect alleged by the plaintiff.
The trial court in Martin also had argued that Wilson was not "in har-
mony with accepted principles of North Carolina tort law."67 It cited five such
principles that conflicted with the Wilson rationale: (1) "proximate cause of an
injury is a factual question for the jury, rather than a question of law for the
court;" 68 (2) "[t]here may be more than one proximate cause of an injury; ' 69
(3) "[i]f the negligence of an actor is a proximate cause of any part of the
obligation to design and produce a reasonably crashworthy vehicle."' Id at 841 (quoting Hud-
dell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3rd Cir. 1976)).
62. See id at 849-850 (Adams, J., dissenting).
63. The absence of a significant producer of motor vehicles in the state suggests that
diversity jurisdiction will almost surely exist, or that the suit will be brought in some
other state, whose capacity to deal with North Carolina law should be no greater than
ours.... North Carolina has not adopted a referral statute permitting certification of a
controlling question of stale law to the North Carolina Supreme Court. . . .A case is
not likely to generate damage claims of$ 10,000 or less, and no car manufacturer is apt to
fail to remove when sued in a North Carolina court so long as Wilson and the panel
opinion in the instant case remain dispositive.
Martin, 707 F.2d at 828 n.1 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
Judge Mumaghan's logic, however, may not be sound. A plaintiff wishing to go to state
court could defeat diversity by joining the manufacturer's local distributor; without complete di-
versity, removal to the federal courts is impossible. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267 (1806). Instead, the lack of North Carolina decisions on crashworthiness may be due to desire
by North Carolina plaintiffs' attorneys to take advantage of federal rules of discovery or jury
selection. It also could have resulted from a willingness to risk that the federal courts might apply
crashworthiness, rather than risk facing the traditionally conservative North Carolina courts.
With Martin and Wilson firmly rejecting crashworthiness, there no longer appears to be any rea-
son for plaintiffs' attorneys to sue in federal court.
64. Martin, 707 F.2d at 828 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
65. Id
66. See Martin, 534 F. Supp. 804, 806 (W.D.N.C. 1982). Plaintiff alleged that had the gas
tank not been negligently designed, the victims would have suffered only insignificant injuries;
instead they were burned to death.
67. Id
68. Id (citing Snell v. Cauble Sand & Rock Co., 267 N.C. 613, 618, 148 S.E.2d 608, 611
(1966)); Taney v. Brown, 262 N.C. 438, 444, 137 S.E.2d 827, 831 (1964); Short v. Chapman, 261
N.C. 674, 680, 136 S.E.2d 40, 45 (1964)).
69. Id (citing Hester v. Miller, 41 N.C. App. 509, 512, 255 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1979)).
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injuries, he is liable for that part;' 70 (4) "[d]efendants' negligence, in order to
be actionable, need not be the sole proximate cause of injury, nor the last act
of negligence;" 71 (5) "lilf the intervening act of a third person is reasonably
foreseeable, it does not insulate a previously negligent party from liability for
injuries caused by or contributed to by that previous negligence."'72
Chief Judge Phillips defended Wilson in his special concurrence. He
warned against use of the "gentle pressure tactics of 'assuming' that the state
courts will necessarily follow a view proclaimed by the federal court to be
'enlightened.' 73 He argued that looking at what state courts have recently
said as well as the "basic doctrinal premises they have seemed most consist-
ently to hold" 74 is a better means of forecasting state law than extrapolating
the trend of "enlightened" law in other jurisdictions. Thus, he believed that
the only valid criticism of Wilson would be one that challenged the rationality
of the assumptions Wilson made based on "indicators" in North Carolina
law."7 This view, however, puts the critic at a disadvantage since the Wilson
court did not reveal its assumptions, and the district court decision it summa-
rily affirmed was not published. The only discernible "indicator" in Wilson
was the reference to North Carolina's rejection of strict liability in Smith .76
Now, of course, there is Chief Judge Phillips' special concurrence.
Chief Judge Phillips cited in his Martin concurrence three "indicators"
supporting the assumption in Wilson that North Carolina would reject
crashworthiness. "First and foremost is the fact that North Carolina has at
this late date not yet joined the crashworthiness 'trend.' "77 The lack of an
appropriate case to consider the doctrine was dismissed as a minor obstacle, as
"[icourts minded to join 'enlightened trends' in decisional law have no diffi-
culty reaching out in 'near' cases to join up."7 8
This argument is not persuasive. A court unsure about the wisdom of an
innovative rule of law may avoid reaching it until the experience of other ju-
risdictions has cast some light upon the subject, embracing the rule only when
careful examination of other precedent indicates it to be just and prudent. This
is exactly what North Carolina did in abandoning the requirement of privity
70. Id (citing Wise v. Vincent, 265 N.C. 647, 652, 144 S.E.2d 877, 881 (1965)).
71. Id at 807 (citing Batts v. Faggart, 260 N.C. 641, 133 S.E.2d 504 (1963); Richardson v.
Grayson, 252 N.C. 476, 113 S.E.2d 922 (1960)). See also Hester v. Miller, 41 N.C. App, 509, 512,
255 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1979).
72. Martin, 534 F.Supp. at 807 (citing Brown v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 276 N.C. 398, 404,
172 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1970)).
73. Martin, 707 F.2d at 825 (Phillips, CJ., concurring specially).
74. Id
75. Id
76. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
77. Martin, 707 F.2d at 826 (Phillips, C.J., concurring specially).
78. Id
To dismiss this with the suggestion that it has not been possible to join because an appro-
priate case has not yet been presented and to forecast that-because of diversity's ref-
uge-it will not likely be presented in the future denigrates the wit both of the North
Carolina courts and of counsel practicing in those courts.
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in products liability negligence claims.79 Furthermore, the converse of Chief
Judge Phillips' argument is that a court set on rejecting a doctrine will do so,
even though only in dictum.80 Thus, if North Carolina actually preferred Ev-
ans, there should be state court decisions "joining-up" with that unen-
lightened trend.
Chief Judge Phillips advanced Miller v. Miller8 1 as an example of a case
in which the "join-up" easily could have been accomplished.8 2 In Miller the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, the failure to
wear a seat belt, absent special circumstances, was not contributory negli-
gence. Using Miller to demonstrate North Carolina's unwillingness to accept
crashworthiness in 1983 is inappropriate for several reasons. First, Miller was
decided only nine days after Larsen, which makes it highly unlikely that the
crashworthiness rationale was considered. Second, Miller was not a products
liability case; it dealt with contributory negligence in an action against the
driver of an automobile for personal injuries suffered by a passenger.83 Third,
to "reach out" and impose a duty on manufacturers to use reasonable care not
to expose consumers to an unreasonable risk of injury in a collision, the Miller
court would have had to impose an analogous duty on the public to fasten
their seat belts whenever riding in an automobile. This would have denied
plaintiff recovery by imposing a standard of care almost universally disre-
garded, a result the court was anxious to avoid.84 This failure of the "reason-
able man" to recognize the duty to wear seat belts was the true basis of the
court's refusal to impose such a duty. That the omission actually did not cause
the collision was icing on the cake.85
Chief Judge Phillips' second "indicator" was North Carolina's reluctance
to adopt such liberal tort theories as strict liability and comparative negli-
gence.86 This analogy is questionable, however, because the crashworthiness
theory does not dispense with negligence, as does strict liability, nor does it
seek to apportion fault between the defendant and the plaintiff. Instead,
crashworthiness merely sharpens the focus on proximate cause, recognizing
two distinct proximate causes instead of one, and imposes the familiar liability
of a joint tort-feasor. Thus, the measure of recovery is not changed; it is only
spread more equitably among the blameworthy.
The last "indicator" suggested by Chief Judge Phillips consisted of "the
guidance to be had from recent doctrinal expressions by North Carolina's
highest court."'87 Judge Phillips conceded that crashworthiness is in large part
a question of proximate cause, and that North Carolina generally considers
79. See Corprew v. Geigy Chem. Corp., 271 N.C. 485, 490-97, 157 S.E.2d 98, 102-06 (1967).
80. See Bulliner, 54 F.R.D. at 482. See also supra note 26.
81. 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
82. Martin, 707 F.2d at 826 (Phillips, C.J., concurring specially).
83. Miller, 273 N.C. at 229-30, 160 S.E.2d at 67.
84. See id at 237-38, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
85. Id at 237, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
86. Martin, 707 F.2d at 826 (Phillips, C.J., concurring specially).
87. Id
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proximate cause a question for the jury. He contended, however, that concep-
tually "there is strong indication that the North Carolina Supreme Court pres-
ently identifies the 'first impact' as the critical and sole one for proximate
causation-hence tort liability-analysis."8 8 Such an analysis would preclude
the crashworthiness defect as a valid proximate cause of injuries. 89 Judge
Phillips stated that the Miller court had relied on this analysis when it deter-
mined that the failure to fasten seat belts was not contributory negligence per
se.
90
The difficulty of apportioning damages also was advanced by Chief Judge
Phillips as an alternate ground for the Miller decision. 91 This characterization
minimizes the importance of the Miller court's devoting the first seven pages of
its opinion to resolving whether "the occupant of an automobile [has] a duty to
use an available seat belt whenever [the car] is operated on a public high-
way."' 92 It was only after answering that question in the negative that the
Miller court added: "It would be a harsh and unsound rule which would deny
all recovery to the plaintiff, whose mere failure to buckle his seat belt in no
way contributed to the accident, and exonerate the active tort-feasor but for
whose negligence the plaintiff's omission would have been harmless. '93 The
Miller court gave several other minor justifications, then discussed at length
the difficulties of apportioning damages between a negligent defendant and
contributorily negligent plaintiff, which it deemed a problem that "cannot be
dismissed lightly."94 The court, however, did not base its decision on that
ground. Rather, the court espoused it as one of a number of factors reinforc-
ing the dispositive holding that the customary conduct of the reasonably pru-
dent man does not include wearing his seat belt.95
Although Chief Judge Phillips' reasoning was faulty in applying his three
"indicators," he was correct when he said that the first step in predicting the
future of the law in a jurisdiction is to look to the present status of the general
state law. Thus, if the crashworthiness theory is compatible with North Caro-
lina products liability tort law, federal courts are justified in predicting that
North Carolina would accept the crashworthiness doctrine.
In North Carolina a products liability claim sounding in tort must include
the same elements as any negligence claim: (1) evidence of a standard of care
owed by the reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances; (2) breach of
that standard of care; (3) injury caused directly or proximately by the breach;
and (4) loss because of the injury.96 Thus, for the crashworthiness theory to be




92. Miller, 273 N.C. at 230, 160 S.E.2d at 68.
93. Id at 237, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
94. Id at 238-40, 160 S.E.2d at 73-74.
95. Id at 238, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
96. City of Thomasville v. Lease-Afex, Inc., 300 N.C. 651, 656, 268 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1980)
(citing W. PROSSER, HoRNBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971)).
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compatible with North Carolina law, each of these essential elements must be
established.
The manufacturer's standard of care under the crashworthiness theory is
compatible with the duty of care under North Carolina products liability law.
In the leading case of Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corp. 97 the North Carolina
Supreme Court quoted this definition with approval:
Since the liability is to be based on negligence, the defendant is
required to exercise the care of a reasonable man under the circum-
stances. His negligence may be found over an area quite as broad as
his whole activity in preparing and selling the product. He may be
negligent first of all in designing it, so that it becomes unsafe for the
intended use. He may be negligent in failing to inspect or test his
materials, or the work itself, to discover possible defects, or danger-
ous propensities. 98
The duty to eliminate any unreasonable risk to the passengers in the event of
collision is not dissimilar to this duty to inspect and test the work and materi-
als to discover possible defects or dangerous propensities.
Even if there is no duty in North Carolina to eliminate unreasonable risks
of injury to passengers in the event of a collision, there is such a duty under
federal law. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act99 was passed
in 1966, shortly after the decision in Evans, and declared the necessity of es-
tablishing motor vehicle safety standards. 1° ° "Motor vehicle safety" was de-
fined as:
the performance of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment in
such a manner that the public is protected against unreasonable risk
of accidents occurring as a result of the design, construction or per-
formance of motor vehicles and is also protected against unreasonable
risk of death or injury to persons in the event accidents do occur, and
includes nonoperational safety of such vehicles. 101
The intent of the Act was to authorize the creation of standards that would
impose a duty of care on the auto industry identical to that required under the
crashworthiness theory. The standards are binding on the states10 2 and spec-
ify the testing and degree of protection required of the automobile manufac-
turer. These standards began coming out in 1971 and regulated, among other
things, occupant impact with the interior of the passenger compartment, 10 3
protection of the driver from injury caused by the steering column,1° 4 reten-
97. 271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967).
98. Id at 491, 157 S.E.2d at 102-03 (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 665 (3rd ed.
1964)).
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982).
100. Standards promulgated under this legislation are located in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards, 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.201-571.302 (1983).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1982).
103. Eg., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571.201 (occupancy protection
in interior impacts), § 571.208 (occupant crash protection) (1983).
104. Id § 571.203 (protection for driver from impact with steering mechanism), § 571.204
(steering control rearward displacement).
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tion of passengers within the vehicle in a collision,105 and seatbelts and child
restraints.106 North Carolina indicated its support of this effort by enacting
the Vehicle Equipment Safety Compact.10 7 Somewhat surprisingly, the man-
ufacturers themselves acknowledge this responsibility to protect the passenger
in their advertising, touting efforts to eliminate risks to the passenger upon
impact. 108
Thus, there is ample evidence that it is reasonable to require automobile
manufacturers to eliminate unreasonable risks of injury in the event of a colli-
sion, and that the duty is not incompatible with the North Carolina products
liability standard of due care.
The second essential element in a products liability tort action is a breach
of the duty owed. This could be found in any failure of the manufacturer to
eliminate unreasonable risk of injury. 0 9
The third essential element is that the injury be caused directly or proxi-
mately by the breach. Thus, the crashworthiness defect must be established as
a proximate cause of the injuries sustained. Logically, it is not accurate to say
that one event can be the sole proximate cause for all the injuries suffered in a
crashworthiness situation. It is accurate, however, to say that the initial im-
pact is the sole proximate cause of the injuries which would have been suffered
in the crash absent the crashworthiness defect. The initial impact is also a
proximate cause of the enhancement of injury suffered as a result of the
crashworthiness defect, since there would be no injuries at all without that
initial impact. By the same token, however, the crashworthiness defect is also
a proximate cause of the enhancement of injuries, for without the defect the
enhancement of injuries would not have occurred. The cause of the collision
and the crashworthiness defect would be concurrent proximate causes, and the
manufacturer and the person responsible for the collision would be joint tort-
feasors with regard to the enhancement of injuries. It cannot, however, accu-
rately be said that the initial impact is the sole proximate cause of the en-
hancement of injuries, because it alone could not have caused the
enhancement.
To deny that the crashworthiness defect is a proximate cause of enhance-
ment of injuries imposes complete liability on the person responsible for the
initial collision, regardless of how harmless it would have been in the absence
of the manufacturer's negligence. When the other driver is without insurance
or appreciable assets, denial of the manufacturer's liability for its negligence
105. Id § 571.206 (door locks and door retention systems), § 571.210 (seat belt assembly
anchorages).
106. Id § 571.207 (seating systems), § 571.209 (seat belt assemblies), § 571.213 (child restraint
systems).
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-183.13 (1983).
108. General Motors has been running television advertisements in North Carolina touting
their continuing efforts to improve the crashworthiness of their automobiles (over 150 new
automobiles demolished in crash tests).
109. In Larsen the breach was the improper design of the steering column, a solid column
which projected beyond the wheel base in such a way as to present an obvious danger of rearward
displacement towards the driver in an accident.
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would leave the plaintiff without compensation for his injuries, even those at-
tributable to the crashworthiness defect. Chief Judge Phillips stated that this
harsh result was required by the "in no way contributed to the accident"110
language in Miller. This interpretation of Miller, however, is refuted by that
court's subsequent language:
Furthermore, it is safe to assume that, if an unbelted plaintiff sus-
tained an injury in an automobile accident, he would also have suf-
fered some injury-albeit minor-from buffeting even had he been
wearing his seat belt. Therefore, since plaintiff could have suffered
some injury as a result of the occurrence which resulted solely from
the defendant [driver]'s negligence, defendant's plea of contributory
negligence would not be good as to those injuries.'
Therefore the North Carolina Supreme Court, rather than using "purely con-
ceptual [analysis]. . . identiflying] the 'first impact' as the critical and sole one
for proximate causation,"' " 2 has given a strong indication that it would use a
concurrent proximate cause analysis similar to that advanced above.
This indication was reinforced in the 1980 North Carolina Supreme
Court case of City of Thomasville v. Lease-Afex, Inc.,113 a products liability
case actually considering the enhancement of damages allegedly caused by
negligent design. Defendant installed a fire suppression system on a bulldozer
used by plaintiff at a sanitary landfill. The bulldozer caught fire and was
badly damaged when the fire suppressant system failed to operate. The court
reversed summary judgment for defendant on the negligent design and war-
ranty claims, holding that if the system had failed to function properly, it must
have "caused at least some of the damage to plaintiff's bulldozer." 114 Thus,
recognition of the crashworthiness defect as a proximate cause of the enhance-
ment of damages is consistent with North Carolina products liability law.
The last element in a negligence cause of action is that there be loss be-
cause of the injury. The question is not so much whether there was damage as
how to determine what part of the damage is attributable to each cause. It
would be difficult in many cases to differentiate between damage solely due to
the original impact and damage due to enhancement of injuries caused by the
crashworthiness defect. In Miller the court addressed the problem, and noted
that the difficult task of apportioning damages already was performed by
North Carolina courts in applying the doctrine of "avoidable conse-
quences."" t 5 This doctrine imposes the duty on a plaintiff to minimize the
injuries caused by another; the plaintiffs failure to do so will defeat his recov-
110. Martin, 707 F.2d at 826 (Phillips, C.J., concurring specially). See Miller, 273 N.C. 228,
237, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (1968).
111. Miller, 273 N.C. at 238, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
112. Martin, 707 F.2d at 827.
113. 300 N.C. 651, 268 S.E.2d 190 (1980).
114. Id at 657, 268 S.E.2d at 195. This case is not a complete parallel to the crashworthiness
situation as there is no dispute that the "standard of care of a reasonably prudent fire suppression
system manufacturer is to manufacture a system which functions properly." Id at 656, 268 S.E.2d
at 194.
115. Miller, 273 N.C. at 239-40, 160 S.E.2d at 74.
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ery to the extent of the resulting aggravation of injuries.' 16 This aggravation
of damages often cannot be calculated with certainty, and in a close case a
court may rightly refuse to allocate damages between the plaintiff and defend-
ant.117 When the allocation is between two defendants, however, there is no
reason not to hold them jointly and severally liable casting the burden on each
to prove what part of the damages is not allocable to his negligence. This
treatment of damages is consistent with the concern for the plight of the wor-
thy plaintiff voiced in Miller.'18 Similarly, the Court in Lease-Afex, Inc. dis-
played no reluctance to allow damages when it would be hard to apportion
them between the causes of the injuries. 119 Thus, damages in a crashworthi-
ness cause of action are acceptably ascertainable under North Carolina law.
It appears that because of the compatibility of the crashworthiness doc-
trine with North Carolina products liability law, North Carolina would accept
the crashworthiness theory. Moreover, it is unlikely that North Carolina
courts will have the opportunity to rule on the issue. Thus, it is critical that the
divided federal courts in North Carolina have a clear and well-reasoned pre-
cedent to follow. Martin v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. is particularly disap-
pointing in this respect. Thorough analysis of relevant North Carolina law
reveals that the arguments advanced by those courts predicting the rejection of




117. Id at 240, 160 S.E.2d at 74.
118. Id at 238, 160 S.E.2d at 273.
119. Lease-Alfex, Inc., 300 N.C. at 657, 268 S.E.2d at 195.
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Mazza v. Huffaker: Sex with the Patient's Spouse is
Negligent Psychiatric Treatment
Psychiatric malpractice is one of the fastest growing areas of professional
liability.' Although patients long have been able to sue their doctors for inju-
ries occurring during the course of their medical treatment,2 psychiatrists tra-
ditionally have been free from malpractice litigation.3 This relative immunity
has existed for several reasons. The psychiatric profession's diverse therapeu-
tic techniques have made it difficult to establish definite standards of care. In
addition, trials involving psychiatric treatments often involve complex medi-
cal, legal, and factual issues and rely on conflicting expert testimony.4 This
complexity and confusion, which reflects the subjectiveness of mental health
standards, has made it difficult for a patient to win a verdict from a jury of
laypersons.5 The recent surge in psychiatric malpractice litigation, however,
has included many cases involving factual issues that any juror could compre-
hend and malpractice issues that do not generate conflicting expert testimony.6
These latter cases have included the prescription, as medical treatment, of sex-
ual relations between the psychiatrist and the patient. 7
Sexual relations between patient and psychiatrist always have been recog-
nized as a violation of medical ethics.8 Civil liability, however, was estab-
lished only recently by the 1968 case of Nicholson v. Han.9 Since Nicholson
such civil litigation has increased; there now exists an established malpractice
cause of action for a patient whose psychiatrist has sex with her as part of
prescribed therapy. 10 Although in the early 1970s sexual relations were some-
I. Wilkinson, Psychiatric Ma/practice: Identfying Areas ofLiability, TRIAL, Oct. 1982, at 73.
2. J. GUNTHER, THE MALPRACTITIONERS 3 (1978).
3. Rothblatt & Leroy, Avoiding Psychiatric Ma/practice, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 260, 260 (1973).
4. Id
5. Id
6. For example, in some cases the jury has had to determine whether the psychiatrist actu-
ally had sex with his patient. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
7. Gentry, Psychiatric Liability. Abuse of the Therapist-Patient Relationship, TRIAL, May
1980, at 26; see infra notes 9-15 and accompanying text. One recent survey indicated that five to
ten percent of the nation's psychotherapists have had some form of physical contact with female
patients under the guise of medical treatment. Dietz, Pyschotherapists, Patients and Sex, Boston
Globe, Jan. 31, 1982, at I, col. I.
8. The Hippocratic Oath of the Physician states, "Whatever houses I may visit, I will come
for the benefit of the sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all mischief and in particu-
lar of sexual relations with both female and male persons. ... (quoted in 1982 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 201, 203). The ethical code of the American Psychiatric Association expressly states,
"Sexual activity with a patient is unethical." Lange & Hirsh, LegalProblems of ntimate Therapy,
1982 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 201, 203.
9. 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968) (recognizing cause of action but denying recov-
ery because the action had been abolished); see Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1393 (1970).
10. See Cotton v. Kambly, 101 Mich. App. 537, 300 N.W.2d 627 (1980) (psychiatrist liable
for medical malpractice after inducing the patient to have sex under the guise of psychiatric treat-
ment); Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1976) (psychiatrist who had sexual
intercourse with patient as part of treatment was liable for medical malpractice). See also 25
ATLA L. REP. 98 (1982) (discussing cases involving malpractice claims based on psychiatrists
sexually abusing their patients); Gentry, supra note 7, at 26-29. Because the reported cases dealing
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times advocated as proper therapy," the American Psychiatric Association
has adopted' 2 the view of experts in the psychiatric field today that sexual
contact between patient and psychiatrist harms the patient and departs from
accepted standards of medical practice. 13 The courts have recognized the
mental damage resulting from this type of treatment' 4 and have granted relief
to patients injured by it.' 5
The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently decided its first malprac-
tice case based on a psychiatrist's sexual endeavors. 16 Unlike most recent
cases in other jurisdictions, 17 however, Mazza v. Huffaker involved sexual re-
lations between the psychiatrist and the patient's spouse. Mazza involved Dr.
Huffaker, a psychiatrist who for four years had been treating Mr. Mazza for
manic depressive psychosis. During this continuing treatment, Huffaker also
began to see Mrs. Mazza on a professional basis. Eventually, this relationship
became personal. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Mazza moved out of his home, but
continued treatment with Huffaker. One night, he went home and discovered
Huffaker having sexual intercourse with Mrs. Mazza. It was out of this inci-
dent that the lawsuit arose.18 The jury found Huffaker liable for medical mal-
practice for having sex with his patient's wife.
The court of appeals affirmed. 19 In holding that a patient can suffer
mental and emotional harm sufficient for a malpractice action by witnessing
the psychiatrist's private sexual actions with another, the court extended the
rationale in most sexual intimacy cases.20 Furthermore, as a result of the jury
instructions and special verdict, the decision may have substantial effects on
general medical malpractice principles in North Carolina.
The jury was instructed to find malpractice if it determined that any one
of the following was true: (1) that defendant violated the standard of care;2 1
with sexual relations between psychiatrist and patient have involved male psychiatrists and female
patients, this note will refer to psychiatrists as men and patients as women.
11. See Lange & Hirsh, supra note 8, at 204-05; Riskin, SexualRelations Between Psychother-
apists and Their Patients: Toward Research or Restraint, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1000 (1979).
12. Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 895, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 590 (1976) (Markowitz, J.,
concurring).
13. I d; Riskin, supra note 11, at 1012.
14. Sex as treatment aggravates a patient's mental condition. Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d
891, 902, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 596 (1976); Anonymous v. Berry, No. 78-8182-CA, Division H (Fla.
Duval County Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 1979), noted in 22 ATLA L. REP. 447, 473 (1979). The sexual
abuse also can destroy the patient's family and married life. Walker v. Parsons (Cal. App. San
Diego Super. Ct. July 7, 1981), noted in 68 A.B.A. J. 1353, 1354 (1982). The sex also delays the
patient's recovery from her original mental illness. Combs v. Silverman, No. LE 596 (Va.-Rich-
mond Cir. Ct. Feb. 5, 1982), noted in 25 ATLA L. REP. 98, 98-100 (1982).
15. See cases cited infra note 14. See generally 25 ATLA L. REP. 98 (1982).
16. Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833 (1983).
17. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
18. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 175-76, 300 S.E.2d at 837.
19. 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833 (1983).
20. An argument can be made that the "other person" must be a relative because the trial
testimony was limited to references to sexual acts between the psychiatrist and the patient's rela-
tive. Id at 177, 300 S.E.2d at 838.
21. Record at 198, Mazza, 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833 (1983) (the jury was asked to
determine whether defendant failed to use that degree of professional learning, skill, and ability
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(2) that defendant failed to recognize and guard against the transference or
counter-transference phenomena in his treatment of Mrs. Mazza; (3) that de-
fendant abandoned Mr. Mazza as a patient; or (4) that defendant continued to
treat Mr. Mazza after becoming emotionally and sexually involved with Mr.
Mazza's wife.22 The jury rendered a special verdict finding that defendant
committed medical malpractice in his treatment of Mr. Mazza,23 but the ver-
dict did not reveal the basis of the finding. Thus, each of the grounds enumer-
ated in the jury instructions arguably constitutes malpractice in North
Carolina. Such a decision could have a profound effect on North Carolina
malpractice principles. First, by finding no error in the jury's determination
that Huffaker's conduct violated the standard of care, the court created a
stricter duty and higher standard of care for psychiatrists than for other medi-
cal doctors. Psychiatrists now may be held liable for private actions, unrelated
to the treatment of the claimant.z4 Second, allowing a jury to determine that
Huffaker was liable in malpractice to Mr. Mazza for treatment rendered to
Mrs. Mazza created a unique cause of action on behalf of a third person.25
Finally, the remaining grounds for malpractice coupled with certain rulings
represent an unprecedented liberalization of the court's attitude toward a mal-
practice claimant.
Mazza's primary impact on North Carolina law is the adoption of a
higher standard of care for psychiatrists than for other doctors. To establish
liability for malpractice, a plaintiff must prove that the psychiatrist's care was
not in accordance with the standards of practice among members of his profes-
sion with similar training and experience in the same or a similar commu-
nity.2 6 Traditionally, malpractice has been based on the negligent "treatment
or care" administered to the plaintiff by the psychiatrist.27 Mazza, however,
did not involve allegations of negligent "treatment" of plaintiff. Rather, the
negligent conduct was private, unrelated to any medical treatment, and was
exercised with a person other than plaintiff. Thus, Mazza differs from cases in
other jurisdictions in which courts have held that negligence only arises from
conduct performed as part of the treatment or employment.28 For example, in
that others similarly situated ordinarily possess or whether defendant used his position of trust
and confidence to harm his patient).
22. Id For a definition of transference, see infra text accompanying note 36.
23. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 173, 300 S.E.2d at 836.
24. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981) provides:
Defendant shall not be liable for the payment of damages unless the trier of fact is satis-
fied ... that the care of such health care provider was not in accordance with the stan-
dards of practice among members of the same health care profession with similar
training and experience situated in the same or similar communities.
27. See supra notes 10-15; see generally Furrow, Defective Mental Treatment: A Proposalfor
the Application of Strict Liability to Psychiatric Service, 58 B.U.L. REv. 391 (1978).
28. E.g., City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1965) (police
officer stopped plaintiff for speeding and then raped her in his police car, held that the officer's
employer was not vicariously liable since the rape was not within the scope of the officer's employ-
ment); Hess v. Frank, 47 A.D.2d 889, 367 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1975) (psychiatrist had uttered abusive
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Hess v. Frank29 a New York court held that although the psychiatrist's con-
duct would cause mental anguish to the patient, he could not be guilty of mal-
practice if the conduct of which he complained was unrelated to the medical
treatment being rendered.30
Mazza cited the unique psychiatrist-patient relationship and the corre-
sponding psychiatrist's duties as justification for its ruling that Huffaker's con-
duct was malpractice.31 The psychiatrist's duty to maintain the patient's trust
and confidence was recognized as absolutely essential to the effectiveness of
the therapy rendered. 32 Although all doctors have the duty to maintain a pa-
tient's trust and confidence, 33 this trust is not as essential to the effectiveness of
physical treatment as it is for mental therapy. Thus, a breach of trust arising
out of conduct unrelated to the treatment should not make a nonpsychiatrist
liable for malpractice.34 Similarly, a doctor's personal activities should not be
restricted by the threat of malpractice unless the activities would harm the
professional treatment being rendered. Limiting Mazza to psychiatrists would
adhere to this proposition.
The second major effect of Mazza is the creation of a unique third-party
medical malpractice cause of action. The court allowed Mr. Mazza to recover
on a malpractice claim arising from treatment Huffaker rendered to Mrs.
Mazza while she was his patient. The court of appeals found no error in the
trial court's instruction that the jury must find Huffaker guilty of malpractice
in his treatment of Mr. Mazza if Huffaker "failed to recognize and guard
against the transference or counter-transference phenomenon" 35 between him-
self and Mrs. Mazza while she was a patient.
Transference and counter-transference are common phenomena in psy-
chiatric therapy. Transference occurs when the patient transfers emotions the
patient has towards someone else to the psychiatrist. Counter-transference oc-
curs when the psychiatrist transfers feelings that the psychiatrist has towards
language to patient during a regularly scheduled therapy session; the language was found not to
be part of the treatment and thus not professional misconduct).
29. 47 A.D.2d 889, 367 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1975).
30. Id
31. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 176-77, 300 S.E.2d at 837-38. See also D. DAWIDOFF, THE MAL-
PRACTICE OF PsYcHATRismS 43 (1973). Cf. Whitehurst v. Boehm, 41 N.C. App. 670, 674, 255
S.E.2d 761, 764 (1979) (same rules govern duty and liability for physicians and surgeons). No pre-
Mazza North Carolina case had held a psychiatrist to a higher standard than other doctors. A
special duty for psychiatrists, however, has been advocated by medical experts and other commen-
tators. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 176-77, 300 S.E.2d at 837-38; D. DAWIDOFF, supra, at 43;
Dawidoff, Insanity, Intimacy andInfidelity: Trends in Psychiatric Malpractice, TRIAL, June 1977, at
27.
32. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 176-77, 300 S.E.2d at 837-38.
33. Id at 176, 300 S.E.2d at 837.
34. The doctor should be held liable for his actions under other causes of action that would
be available to the patient. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
35. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 180, 300 S.E.2d at 840. The court attempted to justify the jury
instruction by claiming that its purpose was to enable the jury to determine whether Huffaker and
Mrs. Mazza had sexual relations. Id at 180-81, 300 S.E.2d at 840. If this was the instruction's
purpose, however, the instruction could simply have read, "Do you find that Mrs. Mazza and Dr.
Huflaker had sexual relations?" Using the phenomenon as a basis for the jury's findings resulted
in granting Mr. Mazza a malpractice action for a wrong done to his wife, not to him.
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someone else to his patient.36 The psychiatrist's abuse of the transference phe-
nomena gives the patient a cause of action for malpractice. 37 In Walker v.
Parsons38 a California psychiatrist had the female patient transfer her feelings
concerning her husband and family to him239 He then abused the transference
by making the patient believe he loved her and by having sexual relations with
her. The patient brought a malpractice claim for this abuse and was awarded
4.6 million dollars in damages.40
The transference and counter-transference cases establish that a patient
whose psychiatrist abuses the transference has a malpractice action against the
psychiatrist. In Mazza, however, the psychiatrist-patient relationship existed
between Huffaker and Mrs. Mazza, not Mr. Mazza. Mr. Mazza was therefore
given the right to pursue a malpractice claim under a cause of action that
traditionally belonged to Mrs. Mazza.4 1 Thus, Mazza expands the scope of
transference cases by holding that the spouse of the patient also will have a
cause of action for malpractice. This result is unprecedented.
Although a husband should be granted relief if he suffers from his wife's
psychiatrist abusing the transference, no justification exists for allowing that
recovery under a malpractice claim. The husband does not have a doctor-
patient relationship in the rendering of the negligent treatment (the abuse of
transference). 42 Allowing the husband to recover for malpractice violates the
longstanding principle that a doctor-patient relationship must exist to main-
tain a malpractice suit.43 In addition, a third-party action gives rise to the
possibility of two parties recovering against a defendant under one cause of
action. If the wife and husband both choose to sue a doctor for abuse of the
transference phenomenon, they will be able to do so, each recovering under a
malpractice claim that should be the wife's alone.44
One jurisdiction has allowed a husband to recover against his wife's doc-
tor as a result of the doctor's negligent treatment, but the recovery was not
based on malpractice. The California Supreme Court recognized that a hus-
36. Id at 180, 300 S.E.2d at 840.
37. See Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968) (en banc) (psychiatrist mishandled
the transference phenomenon, stimulated patient's romantic involvement with him, triggering her
divorce and destruction of her family life; court held that patient had a malpractice action); Lan-
dau v. Werner, 105 Sol. J. 257 (Q.B.) (psychiatrist permitted social contacts to intrude upon his
professional treatment of patient, causing her to become suicidal when he stopped the relation-
ship; defendant held guilty of malpractice), aft'd, 105 Sol. J. 1008 (C.A. 1961).
38. (Cal. App. San Diego Super. Ct. July 7, 1981), notedin 68 A.B.A.J. 1353, 1354 (1982). See
also Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 77; 24 ATLA L. REP. 290, 295-97 (1981).
39. Id
40. Id
41. Mrs. Mazza also was seeing Dr. Huffaker as a patient. Their psychiatrist-patient relation-
ship was independent of the relationship between Mr. Mazza and Huffaker. Thus, if Mrs. Mazza
had been subjected to negligent treatment by Huffaker, she, not her husband, should bring the
malpractice claim.
42. Although Mr. Mazza and Dr. Huffaker had a psychiatrist-patient relationship, it did not
encompass the treatment being rendered to Mrs. Mazza. Thus, Dr. Huffaker did not owe Mr.
Mazza a psychiatrist-patient duty.
43. See Easter v. Lexington Memorial Hosp., 303 N.C. 303, 305-06, 278 S.E.2d 253, 255
(1981).
44. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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band had a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when a
doctor's erroneous diagnosis that the wife had syphilis resulted in the breakup
of their marriage.45 The court held that the doctor owed the husband a duty
to exercise due care in diagnosing his wife since the risk of harm from a mis-
diagnosis was reasonably foreseeable.46 The court also held that the husband
had a cause of action for loss of consortium occasioned by the emotional in-
jury to his wife that resulted from the negligent diagnosis. 47
The California case is analogous to Mazza. In each, the negligent medi-
cal treatment of the wife contributed to a breakup of the marriage, resulting in
severe emotional harm to the husband. Neither husband had a doctor-patient
relationship related to the negligent medical treatment. Under the Mazza
analysis, the husband has a malpractice cause of action. Under the California
rule, separate tort actions alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress
and loss of consortium are the proper causes of action. Mr. Mazza could have
sought redress for Huffaker's actions under any of the following claims: (1)
negligent infliction of emotional distress; 48 (2) intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress; 49 (3) loss of consortium; 50 (4) criminal conversation;5' or (5)
breach of contract.52 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, has
stretched medical malpractice principles unnecessarily by allowing Mr. Mazza
to win a verdict by asserting his wife's unasserted claim for abuse of the trans-
ference phenomenon.
Mr. Mazza's recovery for a wrong done to him as a result of his wife's
psychiatric treatment may indicate that North Carolina is liberalizing its view
toward malpractice claimants. The case contradicts North Carolina courts'
conservative attitude toward compensating injured persons for adverse medi-
cal results.53 Certain other rulings in Mazza also portend a more liberal view
toward malpractice claimants and toward malpractice principles in general.
One such ruling was the court of appeals' holding that there was no error in
the trial court's instruction that Huffaker was liable for malpractice if his con-
duct was an "abandonment" of Mr. Mazza as a patient.54
It is generally recognized that a doctor who abandons his patient is guilty
45. Mollen v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930-31, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831, 839 (1980).
46. Id
47. Id at 931, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
48. North Carolina long has recognized the torts of negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981); Stanback v.
Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979); Morrow v. Kings Dep't Stores, 57 N.C. App. 13,
290 S.E.2d 732, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 385, 294 S.E.2d 210 (1982). See generally Byrd, Recov-
ery for MentalAnguish In North Carolina, 58 N.C.L. REV. 435 (1980).
49. See supra note 48.
50. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831
(1980).
51. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 874-88 (4th ed. 1971).
52. See Anclote Manor Found. v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). See
also infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
53. See REP. OF THE N.C. PROF. LIABILITY INS. STUDY COMM'N 3 (Mar. 12, 1976).
54. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 178-79, 300 S.E.2d at 839 (1983); see supra note 22 and accompa-
nying text.
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of malpractice if injury results.55 Abandonment is a unilateral act by the med-
ical practitioner and has been found to exist in cases in which the doctor re-
fused to attend a patient,56 left a patient during an operation,57 failed to attend
to a patient despite a promise to do so,5 8 or discharged a patient prema-
turely.59 Each of these cases involved a doctor's direct action or inaction in
relation to the treatment being rendered. By construing Huffaker's activity
with Mr. Mazza's wife as abandonment, the court recognized that "abandon-
ment" also can be inferred from a doctor's actions that are private and unre-
lated to the patient's treatment.
This holding also could be construed as a rule that a doctor "abandons"
his patient by acting in conflict with the patient's interest, since these conflict-
ing actions would not be conducive to providing proper health care. This
principle, however, would give the patient a right to restrict his doctor's non-
professional activity by the threat of a malpractice suit. Such a result unneces-
sarily expands the scope of negligent malpractice and violates the policies
underlying the cause of action.
Another ruling indicating a more liberal attitude toward malpractice
claimants was the award of damages. Mr. Mazza was awarded $17,000 in
compensatory damages for the cost of medical services rendered to both Mr.
and Mrs. Mazza prior to Huffaker's negligent conduct.60 These damages were
upheld on appeal.61 The court of appeals stated that all medical treatments
given by Huffaker were rendered worthless by his subsequent sexual relations
with Mrs. Mazza.62
This award is unique in two respects. First, prior to Huffaker no North
Carolina court had awarded as damages the cost of medical treatmentsprior to
the negligent act. To the contrary, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
held that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover for medical expenses incurred
prior to the negligence of which he or she complains.63 Mazza may open a
new avenue for plaintiffs seeking malpractice damages. Many innovative ar-
guments now could be made on behalf of plaintiffs suing doctors who have
rendered ongoing treatment. A fatal negligent act by the doctor arguably
would "destroy or make worthless" all treatment administered up until the
negligence.64
55. Wilson v. Martin Memorial Hosp., 232 N.C. 362, 61 S.E.2d 102 (1950).
56. Cortez v. Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980); Vann v. Harden, 187
Va. 555, 47 S.E.2d 314 (1948).
57. Burnett v. Layman, 133 Tenn. 323, 181 S.W. 157 (1915).
58. Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935).
59. Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488 (1967).
60. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 187-88, 300 S.E.2d at 844.
61. Id
62. Id
63. Blaine v. Lyle, 213 N.C. 529, 196 S.E. 833 (1938) (girl who had been treated by doctor for
over one year could not recover expenses incurred for treatment rendered prior to negligent act).
64. A hypothetical situation can demonstrate this point. A patient with a heart condition
must receive treatment regularly over the course of four years. During the last treatment, the
doctor negligently injects the wrong medicine into the patient. As a result the patient must incur a
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The court failed to recognize one important factor in its affirmation of the
award for past medical fees-plaintiff had benefitted from receiving those psy-
chiatric treatments. He was able to work, carry on a family life, and engage in
a relatively normal life during the course of Huffaker's four year treatment.
The award should have been set off by the benefits received by Mr. Mazza.
No subsequent act can make worthless what already was received. 65
The second unique aspect of the compensatory damages award was the
inclusion of Mrs. Mazza's medical expenses. 66 The expenses incurred by Mrs.
Mazza were for treatments she received as a patient of Huffaker, independent
of the treatments Mr. Mazza was receiving. 67 Thus, the award compensates
Mr. Mazza for expenses incurred by another. Here again, the court granted
Mr. Mazza relief under a claim exercisable by his wife, not him.68
Although husbands long have been able to recover their spouse's medical
expenses, a malpractice claim is not the proper vehicle. Florida allowed a
husband to recover expenses in a breach of contract action when the psychia-
trist was found guilty of abusing the counter-transference phenomenon and
causing the wife's suicide.69 The court held that because the psychiatrist
breached a contract with a patient and destroyed the benefit anticipated from
skillful treatment, the party paying for the patient's care was entitled to re-
cover payments made under the contract.70 Recovery also was conditioned
expressly on proof that the psychiatrist's breach destroyed the possibility of
rendering beneficial treatments-the wife's subsequent suicide was proof that
the treatments were not beneficial.7 ' In Mazza, however, there was no finding
that Mrs. Mazza did not benefit from Huffaker's treatments. To the contrary,
testimony at trial tended to show that the treatments received by Mrs. Mazza
were helpful.72
The award of damages for permanent injury also embodies a more liberal
view toward malpractice claimants. Traditionally, North Carolina has main-
tained a high threshold of proof to warrant permanent damage instructions. 73
The evidence must show with reasonable certainty that the injury is perma-
nent.74 The plaintiff must overcome this burden by the greater weight of the
heart transplant or die. In either situation, Mazza would allow the patient or his estate to recover
all medical expenses that the patient had incurred up to that last treatment.
65. In Hess v. Frank, 47 A.D.2d 889, 367 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1975), the court denied a patient's
claim for the cost of past psychiatric treatments. The court held that payments made for treat-
ments rendered were not recoverable.
66. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 187-88, 300 S.E.2d at 844.
67. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
69. Anclote Manor Found. v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
70. Id. at 257.
71. Id.
72. Record at 13 1. The testimony tended to show that the treatment was instrumental in Mrs.
Mazza's reconciliation with her father.
73. See, e.g., Caison v. Cliff, 38 N.C. App. 613, 248 S.E.2d 362 (1978).
74. Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 326, 139 S.E.2d 753, 760 (1965); Caison v. Cliff, 38
N.C. App. 613, 616, 248 S.E.2d 362, 363 (1978).
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evidence.75 The only evidence in Mazza tending to prove a permanent injury
was testimony by plaintiff's expert that Mr. Mazza never again would be able
to form a medical relationship with a psychiatrist. 76 No expert testified that
this would harm plaintiffs mental health permanently.77 No doubt the Mazza
evidence implies some pain and suffering. It is doubtful that the limited expert
testimony met the North Carolina Supreme Court's strict standard of proof of
a reasonable certainty of permanent injury.
Two additional rulings by the court of appeals were incorrect. First, the
court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to allow an expert witness to
state an opinion concerning the professional ethics of Huffaker's conduct. 78 It
is well established that in a malpractice action the psychiatrist's liability is
conditioned on a violation of the standard of care.79 Testimony on ethical
standards is irrelevant to establishing negligence and should have been omit-
ted.80 Also, it is possible that the expert's unnecessary testimony on the ethical
standard confused the jurors and caused them to attribute greater credibility to
the expert's other testimony concerning the proper standard of care. The
court's failure to omit the evidence denied defendant's statutory right to a
judgment based on the standard of care in the community,8 ' and was prejudi-
cial error.
The final error in Mazza was the trial court's instruction that the jury
must find malpractice if it determined that Huffaker continued to treat Mr.
Mazza after becoming emotionally and sexually involved with Mrs. Mazza.82
This instruction preempted the jury's role by conclusively establishing that the
sexual conduct violated the standard of care. The jury was left with only a
factual question whether the couple had sex, not whether having sex violated
the standard of care. Thus, Huffaker was denied his right to a jury determina-
tion of whether he violated the standard of care. Because the instruction had
the same effect as a directed verdict conditioned on a factual finding that the
psychiatrist had sex with the patient's wife, the instruction should have been
ruled prejudicial error.
Mazza significantly expanded medical malpractice principles. Several of
the changes are welcome. Raising the standard of care for psychiatrists,
awarding past medical expenses if offset by the benefits consumed, and de-
creasing the burden of proof for permanent injury will provide more protec-
75. Dolan v. Simpson, 269 N.C. 438, 442, 152 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1967).
76. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 185-86, 300 S.E.2d at 843.
77. The North Carolina Supreme Court historically has required expert testimony to estab-
lish a reasonable certainty of permanent injury. See, e.g., Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 326,
139 S.E.2d 753, 760 (1965).
78. The court did not find error in this testimony because the ethical standard was equivalent
to the standard of care. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 183-84, 300 S.E.2d at 842.
79. Id at 174-75, 300 S.E.2d at 837; N.C. GaN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981).
80. Cf. Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328 (1978) (doctor's breach of the confi-
dentiality of the doctor-patient relationship not recognized as malpractice even though the con-
duct was found to be an ethical violation).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1981), quoted supra note 26.
82. Mazza, 61 N.C. App. at 179-80, 300 S.E.2d at 839; see also supra notes 26-34 and accom-
panying text.
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tion for claimants. Granting third parties a cause of action, defining
"abandonment" of the patient broadly, allowing an expert to prejudice the
jury's decisionmaking role, and giving the trial judge a right to preempt need-
lessly the jury's charge, however, are not desired results. The supreme court
should take action to overrule these aspects of Mazza. If the court is unwilling
to do so, it should at least limit application of the less desirable results to
unique factual situations such as that occuring inMazza. Such a limited inter-
pretation would diminish their effects on North Carolina malpractice princi-
ples since a similar factual pattern is unlikely to occur frequently.
KAREN ANN POPP
Payne v. Cone Mills Corp.: Should A Doctor's Suspicions Bar
A Plaintiff's Meritorious Claim?
Byssinosis, l more commonly referred to as brown lung disease, afflicts
textile workers who are repeatedly exposed to raw cotton dust.2 In North Car-
olina byssinosis is considered an occupational disease.3 A textile worker who
contracts byssinosis is entitled to file a claim for workers' compensation bene-
fits,4 but the claim must be filed within two years5 of the date on which both
prongs of a two-prong test are satisfied. 6 The first prong requires that the
claimant be disabled. The second prong requires that the claimant has been
informed, through a doctor's diagnosis, that his textile job caused or contrib-
uted to his disease. 7 Whether an ambiguous, speculative diagnosis could give
a patient sufficient information to satisfy the notice prong was the central issue
in Payne v. Cone Mills Corp. 8
In Payne the court of appeals held that a claimant, who filed his claim in
1979, had received sufficient notice in 1970 of the occupational nature of his
disease to initiate the two-year limitation period.9 In 1970 Payne's doctor in-
formed him that he "suspected" Payne "might be allergic to some airborne
1. Byssinosis is a disease caused by prolonged exposure to cotton dust with symptoms of
nasal irritation, dry irritating cough, and wheezing respiration of asthmatic character. C. FRAN-
KEL, 5A LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 33.59a, at 82 (rev. ed. 1972).
2. Bouheys, Schoenberg, Beck & Schilling, Epidemiology of Chronic Lung Disease in a Cot-
ton Mill Community, 5 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 607, 616 (Serv-
ice Vol. 1978) (report of study finding excessive chronic lung disease among all types of textile
workers who are exposed to substantial levels of dust including carders, spinners, yarn preparers,
and weavers); Dickie & Chosy, Some Important Occupational Diseases, 3 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE
AND SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 729, 742 (Service Vol. 1975).
3. See Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 101, 301 S.E.2d 359, 369 (1983)
(chronic obstructive lung disease as well as byssinosis compensable occupational disease in North
Carolina); Taylor v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 95, 265 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1980).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53 (1979) authorizes compensation for byssinosis:
The following diseases and conditions only shall be deemed to be occupational diseases
within the meaning of this Article ....
(13) Any disease, other than hearing loss covered in another subdivision of this section,
which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and pecu-
liar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases
of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment.
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1979) provides:
Disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease described
in G.S. 97-53 shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident within the mean-
ing of the North Carolina Worker's Compensation Act and the procedure and practice
and compensation and other benefits provided by said act shall apply in all such cases
5. Id. § 97-58 (b) & (c). See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
6. Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 308 N.C. 701, 712-13, 304 S.E.2d 215, 222 (1983); Taylor
v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 98-99, 265 S.E2d 144, 147 (1980).
7. Taylor v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 97-99, 265 S.E.2d 144, 147-48 (1980).
8. 60 N.C. App. 692, 299 S.E.2d 847 (1983), disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 387, 302 S.E.2d 252
(1983).
9. Id. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850.
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allergen at work."' 0 His claim for disability compensation, fied nine years
after that diagnosis, was barred by expiration of the limitation period. 1 It is
far from certain, however, that the speculative diagnosis Payne received in
1970 was sufficient to apprise him that he had contracted a permanent, disa-
bling, occupational disease, for which he was required to file a claim against
his employer within two years or forego his right to receive compensatory pay-
ment. Although Payne did not receive a conclusive diagnosis of byssinosis
until 1979, the court of appeals held that the earlier, inconclusive diagnosis
was sufficient to begin the limitation period.' 2
The Payne decision reformulates the notice prong of the two-pronged test
established by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Taylor v. JP. Stevens &
Co. 3 Instead of commencing the limitation period on the day the claimant
received actual notice, the Payne decision suggests that a plaintiff must file his
claim when he knew or should have known of the nature and work-related
qualities of his disease. Although the court claimed to have applied the Taylor
rule favoring plaintiff-that a claimant need not file his claim until a doctor
has informed him of the nature and work-related clause of his disease t4-it is
difficult to reach the court's conclusion using the Taylor test. Furthermore,
even if the court intended to follow and apply the Taylor test, the court under-
cut strong policies supporting workers' compensation' 5 in applying the facts to
the test, by evaluating those facts in a light unfavorable to the worker. If
courts follow the Payne approach in similar cases, other claimants may find
their workers' compensation claims barred by the time they learn conclusively
that they are afflicted with a compensable disease.
A better approach, more consistent with the guiding principle of workers'
compensation that "industry '[must] take care of its [own] wreckage,' '"16
would require strict application of Taylor's notice requirement-that the two-
year limitation period does not run until a qualified physician unambiguously
informs the plaintiff of the nature and work-related cause of his disease.' 7
Moreover, in applying this requirement to specific cases, courts should evalu-
ate the knowledge that each plaintiff actually gained from his diagnosis in
light of all surrounding circumstances, including the plaintiff's education, the
specificity of the diagnosis, and the extent to which workers generally were
aware of the particular occupational hazard at the time the diagnosis was
given. If these guidelines had been followed the Payne court probably would
not have barred plaintiff's claim.
The facts of the Payne case were as follows. Claimant James R. Payne, a
10. Id. at 696, 299 S.E.2d at 849.
11. Id. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850.
12. Id.
13. 300 N.C. 94, 97-99, 265 S.E.2d 144, 147-48 (1980).
14. Payne, 60 N.C. App. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850.
15. See, e.g., Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943).
16. Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 14,282 S.E.2d 458, 468 (1981) (quoting Barber
v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943)).
17. Taylor, 300 N.C. at 101, 265 S.E.2d at 148.
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cotton mill worker, had received hospital treatment in 1970 for asthmatic
bronchitis secondary to exposure to textile particles. His doctor advised him
not to return to work because he "suspected that he might be allergic to some
airborne allergen at work."' 18 It was not until 1979 that Payne was diagnosed
conclusively as having byssinosis.19 Although the Industrial Commission
ruled that the doctor had not advised Payne of the nature and work-related
cause of his disease in 1970, the court of appeals held that the evidence did not
support this ruling. Therefore, plaintiff's claim was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.20
In making its determination, the court of appeals addressed two ques-
tions: (1) did the court in Taylor correctly construe sections 97-58(b) and 97-
58(c); and (2) given a proper construction, did the Industrial Commission cor-
rectly find the facts? In conclusory language, the court stated that to satisfy
section 97-58 the communication by the physician to the plaintiff must inform
the plaintiff of the nature and work-related cause of the disease and his result-
ing disability. The court decided that the physician's 1970 diagnosis had satis-
fied the statutory requirements. 2 ' A study of the Payne evidence and the facts
found by the appellate court raises a significant question whether the court
actually applied the test it outlined.
In Taylor, when the North Carolina Supreme Court first instituted the
requirement that the claimant be informed of the nature and work-related
cause of his disease, the court construed ambiguous language in North Caro-
lina General Statutes section 97-58, subsections (b) and (c), by interpreting the
legislature's intent.22 The statute provides:
(b) . ..The time of notice of an occupational disease shall run from
the date that the employee has been advised by competent medical
authority that he has the same.
(c) The right to compensation for occupational disease shall be
barred unless a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within
two years after death, disability, or disablement as the case may be.
23
The court reasoned that if a literal interpretation of the language of the statute
contravened the manifest purpose of the statute, the goals behind the statute
should control.24
Construing the statute in this light, the court has held that the time period
begins running upon the occurrence of two events: disability and notice.
First, to be disabled, an employee must have suffered injury from an occupa-
tional disease that renders him incapable of earning the wages he was receiv-
18. Payne, 60 N.C. App. at 696, 299 S.E.2d at 849.
19. Id. at 695, 299 S.E.2d at 848-49.
20. Id. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850. The plaintiff must establish compliance with the statute's
two-year time limit for the Industrial Commission to have jurisdiction over his claim. See infra
note 29.
21. Payne, 60 N.C. App. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850.
22. Taylor, 300 N.C. at 10 1-02, 265 S.E.2d at 148. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58 (b) & (c) (1979).
24. Taylor, 300 N.C. at 102, 265 S.E.2d at 148-49.
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ing when the incapacitating injury occurred. 25 Second, an employee is
considered "on notice" when he is first advised by a physician that he has the
disease, even though disability may have occurred much earlier.26 Recogniz-
ing that byssinosis is an "insidious" 27 disease with peculiar associated
problems, the Taylor court held that an employee is not informed of his dis-
ease until a physician notifies him of "the nature and work-related quality of
the disease." 28 This standard was designed to reduce the likelihood that una-
ware deserving claimants might lose their compensation rights by passage of
time.2 9
In 1981 the North Carolina Court of Appeals had two occasions to apply
the Taylor notification standard. In Poythress v. J.P. Stevens and Co. 3 0 plain-
tiff's physician diagnosed her condition as byssinosis resulting from "inhala-
tion of cotton lint fibers leading to a disease of the lung characterized by
foreign body reaction in a febrile but coughing patient. '31 The diagnosis was
made in 1963. As a result of her doctor's diagnosis and recommendation,
claimant retired five months later. She did not file a claim for workers' com-
25. See Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 308 N.C. 701, 709, 304 S.E.2d 215, 220 (1983) (a
worker is incapable of earning wages that he was receiving when he is unable to work as he had in
the past; whether claimant still was able to earn the same hourly wage was not determinative of
the question).
26. Id. at 706, 304 S.E.2d at 218 (1983); Taylor, 300 N.C. at 102, 265 S.E.2d at 149.
27. Taylor, 300 N.C. at 101, 265 S.E.2d at 148.
28. Id., at 102, 265 S.E.2d at 149. See also McCall v. Cone Mills Corp., 61 N.C. App. 118,
122-23, 300 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1983); Payne, 60 N.C. App. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850; McKee v.
Crescent Spinning Co., 54 N.C. App. 558, 561, 284 S.E.2d 175, 178 (1981).
29. Although the courts reduced the likelihood that unsuspecting diseased claimants might
lose their right to receive compensation, the courts heightened the procedural requirements re-
lated to this statute. See Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 398 N.C. 701, 704-05, 304 S.E.2d 215,
218 (1983); Poythress v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 54 N.C. App. 376, 378-79, 283 S.E.2d 573, 576-77
(1981). For example, § 97-58(c) is not considered a statute of limitations to be pleaded and proved
by the defendants. Instead, in Poythress the court of appeals held that the section's two-year time
limit is a condition precedent with which plaintiffs must comply before jurisdiction is conferred on
the Industrial Commission. Poythress, 54 N.C. App. at 378-79, 283 S.E.2d at 576-77; Dowdy., 308
N.C at 704, 304 S.E.2d at 218. Because the claimant bears the burden of proving that his claim
was filed timely, failure to meet this condition creates an absolute jurisdictional bar. Unlike a
statute of limitations, for which the jurisdictional bar may be waived by the defendant's failure to
raise it, an employer cannot waive the bar caused by the expiration of the workers' compensation
period. Poythress, 54 N.C. App. at 379, 283 S.E.2d at 577. See also Dowdy, 308 N.C. at 705, 304
S.E.2d at 218 (jurisdiction is challengeable at any time throughout the proceeding).
Since § 97-58(c) creates a condition precedent to establishing the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Commission, appellate courts must review de novo the evidence supporting an Industrial Com-
mission ruling on whether the claimant filed his claim within the prescribed time period. Lucas v.
Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976); Richards v. Nationwide Homes, 263 N.C.
295, 303-04, 139 S.E.2d 645, 651 (1965). The Industrial Commission's findings of substantive facts
are conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (1979)
states: "The award of the Industrial Commission. . .shall be conclusive and binding as to all
questions of fact, but either party to the dispute may. . . appeal from the decision of said Com-
mission to the court of appeals for errors of law .... " See also Walston v. Burlington Indus.,
304 N.C. 670, 677, 285 S.E.2d 822, 828 (1981), amended on reh'g, 305 N.C. 296, 285 S.E.2d 822
(1983); Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 6, 282 S.E.2d 458, 464 (1981). Jurisdictional
facts found by the Industrial Commission are not conclusive on appeal, however, because jurisdic-
tion is a question of law. Higher courts have the power and, indeed, the duty to consider all the
evidence in the record, and make independent findings of jurisdictional facts. Lucas, 289 N.C. at
218, 221 S.E.2d at 261; Richards, 263 N.C. at 303-04, 139 S.E.2d at 651.
30. 54 N.C. App. 376, 283 S.E.2d 573 (1981).
31. Id. at 378, 283 S.E.2d at 575.
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pensation until 1977.32 The court of appeals held that plaintiff had been in-
formed of the nature and work-related cause of her disease in 1963.
33
In McKee v. Crescent Spinning Co. 34 the court of appeals reached the op-
posite result. Claimant, Roy E. McKee, filed his claim in 1978, twelve years
after a doctor informed him that he had "a breathing problem"35 and "if it
doesn't get better soon he had better get out of the mill." 36 Four years after
McKee's first diagnosis, another physician told him that he had "brown lung."
Neither physician, however, further explained the cause of his sickness. Mc-
Kee continued to work in the mill until 1971. 37 The McKee court considered
the recommendation to "get out of the mill" only an admonition, not specific
enough to relay the causation of the breathing problem to claimant. The
"brown lung" diagnosis, which was clearly meaningless to claimant, also
failed to explain the cause of the disease.38
The Taylor court adopted the "nature and work-related cause" formula-
tion of the notice requirement because it found that the legislature never in-
tended that (1) a plaintiff would have to make a correct medical diagnosis of
his own condition prior to notification from a doctor to make his claim timely,
or that (2) the statutory scheme would be construed to render the time for
notice and filing of the claim inequitably short.39 In the McKee opinion, the
court of appeals noted a third justification for the notice requirement: a plain-
tiff should not be required to inquire further and discover the relationship
between his condition and his employment if his doctor fails to inform him
adequately. 40
The court of appeals' ruling in Payne violated all three of these policies.
By finding that Payne indeed had been informed of the nature and work-re-
32. Id.
33. Id. at 383, 283 S.E.2d at 578.
34. 54 N.C. App. 558, 284 S.E.2d 175 (1981).
35. Id. at 559, 284 S.E.2d at 176.
36. Id. at 562, 284 S.E.2d at 178.
37. Id. at 559, 284 S.E.2d at 176.
38. Id. at 562, 284 S.E.2d at 178.
39. Taylor, 300 N.C. at 102,265 S.E.2d at 149. North Carolina's workers' compensation time
limitation rule is more favorable to plaintiffs than other states' rules. There are six different rules
for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run on a workers' compensation claim.
See Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 277 (1950). Arranged from the most to the least onerous to plaintiffs, the
time limitation period begins to run (1) at the time the negligent act occurred; (2) at the time of the
last industrial exposure; (3) when the disease is contracted; (4) whenever the plaintiff should have
known of the disease's causation; (5) when disability results; and (6) the North Carolina approach,
see supra text accompanying notes 25-29. The numerous philosophies embraced by the states are
a product of their differing statutes and judicial interpretations.
When the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the Taylor test instead of a "knew or
should have known" standard, the court placed Norii Carolina among the states lending the most
favorable treatment to workers' compensation plaintiffs stricken with byssinosis. As noted by Tay-
Jor, the "insidious" nature of byssinosis with its peculiar associated problems requires a liberal
reading of § 97-58 to afford plaintiffs their rightful opportunity to file claim. Taylor, 300 N.C. at
97, 265 S.E.2d at 146. By comparison to other states' positions, North Carolina could have pro-
vided more liberal treatment to plaintiffs only by construing § 97-58 as a statute of limitations, cf.
McKinney v. Feldspar Corp., 612 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tenn. 1981) (construing that state's versions of
§ 97-58) instead of a jurisdictional condition precedent.
40. McKee, 54 N.C. App. at 563, 284 S.E.2d at 178.
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lated cause of his disease4' when his physician only had advised him that he
"suspected" the disease was connected causally to Payne's occupation,42 the
court of appeals implied that Payne either should have diagnosed his own
condition based on information from which a qualified medical doctor could
only speculate, or should have inquired further about the relationship between
his condition and his employment by seeking a second, more concrete opinion.
By holding that such a vague diagnosis triggered the statutory time period, the
court of appeals rendered the time for filing the claim inequitably short.43
Implicit in the Payne court's holding is the notion that, in 1970, Payne
knew or should have known from his doctor's diagnosis that he had contracted
a compensable occupational disease. It is, however, not at all certain that
Payne knew anything at all about byssinosis in 1970. Textile workers gener-
ally were poorly educated about the symptoms of byssinosis and their rights to
compensation for occupational disability.44 It was not until 1980, ten years
after Payne's diagnosis, that a widely read North Carolina newspaper publi-
cized the problem of byssinosis.45 If the Payne court had considered claim-
ant's probable lack of knowledge about the disease in 1970, it is doubtful that
it would have found his doctor's speculative diagnosis to be sufficient notifica-
tion to start the running of the statutory time period.
In two other cases decided later in 1983, North Carolina courts again held
that the Industrial Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims
because more than two years had elapsed since the plaintiffs were informed of
the nature and work-related cause of their diseases. The facts in these cases,
McCall v. Cone Mills, Inc. 46 and Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. ,47 however,
strongly indicated that the plaintiffs actually had received notice, as required
in section 97-58, of their occupational diseases. The McCall case was decided
just one month after the court of appeals rendered the Payne decision. In that
case claimant's decedent, Martin McCall, had been diagnosed as suffering
from "allergic pneumonitis due to exposure to cotton fibers and hypertensive
vascular disease."'48 The record was unclear whether his doctor told him that
he had byssinosis.49 Shortly after discharge from the hospital, decedent re-
tired, in part because his physician had informed him that "his lungs were full
of lint" and it's "going to kill you."' 50 From this evidence, the McCall court
found that decedent had been informed sufficiently of his disease, its nature,
41. Payne, 60 N.C. App. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850.
42. Id. at 696, 299 S.E.2d at 849.
43. But see Poythress, 54 N.C. App. at 375, 283 S.E.2d at 579 (A claimant has no right to be
told that he has a claim for workers' compensation; he need be told only the nature and work-
related aspect of his disease for the two-year time limit to begin to run.).
44. See Poythress, 54 N.C. App. at 381, 283 S.E.2d at 579.
45. See Brown Lung: A Case of Deadly Neglect, The Charlotte Observer, Feb. 3-10, 1980
(byssinosis series). This Pulitzer Prize winning feature documented the varied aspects of byssi-
nosis for the paper's approximately 170,000 readers.
46. 61 N.C. App. 118, 300 S.E.2d 245 (1983).
47. 308 N.C. 70, 304 S.E.2d 215 (1983).
48. McCall, 61 N.C. App. at 121, 300 S.E.2d at 247.
49. Id. at 120-21, 300 S.E.2d at 246-47.
50. Id. at 121, 300 S.E.2d at 247.
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and its relation to his work to begin the running of the two-year time limit.5 '
Five months after the Payne case, the North Carolina Supreme Court
reviewed the same time-limit jurisdiction issue in Dowdy.52 Like McCall,
Dowdy presented much stronger evidence supporting the expiration of the
two-year limit than Payne. Five years before Dowdy filed his claim for work-
ers' compensation, his doctor informed him that he was "severely disabled and
he should not be exposed any further to airborne irritants namely cigarette
smoke and industrial dust."53 The examining doctor also stated that the "im-
pairment isprobaby due in part to the cotton dust exposure in spite of the fact
that the diagnosis of byssinosis is not warranted in view of the only occasional
occurrence of complaints in relation to cotton dust exposure."'54 The doctor
found that Dowdy, a cigarette smoker, had chronic obstructive lung disease
with distinct aggravation by cotton dust exposure.55 He encouraged Dowdy to
refrain from smoking and avoid exposure to cotton dust.5 6 On this evidence,
the court held that Dowdy had been informed by a medical authority of his
occupational disease, its nature, and its relation to his employment. Appar-
ently, when Dowdy's doctor told him that his disease "severely restricted his
ability to breath," he was informed of the nature of the disease. By relating
the disease "to cotton dust in [Dowdy's] work envirvonment at the defendant's
mill," the doctor was deemed to have informed Dowdy of the work-related
cause.57 Although chronic obstructive lung disease was not recognized as a
compensable disease in 1973, 58 that fact was irrelevant for section 97-58
purposes.59
The Taylor court may have intended its two-pronged test to establish a
bright-line standard that would require all questions of doubtful notification
to be resolved in the claimant's favor.60 If that was the court's intention, it has
been obscured by the holdings of Poythress, McKee, McCall, Dowdy, and
Payne. These five cases do not fall on one side or the other of a bright-line
51. Id. at 122-23, 300 S.E.2d at 247.
52. 308 N.C. at 701, 304 S.E.2d at 215.
53. Id. at 707, 304 S.E.2d at 219.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 706, 304 S.E.2d at 219.
57. Id. at 712-13, 304 S.E.2d at 222.
58. See Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yam, 308 N.C. 85, 101, 301 S.E.2d 359, 369 (1983)(chronic obstructive lung disease recognized as a compensable occupational disease under certain
circumstances); Note, Workers' Compensation-Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yam: Leaving
Precedent in the Dust?, 62 N.C.L. REv. 573 (1984).
59. Poythress, 54 N.C. App. at 380, 283 S.E.2d at 576.
60. Although § 97-58 is a condition precedent to obtaining jurisdiction, Poythress, 54 N.C.
App. at 375-79, 283 S.E.2d at 576-77; Dowdy, 308 N.C. at 704,304 S.E.2d at 218; see supra note 29,
it closely resembles a statute of limitations in its purpose. See Lunkin v. Triangle Farm, Inc., 208
La. 538, 543, 23 So. 2d 209, 210 (1945) (discussing purposes of a workers' compensation statute of
limitations). The North Carolina Supreme Court has cautioned that "'the statute of limitations
... is not such a meritorious defense that [judicial interpretation] should be strained in aid of
it.' Hardbarger v. Deal, 258 N.C. 31, 35, 127 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1962) (quoting Rochester v. Tub,
54 Wash. 2d 71, 74, 337 P.2d 1062, 1064 (1959)). By analogy, courts should not stretch facts
unnecessarily in defendant's favor to find that the two-year time limit prescribed by § 97-58 has
expired.
1984] 1453
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
standard, but may be arranged more appropriately along a continuum of fact
situations-ranging from those with facts clearly showing that the plaintiff had
received notice sufficient to satisfy the Taylor test to those with facts demon-
strating that the plaintiff had received no diagnosis that triggered the running
of the statute. McCall and Poythress may be placed together at one end of the
continuum because they both exemplify situations in which plaintiff clearly
received the notice mandated by Taylor; both claimants received affirmative
diagnoses that their diseases were caused by cotton lint.61 McKee appears at
the other end of the continuum because its facts show that plaintiff did not
receive adequate Taylor notice. A doctor advised McKee to leave the mill
only if his condition failed to improve, but did not even speculate about the
cause of the disease. 62 From this, McKee could draw only a vague inference
that his mill work either aggravated or contributed to his already well-devel-
oped disease. The Dowdy facts fall between these two ends, closer to the no-
tice end. The diagnosis that Dowdy's condition was "probably" due to cotton
dust63 indicated that the doctor offered his opinion within a reasonable degree
of medical certainty. Given the very nature of the disease, affirmative diagno-
sis often is difficult.64 Thus, this diagnosis was sufficient to notify a plaintiff
according to the Taylor guidelines.
The Payne facts fall somewhere between the notice in Dowdy and the lack
of notice in McKee. Dowdy was told that his disease was "probably" caused
by cotton dust;65 Payne's physician only "suspected" that his breathing
problems resulted from agents in the mill environment. 66 The court of appeals
implied that Payne knew or should have known from this diagnosis that he
had an occupational disease. 67 McKee, on the other hand, did not have even
the benefit of speculation as to the cause of his disease.68
By implicitly holding Payne to a "knew or should have known" standard
of notification, the Payne court transformed section 97-58 from a claimant-
favorable statute, as construed by the Taylor and McKee courts, to a defend-
ant-favorable statute. Payne permitted a speculative diagnosis, rendered at a
time when public awareness of the byssinosis problem was minimal, to satisfy
the Taylor rule. The holding in Payne circumvented the purpose of the statute
by causing the time limit to run before claimant received actual notification of
the nature and cause of his disease.
Payne's departure from the Taylor approach should not be followed and
should be disapproved by the North Carolina Supreme Court. In future cases
the North Carolina appellate courts should hold that the two-year limitation
61. McCall, 61 N.C. App. at 120-23, 300 S.E.2d at 246-47; Poythress, 54 N.C. App. at 378,
283 S.E.2d at 575.
62. McKee, 54 N.C. App. at 561-62, 284 S.E.2d at 178.
63. Dowdy, 308 N.C. at 707, 304 S.E.2d at 219.
64. See Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 640, 256 S.E.2d 692, 696 (1979).
65. Dowdy, 308 N.C. at 708, 304 S.E.2d at 221.
66. Payne, 60 N.C. App. at 696, 299 S.E.2d at 849.
67. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
68. McKee, 54 N.C. App. at 561, 284 S.E.2d at 178.
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period does not begin to run until a qualified physician unambiguously informs
the plaintiff of the nature and work-related cause of his disease. In each case,
the question whether the claimant was adequately informed about his disease
should be answered with reference to the plaintiffs individual knowledge and
the overall public awareness of the occupational disease at the time of the
diagnosis. Courts should guard against any construction of section 97-58 that
would permit the time limit to run before the claimant receives meaningful
notification of the nature and cause of his disease.
TAMARA PATTERSON BARRINGER
Diaz v. United States Textile Corp.: Accidental Injuries Arising
Out of and In the Course of Employment
An injury is compensable under the North Carolina Workers' Compensa-
tion Act' only if it is an "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment . *... 2 The worker need not show negligence attributable to
the employer, and contributory negligence on the part of the claimant is not a
bar to compensation.3 In Diaz v. United States Textile Corporation,4 however,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals denied compensation to an employee
and intimated that the employee's contributory negligence was the basis for
the court's refusal to affirm the Industrial Commission's award of compensa-
tion.5 If the contributory negligence doctrine was the basis for the court's de-
cision, the Diaz holding represents an erroneous application of North
Carolina's workers' compensation law.6 This note examines the Diaz court's
construction of the phrase "injury by accident arising out of and in the course
of employment."
Carlos Diaz worked as an electrician for defendant. The Industrial Com-
mission found that his duties included installing certain machines in defend-
ant's textile plant, and adapting the machines to the existing voltage at the
plant.7 In the course of these duties, Diaz entered one of the electrical substa-
tions located on defendant's premises to determine whether the power source
"was resistant enough to bear the load of the charge that was going to be put
upon it . . . He gained entrance to the enclosed sub-station by placing a
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
2. Id § 97-2(6) (1979). This phrase has been the subject of much judicial analysis. See,
e.g., Note, Workmen's Compensation-Accident Arising Out of and In Course of Employment In
North Carolina, 10 N.C.L. REv. 373, 373 (1932).
There is only one exception to the rule that an injury must occur accidentally to be compensa-
ble: occupational diseases are compensable even though they do not occur as the result of acci-
dent. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1979).
3. This change in the common law resulted from the fact that,
[w]orkers' compensation laws were a statutory compromise. The ... acts assured work-
ers compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment without
their having to prove negligence on the part of the employer. In exchange for the em-
loyer's loss of common law defenses... the employee gave up his right to common
aw verdicts .... In effect, tort liability was replaced with no fault liability.
Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C. App. 124, 125, 284 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1981), disc. rev'denied, 305 N.C.
395, 290 S.E.2d 364 (1982). Furthermore, "'It is generally conceded by all courts that the various
compensation acts were intended to eliminate the fault of the workman as a basis for denying
recovery.'" Archie v. Greene Bros. Lumber Co., 222 N.C. 477, 480, 23 S.E.2d 834, 836 (1943)(quoting Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 199 N.C. 28, 33, 153 S.E. 594, 596 (1930)). See also Hartley
v. North Carolina Prison Dep't, 258 N.C. 287, 289, 128 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1962); Vause v. Vause
Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88,91,63 S.E.2d 173, 175-76 (1951);see infra note 31 and accompany-
ing text.
4. 60 N.C. App. 712, 299 S.E.2d 843, disc. rep. denied, 308 N.C. 386, 302 S.E.2d 250 (1983).
5. The court found that claimant's injuries were not the result of an accident because he
"should have known" that his actions would result in "severe electrical bums." Id at 717, 299
S.E.2d at 846.
6. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
7. Diaz, 60 N.C. App. at 714, 299 S.E.2d at 845.
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wooden stepladder against the fence ... and climbing over [it]." 8 While in-
side, Diaz "made an inspection of the transformer and discovered a piece of
wood, approximately two to three feet long resting between a wire and one of
the transformers. He did nothing about the board at that time, and left the
sub-station."9 After a coffee break, Diaz "decided to reenter the substation
and remove the piece of wood to avoid a serious accident . . . . When he
reached the piece of wood, he gave it a hard blow with his left hand. . .[and]
received a great electrical shock."' 0 As a result, both of plaintiffs arms had to
be amputated.""II
The Commission found that claimant "sustained an injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment,' 12 and awarded compen-
sation. The court of appeals reversed.' 3 The evidence presented to the Com-
mission was conflicting. First, evidence was presented that cast doubt on
whether the injury was an accident. The court noted the alleged existence of a
suicide note.' 4 Furthermore, Diaz offered contradictory explanations of why
he attempted to remove the board-initially explaining that "he needed a
board inside the fence,"' 5 but later testifying that "the piece of wood could fall
and provoke an accident, so I decided to remove it."'16 Moreover, both Diaz's
coworkers and others investigating the incident testified that they found no
board inside the substation.' 7 Second, evidence was presented that cast doubt
on whether Diaz's injury occurred "in the course of employment." Diaz had
never entered the electrical substation before' 8 and had not been directed to
do so.' 9
Although these factors cast doubt on the Commission's decision, "[tihe
finding of the Commission. . .is conclusive if supported by any competent
evidence." 20 The court's review is "limited. . .to two questions of law...:
(1) Whether or not there was any competent evidence before the Commission
to support its findings of fact; and (2) whether or not the findings of fact...
justify. . . the legal conclusions and decisions."' 2' Thus, the determination of




11. Id at 713, 299 S.E.2d at 844.
12. Id at 714, 299 S.E.2d at 845.
13. Id at 717, 299 S.E.2d at 847.
14. Id The record does not state when, and under what circumstances, the alleged suicide
note written by plaintiff was found. The court deemed it unnecessary to consider defendant's
contention that the note should be admitted into evidence because of the court's disposition of the
case. Id
15. Id at 716, 299 S.E.2d at 846. A deputy sheriff testified that Diaz offered this explanation
to him at Duke Hospital. Id
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id at 714, 299 S.E.2d at 845.
19. Id at 716, 299 S.E.2d at 846.
20. Cole v. Guilford County, 259 N.C. 724, 726, 131 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1963).
21. Henry v. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 447, 449, 57 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1950).
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question of law and fact,22 one in which the court must give due regard to the
Commission's findings.
The statutory condition that an injury is compensable only if caused by
an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment" is intended to
separate work-related injuries from nonwork-related injuries.23 Its primary
function is to determine the relationship between injury and employment.24
The test is composed of three parts, the first of which requires that the injury
be the result of an accident.25 The North Carolina courts define "accident" as
"an unlooked for and untoward event. . not expected or designed by the
person who suffers the injury."26 An accidental injury is fortuitous and
unintentional. 27
The court in Diaz, however, held that the evidence did not satisfy the
requirements of injury by accident. 28 This was because the claimant, "an ex-
perienced electrician, should have known that if he hit a wet board with his
bare hand while standing on wet grass and while the board was resting on a
wire with at least 3,000 volts of electricity running through it, he would receive
severe electrical burns."'29
Whether a claimant "should have known" is not the appropriate test;
rather, the standard is whether claimant "expected or designed" the injury3 0
The court's holding implies that Diaz's injuries were not by accident because
he was negligent. The court's finding was an erroneous application of work-
ers' compensation law because even gross negligence is no defense to a com-
pensation claim.31 The elimination of contributory negligence is a foundation
of the Workers' Compensation Act.32
The second and third requirements of the test, that the accident "arise out
of" and "in the course of" employment "are not, and should not be, applied
entirely independently . . . . [D]eficiencies in the strength of one factor are
sometimes allowed to be made up by strength in the other."33 At this point,
however, it will be helpful to examine the phrases separately.
The phrase "arising out of the employment" refers to the origin or cause
of the injury.34 It is not enough that the injury occurs at the workplace; rather,
it must be "a natural and probable consequence or incident of the employment
and a natural result of one of its risks, so that there is some causal relation
22. Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977).
23. Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 281, 225 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1976).
24. Id
25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1979).
26. Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n Coop., 246 N.C. 274, 278, 98 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1957).
27. See Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co., 217 N.C. 468, 472, 8 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1940).
28. Diaz, 60 N.C. App. at 717-18, 299 S.E.2d at 846.
29. Id at 717, 299 S.E.2d at 846 (emphasis added).
30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
31. Hartley v. North Carolina Prison Dep't, 258 N.C. 287, 289, 128 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1962).
32. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
33. Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 281, 225 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1976) (quoting 1
A. LARsoN, WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION LAW § 29.00 (1972)).
34. Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 238, 188 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1972).
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between the injury and the performance of some service of the employ-
ment."35 Furthermore, the risk generally must be one that a reasonable per-
son would assume to be "incidental to the service when he entered the
employment." 36
The employee in question, however, need not have perceived the risk
before the injury occurred. It is sufficient that the injury be "one which, after
the event, may be seen to have had its origin in the employment."
37 If it
originated in the employment, it need not be shown that it ought to have been
foreseen or expected.38
The court in Diaz did not explicitly address whether plaintiff's injury
arose out of the employment, but implied that it did not. Diaz's duties, accord-
ing to the court, did not include having to connect the wiring from the substa-
tion to the machinery, nor was Diaz directed by his superiors to enter the
substation. 39 Furthermore, even if one of his duties was to check the voltage
in the substation, Diaz had completed the duty before he reentered the substa-
tion.40 Therefore, the court seemed to imply that the claimant was acting
outside the scope of his employment by reentering the substation and attempt-
ing to remove the board.4 1
If the court intended to imply that Diaz's injury did not arise out of the
employment, such a finding is incorrect. Whether Diaz's duties included
checking the power source does not determine whether the injury arose out of
the employment. An employee may perform a task beyond the scope of his
assigned duties if he reasonably believes that it will further his employer's
interests.4 2 The Commission believed Diaz's explanation that he was attempt-
ing to eliminate a safety hazard, and therefore properly may have found that
Diaz reasonably believed that he was furthering his employer's interests. A
reviewing court is bound by the Commission's finding if any competent evi-
dence exists to support it.4 3
35. Perry v. American Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 274, 136 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1964). See also
Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448,455, 162 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1968) ("When an injury cannot fairly be
traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause, or if it comes from a hazard...
common to others, it does not arise out of the employment.").
36. Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 239, 188 S.E.2d 350, 354. See also Allred v. Allred-
Gardner, Inc., 253 N.C. 554, 557, 117 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1960) ("Where any reasonable relationship
to the employment exists, or employment is a contributory cause, the court is justified in uphold-
ing the award as 'arising out of employment.' ").
37. Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 726, 153 S.E. 266, 269 (1930).
38. Id at 726, 153 S.E. at 269. See also Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 438, 132
S.E.2d 865, 868 (1963).
39. Diaz, 60 N.C. App. at 717, 299 S.E.2d at 846.
40. Id
41. Id
42. According to Professor Larson, "an employee who honestly attempts to serve his em-
ployer's interests by some act outside of his fixed duties should not be held to the exercise of
infallible judgment on what best serves those interests." I LARSON, supra note 33, at § 27.12.
Accord Stubblefield v. Watson Elec. Co., 277 N.C. 444, 177 S.E.2d 882 (1970); Guest v. Brenner
Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 85 S.E.2d 596 (1955). For application of this doctrine to the "in
the course of employment" part of the test, see infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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The third requirement of the test, that the employee be injured "in the
course of the employment," refers "to the time, place and circumstances under
which an accidental injury occurs." 44 Since there was no dispute that Diaz
was injured during his working hours and on his employer's premises, only the
"circumstances" part of the test need be considered here. "[W]here the em-
ployee is engaged in activity which he is authorized to undertake and which is
calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the employer's business, ' 4 the cir-
cumstances are said to be within the course of employment.
The court of appeals relied in part upon Diaz's apparent lack of authority
to enter the substation in holding that the injury did not occur in the course of
employment.46 Whether Diaz was authorized to enter the substation, how-
ever, is not dispositive. If he "had reasonable grounds to believe that the act
. . . was incidental to his employment, or. . . would prove beneficial to his
employer's interest. . ., compensation may be recovered, since then a causal
connection between the employment and the accident may be established." 47
If Diaz reasonably believed that his act was either incidental to his employ-
ment or beneficial to his employer's interest, then compensation was proper.
A second reason for the court's finding that Diaz's injury did not occur in
the course of employment was that, under either of the explanations Diaz gave
for his behavior, he acted outside the scope of his employment. The court held
that Diaz "was not doing what a man so employed may reasonably do at a
time he was employed and at a place where he may have been during the time
to do that thing."48
The court's decision may have been influenced by Diaz's contradictory
explanations of why he hit the board, the testimony that no board was found
inside the substation after the accident, and the alleged existence of a suicide
note.49 All of these factors suggest that Diaz may have intended to injure or
kill himself. If this were so, Diaz's injuries would not be the result of an acci-
dent,50 and denial of compensation would be proper.5 ' The weighing of this
44. Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 238, 188 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1972).
45. Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448, 456, 162 S.E.2d 47, 53 (1968).
46. Diaz, 60 N.C. App. at 717, 299 S.E. 2d at 846.
47. Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448, 456, 162 S.E.2d 47, 53 (1964). The supreme court held
in 1982 that:
"[C]ompensability of a claim basically turns upon whether or not the employee was act-
ing for the benefit of his employer 'to any appreciable extent' when the accident occurred
. . . Such a determination depends largely upon the unique facts of each particular
case, and, in close cases, the benefit of the doubt. . . should be given to the employee in
accordance with the established policy of liberal construction and application of the
Workers' Compensation Act."
Hoffman v. Ryder Truck Lines, 306 N.C. 502, 506, 293 S.E.2d 807, 810 (1982) (quoting Guest v.
Brenner Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 452, 85 S.E.2d 596, 600 (1955)).
48. Diaz, 60 N.C. App. at 717, 299 S.E.2d at 846.
49. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
50. Under the generally accepted definition of the term "accident," the injury must not have
been "expected or designed" by the employee. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
51. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12(3) (1979), which states in pertinent part: "No compensation
shall be payable if the injury or death to the employee was proximately caused by:. . . (3) His
willful intention to injure or kill himself or another."
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evidence is within the province of the Industrial Commission, however, and
must be accepted as fact by a reviewing court if supported by any competent
evidence.52 Applying the Commission's findings of fact to the law, an award
of compensation was proper.
The Diaz decision represents an erroneous application of workers' com-
pensation law and should be overruled expressly by the North Carolina
Supreme Court. By holding that the claimant's injuries did not arise by acci-
dent because he "should have known" that injury would result from his ac-
tions, the court of appeals incorrectly interjected the concept of contributory
negligence into workers' compensation law.53 By rejecting the Commission's
findings that Diaz reasonably believed his actions were incidental to his em-
ployment and would further his employer's interests, the court of appeals re-
jected findings of fact that were supported by competent evidence and were
therefore binding on the court. Until Diaz is disapproved by a higher court it
may invite the Industrial Commission and other panels of the court of appeals
to deny meritorious claims under a misconception of the law.
PAUL R. MARR
52. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 3, 31, and accompanying text.
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North Carolina General Statutes Section 97-31: Must it
Provide Exclusive Compensation for Workers who Suffer
Scheduled Injuries?
The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act' establishes three ave-
nues of compensation for injured workers. First, section 97-29 provides bene-
fits to workers who are unable to work as a result of an injury.2 Second,
section 97-30 makes benefits available to workers who are able to earn some
wages but less than the amount that they were earning prior to their injury.3
The amount of compensation awarded to workers under these two sections is
determined by the duration of a worker's disability.4 Finally, section 97-31
awards compensation to workers even if they suffer no diminution of earning
capacity as a result of their injury.5 Unlike sections 97-29 and 97-30, compen-
sation under section 97-31 is limited to a fixed duration and a list of specifi-
cally enumerated injuries.6 This compensation is "in lieu of all other
I. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
2. The pertinent part of id. § 97-29 (Cum. Supp. 1983) provides:
Except as hereinafter otherwise provided, where the incapacity for work resulting
from the injury is total, the employer shall pay or cause to be paid, as hereinafter pro-
vided, to the injured employee during such total disability a weekly compensation equal
to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66S%) of his average weekly wages, but not more
than the amount established annually to be effective October I as provided herein, nor
less than thirty dollars ($30.00) per week.
3. The pertinent part ofid. § 97-30 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in G.S. 97-31, where the incapacity for work resulting
from the injury is partial, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid, as hereinafter
provided, to the injured employee during such disability, a weekly compensation equal
to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66%%) of the difference between his average weekly
wages before the injury and the average weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter,
but not more than the amount established annually to be effective October 1 as provided
in G.S. 97-29 a week, and in no case shall the period covered by such compensation be
greater than 300 weeks from the date of injury.
4. Id. §§ 97-29, -30; see id. § 97-2(9) (1979) (definition of "disability" under the Act).
5. Watts v. Brewer, 243 N.C. 422, 424, 90 S.E.2d 764, 767 (1956); Anderson v. Northwestern
Motors, 233 N.C. 372, 374, 64 S.E.2d 265, 266 (1951); Loflin v. Loflin, 13 N.C. App. 574, 577, 186
S.E.2d 660, 662, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 154, 187 S.E.2d 585 (1972).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1979) provides:
In cases included by the following schedule the compensation in each case shall be paid
for disability during the healing period and in addition the disability shall be deemed to
continue for the period specified, and shall be in lieu of all other compensation, includ-
ing disfigurement, to wit:
(1) For the loss of a thumb, sixty-six and two-thirds percent (663%) of the average
weekly wages during 75 weeks.
(2) For the loss of a first finger, commonly called the index finger, sixty-six and two
thirds percent (662A%) of the average weekly wages during 45 weeks.
(3) For the loss of a second finger, sixty-six and two-thirds percent (6635%) of the
average weekly wages during 40 weeks.
(24) In case of the loss of or permanent injury to any important external or internal
organ or part of the body for which no compensation is payable under any other subdivi-
sion of this section, the Industrial Commission may award proper and equitable compen-
sation not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1979).
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compensation. ' 7 The critical language of section 97-31 provides: "In cases
included by the following schedule the compensation in each case shall be
paid for disability during the healing period and in addition the disability
shall be deemed to continue for the period specified, and shall be in lieu of all
other compensation, including disfigurement. . .. "8
The North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted section 97-3 I's "in
lieu of' proviso as entitling an injured employee to compensation exclusively
under the schedule, if all his injuries are included in it.9 The court of appeals
adhered to this view1 o until 1983 when it rejected the exclusive compensation
theory in West v. Bladenboro Cotton Mills, Inc. 1 and Cook v. Bladenboro Cot-
ton Mills, Inc. 12 Instead of viewing section 97-31 as an exclusive source of
compensation for a worker with a scheduled injury, West and Cook inter-
preted section 97-31 as an alternative basis of compensation for a worker who
also qualified under another compensatory section of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act.13 This rationale allows a worker to elect the most favorable statutory
remedy; if he chooses to receive compensation under section 97-31, however,
he cannot recover additional compensation under another section of the Act,14
because compensation under section 97-31 is "in lieu of all other
compensation."
The Cook and West interpretations of section 97-31 are more equitable
and more consistent with the underlying policy of the workers' compensation
law than the supreme court's construction. Although these cases depart from
precedent set by a higher court, they should not be overruled. Instead, the
supreme court should reevaluate its interpretation of section 97-31 and, at the
earliest opportunity, approve the court of appeals' approach.
Cook and West are strikingly similar. In both cases, claimants were em-
ployed for most of their adult lives at the Bladenboro Cotton Mills where they
were exposed to high levels of cotton dust. When Bladenboro was purchased
by Highland Mills in 1979, neither claimant obtained employment because
pulmonary testing revealed that their lungs were impaired.' 5 Both plaintiffs
had little hope of securing other employment. Cook had "to take her time in
climbing stairs and [could] become over exerted while sweeping."' 16 She un-
successfully sought work at the local employment agency and was turned
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Perry v. Hibriten Furniture Co., 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E.2d 397 (1978).
10. See Baldwin v. North Carolina Memorial Hosp., 32 N.C. App. 779, 233 S.E.2d 600
(1977); Loftin v. Loflin, 13 N.C. App. 574, 186 S.E.2d 660, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 154, 187 S.E.2d
585 (1972); Dudley v. Downtowner Motor Inn, 13 N.C. App. 474, 186 S.E.2d 188 (1972).
11. 62 N.C. App. 267, 302 S.E.2d 645 (1983).
12. 61 N.C. App. 562, 300 S.E.2d 852 (1983).
13. West, 62 N.C. App. at 270-71, 302 S.E.2d at 648; Cook, 61 N.C. App. at 565-66, 300
S.E.2d at 854-55.
14. West, 62 N.C. App. at 271, 302 S.E.2d at 648. See also supra text accompanying note 8.
15. West, 62 N.C. App. at 268, 302 S.E.2d at 646; Cook, 61 N.C. App. at 563-65, 300 S.E.2d
at 853-54.
16. Cook, 61 N.C. App. at 563, 300 S.E.2d at 853.
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down for ajob at a retail store. 17 Similarly, West had "a fifth grade education
and no significant training outside the cotton textile industry."' 8 Both claim-
ants sought lifetime compensation under section 97-29 for total and permanent
disability. The Industrial Commission, however, made a lump sum award to
both claimants. The Commission awarded Cook 3000 dollars under section
97-31(24), which provides compensation not to exceed 10,000 dollars for per-
manent injury to any important internal organ for which no scheduled com-
pensation is otherwise payable. 19 West received a 6000 dollar lump sum
award. Although the Commission did not specify the statutory basis for the
judgment, the court of appeals assumed that the award was pursuant to the
same section.20
The court of appeals remanded both cases to the Industrial Commission
with instructions to reconsider claimants' arguments that they were disabled 21
within the meaning of section 97-29.22 The court interpreted section 97-29 as
an alternative basis for compensation for workers who suffered an injury also
compensable under section 97-31. The West court, citing the North Carolina
Supreme Court decision in Perry v. Hibriten Furniture Co. ,23 concluded that
the "in lieu of other compensation" clause of section 97-31 would permit a
recovery under either section 97-31 or section 97-29, but not both.24
Although the West decision cited the supreme court as authority, the
Perry court actually adopted a broader view of the "in lieu of' clause than
that attributed to it. In Perry, decided unanimously in 1978, the supreme court
had held that the "in lieu of' clause did not merely prohibit double recovery
under section 97-31 and another section, but that it compelled recovery under
only section 97-31.25 The claimant in Perry had suffered a work-related injury
while employed by the Hibriten Furniture Company. Medical experts agreed
that he lost between twenty-five and seventy-five percent of the use of his back.
17. Id. at 565, 300 S.E.2d at 854.
18. West, 62 N.C. App. at 268, 302 S.E.2d at 646.
19. Cook, 61 N.C. App. at 563-65, 300 S.E.2d at 853-55.
20. West, 62 N.C. App. at 269-70, 302 S.E.2d at 645-66.
21. "Disability" is a term of art. It does not refer to physical injury as such, but rather to loss
of earning ability. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (1979). Total disability is a prerequisite to compen-
sation under section 97-29. Id. § 97-29 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
22. The court's language in West illustrates the policy considerations that caused it to depart
from the supreme court's decision in Perry v. Hibriten Furniture Co., 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E.2d 397
(1978). In West the court stated:
Upon remand, if the Commission finds plaintiff has a disability because of the occupa-
tional disease, then the statutory basis for compensation should be specified. An award
for damage to the lungs may be made under G.S. 97-31(24) .... But such an award, by
the express terms of the statute, would be in lieu of all other compensation. Perry Y.
[Hibriten] Furniture Co., 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E.2d 397 (1978). Such an award may also be
based on G.S. 97-29. . . . In many instances, an award under G.S. 97-29 better fulfills
the policy of the Workers' Compensation Act than an award under G.S. 97-31 because it
is a more favorable remedy and is more directly related to compensating inability to
work.
West, 62 N.C. App. at 270-71, 302 S.E.2d at 648.
23. 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E.2d 397 (1978).
24. West, 62 N.C. App. at 271, 302 S.E.2d at 648.
25. Perry, 296 N.C. at 93-94, 249 S.E.2d at 401.
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Their testimony indicated that Perry was "probably unable to carry out gain-
ful employment" and "probably disabled from any useful occupation.
26
Perry testified that he continued to suffer pain in his back and legs and could
no longer lift or bend without hurting.27 The Industrial Commission con-
cluded that Perry sustained a fifty percent loss of the use of his back and
awarded him 150 weeks' compensation under section 97-31(23). Perry alleged
that he was totally disabled and should have been awarded compensation
under section 97-29.28 The supreme court quoted section 97-31, emphasizing
the phrase "in lieu of all other compensation."2 9 It then held that section 97-
31 was claimant's exclusive remedy:
The language of G.S. 97-31 .. .compels the conclusion that if by
reason of a compensable injury an employee is unable to work and
earn any wages he is totally disabled, G.S. 97-2(9), and entitled to
compensation for permanent total disability under G.S. 97-29 unless
all his injuries are included in the schedule set out in G.S. 97-31. In that
event the injured employee is entitled to compensation exclusively
under G.S. 97-31 regardless of his ability or inability to earn wages in
the same or any other employment.30
The court of appeals' decisions in Cook and West circumvented the Perry
holding. If the court of appeals had followed the Perry rule, it would not have
allowed West and Cook the opportunity to recover compensation under sec-
tion 97-29, the disability section of the Workers' Compensation Act, because
under Perry, an "injured employee is entitled to compensation exclusively
under section 97-31 regardless of his ability or inability" to work.3 1
Because more than one reasonable interpretation of the "in lieu of' clause
exists, the legislature's intent in ratifying this clause is important. Unfortu-
nately, the clause's legislative history is inconclusive. The circumstances sur-
rounding the adoption of the clause may be viewed as supporting either the
Perry or the Cook-West rule.
The legislature apparently adopted the "in lieu of' clause in response to
the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in the case of Stanley v. Hyman-
Michaels Co. 32 In Stanley the supreme court considered an earlier version of
section 97-31 that did not contain the "in lieu of' clause.33 Plaintiff had suf-
fered two scheduled injuries, the loss of his left leg and the loss of the use of
fifty percent of his right foot, in an industrial accident. The Industrial Com-
mission noted that section 97-31 explicitly provided that the loss of both arms
or hands, or vision in both eyes "'shall be deemed permanent total disabil-
26. Id. at 90-91, 249 S.E.2d at 399-400.
27. Id. at 92, 249 S.E.2d at 400.
28. Id. at 89, 249 S.E.2d at 398-99.
29. Id. at 93, 249 S.E.2d at 401.
30. Id. at 93-94, 249 S.E.2d at 401 (emphasis in original).
31. Id.
32. 222 N.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 570 (1942).
33. North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, § 31, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117,
130 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-1 to -122 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983)).
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ity,' ,,34 and shall be compensated under section 97-29, but did not state that
the loss of a leg and the partial loss of the other foot would constitute such
disability.35 Thus, the Commission concluded that claimant's exclusive rem-
edy was the scheduled payments provided by section 97-31.36 The supreme
court reversed the Commission, recognizing that although the combinations of
injuries specified in section 97-31 were conclusively presumed to cause total
and permanent disability, other injuries also were capable of causing such dis-
ability.3 7 The court held that the Commission had "power to find that other
injuries or combination of injuries occurring in the same accident may result
in permanent total disability and when the Commission so finds, the injured
employee should be compensated as provided in [the predecessor to section
97-29]. "38 Thus, Stanley allowed claimant to prove permanent and total disa-
bility and receive compensation under section 97-29 even though his injuries
would have been compensable under section 97-31. When the legislature con-
vened the following spring, however, it amended section 97-31 to include the
"in lieu of" clause.39
Although the holding discussed above may have elicited this prompt leg-
islative response, a closer reading of Stanley suggests that the legislature
amended section 97-31 because of the court's disposition of a different issue in
that case. When Stanley was decided, section 97-31 included a provision au-
thorizing the Commission "to make and award a reasonable compensation for
any serious bodily disfigurement received by any employee within the mean-
ing of this Act, not to exceed twenty-five hundred ($2,500) dollars."'40 The
Commission had stated that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was not entitled to
recover scheduled compensation for loss of particular bodily parts and then
recover additional compensation under the disfigurement section, when the
disfigurement resulted from the same loss of bodily parts for which compensa-
tion already had been awarded. 41 On appeal defendants urged the supreme
court to affirm the Commission's decision. The supreme court reviewed the
legislative history of section 97-31, and noted that the "in lieu of" clause had
appeared in the original workers' compensation bill. The clause was deleted,
however, before the General Assembly adopted the Act.42 Relying on the fact
that the legislature had deleted the "in lieu of" clause during its debate, the
court stated: "We think the statute does authorize the Commission to award
compensation for serious disfigurement resulting from the loss or partial loss
34. Stanley, 222 N.C. at 260, 22 S.E.2d at 572 (quoting the North Carolina Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, ch. 120, § 31(t), 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117, 131) (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-1 to -122 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 260, 22 S.E.2d at 572.
37. Id. at 260-61, 22 S.E.2d at 572-73.
38. Id. at 260, 22 S.E.2d at 572-73.
39. Act of March 5, 1943, ch. 502, § 2, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 556, 556 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1979)).
40. North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, § 31(t), 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws
117, 131 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-1 to -122 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983)).
41. Stanley, 222 N.C. at 262, 22 S.E.2d at 573.
42. Id. at 263, 22 S.E.2d at 574.
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of a member for which compensation is provided in the schedules. '43 Thus,
Stanley authorized two awards under section 97-31 for one injury---one award
for the injury itself, and another award for disfigurement arising out of the
injury.
It is entirely possible that the General Assembly added the "in lieu of'
clause to section 97-31 to make clear its intention not to allow double compen-
sation within section 97-31. Significantly, the amended version of section 97-
31 provides: "In cases included by the following schedule, the compensation
in each case.. . shall be in lieu of all other compensation including disfigure-
ment. . . ." By appending the "in lieu of' clause to section 97-3 1, the Gen-
eral Assembly may not have intended to change the portion of Stanley
permitting disabled claimants to recover under section 97-29 rather than under
section 97-31. The circumstances surrounding this amendment, therefore, do
not compel the interpretation of section 97-31 expressed in Perry and, in fact,
support the interpretation that views the "in lieu of' clause as a measure to
prevent double recovery. Because neither the language of section 97-31 nor its
legislative history compel the Perry interpretation, the supreme court should
consider the merits of the Cook and West interpretations of the section.
Three strong policy factors support the interpretation of section 97-31 of-
fered by Cook and West. Those factors are: (1) the earning impairment prin-
ciple of workers' compensation law, (2) the goal of achieving equitable results
in individual cases, and (3) the necessity of construing section 97-31 in a man-
ner that will not vitiate section 97-29. The earning impairment principle rec-
ognizes that workers' compensation disability benefits are predicated on the
extent of earning impairment that a worker sustains as a result of injury,
rather than the degree of physical impairment.4 5 This principle represents a
compromise between the employer's and employee's interests. The employee
surrenders his right to common-law damages in return for guaranteed, fixed
compensation. The employer foregoes his right to deny liability altogether, in
return for liability limited to the employee's loss of earning capacity.46 Thus,
43. Id. at 264, 22 S.E.2d at 575.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1979) (emphasis added).
45. See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.11 (1983). There are
essentially two views concerning the type of disability tharworkers' compensation should redress.
Benefits should compensate for economic loss-lost wages or the impairment of the ability to earn
wages--or compensate for physical loss or the functional impairment of muscles, tendons, and
bones with their attendant psychological effects. Most workers' compensation statutes reflect the
earning impairment viewpoint. For example, in North Carolina's Act, "It]he term 'disability'
means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the
time of injury in the same or any other employment." N.C. GEN STAT. § 97-2(9) (1979). Cf. Hall
v. Thomason Chevrolet, Inc., 263 N.C. 569, 574-75, 139 S.E.2d 857, 861 (1965) ("Under the Work-
men's Compensation Act disability refers not to physidal infirmity but to a diminished capacity to
earn money."). For a thorough discussion of these viewpoints and the influence of the earning
impairment principle in compensation law, see 2 A. LARSON, supra, § 57-14(a)-(j).
46. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 203-04 (1917). Cf. Conrad v. Cook-Lewis
Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 725-26, 153 S.E. 266, 268 (1930) (quoting Stertz v. Industrial Ins.
Comm'n of Wash., 91 Wash. 588, 590, 158 P. 256, 258 (1916)):
[T]he act under consideration contains elements of a mutual concession between the
employer and the employee .... "Both had suffered under the old system; the employ-
ers by heavy judgements,. . . the workmen through the old defenses or exhaustion in
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the earning impairment principle eliminates the practical problems of a sub-
jective measurement of evaluating disability.47 By requiring the Industrial
Commission to reevaluate claimants' section 97-29 claims in Cook and West,
the court of appeals attempted to tie the awarding of compensation to the ac-
tual earning disability incurred. As the court observed in West, "[iln many
instances, an award under G.S. 97-29 better fulfills the policy of the Workers'
Compensation Act than an award under G.S. 97-31 because it is a more
favorable remedy and is more directly related to compensating inability to
work."'48 Cook and West, therefore, adhere to the earning impairment princi-
ple of compensation.
The equitable results achieved in Cook and West attest to the validity of
the earning impairment principle and provide further support for the court of
appeals' interpretation of section 97-31. Although Cook and West suffered
only a partial loss of respiratory function as a result of their injuries, 49 they
were unemployable in the industry in which they had labored for most of their
adult lives. With several years remaining before they reached retirement age,
their 3000 dollar50 and 6000 dollar5' awards would not have sustained them.
Thus, there was a substantial likelihood that they would become wards of the
State. The court of appeals' decision to afford Cook and West an opportunity
to prove total and permanent disability was in their best interests and the best
interests of society.
The final factor favoring the court of appeals' interpretation of the "in
lieu of" clause is that the decisions in Cook and West were necessary to ensure
the continued vitality of section 97-29. The subsection of 97-31 under which
the Commission awarded Cook and West compensation, section 97-31(24),
provides compensation for an indefinite range of injuries including permanent
injury "to any important external or internal organ or part of the body" for
which no scheduled compensation is otherwise payable.5 2 Since every disa-
wasteful litigation. Both wanted peace. The master, in exchange for limited liability,
was willing to pay on some claims in [the] future, where in the past there had been no
liability at all. The servant was willing not only to give up trial by jury, but to accept far
less than he had often won in court; provided he was sure to get the small sum without
having to fight for it."
47. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 45, § 57-14(h). How does one meaningfully compare the
loss of a hand with the loss of a foot and assign a value to each without taking into account the
extent of a worker's earning impairment? The medical impairment approach, see supra note 45,
has influenced the award of scheduled compensation for loss of members. For example, sched-
uled benefits must be paid even if a worker suffers no decrease in earning ability as a result of
injury. See supra text accompanying note 5. Despite the influence of the medical impairment
approach, however, the amount of scheduled compensation payable for the loss of a hand or foot
is determined on the basis of former income. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(12), (14) (1979).
48. West, 62 N.C. App. at 271,302 S.E.2d at 648. In contrast to West, the Perry approach did
not attempt to relate compensation to a worker's actual earning impairment. Under Per y if a
worker suffered a scheduled injury, he received the limited compensation available there "regard-
less of his ability or inability to earn wages." Perry, 296 N.C. at 94, 249 S.E.2d at 401.
49. West, 62 N.C. App. at 268, 302 S.E.2d at 646; Cook, 61 N.C. App. at 563, 300 S.E.2d at
853.
50. Cook, 61 N.C. App. at 564, 300 S.E.2d at 854.
51. West, 62 N.C. App. at 268, 302 S.E.2d at 646.
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(24) (1979).
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bling injury arguably affects some important "part" of the body, requiring dis-
abled claimants to recover only under section 97-31 would eliminate the
possibility that any claimant ever would be able to recover under section 97-
29. All permanently injured claimants would receive only the limited com-
pensation available under section 97-31's schedule. A claimant, however,
should not be foreclosed from the opportunity to prove permanent and total
disability, and to obtain an award under section 97-29, just because his injury
may be described as an injury to an "important organ or part of the body."
In the West and Cook cases the court of appeals fashioned an interpreta-
tion of section 97-31 that departed from the Perry rule established by the
North Carolina Supreme Court. The court of appeals' approach, however,
serves the policies underlying the Workers' Compensation Act better than the
Perry approach. The West and Cook decisions are consistent with the earning
impairment principle of compensation. They set a precedent that will produce
equitable results in cases of workers who suffer injuries compensable under the
schedule, but who nevertheless are unable to resume working as a result of
their injuries. Furthermore, the construction of section 97-31 proffered by
Cook and West was necessary to prevent emasculation of section 97-29 of the
Act. Given these considerations, the supreme court should reevaluate Perry
and adopt the West-Cook construction of section 97-31.
JOHN DAVID MAYBERRY
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